Russia Profile
www.russiaprofile.org
April 27, 2007
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Has Putin Made His Choice?
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Ethan S. Burger, Nikolas Gvosdev, Vlad Ivanenko, Andrei Tsygankov
Last week, the Moscow rumor mill started spinning with a new force. On Friday, an editorial in Nezavisimaya Gazeta citing high-ranking sources in the Kremlin asserting that President Vladimir Putin had finally made up his mind about whom he wanted to succeed him as Russia’s third president and that his choice is First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta cited as proof Ivanov’s interview to the Financial Times last week in which he spoke in a clearly presidential manner, addressing a broad range of issues and staking political positions that revealed the policies his might pursue as a future president of Russia. The paper claims that only a likely successor would be authorized by Putin to speak on crucial foreign policy issues and asserts that Putin wants to see Ivanov as president and rival Dmitry Medvedev as prime minister.
It is true that Ivanov has become a key spokesman on Russia’s foreign policy, staking tough positions in defense of Russia’s interests, but also making clear that Russia was not interested in the least in a confrontation with the West. In the recent interview with the Financial Times, he also spoke to the concerns of Western investors. While staking out a relatively liberal position on the economy, he made it clear that the Russian government will not cede control of Russia’s natural resources, particularly oil and gas. This is at least on par with what Medvedev said at Davos in February.
Ivanov has also recently become much more visible on state television channels and his public opinion ratings have been going up. A recent VTsIOM poll has Ivanov catching up with Medvedev ¬ 13 percent to 18 percent, while a Levada poll even puts Ivanov slightly ahead of Medvedev ¬ with 31 percent to his rival’s 29.
Is Ivanov The One? Or is this just an information campaign to compromise Ivanov and derail his candidacy? After all, Putin likes surprises and there is no better way to kill the nomination than to make the nominee’s name public. Is the Kremlin trying to make the succession race much more competitive? What do Ivanov’s statements tell about what his policies would be should he become president? Is he a candidate the West can do business with? How would the Western investors view Ivanov’s ascension to the Kremlin and his role in economic policy?
Vlad Ivanenko, Economic and Trade Policy Consultant, Ottawa:
A recent economic conference, held at the Higher School of Economics on April 3-5, is, apparently, the closest Russian analog of annual American Economic Association meetings. However, unlike U.S. academic gatherings that attract mid-rank state officials at best, the list of participants at the Moscow meeting included such dignitaries as Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin and Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref. The attention that top bureaucrats pay to what social scholars say is not limited to this conference. For example, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev attended a similar meeting on the role that human capital plays in Russian development on March 13.
Why state officials express keen interest in seemingly academic debates would be puzzling if not for one observation: the country is preparing for the next electoral cycle and the Kremlin knows that it cannot assure what course Russia assumes after President Putin steps down in 2008.
Moscow understands that the change of leadership in 2007-8 is a qualitatively different exercise than what Russia experienced in 1999-2000. Then, the country was reeling from the mess created in 1990s. People longed for stability. They were relieved to see a leader who was sober, energetic, and spoke right words about peace and order. That was enough to lead them to the polls.
This time the Kremlin needs to do quite a bit more to ensure success. Putin realizes that he cannot control his chosen candidate after he or she is elected. Thus, any promise that such candidate gives him today should be insured against the possibility of reneging. First, such insurance comes in the form of limits imposed on the next president administratively. This consideration explains why, for example, the budgetary horizon has been recently extended to three years instead of one year. Second, Putin requires his successor to comply with voters’ dominant preferences.
The last point explains why Dmitry Medvedev, the formerly acknowledged frontrunner for the position, and his economic associates in the government are so interested in new ideas. They shop for programs that the presidential hopeful can use to appeal to the median voter. This voter, in spite of publicly professed political apathy, is smarter today than in 2000 and will not be swayed by the right words alone. The modern Russian voter wants to see a practical program.
Sergei Ivanov is still learning to work within this format. Will he succeed in the time left?
Andrey Tsygankov, Associate Professor, International Relations, San Francisco State University, San Francisco:
Ivanov may indeed be The One, although must of Russia’s political development is still in the dark. We don’t have a strong public message from Putin, and it is not clear that we will have one before the elections. Most importantly, we have no idea of how meaningful Ivanov’s succession might be given the absence of clarity on Putin’s own role in the system. All we know at this point is that he is certain to have a powerful role. This is comforting given that Ivanov does not seem close to filling in the big shoes of the current president.
At least for now, Ivanov, in comparison with Putin, is more Soviet, less confident and more likely to be led by defiance, rather than pragmatism, in relations with the West. His appearances on the BBC’s “Hard Talk” program and in other known media reveal a man who may be decent and patriotic, yet lacking a vision and imagination ¬ qualities without which it is hard to picture a successful president of a country like contemporary Russia. For instance, in one of his articles, he boldly proclaimed: “Russia has now completely recovered the status of a great power that bears global responsibility for the situation on the planet and the future of human civilization.” Yet the nation‘s demographic situation, poverty, corruption and dependence on energy exports should be sufficient to appreciate its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In his recent interview with the Financial Times, Ivanov mentioned that there “are many problems in Russia” and “there is a huge gap in incomes between the rich and the poor.” In general, however, he has not been comfortable with admitting Russia’s problems and suggesting solutions. Excessively laudatory and somewhat dogmatic assessments of a great power revival, accompanied by a deep ambivalence about the Soviet breakup and a negative attitude toward cooperating with the United States in the wake of Sept. 11 all suggest that, when presented with the enormous power of making critical decisions, Ivanov may be tempted to oversimplify, rather than look for creative solutions to Russia’s still very complex problems.
Of course, Ivanov deserves the benefit of the doubt, and he may grow on the job. If he is The One, he possesses some qualities that will provide continuity with the current policy course. Apart from close friendship, Ivanov and Putin share a background in the security services and similar attitudes on a number of domestic and international issues. It is also important that neither one is very close to the so-called siloviki faction led by Igor Sechin. While at this point in Russia’s history it is important for its president to have at least some security background, it is no less important to have freedom of mind and strength of character to act on behalf of larger social strata, as Putin has done.
Ethan S. Burger, Scholar in Residence, School of International Service, American University & Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.:
Assuming that Putin does not go back on his word and seeks some way to retain the Russian presidency, which I regard as highly unlikely, he should have the principal role in determining his successor. Given Putin's popularity ratings, which are unlikely to change given the state's control of most television channels, this should be no surprise, and in fact if he indeed voluntarily gives up the presidency, it will set a good precedent for the future.
As the recent Financial Times analysis of the situation indicates, Sergei Ivanov appears to have the inside track to be Putin's successor. With Russia pursuing a more assertive foreign policy there is little evidence to suggest that Dmitry Medvedev will successfully challenge this situation if he is made prime minister, or that Igor Sechin can rally his support by re-positioning himself from someone affiliated with big energy to someone who is more popularist. Dmitry Kozak, my personal favorite, seems not to want to enter a race he cannot win.
Nonetheless, it is hard to understand why the Putin government allowed or orchestrated the squelching of the demonstrations in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod by supporters of Garry Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and others. His "apology" seemed to be largely for Western consumption. If the existing elite's control on power is as strong as it seems, it is hard to understand the overreaction ¬ which can only be viewed as counter-productive.
Nonetheless, so long as the emergence of a Russian middle class occurs, tolerance of corruption is reduced and some modus vivendi is achieved with civil society, barring a major setback, Putin will choose his successor.
It is unfortunate that he lacks the stature and self-confidence of a Charles DeGaulle. It is a shame that Putin has not taken a more conciliatory approach towards Chechen national aspirations or that he has not fully appreciated the benefits of working more closely with the EU and United States on Iran, Belarus and other international issues.
Despite ruling with a heavy hand, he will be viewed by the majority of the Russian population as leaving office with a positive legacy, despite his inability to resolve some of Russia's most pressing problems (demographic, economic stratification, and a failure to invest in the public health care system to a sufficient degree).
Nikolas Gvosdev, Editor, The National Interest, Washington, DC (http://www.nationalinterest.org):
A "cohabitation" between Dmitry Medvedev as prime minister, handling domestic affairs and economic policy, and Sergei Ivanov as president, in charge of Russia’s foreign and defense policies ¬ and also providing a balance among Kremlin factions ¬ is certainly a logical scenario for solving the succession question. Whether it would work ¬ since Ukraine´s attempt at cohabitation between the "two Viktors" has now failed ¬ is another question.
But in one respect ¬ and I would limit my response to this particular question ¬ who the next president of Russia turns out to be will not have much impact on Russia´s key foreign relationships. Whether Hillary Clinton, John McCain or another U.S. presidential hopeful will end up being introduced to a president Medvedev, Ivanov, Yakunin or Sobyanin won’t have much impact on reversing recent negative developments in the relationship between Moscow and Washington. In the absence of a color revolution in Russia itself, official Washington and some of the states of Eastern Europe will consider the next leader of Russia to be no more than the continuation and clone of the current undesirable incumbent. At the same time, the Western Europeans, led by Germany, will continue to invest in Russia and to work for more symbiotic economic relations no matter who sits in the main Kremlin office ¬ although they might be somewhat more reassured to see Medvedev as one of the top leaders. And Italians, Germans, Indians and Chinese, used to having the state play a leading role in a country’s economic life, will adjust to the limitations on foreign investment. And the Anglo-Americans will continue to complain.
I thought that one purpose of Putin´s speech at Munich was designed to "lock in" Russia´s overall foreign policy direction for his successor, just as current economic arrangements are being forged with an eye to enduring beyond the 2008 elections. Who the next president is is less important than the fact that it will continue to be "Putin apres Putin."
Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA: (Dr. Blank’s views as expressed to Russia Profile do not represent those of the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense)
If Putin were to decide upon a successor now, he would effectively be sealing that person's fate because everyone would coalesce against him or seek to ensure their power in his reign thereby lessening his authority. Second, Putin would be effectively ceding much of his power and authority to the candidate, so it is very unlikely he will give any indication privately or publicly that he is doing so. Similar bomblets appeared after Medvedev's Davos speech and all this hoopla about Ivanov being The One suggests nothing so much as the eternal gullibility of the media mind and its focus on the short-term, rather than substance. More likely, Putin is playing a more sophisticated game of divide and conquer than his Russian media observers are able or willing to see. There is no doubt that either Ivanov or Medvedev are people with whom the West can negotiate, but what is there to negotiate? Ivanov and Medvedev have given no sign of their willingness to accommodate Western interests beyond a very narrow framework. So while discussions may be "civilized" ¬ nonviolent and not conducted as shouting matches ¬ it is unlikely they will be much more productive than is now the case. While Medvedev is more attuned to the economic agenda and Ivanov to a more classic security agenda, I doubt that Western business will fare well under either man because of the logic of the system, which is stronger than any one of them ¬ they will either have to move further than Putin to be an autocrat or preside over an even more dispersed network of oligarchical bureaucratic power.
Ivanov would be likely to continue, and maybe extend, the ongoing military buildup and would probably be more inclined to conduct noisy and unfounded campaigns like the current one on missile defense against the West, but it is impossible to believe that Medvedev is more pro-Western than he is, merely that their personalities, interests and institutional perspectives are different. These facts are by no means trifles but it does not follow that Medvedev is likely to adopt a more pro-Western agenda. Much more likely is the idea that the Kremlin wants to make the race look more competitive than it actually is but it appears that Russian media have fallen into the very human and Western trap of considering this a horse race rather than a political contest in which the key attribute is Putin's perception of who can better govern Russia and ensure his continuation in a place of influence if not power.