Date: Sat, 21 Apr 2007
From: Mikhail Kazachkov <mkazach@inok.com>
Subject: Putin's Successor
Just like in the U.S., Russia’s presidential campaign started unprecedentedly early. Contenders are barely emerging, yet pundits are already testing our patience with a tidal wave of speculation. One scenario, however, is conspicuously missing from their menu at least as of mid-April 2007.
The polls persuasively indicate the Russian electorate would love for Putin to stay in office and will vote for whomever Putin supports, even if the candidate is a complete unknown. Hence, the pundits keep replaying the following four scenarios:
1. Putin changes the constitution and stays for a third term;
2. Putin endorses Dmitry Medvedev, first deputy prime minister, associated with the so-called liberal grouping in the Kremlin elite;
3. Putin anoints Sergei Ivanov, the other first deputy prime minister, associated with the so-called “siloviki”;
4. Putin at the last moment pulls a “joker” out of the deck a dark horse candidate repeating president Yeltsyn’s move, which gave Putin his presidency.
Here is my prediction.
There will be a free and fair election as far as the two candidates, Ivanov and Medvedev, are concerned. I wouldn’t even exclude Putin stepping in to provide corrective support to whoever is slipping in the polls.
Here is why I am going out on a limb, predicting 11 months before the election.
Technically, no representative democracy is ruled directly by the will of the people. Just look at the White House’s Iraqi stance vis-a-vis public opinion polls. The less mature a democracy, the more decisions are made by the relatively narrow circle representing the political and business elite.
Russia is no different from any other young democracy. It is ruled by consensus of its governing and business elite, who value stability above most other factors. Which does not mean there are no conflicts between various elite factions. Only presidential power can keep their conflicts under control.
Putin’s power and popularity come from profoundly different sources. His approval ratings are at 80 percent. Not surprising, given the years of steady improvement in the national economy. Last year alone the standard of living grew 12 percent (adjusted for inflation). But presidential power in an elite-governed young democracy does not flow from approval ratings alone. Putin is in control due to his proven ability to keep opposing elite groups balanced against each other as he steers the consensus course.
The moment President Putin sides with one of the groups, he will loose a very significant share of his power. In fact, he would become hostage to that very group. Everything in Mr. Putin’s past indicates he knows better. So, we can expect Mr. Putin to apply the same balancing approach to his “Operation Successor.”
By creating a level playing field and ensuring both candidates honestly compete for the majority vote, Mr. Putin wins a lot while losing nothing.
He hand picked both candidates. Both enjoy his trust. To continue his policies any successor will need all the legitimacy he can get. What better way to secure legitimacy than in a free and fair election? Ah... fair and free but only for the two vetted candidates. Not for anyone else.
In a post Soviet nation where private property still has no true legitimacy, succession of power can trigger assets redistribution. Few things can be more destabilizing than a fight among elites for the control of major assets. It would be ridiculous for a stability-obsessed Putin to allow such an eventuality.
By leaving the choice of his successor to the free vote of the electorate he is: (1) extricating himself from the need to choose; (2) laying the blame at the door of the losing group; and (3) confirming his established position as a fair consensus builder.
The Olympic “let the games begin” implies “let the victory go to the best.” The USSR did not allow for much alternative opinion. Its present Kremlin heirs learned their bitter lesson. It is incorrect to ascribe to the “Putin regime” such an authoritarian staple as suppression of dissenting opinion. The Kremlin is quite tolerant of criticism in print and even radio media. This is not because of weakness, omission, or oversight. Russian rulers want to hear responsible alternative voices and are far from ignoring them. What they adamantly refuse to allow is the projection of dissenting ideas into the general public, e.g., the latest series of Gary Kasparov led demonstrations.
Andrey Illarionov’s career as Putin’s chief economic adviser is a perfect metaphor illustrating the limits of the Kremlin’s tolerance. Dr. Illarionov, one of Russia’s most gifted economists and a person of uncompromising integrity, kept his post after publicly calling his boss’s attack on Yukos “the swindle of the century.” Several other statements highly critical of Putin’s policies followed, but to everyone’s amazement, Dr. Illarionov’s employment continued, albeit with a scaled down scope of responsibilities. He continued his criticism in public and was eventually fired, ending up as one of the leaders of the recent brutally suppressed Moscow rally.
The Kremlin’s elite constituency relies on serious publications as a forum for developing a consensus about the nation’s direction. Television’s been reduced to entertainment for the masses, which the ruling elite is committed to keep out of real politics. There is nothing unusual about limiting democracy to elites. History brings to mind a number of remarkably successful aristocratic republics from Athens and republican Rome, to the Russian medieval city-republic of Novgorod, to the nineteenth century U.S. with its voting restrictions for women, blacks, and those without adequate property. In the twenty-first century such a system is an obvious anachronism.
So the Kremlin mimics a modern democracy, while de facto limiting the masses’ choice to two pre-approved presidential candidates. Similarly, in political party building its goal is to limit the choice to two main predictable players. Not a real modern democracy? Surely not. But perhaps not all that bad for a young one, with a nascent middle class.
President Putin and the Russian elites he represents are neither overly emotional, nor stupid. They see rational reasons to behave the way they do. So they chose to build an aristocratic republic in the twenty-first century. Understanding their thinking is more productive than merely passing judgment.
And it can sure help with predictions.