Russia Profile
February 24, 2006
Russia Profile Weekly Experts' Panel: Are Russia and Georgia Headed for a Major Conflict Over South Ossetia?
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Yury Fedorov, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Andrei Lebedev, Andrei Seregin and Andrei Zagorsky.
Last week Russia and Georgia engaged in a heated war of words over South Ossetia and the role of Russia peacekeepers in the conflict area.
This diplomatic standoff is likely to continue over the coming week. Tensions between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian authorities have been rising steadily since January, and minor spats and non-violent clashes (over traffic violations by peacekeepers, for example) have become an almost daily occurrence. Last week, the Georgian Parliament voted 179 to 0 to demand the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force and its replacement by an OSCE or NATO-led international contingent (composed mostly of soldiers from Ukraine and the Baltic states). The South Ossetian leadership has decidedly rejected replacing the Russian peacekeepers with any other force.
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and senior members of his government have raised the level of vitriol directed against Russia to an unacceptable degree and have been doing just about everything in their power to provoke Moscow and the leadership in South Ossetia. So far, officials in Moscow and South Ossetia’s capital, Tshinvali, have been able to withstand the pressure, despite domestic calls in Russia to put pressure on Georgia by threatening its gas supplies, and even a suggestion to recall Russia's ambassador to Tbilisi.
Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that the eventual formula applied to Kosovo – either independence or some loose confederation with Serbia – should be applied to the frozen conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There is considerable concern in Moscow that Saakashvili might be itching for a conflict over South Ossetia, both to regain the territory and to shore up his faltering domestic position.
Gleb Pavlovsky, a senior advisor to the Kremlin and the host of the NTV network’s Real Politics show, suggested on Saturday that Washington might be tacitly encouraging Tbilisi to pick the fight with Russia at this particular moment to distract Moscow’s attention from Iran. He even went so far as to suggest that Saakashvili might actually even be receiving prompts from some leaders in the Democratic Party to make life even more miserable for both U.S. President George W. Bush and Putin.
Moscow, for unexplained reasons, has torpedoed the planned meeting of the Joint Controlling Commission in Vienna on Feb. 20 and 21.
What is going on here? Where is the conflict over South Ossetia headed? What are Saakashvili's motives? Does he really have the backing in the West to resolve the conflict by force? Does Georgia have the military capability to defeat South Ossetia's defense force, which would likely be reinforced from Russia? What would the resumption of hostilities mean for the region as whole? What will the economic cost-benefit be of settling the conflict either by ceding South Ossetia to Russia or restoring Georgia's control over the area?
What should be – as opposed to what currently is – the role of Russia and the role of the West in handling this conflict?
How does the issue play in Russia domestically? Who is likely to gain strength if hostilities in South Ossetia were to resume – nationalists (restoration of empire) or pragmatists (maintaining stability)? How has the Russian leadership been handling the brewing crisis so far (both in domestic perceptions and Western public opinion)?
Yury Fedorov
Principal Researcher, Chatham House, London
My understanding is that the Georgian leadership does not take the military option seriously. Georgia is not ready for war, especially for a protracted war without serious chances of a fast and effective victory. By fueling a conflict with Russia, Tbilisi would most likely want to distract public attention from the situation within the country, to mobilize its supporters and to neutralize the growing influence of opposition forces. It would also like to strengthen the country’s international position.
What I’m really concerned about is Russia’s stance. The impression being created is that the Russian parliament – and more troubling still, the Foreign Ministry – are proving their political and professional incompetence once again. It is not so difficult to foresee the future developments. Tbilisi is one step away from withdrawing from the agreement it signed in 1992. And, if it really does this, then the legal foundation for stationing Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia will be destroyed. Any references to the position of South Ossetia have no legal meaning at all. South Ossetia is not a party to the 1992 agreement. In 1992, the leaders of North and South Ossetia did not sign this agreement, although they had been consulted on the text and did not object.
Thus, right after a withdrawal from the 1992 Agreement, Georgia may – and most probably will – demand that Russia remove its peacekeepers from South Ossetia. Moscow will be obligated to do this; otherwise, it will immediately be accused of aggression against Georgia. Tbilisi will have the full right to petition the UN, the OSCE and other international institutions while Moscow will have no legal arguments to counter the Georgian accusations.
Accordingly, a major diplomatic scandal is looming on the very eve of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, the success of which is a matter of utmost importance for the Kremlin. The question is: Why did the Russian Foreign Ministry not see this coming?
Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Editor, The National Interest
Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies, The Nixon Center, Washington DC
The rise in tensions between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia has the potential to seriously disrupt the U.S.-Russia relationship at a time when cooperation between the two states is essential in defusing a number of trouble spots around the world.
My first concern is that there appears to be no trilateral mechanism in place to ensure that Moscow, Tbilisi and Washington have open, unimpeded and clear channels of communication to quickly defuse any crisis that may erupt. It certainly isn’t viewed as a major issue in the United States the Ossetian crisis has not been mentioned by the State Department in its press briefings, even though Russia and Georgia came to the brink of an armed conflict.
My second concern is that official Washington doesn’t seem to think that there are any fundamental issues to be solved here. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s comment in May 2005 speaks volumes: “I do believe that, as democracy develops here, there will be reason for people who now live in Abkhazia or live in South Ossetia to really want to be a part of this great Georgian democracy.”
Indeed, some here in Washington hold the view that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are nothing more than Russian-created, mafia-controlled statelets. If you don’t believe that the Abkhaz or Ossetians have any legitimate concerns, then you don’t take the separatists seriously, which I think is a mistake. This type of thinking is clearly on display in Senate Resolution 344, which Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Harry Reid (D-NV) introduced in December 2005, which expresses “support for the Government of Georgia's plan to control peacefully and re-establish authority in the region of South Ossetia.”
My third concern is over mixed or ambiguous messages. In May 2005, Rice said “the United States, in conjunction with the international community, will try and help Georgia to resolve these difficult conflicts.” What does that mean? Peaceful methods only? Turning a blind eye to the use of force? I think that Washington’s preference is for conflicts to remain quiet but the Georgian Defense Minister could take this statement to mean he has a green light for raising the ante.
So, we have a real situation where an incident could quickly lead to an escalation. The danger is that U.S. policymakers may believe that the Georgians could replicate the success of Croatia’s “Operation Storm” in 1996 and quickly retake Ossetia and Abkhazia – but I have not encountered anyone who is confident that Tbilisi could launch such a military operation in order to present both Washington and Moscow with a fait accompli.
Compounding the problem is that neither Washington nor Moscow has a consistent stance on the question of separatism versus the territorial integrity of states. It is significant that official Washington’s position is that any final settlement for Kosovo would be unique and would have no bearing on any other frozen conflict, especially in the Caucasus. Not only does Russia have a Chechnya precedent to be concerned about, Moscow, like Washington, is also uncomfortably poised between Armenia and Azerbaijan with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. All of this makes a “universal settlement” highly unlikely.
What this means, then, is that the initiative really lies with the Georgians – and the extent to which they interpret the signals they receive from Washington.
Andrei Lebedev
Former Political Editor, Izvestia, Moscow
Both sides seem to be escalating the tensions. Most of the moves seem not only unnecessary, but also absurd – such as demanding that Russian peacekeepers get Georgian visas, or transferring the Joint Control Commission session from Vienna to Moscow. Still, chances are good that no fire will break out in South Ossetia in the nearest future.
Tbilisi evidently hopes to win support from the West for its South Ossetian crusade. That was the main reason for Saakashvili to reiterate Georgian membership in NATO as a top priority. Provoking open conflict might seem unreasonable for Tbilisi, considering its dependence on Russian gas and electricity. But then again, Moscow might not dare cut the supply lines, fearing the inevitable criticism of its “inhumane conduct” by the international community.
But Georgia is of marginal significance to the West at the moment, although it is considered a reserve transit rout for transporting Central Asian oil and gas to consumers in the West. Of course, one more staging area for potential anti-Iran military action wouldn’t hurt either. Since Washington seems all but set to punish Tehran for its nuclear program, it is hard to believe the United States will permit Saakashvili at this particular moment to translate diplomatic tension over South Ossetia into an open military conflict.
Changing the guard in the peacekeeping operation is something else. Placing NATO peacekeepers along a strip of the Russian southern border would suit Western purposes just fine. But that seems too far-fetched a scenario at the moment, since it’s impossible to do that without Moscow’s agreement (which, needless to say, is not in the cards).
As far as the Russian political elites are concerned, there is no love lost between them and Saakashvili. Of course, some token protests in support of Georgia would be voiced in the event of an escalation, but not much else.
In this case, foreign policy considerations by far outweigh the importance to the Kremlin of consolidating internal support; that much has been stressed by Putin’s recent remark about the importance of the “Kosovo precedent” for solving the “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union. This means the Kremlin prefers waiting for a peaceful way to annex the territories in question if such an opportunity were to become feasible. Another war in the Caucasus could be disastrous for Moscow’s control over the Russian part of the region. In order not to provoke such a crisis, the Russian side has to bide its time, while pretending to take some meaningful steps. One such remedial action might be replacing South Ossetia’s president, Eduard Kokoiti, with a less odious figure. This would allow both sides to save face by pretending they are engaged in a new round of meaningful talks. Meanwhile, the Russian peacekeepers will stay on the ground.
Not to be disregarded is the personal factor. Rumor has it that the mutual antipathy, to put it mildly, between Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and his constantly changing Georgian counterparts (Giorgi Baramidze – Irakli Bezhuashvili – Irakli Okruashvili) might trigger some unprompted action, a fact that makes the whole situation highly unstable and unpredictable.
Andrei Seregin
Independent Foreign Policy Analyst, Moscow
The level of nationalist enthusiasm in Georgia’s political and military establishment is dangerously high. The standing ovation in the Georgian Parliament on Feb. 15 resembled nothing other than the adoption of the ill-fated 1990 act abolishing the statute that granted autonomy to South Ossetia. The civil war in the country started right after that vote. It’s very likely that Saakashvili will not be able to resist the lure of a “small victorious war” with South Ossetia. However, an all-out war with Tskhinvali will bring him much less than he may get by careful diplomacy if he stays the course.
Paradoxically, in the long run, Saakashvili’s gamble on applying political and military pressure on South Ossetia may not be as foolhardy as it seems today. The Georgian leader may not have a crystal-clear view of what lays immediately ahead in the conflict, but he has a general strategic vision: the entire Caucasus region is on the brink of turmoil, while Russia has seen its position in the region deteriorate.
For many foreign and domestic observers, Putin’s attempts to capitalize on separatist/independence movements in the states of the former Soviet Union is an ominous sign: Its purpose is to compensate for Moscow’s loss of ability to appeal to regional elites and grassroots voters (both in Russia itself, and in the neighboring countries in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence). Given the long-standing Russian tradition of total control by a strong central government, the continued instability and recent terrorist attacks in the south of Russia devalue the historically sacred character of the Kremlin’s power in the eyes of its subjects, and also raise doubts about the basic duty of any state: the ability to protect its people.
Moscow is in no position now to act in an adversarial manner towards Tbilisi. Despite its drive to become the world’s energy superpower, Putin’s government, in the eyes of many Western observers, has exceeded the “acceptable limits” of authoritarianism and “imperial foreign policy in the former Soviet Union.” With the success of Russia’s G8 presidency still uncertain, the Kremlin’s policy in the conflict between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali is being held almost hostage to Western approval or disapproval.
Saakashvili seems to be aware that an armed conflict over South Ossetia, with major hostilities between Georgian troops and South Ossetian paramilitary units, is not something Russia is prepared to stomach at the moment. Were this to happen, it seems likely that the Russian peacekeepers would withdraw to Russia with volunteers from the Russian region of North Ossetia taking their place. This is a real nightmare scenario for the Kremlin.
The West, and the United States in particular, is holding the reins of Saakashvili’s actions. Will it act to restrain him - and will he heed the advice?
Andrei Zagorski
Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)
The most recent escalation of the Georgian-Russian war of words is very much a d?j? vu scenario. This is not the first time that Tbilisi has expressed its dissatisfaction with Russia’s role in the conflict area in the South Caucasus, accusing Moscow of supporting the breakaway entities – nor is it the first time that Tbilisi has demanded the replacement of Russian peacekeepers by a multinational contingent under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE, the EU or NATO.
Many of the arguments made by Tbilisi make sense and, certainly, the angry replies from the Russian military, implying that South Ossetia is not under Georgian jurisdiction, aren’t doing anything to alleviate the tensions. However, those complaints are not exactly at the core of what Tbilisi really wants. In fact, it does not want the peacekeepers to be impartial. Instead, it wants them to be more supportive of the Georgian position in the conflict. This is exactly the point that Moscow stresses every time it accuses Tbilisi of irresponsible actions. And this claim is not entirely wrong. Thus, there is no black and white picture in this or previous disputes between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia.
As always at moments like this, the hawks on both sides are speaking the language of war, which is spread by the media, while moderates largely fail to get their message across to the public. This often results in completely divergent readings of the same events. In particular, Tbilisi is stressing that the most recent statement by the Georgian Parliament demanding the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers deliberately avoids presenting a fait accompli by setting no deadlines, and should, rather, be interpreted as an invitation to negotiate. Moscow, on the contrary, reads the call for withdrawal as an expression of the radicalism of the Georgian authorities and is reluctant to negotiate under such pressure.
This escalation of rhetoric between Russia and Georgia is paralleled by a surprising degree of rapprochement between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, although the parties are far from a breakthrough in resolving the conflict. So, over the past 18 months, there has been a remarkable narrowing of positions contained in the Georgian peace plan of 2004 and the response by Tskhinvali formulated a year later. Both sides agree on a gradual approach that foresees the demilitarization of the conflict area, confidence building and a turn to final status issues at a much later stage. There certainly continues to be a significant gap as well, since Tbilisi wants the process to be completed within a few years, while Tskhinvali has avoided setting any deadlines.
Both Tbilisi and Moscow know that they cannot afford a war. Georgia can’t afford a war it can hardly win and that would hurt its reputation, while Moscow can hardly benefit either from additional turmoil in the unsettled Caucasian region or from even involuntary military involvement in the hostilities.
Both Tbilisi and Moscow know that it is very difficult to find a reasonable replacement to the Russian peacekeepers that will gain approval from Tskhinvali. Nevertheless, Tbilisi obviously wants to motivate Moscow to put pressure on South Ossetia by claiming that, otherwise, the peace process could be further internationalized. Moscow is looking for exactly the opposite. It wants to maintain its central role in the settlement process and opposes any principal changes in the negotiation framework. The escalation usually produces slight movements back and forth involving secondary details in the negotiating positions.
Muddling through such crises in relations between Russia and Georgia has, meanwhile, become standard procedure. However, each crisis bears the risk that the routine scenario will somehow go wrong. This is not because either Tbilisi or Moscow wants this but, instead, other local actors might seek to benefit from an escalation of the conflict.