#41 - JRL 2006-232 - JRL Home
From: "Dietwald Claus" <dietwaldclaus@hotmail.com>
Subject: The Georgian Trap - How the West may have lost the Quiet War for Central Asia
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006

The current conflict between Georgia and Russia has a lot of appeal for the West: plucky little mountaineers standing up to the big bad Russian bear. Supporting Georgia appears to be the honorable thing to do ­ but it hardly serves Western interests. In fact, it may already be one of the most serious foreign policy set-backs for the Western alliance in years.

The current crisis in Georgia is not about Georgia at all ­ it is about who is going to win the Quiet War for control over Central Asia and the Caucasus. For more than a decade, the Western alliance has tried to counter traditional Russian regional hegemony, while Russia tried to maintain it. And until quite recently it appeared as if the West might have the upper hand. Whether it was the Baku-Tbilisi-Çeyhan oil pipeline, the setting up of GU(U)AM, or the stationing of US troops on former Soviet bases ­ what the West wanted, the West got.

The message to the region’s different dictatorships was simple: Russia is no longer as strong as it used to be. You now have an alternative and can ally yourself with the West, and there is nothing Russia can do about it. And for a while, this was how it seemed.

But then the West began to overplay its hand. The first dramatic set-back was in 2005, when the Uzbek leadership killed a still unknown number of protesters in Andijan. Inexplicably, the US chose to criticize Tashkent harshly for this ­ a diplomatic blunder Russia seized upon immediately. While the US had gained some moral high-ground, Russia had gained an ally (though a fickle one). Next came the change of heart among the victors of the so-called Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan ­ initially praised for turning their back on Russia they now have become rather hostile towards the West.

Most Western observers seemed to have missed that Russia has not brought about these set-backs, but has merely profited from Western diplomatic mismanagement. Neither Uzbekistan nor Kyrgyzstan enjoy being back in the Russian orbit ­ but unlike Washington, Moscow is willing to grant non-interference in domestic matters for a friendly foreign policy.

In this sense, the Washington Post’s lament about “Moscow Trumps West in Battle for Clout in Former Soviet States” (October 6, 2006) is misguided. Most governments in Central Asia so far have tried to play Russia and the Western alliance against each other. By not committing fully to either side, they were hoping to maximize their independence from both. Moscow hasn’t gained clout so far, it has merely proven itself the lesser of two evils.

The situation in Georgia, however, may have already allowed Moscow to make good on more than ten years of losing ground in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Fortunately for Russia, Georgia’s commitment to the West ­ or at least an anti-Russian course ­ is serious. While Western politicians may enjoy every time Saakashvili sticks it to the Kremlin, they seem not to realize that the Kremlin is doing everything to stoke the fire, probably hoping that Georgia will lose nerve and move against Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Since Moscow knows the West will not help Georgia in a war with Russia, such a war would be a cruel, but very effective PR exercise for Russia. In the future, other governments will be very careful about letting themselves be goaded into challenging Russia.

And en passant Moscow would gain control over the BTC pipeline, throw a wrench into the plans of building a parallel gas pipe, and work furiously at configuring the regional energy transportation network once and for all in a way that would maximize Russia’s profits for the long term.

Washington has realized this danger too late, and while it is calling on Saakashvili to tone things down, the damage is already done. Washington’s credibility as a protector of regional powers has suffered a devastating defeat: war or no war, the message is loud and clear ­ don’t mess with Russia, because when push comes to shove, you are on your own

Maybe if American foreign policy makers head read less Kipling and more Machiavelli, they would have realized that no matter how clever you play the game, at the end of the day it is still better to be feared than despised.

Dietwald Claus
Kirov, Russia.