August 1, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1107 •1108 •1109  

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1109
1 August 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moskovskiye Novosti: Spiritual Heritage's Podberezkin 
Profiled.
2. Literaturnaya Gazeta: Interview with economist and political 
scientist, "What Are the Higher-Ups Talking About? What Are 
Those Lower Down Hearing?"
3. Obshchaya Gazeta: Major Farm Areas Threatened by 
Environmental Abuses.] 

*********

Spiritual Heritage's Podberezkin Profiled 

Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 30
July 27-August 3, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
"Portrait" article by Yevgeniy Krasnikov under the "Politics"
Rubric: "Secret Adviser to Many Leaders"

Many people describe Aleksey Podberezkin, leader of "Spiritual
Heritage" and "secret adviser" to Gennadiy Zyuganov, as the second most
important figure in the opposition camp.
Until now Aleksey Podberezkin has remained more in the shadows, but
now he has stepped into the light and it seems that he intends to play a
more noticeable role in Russian politics.

MN File [Subhead]

Aleksey Podberezkin is the cochairman of the People's Patriotic Union
of Russia, chairman of the "Spiritual Heritage" sociopolitical movement,
founder and president of "RAU Corporation," doctor of historical sciences,
and deputy chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee. He
was born in 1953 in Moscow. In 1979 he graduated from the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations as an external student. He is an
expert on U.S. military policy. From 1981 to 1985 he worked at the USSR
Committee of Youth Organizations, and from 1985 to 1990 he was a senior
scientific associate at the Institute of the World Economy and the USSR
Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy. In 1990 he left the CPSU. In 1990-91
he was an adviser to Boris Yeltsin's aide, Aleksey Tsaregorodtsev. He is
married and has three children. His hobbies are swimming and tennis.

Legends and Myths [Subhead]

Aleksey Podberezkin can be called a legendary hero of the
Communist-patriotic opposition. In terms of the number of legends
circulating about him, he long ago surpassed his opposition comrades in
arms and perhaps will soon rival such "eminences grises" of Russian
politics as Gennadiy Burbulis and Anatoliy Chubays. One legend has it that
back in his youth Aleksey Podberezkin was recruited by two intelligence
services -- the KGB and the CIA. On their suggestion he used money from
the CPSU and U.S. State Department to set up the RAU Corporation, which
provided the West with first-class espionage information and worked
secretly to undermine the Communist Party.

MN File [Subhead]

RAU Corporation was set up in June 1990 as a closed joint-stock
company. Its purpose was to conduct scientific research and educational
work. According to its charter, the corporation's staffers must be
patriots. In the spring of 1994 the organizing committee of the "Spiritual
Heritage" movement was created through the efforts of RAU, and in May 1995
its constituent congress took place. Today the movement has over 10,000
active members.
After the Communist threat was eliminated in August 1991 (legend has
it that defenders of the White House armed and fed by RAU Corporation
suppressed the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] putsch),
Podberezkin allegedly became disillusioned with the democrats and directed
all of his efforts toward eliminating the democratic threat. Incidentally,
stories differ on this point: Some say that he did this quite sincerely,
offended that Yeltsin had given the Foreign Ministry to Kozyrev rather than
to him. Others maintain that even then Podberezkin was actually Yeltsin's
"agent of influence" in the opposition camp. No one, however, disputes the
fact that Podberezkin maintained many eminent Russian politicians. In
1992-93 Podberezkin set up approximately 10 opposition fronts, assemblies,
and parties. In 1993, according to legend, Podberezkin persuaded Rutskoy
to storm Ostankino, landing the unlucky vice president in jail while he
himself offered his services to the president. Rumor has it that the
president instructed him to resume the secret battle against the Communist
hydra. Without any particular efforts Podberezkin managed to charm (or,
according to other accounts, bribe) CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian
Federation] leader Gennadiy Zyuganov. The former teacher from Ryazan
[Zyuganov], falling in with a bad crowd, became acquainted with powerful
bankers, businessmen, and foreign politicians, and as a result became a
weak-willed puppet in the hands of the treacherous agent. In order to allay
the Communists' vigilance, Podberezkin first helped them to win the
parliamentary elections, and then brilliantly ruined their presidential
election campaign. Now -- according to ill-wishers -- under the invisible
guidance of Aleksey Podberezkin, the CPRF is falling deeper and deeper into
the abyss of liberalism and national appeasement. And he is already
scouting out a new victim. It is claimed that Viktor Chernomyrdin and
Yuriy Luzhkov are next in line.
In order to verify the numerous rumors accompanying the political
career of the "main puppeteer of the Russian opposition," MN's
correspondent went to the three-story mansion rented by RAU Corporation. 
There, in a small office decorated with an icon, a big bucket [badya], and
cartoons of Gaydar and Yavlinskiy, is where my conversation with our hero
took place.

On the Party and the Party Nomenklatura [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] In 1990 you left the CPSU, but this by no means
aggravated your relations with the higher Party nomenklatura. Perhaps there
was no crisis in relations because the RAU vice president was the daughter
of a Politburo member, and your wife was the daughter of a major Party
functionary?
[Podberezkin] I simply suspended my membership of the CPSU. The
party headed by Gorbachev was deliberately destroying the state. And I was
not indifferent to the state. We had many top Party officials,
ambassadors, and ministers working at RAU. One time I counted them, and
clutched my head: The staff list contained six Politburo members, five
candidate members, and 86 generals. But they were not much use, only a
source of problems. They were good people, but they worked poorly. But I
could not say no to my acquaintances.
My wife really is the daughter of CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Konstantin Rusakov. All I will say is that, although I had known her for a
long time, I married her only after the ban on the CPSU. [Podberezkin
ends]
The first unconventional move by Aleksey Podberezkin during
perestroyka was his departure from the CPSU in 1990. One year prior to
this, Podberezkin had given the CPSU Central Committee a note exposing an
insidious U.S. plan to dismember the USSR and demanding resolute action. 
The message remained unanswered, which probably offended its author
considerably. But it is possible that Podberezkin's motives were not just
ideological: It was easier for a nonparty person to attract American
partners to set up the RAU Corporation.

The Secret of Deposits [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] Who was the first to invest money in the creation of the
RAU Corporation? Some talk of CPSU money and Western investments, as well
as banks....
[Podberezkin] I have never had Party money, or money from abroad, or
state funds. As for private funds, yes I had them. All my friends are
"New Russians" who are not indifferent to the fate of the country. There
is not a single bank among the top 10 most influential banks with which I
have not collaborated in one way or another. But they have provided money
only for specific projects. [Podberezkin ends]
Of course it is difficult to imagine a politician or businessman who
would admit that he used CPSU funds. But MN's correspondent was told by
several former employees of the corporation that the RAU Corporation had
used Party money. The question of bank financing remains rather unclear as
well. There is evidence that some banks not only financed projects, but
also invested substantial funds in RAU. Naturally, however, there is no
direct proof of this. All that is known is that in 1990-91 RAU had 2,500
staffers, mostly former employees of the Defense Ministry, the KGB, the
Central Committee apparatus, the Foreign Ministry, and the Committee of
Youth Organizations. In 1990 the pay of an administration head was 1,100
rubles [R] while a deputy chairman got R1,500. A Party rayon committee
instructor received R300 at the time.

Useful Friends [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] You worked in prestigious Soviet institutions. Did you
get to know any influential people and make any useful acquaintances?
[Podberezkin] When I worked for the Committee of Youth Organizations I
made the acquaintance of Gennadiy Seleznev, who headed Komsomolskaya Pravda
at the time, Sergey Karaganov, Yuriy Baturin, and Andrey Kokoshin. In
general, all my life I have had more friends among the democrats. 
[Podberezkin ends]
His colleagues from his former workplace did a lot to promote the
start of Aleksey Podberezkin's political career. In 1990 Boris Yeltsin's
aide Aleksey Tsaregorodtsev offered him the chance to become his adviser. 
This cooperation was mutually advantageous: Tsaregorodtsev's wife worked
for Podberezkin at RAU. In 1991, when Tsaregorodtsev was assigned by
Yeltsin to head Vice President Rutskoy's staff, he took Podberezkin with
him. Although back then Aleksey Ivanovich [Podberezkin] himself defined
his position as being "democratic-patriotic," this did not prevent him from
getting together with Gennadiy Zyuganov, who was an orthodox Communist at
the time.

A Hero of Two Defenses [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] How did you manage to defend the White House twice
-- in 1991 and 1993?
[Podberezkin] In 1991 I and many other employees were working for
Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy. Naturally in August 1991 our people
stayed with Rutskoy. Of course I did not consider myself to be a hero. 
When they wanted to award me a medal, I simply laughed.
I was sitting in Rutskoy's reception room when I heard the president's
speech 21 September 1993. I was on the side of the White House, but I
could do little to help: I delivered groceries and helped with
communications. [Podberezkin ends]
It is clear that Podberezkin's role in the 1991 and 1993 political
crises really was not very great. His presence at the White House back
then seemed to be more part of a team game rather than evidence of definite
political views. In 1993 he was present at the talks that took place at
the Svyato-Danilovskiy monastery, and he drove Metropolitan Kirill to
Ostankino in his car, where the latter read out the patriarch's appeal to
abstain from bloodshed.

Leaders Wanted [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] In order to realize his ideas, a "secret adviser" needs
leaders. You have sought cooperation with a whole series of politicians of
different convictions: Yeltsin, Rutskoy, Sterligov, Skokov, Zyuganov. How
did you find working with them?
[Podberezkin] Our aim was to promote state-patriotic ideologies.
Wherever we could. To some extent or other I took part in preparing
presidential messages. But of course there was no guarantee that my
proposals would not be tossed into the wastebasket. With Rutskoy, I took
part in preparing programs on agrarian and military reform, and I also
worked as his speechwriter. I was indirectly connected with Sterligov,
although for a while he was one of our staffers and would share his plans
with us. In 1994 I presented our studies to Yuriy Skokov. But he spent a
long time in thought, time was running out, and we began to cooperate with
Zyuganov. He turned out to be more receptive and flexible. [Podberezkin]
Any political scientist tries to bring his proposals and studies to
the authorities. The authorities, if they are smart enough, study them and
sometimes even pretend to listen. It is entirely possible that the
president actually did try to enrich his arsenal with opposition ideas, but
maybe this was just a part of a game to "tame" the most malleable
oppositionists.
Cooperation with Rutskoy worked out rather well for the RAU. Through
the efforts of the corporation, the Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces,
at which Rutskoy first appeared in the capacity of oppositionist, was
prepared and conducted in February 1992. This was, in fact, the first
attempt to unite the "patriotic opposition" and at the time did not yet
carry any traces of Communist ideology. But it did not prove possible to
create a united front then. The only real party was the CPRF, the RAU
reasoned, and so the RAU heads felt that an alliance with the Communists
was essential. But their ideology had to be modernized. Immediately after
the August putsch, Aleksey Podberezkin hired the most effective, in his
opinion, Party functionary of them all -- Gennadiy Zyuganov. "Zyuganov
worked as a consultant for our journal Obozrevatel, did research work, and
wrote articles and official memorandums."

Communist Romance [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] At the 1995 parliamentary elections you and your comrades
in arms received seven deputy's seats on the CPRF list. What did you do for
the Communists to earn this: Did you bring them together with bankers or
organize trips abroad?
[Podberezkin] The international trips were not organized by us. The
rumors that we bring bankers together with Communists are exaggerated. 
Although there have been cases, people approach Zyuganov even without
Podberezkin's help. They probably value us for our capacity for work, our
responsibility, and our ability to "make a product." In 1995 we were the
only all-Russia organization to support the CPRF. Not many people know
this, but in Moscow a significant number of signatures were collected for
it by our activists. [Podberezkin ends] The close partnership between
Podberezkin and the Communists began in 1994. It is obvious that initally
the RAU Corporation provided the Communists with substantial help, not just
ideological, but also material and organizational. During the presidential
campaign Podberezkin was the deputy head of Zyuganov's election
headquarters and worked "quite autonomously, from both the ideological and
financial viewpoints." He tried to prove to non- Communist voters that
Zyuganov is not so much a Communist as a patriot, not a destroyer but a
guardian. Although they lost the election, during the election campaign
the Communist ideology was strongly diluted with traditional ideas. It was
then that the new organization -- the People's Patriotic Union of Russia --
was born.

Plans for the Future [Subhead]

[Krasnikov] Is your movement doomed to always move in harness with
the CPRF? Is it capable of functioning independently?
[Podberezkin] At the elections to the Moscow City Duma we will have
our own list. And I want to persuade both the Communists and certain
democratic-patriotic organizations to form a bloc. But we must be in the
vanguard. If we have total success, I will start working for the City
Duma. I intend to cooperate with Luzhkov to protect Moscow's interests. 
[Podberezkin ends]
As MN's correspondent learned from conversations with Communist
functionaries, Aleksey Podberezkin's relations with the CPRF party top
brass are far from ideal. At best they "tolerate him," at worst "they
cannot tolerate him." The hostility toward him is attributable not only to
ideological disagreements, but also to jealousy of an "outsider" who has
managed to weave his web around the leader. Essentially, for Podberezkin,
the only reliable ally in the CPRF is Zyuganov himself. How long can this
alliance last?
Now Aleksey Podberezkin intends to play a more noticeable role in
politics than before. He is no longer just a political scientist, an
expert, or an adviser, but a leader of an all-Russia movement.
Podberezkin's know-how -- the national-Communist idea that brought him a
deputy's seat and put him among the 100 most influential politicians -- did
not bring the desired success at the presidential elections. The reform of
the CPRF is encountering extremely stubborn resistance from the orthodox. 
So Podberezkin does not feel that he is tied to the CPRF by an unbreakable
chain. "On 1 May we assembled our own column in Moscow and, can you
imagine, there was not a single red flag!" If Zyuganov (or the CPRF) move
toward the orthodox Communists, Aleksey Podberezkin may seek a new leader
who looks toward a patriotic, state ideology.

********

Economist Oleg Vite on Socioeconomic Issues 

Literaturnaya Gazeta
July 16, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with economist and political scientist
Oleg Vite by Literaturnaya Gazeta observer Lora Velikanova; place
and date not given: "What Are the Higher-Ups Talking About? What
Are Those Lower Down Hearing?"

[Velikanova] When summing up the results of the work of the
new, much younger Cabinet of Ministers, one cannot but pay attention
to its one obvious failure: Chubays and Nemtsov and Sysuyev articulate
their ideas excellently, but the ones to whom they are trying so
hard to convey these ideas actually do not understand them. "If
you conduct housing-municipal reform, things will be significantly
better for you," they assert up above. "They want to raise our rents,
to which we categorically object," they respond down below. And,
in my opinion, they are right—they simply have nothing
with which to pay. What kind of mutual understanding is this?
[Vite] There are many socio-occupational groups that are in
an extremely difficult situation, they are critically in need of
help. But there are also those who are feigning poverty (a formula
has been derived—in terms of the level of "feigning poverty"
our country occupies first place in the world). With a weak economy
it is very difficult to provide service for both categories. And
as a result the assistance everywhere is being received by the ones
who do not especially need it.
Here are some assessments (they were voiced in the President"s
message): In Western countries it is considered more or less acceptable
if 50-60 percent of the aid to the needy reaches those for whom
it is intended. In our country, according to expert evaluations,
social assistance is distributed in these proportions: 19 percent
goes to those who need it, and 81 percent goes to others. This means
that in order to give a ruble to the poor, we must give 4 rubles
to the rich.
[Velikanova] An extremely wasteful system.
[Vite] Such a low level of effectiveness of social redistribution
shows that the time has come to narrow the group of people who receive
benefits.
[Velikanova] But who will agree to that? Take the deputies:
Have they ever given up their benefits? Even if they have taken
them from the mouths of children. And they still talk about fairness.
In the end, those whose benefits come under the knife will again
not understand the government.
[Vite] Here we must keep in mind such a component of our attitudes
as exaggerated expectations. Soviet society greeted the collapse
of Communism with incredibly high expectations. Do you remember
what the candidate deputies (including democrats) promised during
1987-1989? Wages would increase, the deficit would disappear, ecologically
harmful productions would be closed down, and so forth and so on.
Even though during the past 20 years before that we neglected everything,
lived on loans, and robbed future generations. But the people expect
it: You promised. Give it to us. Exaggerated expectations are hampering
us to this day. But now our society has finally matured to the point
where it is possible to discuss things that previously had to be
concealed. For example, under-the-counter incomes, which have also
come down to us from Soviet times. We cry about wages but we say
nothing about other, much larger amounts of money. So you have to
understand who is living how. You can make serious promises only
by telling the truth, and you can tell the truth only by deliberately
bringing up for public discussion that which could not be discussed
previously. This is always difficult to do, but especially during
a transition period. At one time one eminent figure in the Great
French Revolution said: "The transition from bad to good is frequently
worse than the bad itself."
[Velikanova] An excellent paradox, but I would like to see
its essence more clearly.
[Vite] If the reforms are perceived as a means of improving
a life that is already not so bad and not as the only possibility
of crawling out of the hole, they will definitely be perceived in
a negative way.
When the Titanic ran up against the iceberg, people on the
upper deck continued to dance—a wonderful life was still
going on there. By the same token, certain phenomena in the economy
are not yet apparent, they will not manifest themselves for several
years, and people are continuing to "dance." They expect improvement
of their life and not rescue from death, which is actually already
"dancing" next to them. But it cannot be seen so far, and therefore
when they speak about the price of reforms, they are not taking
into account the fact that they are being saved from real destruction.
One can picture it this way: A seriously ill person crawls
into a dilapidated rayon hospital. But the hospital has no medicines,
the bandages are dirty, the instruments are obsolete, and the doctors
are drunk. What choice does the patient have?
[Velikanova] Either have the operation or die.
[Vite] But the stereotype of the perception of the reforms
was quite different...
[Velikanova] Surprise that with the wave of a magic wand the
"Kremlin" did not appear in the rayon hospital...
[Vite] After the increased expectations, that is the second
stereotype which makes it terribly hard to see the real achievements
of the reformers. There is a third as well—it is the myth
about the omnipotence of the state. In its most general form it
can be worded like this: If something good is not done, it is because
the state does not want to do it.
[Velikanova] It has sold out to the Americans...
[Vite] Precisely. How specifically does this stereotype manifest
itself? In the fact, for example, that the Soviet person did not
get into the habit of comparing state incomes, from which he was
to obtain certain benefits, and his own incomes. As if the state
had some special source of income of its own which has nothing to
do "with me." Therefore the less I give it, the better it will be.
And in general it does not matter if I give nothing at all, let
it (the state) do this or that. This stereotype contains the entire
system of redistribution and all the difficulties of reform.
If everyone wants to get what they have coming to them but
they give less, and mankind has not yet come up with any sources
of income from the state except us, where is it to come from? And
here the problem of the language barrier between the authorities
and the people becomes key. Especially in light of the forthcoming
reforms. People have become accustomed to thinking that the state
will get money from somewhere, and I have my own. My income has
nothing to do with the sources of the budget income...
[Velikanova] The state has a large income and I have a small
one. Therefore I pay 20 percent of the cost of housing and municipal
services, and it pays 80 percent. In my opinion, this is fair. That
is approximately how the citizens think.
[Vite] But tell them: "Today you are paying 20 percent but
you should be paying 100 percent."
[Velikanova] The citizens will simply dig their heels in:
"What the hell?..."
[Vite] "Since there is a state, let it pay." And so it turns
out that unless the economists" jargon is translated into
an adequate language, the problem is at an impasse. Because, to
tell the truth, the population has always paid, is paying, and will
pay all 100 percent of the cost of services—there is no
other source of income except the labor of the people. What is important
is how it is distributed. Everyone is convinced that the point of
the housing and municipal reform lies in increasing state income
and reducing the income of the citizens. In fact it is the other
way around: If the state ceases to redistribute, its income will
be less and that of the citizens will be more.
The population now pays in various ways: 20 percent itself,
through cash, and 80 percent through the chain: taxes—the
state budget—subsidies. Now the producers of services and
various housing and municipal offices receive these subsidies. The
reform presupposes transferring the subsidy money in the form of
subsidies to those who do not have enough to pay for an apartment,
that is, the consumers of the service, you and me. In the case where
they render assistance to the consumer, they give him the money
so that he can buy the services at market prices. When the money
is given to the producer, as it is now, it is so that he can sell
his services at below market prices. It is the same money. What
is the difference? That "below market prices" extends to everyone,
control disappears. Thus the point of the reform of housing and
municipal services lies in changing the forms of social
assistance—the
money goes to those who need it and not the producers, regardless
of how they spend it, whether they are corrupt, and so forth. When
the money goes only to those who need it, there is a reduction of
the number of those who are granted subsidies.
At a seminar on housing and municipal reform where Gaydar
spoke, a journalist asked: "Because of the reform, you want the
rich to pay more for housing. But will they have enough money?"
And even there it never occurred to anyone to respond: "Where does
the money for housing and municipal services come from now?" There
are two scenarios: Either we pay or we put it off on our children,
future generations; there are no other scenarios. Unless, of course,
we attack neighboring countries.
[Velikanova] I want to shift the conversation to a somewhat
different plane. Tell us, please, when we speak of the fact that
the arguments of the authorities do not reach the people, that the
citizens do not listen to them, what role, in your opinion, is played
by the blatant, as if for show, enrichment of those who are in power
and along with this their blatant well-being, their privileges,
in brief—their immodesty next to the impoverished majority?
Is this not where mutual understanding is lost?
One of our "hot spots" are investors who lost their savings
in 1992. Today they see the fashionable new building of the Sberbank
they hate so much and say: "That was built with our money. Why did
they not give it to us?" It is the same with all the other excesses:
"That is from our money. We earned it and they use it."
[Vite] Every cloud has a silver lining. The advantage from
the financial crisis that occurred in 1996-1997 is that it revealed
all these problems and people began to talk about them. Even a year
ago there were few who would raise the question: "What did you do
with our money?" Now they are beginning to be aware of this. Not
all, but they are undoubtedly beginning. And this is very good.
Without this there is no chance of reducing the luxury. There should
be large groups of people who are vitally interested in knowing
how the money turned over to the state in the form of taxes is being
spent. Not in the sense that I am concerned about the good of the
fatherland, but precisely because I want to know where the money
I give goes and for what. As long as many people do not understand
this simple idea, there is no point. Are people disturbed? This
is a guarantee that things will move where they should.
It is possible to consider this issue from the example of
the housing and municipal reform as well. We will pay for everything
ourselves, without the participation of the state—there
will be a large segment of people who are vitally interested in
economizing on water and electric energy, on reducing outlays for
housing and municipal services, and improving the work of the municipal
services. The same question will arise: "What are you spending my
money on? I pay so much and you are still operating poorly." As
a result, the main goal of the reform is achieved: The cost of housing
and municipal services decreases and their quality improves.
Until people have a clear idea that everything the state has
and spends is their money, the luxurious, unaffordable life of the
bureaucrats will not disappear and our life will not improve. A
weak state simply cannot cope with all this.
[Velikanova] What do you mean by the concept a "weak state"?
[Vite] In this case I have in mind that a weak state is not
a strictly controlled bureaucratic structure where the order from
the boss is the law for the subordinate, but a class of free bureaucrats,
where everybody does as he sees fit. This nuance, incidentally,
is not taken into account when they speak about state regulation
and state control. We have a very great deal of state control, which
on investigation means only control in the interests of a specific
controlling bureaucrat. But there is very little state control in
the sense of protection of the interests of the state as a whole.
[Velikanova] So a weak state means an uncontrolled bureaucrat?
[Vite] It means a loosely controlled bureaucrat, the inability
to establish strictly identical rules of the game for everyone,
which, in turn, means that those who are stronger and richer can
always gain for themselves certain advantages, benefits, and so
forth. So if we have a weak state...
[Velikanova] And we have one...
[Vite] ...It will take a certain number of years to bring
it into a more or less normal condition. And until this is achieved,
one must recall that everything entrusted to it will be done poorly.
Including redistribution of funds.
[Velikanova] And now explain, please, what you mean by the
concept "normal condition" and "strengthening of the state"?
[Vite] This means first of all state control over its money.
For the first time in 1997, when the new government was formed,
there appeared a real possibility of strengthening the state"s
role within necessary limits—for instance, to begin to
establish control over natural monopolies, to conduct reform of
the social security system and housing reform, that is, to establish
control over the way social aid is provided. If the rich and simply
well-to-do help the poor, they must be certain that their money
will really go to the poor, and not to those who are just as well
off as they are or may be even richer than they are but are feigning
poverty. This is state control over the distribution of the taxpayers"
funds.
An excellent economy, based on free purchase and sale, can
function only—and Gaydar aptly noted this at one time—when
there are things that are not sold and not bought: laws, court decisions.
Therefore the first task now is to establish equal rules of the
game for everyone. The second is to redistribute part of the funds
from the rich to the poor. And, finally, the third is to take a
certain amount of other money from the citizens to solve common
problems, the ones for which the citizens are prepared to give money.
For example, for strengthening the country"s defense capability.
Are they prepared? Let us write it down. Complete candor is needed
here. So the problem of a new language of communication between
the authorities and the citizens means also the state"s
ability to formulate a real choice of what will have to be done.
[Velikanova] And do you believe in this kind of openness?
[Vite] Why can openness begin now? Because they have their
backs to the wall. It is impossible to put it off. There is no choice.
In general, as I understand it, any significant changes in history
take place not because people select between good and better but
between complete catastrophe and anything that is a little better.
By the end of 1996 the avalanche of indebtedness reached a scale
that was dangerous for those who were getting rich on this indebtedness.
This gives us reason to hope that this time we will obtain an effect
from a strict policy of strengthening the role of the state.
[Velikanova] I still do not understand very well why this
has become possible now, and not three years ago, for example.
[Vite] Because inflation has somehow relieved the situation.
Take, for example, relations between the state and military servicemen
and pensioners. We object that there is a pipeline through which
funds are distributed to them. But on the pipeline there are many
various taps from which along the way funds go to bureaucrats, managers
of their own polyclinics, regional leaders... You do not have enough
money? Never mind, we will print some, and let our children think
about it when they grow up. Now inflation, from which, incidentally,
the poor suffer most, is being covered. The fog disperses and it
suddenly becomes clear where this tap is and how much has drained
out. The costs of the existing system turn out to be intolerable.
And there is a good indicator here—the Communists.
They have stopped demanding to have money printed.
[Velikanova] And Ilyukhin?
[Vite] He is still there. But his proposals do not pass—that
is what is important. So the Communists are like a thermometer which
indicates the degree of recovery from prejudices.
[Velikanova] And what about squabbles within the team? Will
Chernomyrdin be able to work with Chubays or will the endless rumors
ultimately flow smoothly into a presidential edict?
[Vite] Even if I knew some secret about this I still could
not say—I am not supposed to as a worker in one of the
units of the structure. But I know nothing about such a thing. But
I am prepared for conjecture on this subject.
Let us proceed from the fact that Chernomyrdin is linked to
certain groups and, naturally, is close to the interests of these
groups, and their interests do not coincide with Chubays"s
interests. If we assume this, we come to the conclusion that Chernomyrdin
is not eager for control over natural monopolies. If this is so,
the following question arises: Why does Chernomyrdin tolerate Chubays?
Vykhirev tolerates him as well. But why?
Thus comes the question which really should be answered: It
is not whether there are disagreements or not, but why, in spite
of their differences, do they nonetheless work together to do that
which, according to assumptions, contradicts the interests of one
of them? The answer, in my opinion, is very simple: It is that same
financial crisis which is linked to the curbing of inflation, the
disclosure of the monstrous wastefulness of the system, for those
same natural monopolies, for that same Vykhirev, that put the question
extremely plainly—either they participate in a very serious
destruction of the economy or they begin to change the rules of
the game somewhat and select different points of reference for themselves.
With a weak state it is quite impossible to imagine that any
Chubays or even a hundred Chubays"s could force these people
to do anything against their will. What then? They themselves have
matured to the point of being able to work together. The guarantee
of the efficiency of the present government is that, in spite of
their different prior histories, the participants have come to the
same points of reference, views, and ideas about what needs to be
done and how to do it.
I can add something else: If Chernomyrdin seriously wanted
to get rid of Chubays, he would undoubtedly be able to do so. In
fact, many groups have now seen the need for radical changes.
[Velikanova] Does the current government have time to show
any real results? So they can rid themselves of the fear that Communists
will come to power?
[Vite] With the minimum number of mistakes made by the current
authorities—and it is clear to everyone that they intend
to avoid this—by the year 1999 we will begin to see appreciable
growth. Of course it will not affect everyone, certain sectors will
develop rapidly and some will continue to decline. But on the whole
in 1999 the growth will be such that the opposition will not be
able to deny it. Discussions to the effect that the economy is continuing
to decline will disappear.

**********

Major Farm Areas Threatened by Environmental Abuses 

Obshchaya Gazeta
July 17-23, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
rticle by Anna Politkovskaya, under the "Under Extreme
Circumstances" heading: "The Great Chernozem Power No Longer Exists.
The Country"s Topsoil Is in a Critical State"

The Russian land is becoming degraded at a precipitous rate,
and this has never yet happened in the history of the Fatherland.
According to various estimates, from 60 to 75 hectares are already
catastrophically polluted and require immediate attention—otherwise,
they run the risk of turning into desert zones in the near future,
capable only of being the support under industrial foundations.
Like a sarcoma, black stains are spreading across our
spaces—around
major industrial centers and megalopolises. The Chelyabinsk and
Novokuznetsk complexes, the Moscow and Tula agglomerations, Irkutsk,
Novosibirsk, Norilsk, Magnitogorsk, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk... Heavy metals,
oil, petroleum products, chlororganic compounds, radioactive
elements—the
land is dosed with all of these, and it is dying under indifferent
feet. More than 240,000 hectares are taken up in our country with
industrial and household waste dumps. In order fully to assess the
mores prevailing in the state, it is worth noting that dumps sanctioned
by state agencies occupy only 35,000 hectares. All the rest is land
that has been taken over for the purpose. Last year, enterprises
brought almost 95,500 tonnes of industrial wastes to these unrestricted
garbage ordnance yards, including 204 tonnes of wastes in the most
dangerous category (lead, cadmium, mercury, zinc, arsenic). It is
difficult to believe, but in Russia today, 513,000 hectares are
polluted with lead alone; 326,000 are polluted with zinc, and 3,000
with arsenic (figures of the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs).
It is believed that the destruction of soils is taking place
primarily due to the degradation of the agricultural regions. And
the dimensions here are perhaps comparable only with the unparalleled
size of the state itself—from the destruction of unique
reindeer pastureland in the north, through the depletion of the
Chernozem in the central portion of Russia and on to the desertification
in the south. 
There is one reason for the dying out of our lands, assert
specialists from the State Committee for Environmental Preservation
and the Russian Federation Committee on Land Resources and Land
Management, the two principal federal departments responsible for
the condition of soils: their improvident and incompetent use continues.
But how does the state stand up against all this horror? How
does it make sure the soils are restored?
According to Andrey Prokhorov, chief of the soils and lands
department of the State Environmental Control Administration of
Russia"s State Committee for Environmental Preservation
(Roskomekologiya), "Now it is ordinary land accounting; there is
no recultivation. The land accounting services simply on paper transfer
many thousands of hectares from the "destroyed"
category to the "reserve" category—on
the basis of the so-called report on self-healing. For example,
there was a mined-out waste pile in a coal-mining region—it
was abandoned, and some time afterward, the man-made hill itself
became covered with grass. And so it was registered as recultivated
land."
Today the area of destroyed lands is more than 1 million hectares,
of which, it has been calculated, in 1996 only 79,000 were "restored"
in the manner described above. Moreover, every year 100,000 hectares
are thrown out of the category of those that are normal and capable
of being fertile.
"The prognosis is not a comforting one," believes Andrey Prokhorov.
"The degradation of its lands threatens Russia with the loss of
foodstuff independence. Marvelous and unique areas of Chernozem
are dying. The very same about which Gogol wrote: Put in a shaft,
and a britzka will grow; and Vasiliy Dokuchayev called them the
king of soils. All that is already a thing of the past. Some 43
percent of the arable lands contain low levels of humus, an organic
substance with which the very idea of fertility is connected. Not
so long ago, our Chernozem fields were up to 4-5 percent humus—now
that level has dropped to 2.6-2.8 percent. Literally nothing remains
between this and irreversible loss of fertility (1.8 percent)—and
this will happen in about 15-20 years. Individual fields even now,
although they may be black in appearance, are in actual fact barren,
infertile. Tula, Kursk, Orel, Lipetsk, Belgorod, and Rostov Oblasts,
Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays. The erosion of the Chernozem is proceeding
unchecked. If you fly over Belgorod Oblast today, it truly is white
from above—chalky deposits underlay the Chernozem there,
and now only the chalk remains. The situation is no better in the
southern regions.
Specialists know that it is no simple matter to help the depleted
soils. It is best to halt any activity on them and just wait for
nature itself to restore the wealth that humankind has lost. Unfortunately,
a technological solution to the problem does not at this point exist
at all. And self-restoration will take hundreds of years. Soils
specialists calculate that one tiny millimeter of the humus layer
is formed over 100 years. This means that over the course of the
20th century, we have managed to eliminate the fruits of Mother
Nature"s labors in the creation of Chernozem over the course
of eight millennia.
The problem of land degradation also has a political underlying
reason. This is not the first year that the discussion has been
going on, on whether rapid distribution of lands to private ownership
could save our soils from destruction. Soils experts today say confidently:
Yes, it could. However, their opinion is not at all of the avant-garde,
but rather, traditional in the Russian way. They are convinced that
the first thing that needs literally to be drummed into a person"s
head is the idea of three types of property: "somebody else"s"
property, "one"s own" property, and land property, as the
highest form. Land ownership is not full free rein over a plot of
arable land: If you feel like it, you ruin it, and if you want to,
you sell. Land exists eternally, while an individual upon it is
here today and gone tomorrow. Therefore, he must have an interest
only in the results of his labor on that land being his property.
And then the individual will have an interest in the land that he
has, as a means of production, being in the best condition. These
are eternal ["vechnyye"] relations, and not material ["veshchnyye"]
ones.
[Begin box]
Reference
As of 1 January 1997, the Russian Federation"s land
resources amounted to 1.71 billion hectares. About 50 percent of
the territory is covered with forests and shrubbery. Agricultural
land takes up 222 million hectares (13 percent), including 130 million
hectares of arable land (8 percent). [End box]

**********