July 22, 1997   

This Date's Issues:   1070 •1071 •1073  

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1070
22 July 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. TEXT: TALBOTT DETAILS U.S. APPROACH TO CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA.
2. TEXT: COHEN REMARKS TO COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA. 
(Discusses reasons for NATO enlargement).] 

*********

#1
>From United States Information Agency

21 July 1997 
TEXT: TALBOTT DETAILS U.S. APPROACH TO CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA 
(Administration seeks more funds for region) (3600)

Washington -- The Clinton administration is seeking a 40 percent
increase in foreign assistance funds for the nations of the Caucasus
region and Central Asia, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said
in a speech at Johns Hopkins University's Central Asia Institute July
21.

"These resources will allow us to increase our support for democratic
and economic reform in Central Asia and the Caucasus," Talbott said.
"Even in straitened budgetary times, that is a prudent investment in
our nation's future."

At the same time, Talbott said Russia that the United States will be
watching closely its relations with the states along its southern
border, noting that there is considerable anxiety among them "about
how Moscow will handle its relations with the other members of the CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States)."

Talbott stated, "One of the watchwords of our dialogue with Russia is
integration -- the right kind of integration. Integration means that
the doors -- and benefits -- of international institutions will be
open to Russia as long as Russia stays on a path of reform, including
in the way it conducts its relations with its neighbors, and that
means the way it defines integration in the context of the CIS."

Turning to other matters, Talbott announced that the United States
will open an environmental office in Tashkent this summer and
participate alongside Kazak, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Russian and Turkish troops
in a joint peacekeeping exercise in September.

Talbott also made clear that the administration is seeking to repeal
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. This section was enacted by
the Congress and prohibits U.S. funding for most programs to
Azerbaijan. The result, Talbott said, "has the negative effect of
limiting our leverage with Baku and complicating our ability to be as
effective as we could otherwise be as an honest broker (to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). It has also made it impossible for us to
provide the Azerbaijanis with assistance on elections, economic
reform, energy development and in other areas where it is our national
interest to do so."

"The United States has a stake" in the success of the Caucasus and
Central Asian nations, Talbott said, citing the region's estimated 200
billion barrels of oil. "That is yet another reason why conflict
resolution must be Job One for U.S. policy in the region: It is both
the prerequisite for and an accompaniment to, energy development."

Following is the text of Talbott's remarks:

(Begin text)

"A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central
Asia"
An Address by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
Central Asia Institute
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
July 21, 1997

Thank you very much, Fred (Starr), and thanks to you, too, Paul
(Wolfowitz). I've followed the Institute's work since it opened up
shop ten months ago. In that short time, it has become a major source
of scholarship and public education. You have already made an
important contribution to the American national interest in the
Caucasus and Central Asia.

That region is opening up, and reaching out, to us and to the other
established democracies. Let me illustrate that point with an image
from a scene I witnessed almost exactly two weeks ago. It was in
Madrid, at a meeting of the 44 countries that make up the new
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. President Clinton found himself
seated between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the
foreign minister of Uzbekistan, and directly across from the foreign
minister of Armenia and the President of Azerbaijan. The protocol may
have been an accident of the alphabet, but it was appropriate
nonetheless.

The Euro-Atlantic Community is evolving and expanding. It stretches to
the west side of the Atlantic and to the east side of the Urals. The
emergence of such a community represents a profound break with the
past for all the peoples involved, but for none more than those of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, who have, for so much of their history,
been subjected to foreign domination.

Today, they have the chance to put behind them forever the experience
of being pawns on a chess board, as big powers vie for wealth and
influence at their expense. For them, genuine independence, prosperity
and security are mutually reinforcing goals.

The United States has a stake in their success. If reform in the
nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia continues and ultimately
succeeds, it will encourage similar progress in the other New
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, including in Russia and
Ukraine. It will contribute to stability in a strategically vital
region that borders China, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and that has
growing economic and social ties with Pakistan and India. The
consolidation of free societies, at peace with themselves and with
each other, stretching from the Black Sea to the Pamir mountains, will
open up a valuable trade and transport corridor along the old Silk
Road, between Europe with Asia.

The ominous converse is also true. If economic and political reform in
the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia does not succeed -- if
internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and flare -- the region
could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and
political extremism and a battleground for outright war.

It would matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen
in an area that sits on as much as two hundred billion barrels of oil.
That is yet another reason why conflict-resolution must be Job One for
U.S. policy in the region): It is both the prerequisite for, and an
accompaniment to, energy development.

Let me review very briefly what has happened in the five and a half
years since the hammer-and-sickle flag was lowered for the last time
over the Kremlin -- and over government buildings throughout the
former USSR. Thanks to the prompt and far-sighted response of the Bush
administration, we were the first country to open embassies in every
capital. We airlifted essential human assistance to these countries in
their first winter of independence.

By the way, it was at Paul Wolfowitz's insistence, when he was at the
Pentagon, that the U.S. established Defense attache offices at these
embassies; and it was at his behest that the first
military-to-military contacts took place.

In the four and a half years since the Clinton administration came
into office, our message to the states of the region has been simple:
As long as they move in the direction of political and economic
freedom, of national and international reconciliation, we will be with
them. That is what president Clinton told Eduard Shevardnadze of
Georgia last Friday. It is what Vice P
President Gore told Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan earlier in the week. It
is what president Clinton will tell president Aliyev next week. And it
is the message that the First Lady will carry directly to the peoples
and governments of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan this fall.

Our support has four dimensions:

-- The promotion of democracy;

-- The creation of free market economies;

-- The sponsorship of peace and cooperation within and among the
countries of the region; and

-- Their integration with the larger international community.

Over the course of the past year we have broadened and deepened our
engagement with the region in each of these areas. Let me take them
one at a time.

First, democracy. The requisite institutions and attitudes -- rule of
law, civilian control and parliamentary oversight of the military, and
respect for human rights -- are not, to put it mildly, deeply rooted
in the region. The very newness of democracy is itself a major
obstacle to the process of democratization. After at least seven
decades of being ruled from Russia -- and in some cases much longer
than that -- these states were, when they gained their independence
overnight on Christmas Day 1991, ill prepared for the challenge of
modern statehood. Many observers asserted that of the twelve New
Independent States that emerged from the USSR, the eight of Central
Asia and the Caucasus would be the least likely to survive.

President Shevardnadze has been particularly courageous in proving
that pessimism wrong and in warning us, during his two visits to
Washington, to make sure it is not self-fulfilling. The Georgian
elections in 1995 were the first in the region that international
observers judged to be free and fair.

Elsewhere, the picture is mixed. Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian
state to have held an open, multi-candidate presidential election, but
the government has launched criminal proceedings against some of its
critics. Other states have committed serious violations of their
citizens' human rights.

For our part, the United States has worked with international
organizations like the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe), as well as with non-governmental organizations like the
National Democratic Institute and the International Republican
Institute to provide training and assistance to nascent political
parties. We have also supported a wide range of home-grown NGOs, such
as an association for the defense of women's rights in Azerbaijan, a
young lawyers' association in Georgia and the Association of Youth
Leaders in Kazakstan.

All the while, we have spoken out publicly about human rights abuses
and flaws in the democratic process, such as the shortcomings in the
elections in Azerbaijan two years ago and in Armenia last fall.

In promoting democracy, we make the case it is a condition for lasting
economic progress. Only if the citizenry and the growing private
sectors in these states have a say in the policies of the government
will reform have the necessary backing; and only if these countries
develop the rule of law will they attract the foreign investment they
so desperately need.

As in politics, some states have proceeded more rapidly than others in
the economic realm. Armenia and Georgia deserve a lot of credit,
literally and figuratively. Both lack mineral wealth and have been
caught up in serious regional conflicts. Yet they have been
pace-setters in fiscal stabilization, privatization and progress
toward real growth.

In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan reached that last milestone
in 1996. Other countries, however, have yet to take the most difficult
steps toward building a market economy.

Our goal is to help them in that direction. Since 1992, the U.S. has
obligated more than 2.2 billion dollars in overall assistance to the
eight states of the Caucasus and Central Asian region. Initially, much
of this aid was directed at pressing humanitarian needs. We have also
been a major donor to refugee programs throughout the area.

But we are now shifting our focus in the region from humanitarian to
development assistance. That is the priority in the plan we have
submitted to Congress for expanded assistance programs within the NIS
in FY98. We are asking Congress to increase our assistance by 34
percent to $900 million. These additional resources will allow us to
increase our support for democratic and economic reform in Central
Asia and the Caucasus by over 40 percent. Even in straitened budgetary
times. That is a prudent investment in our nation's future.

But there are obviously limits to what we can do ourselves. That is
why, in our support for reform in the Caucasus and Central Asia, we
have been close partners with the major international financial
institutions. Working through the IFIs (international financial
institutions) allows us to leverage our scarce aid dollars with those
of the international community.

American assistance has helped Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan implement one
of the most modern and transparent tax reform laws in the NIS, and we
have helped Kazakstan and Armenia with ambitious privatization
programs. We have also aided Kyrgystan in establishing a stock market.
Throughout the region, we're encouraging the states there to establish
ties with the World Bank, international Monetary Fund, the Council of
Europe, the European Union and other international financial and
political institutions. We hope to welcome Armenia, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan into the World Trade Organization on the
commercial terms generally applied to new members before the end of
1998. We have supported the efforts by states in the region to develop
a Eurasian transportation corridor, to eliminate trade barriers among
them, and to create a region-wide market through the Central Asian
Free Economic Zone.

Meanwhile, we are also providing funding and technical advice to help
the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia overcome another grim
legacy of Soviet rule, environmental degradation, such as the disaster
that has befallen the Aral Sea. This summer we will open a regional
environmental office in Tashkent to coordinate our environmental
efforts in Central Asia. We are advocating similar regional approaches
to transnational issues like weapons proliferation drug trafficking,
and organized crime.

Let me turn now to the security dimension of our engagement in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. This September the Central Asian
peacekeeping Battalion, made up of armed forces from Kazakstan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, will host troops from the United States,
Russia, Turkey and other nations in a joint peacekeeping exercise.
These units will practice together their skills in minesweeping and
distributing humanitarian aid. The image of American, Russian and
Turkish troops participating together -- very much on the same side --
in combating threats to the stability and security of the region -- is
worth keeping in mind when listening to conventional wisdom about how
the region is heading back to the future.

For the last several years, it has been fashionable to proclaim or at
least to predict, a replay of the "Great Game" in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. The implication of course, is that the driving dynamic
of the region, fueled and lubricated by oil, will be the competition
of the great powers to the disadvantage of the people who live there.

Our goal is to avoid, and actively to discourage, that atavistic
outcome. In pondering and practicing the geopolitics of oil, let's
make sure that we arc thinking in terms appropriate to the 21st
century and not the 19th. Let's leave Rudyard Kipling and George
McDonald Fraser where they belong -- on the shelves of historical
fiction. The Great Game which starred Kipling's Kim and Fraser's
Flashman was very much of the zero-sum variety. What we want to help
bring about is just the opposite, we want to see all responsible
players in the Caucasus and Central Asia be winners.

An essential step in that direction is the resolution of conflicts
within and between countries and peoples in the region. In the last
century, internal instability and division provided a pretext for
foreign intervention and adventurism. In the last decade, since the
breakup of the USSR, several such conflicts have erupted again. Let me
touch on three, and on what the United States and the international
community are doing to help resolve them.

The first is the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Even though the guns are,
for the moment, silent, the fighting of the past decade has displaced
nearly 800,000 Azeris. That's over ten percent of the population of
Azerbaijan. While the cease-fire is welcome, it is also precarious,
and the absence of real peace has hurt both Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The United States, through its involvement in the OSCE, is determined
to help find a solution in Nagorno-Karabakh -- a solution that, by
definition, will require difficult compromises on all sides. This is
an effort in which I've been personally involved for over four years,
particularly in recent months.

Along with Russia and France, the United States is conducting an OSCE
initiative under the auspices of the so-called Minsk Conference. I
traveled to the region at the end of May, and Lynn Pascoe, our special
envoy, has been back there in the last several days.

The U.S., Russian and French co-chairs have achieved an extraordinary
degree of harmony. That solidarity seems to have induced some
flexibility among the three parties to the conflict.

But there are still plenty of obstacles to further progress. One of
those is domestic -- we have inflicted it on ourselves. I am referring
to Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, which limits our ability to
provide assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan. This legislation,
written in 1992, was intended to help Armenia overcome an Azerbaijani
embargo. But it has had the negative effect of limiting our leverage
with Baku and complicating our ability to be as effective as we could
otherwise be as an honest broker. It has also made it impossible for
us to provide the Azerbaijanis with assistance on elections, economic
reform, energy development and in other areas where it is in our
national interest to do so, hence, our opposition to Section 907. I
suspect you'll be hearing more on the subject when President Aliyev
arrives here next week.

There is, of course, another conflict in the Caucasus, about which we
heard a great deal from President Shevardnadze last week. This is the
one in Abkhazia. President Clinton told president Shevardnadze that
the United States is prepared to intensify its diplomatic efforts on
behalf of a United Nations-backed settlement.

As for the five-year-old civil war in Tajikistan, that situation
remains fragile and dangerous. We have provided funding for the
U.N.-brokered peace process, and we welcomed the signing last month of
a comprehensive peace accord in Moscow. We are prepared to provide aid
for demobilization, start-up assistance for political parties and
preparation for new elections. The difficulties in implementation are
sobering, but the recent accord offers a real opportunity for
reconciliation, not only within Tajikistan, but with benefits for the
surrounding countries as well.

That is the more general point to which I would like now to turn: The
big states that border the eight nations of the Caucasus and Central
Asia have much to gain from regional peace, and much to lose from
regional conflict. Some would say that is self-evident, but others
would say it is ahistorical in that it disregards the inevitable --
and irresistible -- temptation of the Great powers to replay the Great
Game for the prize of oil and gas from the Caspian Basin.

Overcoming old prejudices and predispositions from the Era of
Lieutenant Flashman needs to be a constant theme in our own diplomacy
in the region, and we are using our good offices to that end. On all
my trips to or from the Caucasus, I've made a point of stopping in
Ankara. The Turks are making major investments in Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan, and developing trading relationships with the entire
region.

Turkey's increased attention and activism has been a source of solace
and support to those who rightly worry about the projection of Iranian
influence. But many Russians see the Turkish role differently. They
worry that Turkey's growing involvement in the region might cut them
off from the former Soviet republics.

Russia, of course, is the target of concern itself, for reasons rooted
in history -- including very recent history. Under Czars and
commissars alike, Russia's leaders in the past seemed capable of
feeling strong, secure and proud only if others felt weak, insecure
and humiliated.

Today, there are still plenty of questions -- and, among Russia's
neighbors plenty of anxieties -- about how Moscow will handle its
relations with the other members of the CIS. Whether that grouping of
states survives will depend in large measure on whether it evolves in
a way that vindicates the name -- that is, whether it develops as a
genuine commonwealth of genuinely independent states. If it goes in
another direction, if its largest member tries to make "commonwealth"
into a euphemism for infringement on the independence of its
neighbors, then the CIS will deserve to join that other set of
initials, USSR, on the ash heap of history.

President Clinton has addressed this question frequently over the past
four years. "How will Russia define its role as a great power?" he
asks. "In yesterday's terms or tomorrow's?" Russia, he has said, has a
chance to show that a great power can promote patriotism without
expansionism; that a great power can promote national pride without
national prejudice ... the measure of Russia's greatness in the future
will be whether the big neighbor, can be the good neighbor."

One of the watchwords of our dialogue with Russia is integration --
the right kind of integration. Integration means that the doors -- and
benefits -- of international institutions will be open to Russia as
long as Russia stays on a path of reform, including in the way it
conducts its relations with its neighbors, and that means the way it
defines integration in the context of the CIS.

As I indicated at the outset, that is consonant with the message we
are conveying to all the New Independent States, notably including
those of the Caucasus and Central Asia. We believe that our presence
and influence in the region can itself be a force for the right kind
of integration.

Let me close by stressing that support for reform, democracy, economic
development and integration in that vitally important region is not
just a task for the U.S. government, or even for governments in
general. Ultimate success will also depend upon the efforts of
non-governmental organizations and businesses like those represented
by many of you here today.

And it will require the kind of clear thinking, new ideas and
constructive criticism -- that this Institute has generated in its
first year of existence -- some of which I look forward to hearing
from you right now.

Thank you very much.

**********

#2
>From United States Information Agency

21 July 1997 
TEXT: COHEN REMARKS TO COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA 7/21 
(Discusses reasons for NATO enlargement) (2820)

San Francisco -- The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine
Charter together "soundly refute the argument that NATO enlargement is
creating 'new dividing lines' in Europe," Secretary of Defense William
Cohen told the Commonwealth Club of California July 21.

"I saw this with my own eyes when I traveled to Lviv right after the
Madrid summit to attend a Partnership for Peace exercise involving
forces from the United States, Ukraine, and nine other former Warsaw
Pact nations, all gathered together on what used to be the largest
Soviet military training ground in Europe," he said.

"It was a truly inspiring sight. On soil that once suffered the
footfalls of troops from one-half of Europe training for war with the
other half, forces from all over Europe came to train for peace."

Cohen also outlined some of the main reasons for NATO enlargement:

-- When Europe is safe, America is more secure.... No one doubts that
America has important security interests at stake in central and
eastern Europe. NATO enlargement will help deter threats to those
interests from arising.

-- To defend Europe's gains towards democracy and prosperity. An
enlarged NATO can do for all Europe what NATO has already done for
Western Europe, providing the security and stability for new
democracies to flourish.... This same security and stability are also
key ingredients to furthering prosperity both in the United States and
in Europe.

-- To help create a climate of peace throughout the Continent, prevent
local rivalries, diminish the incentives for competing arms buildups,
and foster a realm of trust and cooperation where members can resolve
their differences through negotiation rather than confrontation.

-- NATO enlargement will right the wrongs of the past, offering
security and stability to nations that suffered greatly from five
decades of Soviet oppression.

Following is the text of his remarks:

(Begin text)

U.S. Department of Defense
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 21, 1997

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
By U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
Commonwealth Club of California
21 July 1997

Just a few short years ago, amidst the ruins of the Soviet Empire and
the rubble of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukayama wrote that the sweep
of history had come to an end, and that Western economic and political
liberalism would sweep the globe as the new universal culture. His
thesis was captured more colloquially by a South African academic
named Peter Vale, who commented, "Rejoice my friends or weep with
sorrow. What California is today, the world will be tomorrow."

While Fukayama was wrong, it is true that today we truly do stand at a
pivot point in history. On one side of the world coin is momentous
opportunity, with flourishing markets, breathtaking technologies, and
brave new democracies. But on the other side of that coin are
startling new dangers, rising ethnic conflicts, regional aggressors,
and terrorism. And it is our challenge -- America's challenge -- to
move beyond the "post-Cold War" mindset, and reorient ourselves for a
new century. We must articulate America's vision for this new century,
and then set about achieving it -- capitalizing on the new
opportunities, avoiding the new dangers.

As Secretary of Defense, I can tell you that America's security vision
for this new century is quite simple: We seek a world where there is
more stability in more regions, more democracy and more prosperity in
more nations, and thus fewer threats to America's interests.

Underpinning this vision is the essential requirement that America
remain engaged in world affairs, to influence the actions of others --
friends and foes -- who can affect our national well-being. Today,
there are some who would have us pull back from the world, forgetting
the central lesson of this century: that when America neglects the
problems of the world, the world often brings its problems to
America's doorstep.

This lesson was well understood by the generation of Americans that
won World War II. That generation articulated a vision for peace and
stability in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. On both
continents that vision was premised upon an America that was not only
forward-deployed with strong military forces, but also an America that
extended a helping hand, seeking to rebuild defeated foes, such as
Germany and Japan.

Today, the greatest way we can honor that World War II generation, is
to complete the global vision for peace that they articulated, both in
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. In so doing, we would also
bequeath a great gift to the first generation of the next century.

This great task is made more imperative by the fact that today
technology has miniaturized the globe, reducing the vast oceans that
lap our shores to mere ponds. Today, we cannot simply zip ourselves
into a continental cocoon and watch the world unfold on CNN.

Centuries ago, Archimedes discovered the secret behind the lever and
declared: "Give me a place to stand, and I will move the world."
Today, history has given the United States a place to stand. Using our
ideals, our diplomacy and our military might as our lever, we have the
unique opportunity to move the world, not simply for the betterment of
others, but for the betterment of ourselves.

Indeed, it is our duty and our destiny to put our muscles to this
lever and engage both the Atlantic and Pacific communities in the
greater cause of building a new century. A new century defined not by
conflict, but by cooperation. Not by its perils, but by its promise.

In the Asia-Pacific region, being Archimedes means strengthening the
U.S.-Japan security alliance -- as we are doing with our ongoing
negotiations to orient it to the challenges of the 21st century --
ensuring that it continues to be a calming force for peace and
stability throughout the region.

It means maintaining a strong alliance with the Republic of Korea,
ready for any contingency in the near term, and ready to promote our
shared interests in the long term, even after the division of the
Peninsula ends.

It means enhancing our relationships with friends and allies in
Southeast Asia, which will soon overtake Europe as our second largest
overseas export market and is of growing importance to American
security.

Being Archimedes in the Asia-Pacific also means following a strategy
of engagement with China: working with China where we can, disagreeing
where we must, and doing what we can to ensure a future where China
contributes to the tides of economic dynamism, cooperation and trust
that are filling the Pacific Basin.

On the other side of the globe, across the Atlantic in Europe, playing
the role of Archimedes means that America must team up with our NATO
allies to complete the dream first spoken by George Marshall when he
strode to the podium at Harvard 50 years ago.

In June of 1947, as a Europe shattered by war struggled to rise to its
feet, Marshall dared to imagine Europe as a new continent -- healed,
whole, and free -- at peace with itself and with the world, and linked
to America across a bridge of help, hope, and heritage.

Marshall's vision became the Marshall Plan. Half of Europe embraced
the Marshall Plan and built strong democracies, strong economies and a
strong alliance called NATO. But half of Europe was denied the
Marshall Plan when Joseph Stalin slammed the Iron Curtain down upon
the fingers of America's helping hand.

Two weeks ago in Madrid, America and our European allies took historic
steps toward completing Marshall's vision.

First, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to develop genuine cooperation
with both Russia and Ukraine. The Founding Act with Russia, signed in
May, and the NATO-Ukraine Charter, signed in Madrid, will set NATO on
a future course of consultation and cooperation with these two great
European nations, giving Moscow a voice -- but not a veto or a vote --
in Brussels, and allowing NATO to forge closer ties with a Ukraine
that is rapidly becoming a model nation in promoting pan-European
cooperation. Together, the two documents soundly refute the argument
that NATO enlargement is creating "new dividing lines" in Europe.

I saw this with my own eyes when I traveled to Lviv right after the
Madrid summit to attend a Partnership for Peace exercise involving
forces from the United States, Ukraine, and nine other former Warsaw
Pact nations, all gathered together on what used to be the largest
Soviet military training ground in Europe.

The American forces, you should know, were from the California
National Guard, which has established a sister relationship with
Ukraine's armed forces. It was a truly inspiring sight. On soil that
once suffered the footfalls of troops from one-half of Europe training
for war with the other half, forces from all over Europe came to train
for peace.

But, of course, the largest step NATO took in Madrid toward completing
Marshall's vision of a new Europe was to invite three new democracies
-- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic -- to enter into accession
negotiations leading to full NATO membership.

In choosing these three nations, NATO recognized the enormous progress
they have made in building their new democracies, opening up their
economies, and modernizing their military forces. But NATO also made
very clear in Madrid that the first new members shall not be the last.
The door to NATO membership must, and will, remain open to all those
able to share the responsibilities of membership.

And as President Clinton, Secretary Albright and I fanned out across
the Continent in the days following the Madrid summit, the message we
carried, both to those nations selected for membership and to those
who still have a ways to go, is that the responsibilities of
membership are very great indeed.

Enlargement means extending the most solemn guarantees a nation can
make -- a commitment to the security of another. So in Warsaw, Prague
and Budapest, the three of us underscored that being a NATO member
means becoming contributors -- not merely consumers -- of security.
And so we emphasized the need for them to continue to modernize their
armed forces and make them interoperable with NATO forces. I can
assure you that I have no doubt that by the time these three nations
join the Alliance in 1999, the addition of their armed forces will
indeed make NATO not simply larger, but stronger.

The benefits of a larger, stronger NATO are enormous, both for Europe
and for America.

One need look no further than the history books to understand that
when Europe is safe, America is more secure. And when peace in Europe
is threatened, so too is America. As President Clinton said last May,
"Europe's fate and America's future" are inextricably linked.

Twice before in this century, thousands of Americans have fought and
died defending freedom in Europe. Yet in the last 50 years, American
blood has not been shed fighting a war in Europe. The reason for that
is NATO. As Secretary Albright said, "We have learned that alliances
make the threat of force more credible, and therefore the use of force
less likely -- that by promising to fight if necessary, we can make it
less necessary to fight."

No one doubts that America has important security interests at stake
in central and eastern Europe. NATO enlargement will help deter
threats to those interests from arising. It embodies the wisdom that
liberty enlarged is liberty ensured. And it will replace the
artificial lines that divided the Continent with a wider circle of
security that will make the alliance stronger and better able to
protect peace and prevent future war.

The second reason to enlarge NATO is to defend Europe's gains towards
democracy and prosperity. An enlarged NATO can do for all Europe what
NATO has already done for Western Europe, providing the security and
stability for new democracies to flourish, just as it once did for
Germany, Italy, and Spain.

This same security and stability are also key ingredients to
furthering prosperity both in the United States and in Europe. The
stability that NATO provides to Europe does not simply help us avoid
the costs of future wars, it is also the basis for investment, trade
and economic growth that benefit Americans and Europeans alike, from
Berkeley to Budapest and beyond.

A third reason to enlarge NATO is to help create a climate of peace
throughout the Continent, prevent local rivalries, diminish the
incentives for competing arms buildups, and foster a realm of trust
and cooperation where members can resolve their differences through
negotiation rather than confrontation.

Just the prospect of enlargement has been a powerful force for peace
these past few years, causing countries to dramatically improve their
relations with their neighbors and restructure their militaries under
democratic civilian control. This dynamic has melted away old disputes
between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania,
Italy and Slovenia, Germany and the Czech Republic.

These are the same types of disputes that caused World War I, the same
disputes that Hitler played upon to start World War II, and the same
disputes that led to the worst killing in Europe since World War II,
in the former Yugoslavia. Today, the enlargement process is causing
nations to fix these disputes, instead of allowing them to fester, or
to be fanned by narrow-minded nationalists.

Finally, NATO enlargement will right the wrongs of the past, offering
security and stability to nations that suffered greatly from five
decades of Soviet oppression. Failing to enlarge would amount to
validating the line Joseph Stalin drew in 1945 and which two
generations of Americans and Europeans fought to overcome. It would --
again, in the words of Secretary Albright -- "mock half a century of
sacrifices on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and would create a
permanent source of tension in the heart of Europe."

Some have maintained that despite these benefits of an enlarged NATO,
the cost to America will simply be too high -- both in treasure and in
potential blood. This is simply false. The Defense Department's best
estimate is that the direct incremental costs to the United States
will be on the order of 100 to 200 million dollars a year for a period
of 10 years. These numbers could change as we develop a better
understanding of what is needed to make new members better able to
operate with NATO forces and better able to host NATO forces in the
event of a crisis. In fact, some of our technical experts believe we
have overestimated the likely cost.

But I can tell you with confidence that while an adequate defense is
always expensive, alliances make it cheaper -- both because costs are
shared, and because when forces are interoperable they are more
effective and efficient. And I can tell you with certainty that the
costs of NATO enlargement are truly a pittance when weighed against
the blood and treasure we would spend fighting another war in Europe
-- a war caused by instability that we failed to prevent when we
failed to enlarge.

The essence of the challenge facing America, both across the Atlantic
and across the Pacific, was well put in another speech given across
the Bay in Berkeley. In this speech, the speaker noted that in "Europe
... in the Middle East, in Indonesia, in China ... in Japan and Korea
the character and strength of (America's) leadership may well be
decisive in the present situation. Evad(ing) the issue by inaction ...
would vacate our dominant position of leadership and thereby revert
(us) to a secondary role -- a role which inevitably would deprive each
of us of those American principles of freedom and justice we have
always upheld by every means available." And, I would add, (it would)
deprive us of the fruits of economic growth.

This speech was given at the 1948 UC Berkeley Charter Day celebration
by George Marshall as he was barnstorming the country to garner
support for his plan. Today, Marshall's prescient words echo down to
us across the decades, underscoring the importance of holding up the
lamplight of history so that we do not stumble on the footpath to the
future.

In closing, let me share a thought uttered by Winston Churchill at a
dinner he hosted many years ago for the journalist Stuart Alsop. After
dinner, having indulged in some champagne and a touch of brandy,
Churchill said, "America. America. A great and powerful country. Like
some strong horse, pulling the rest of the world out behind it out of
the Slough of Despond towards peace and prosperity." Then he fixed his
cold blue eyes on Alsop accusingly, and asked: "But will America stay
the course?" Nearly 50 years later, we can answer his question.
America has stayed the course because that is our responsibility. We
will stay the course, because that is our destiny.

***********