A remarkably successful year in U.S.-Russian relations
Valdaiclub.com interview with Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates
[Introduction in original:] The ratification of the new START agreement by both sides will not raise the U.S.-Russian partnership to a new level. It will create a foundation for doing that. But hard work remains to reach agreement on such difficult matters as European security architecture, interaction in the former Soviet space, management of the Arctic region, and next steps on Iran.
Valdaiclub.com interview with Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates
How do you assess the ratification of START treaty? What does this step mean for the «global zero» strategy of President Obama?
The U.S. Senate's ratification of the new START agreement caps a remarkably successful year in U.S.-Russian relations that witnessed closer cooperation on Iran, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan; approval of the U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement on civil nuclear cooperation (the so-called 123 Agreement), and significant progress on Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization. The treaty, assuming it is now ratified by the Russian side, will help build trust and confidence between Russia and the United States, in part by establishing an on-site inspection regime to replace the one that lapsed a year ago. That will provide a firmer foundation for U.S.-Russian relations, on which, one hopes, the two sides will build in coming years.
Failure to ratify START would have been a near fatal blow to President Obama's goal of "a world without nuclear weapons." But strangely it does little to advance it. The reductions in the American and Russian arsenals stipulated by the treaty are modest at best; in fact, the counting rules create the possibility that the two countries will have more actual warheads deployed than they would have had under the Moscow Treaty, which the new START supercedes. (All warheads on a strategic bomber, for example, count as just one warhead under the new START.) Moreover, this agreement will do little, if anything, to persuade other nuclear-weapons state that they should reduce their nuclear arsenals, in part because the American and Russian arsenals will remain an order of magnitude larger than those of other states.
Do you think that the ratification of START treaty by the both sides will raise the partnership relations between Russia and the U.S. to a new level?
The ratification of the new START agreement by both sides will not raise the U.S.-Russian partnership to a new level. It will create a foundation for doing that. But hard work remains to reach agreement on such difficult matters as European security architecture, interaction in the former Soviet space, management of the Arctic region, and next steps on Iran. Genuine cooperation on these matters would raise U.S.-Russian partnership to a new level.
What impact on the deployment of the U.S. missile defense in Europe the ratification of START treaty will have? Does it mean the end for the US unilateral approach in this question?
None. As part of the ratification process in the United States, President Obama pledged to continue with the missile defense program that he launched last year, after a long review of various options. Talks on a joint U.S.-European-Russian system will continue, but it would take substantial progress in those talks, concrete evidence of a commitment to build an effective missile defense system, before the United States would reconsider continuing its own missile defense program.
Just a last question concerning the U.S.missile defense strategy in Europe: could it undermine a goodwill of Presidents of U.S.A. und Russia and the character of ratification of new START treaty? Or is it really evidence for confidential bilateral relations between our nations in the future?
In the preamble, the new START agreement notes the interrelationship between defensive and offensive systems, but the language is not binding. Russian and American positions on missile defense clearly differ. Foreign Minister Lavrov has said that Russia will withdraw from the new START if there are qualitative or quantitative improvements in the American missile defense system that Russia believes threaten its nuclear deterrent. President Obama, in order to secure the necessary votes in the Senate to ratify the agreement, gave written assurances that he would continue with the American missile defense system now being constructed in Europe (and elsewhere), which is independent of anything that NATO might do, alone or with Russia. That said, NATO-Russian, and bilateral U.S.-Russian, cooperation on missile defense, if pursued in good faith could eventually lead to a situation in which the various missile defense projects are integrated in a way that provides effective defense while alleviating Russia's concern that this system might undermine its nuclear deterrent. This is now one of the key challenges for U.S.-Russian relations. The final ratification of the new START agreement should encourage both sides to be bolder and more creative in the approach to missile defense cooperation.
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