VOA Russian Service Crossfire: Putin Seeks a Broader Role for Russia in the Middle East
Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2012
Subject: VOA Russian Service Crossfire: Putin Seeks a Broader Role for Russia in the Middle East
From: Donald Jensen donald.jensen8@gmail.com
Voice of America
Russian Service
Crossfire
www1.voanews.com/
Russian/news
June 28, 2012
Putin Seeks a Broader Role for Russia in the Middle East
By Donald N. Jensen
Vladimir Putin took his latest step toward reorienting Russian foreign policy this week, travelling to Israel, the Palestinian West Bank and Jordan. The visit, his first to the Middle East since returning to the presidency last March, tried to achieve a difficult diplomatic balance: strengthening Moscow's already good ties with Israel while cultivating Arab world leaders. Putin also sought to show that the United States, the traditional great power in the area, is not the only outside power that can wield influence there. The trip comes during a period of declining Russian influence due to the Syrian government's harsh suppression of its opposition and the failure of international efforts to subject Iran's nuclear program to strict international oversight. Russia is widely seen as tilting toward both regimes. Moscow is also concerned about the impact of the Arab spring, which has brought to power new leaders less beholden to the Kremlin and raised concerns in the Kremlin that the rise of militant Islamists could inspire similar movements in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Putin played a relatively weak hand this week with some bravado:
In Israel, home to a large Russian immigrant population, Putin unveiled a war memorial to commemorate the contributions of the Red Army to liberating Nazi death camps. He discussed Iran and other regional issues with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak. Putin reassured Israeli President Peres that Russia has "a national interest in preserving Israel's peace. However, he warned against any Israeli military action against Iran, noting that Jerusalem should learn from the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Putin described discussions with Natanyahu about Syria as "useful." In talks on Tuesday with Palestinian Authority President Abbas Putin praised his counterpart for what he said was a "responsible" position in negotiations with Israel, frozen since 2008, and said Russia has no problem recognizing a Palestinian state. He also criticized "unilateral Israeli actions, an apparent reference to Israeli settlement construction. Later in the day Putin discussed the Syria crisis, the stalled Middle East peace talks and the Iran nuclear program with King Abdullah of Jordan. Russia also may help Jordan with building a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes and modernizing an oil terminal on the Gulf of Aqaba.
Even as Putin played international statesman, Moscow's ultimate intentions regarding Syria remained nevertheless a matter of considerable uncertainty. On the one hand, according to Western press reports, Moscow has told former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that Russia backs his proposal for a national unity that could include opposition members. That plan, according to one draft, would exclude from power "anyone whose position could undermine a settlement" language implying Assad would have to go and suggesting to some observers that Russian support for the Syrian dictator may be slipping. The Russian press, moreover, has reported that Moscow cancelled a deal to supply S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Syria, a decision Israeli Defense Minster Barak attributed to Israeli lobbying during Putin's visit. (Sales of other weaponry to Damascus will apparently continue). The Annan proposal is to be discussed at a summit in Geneva on June 30 that Russia, the other permanent members of the Security Council, and other key players in the Middle East (Iran was not been invited to participate, despite Russian pressure).
On the other hand, Russia has repeatedly denied reports it would dump Assad at least as part of a negotiated deal that it considered externally imposed regime change. Foreign Minister Lavrov said at a press conference in Moscow June 28 that the Geneva meeting would focus on getting the Syrian opposition to soften their demands and condemned reports that Assad's fate has been decided as an "unscrupulous approach to diplomacy." Whatever Moscow's actual plan for Assad, Russia above all wishes to improve its standing in the region by appearing to act as a peace broker. [DJ Note: The Geneva meeting adopted a watered-down version of the Annan plan which left unanswered the question whether the Syrian leader must step down or could be a part of a transitional government].
Such a lack of clarity about Russian intentions is not limited just to the current Syria crisis. Moscow's approach in recent years to Libya and Iran also was a two-headed one that seemed to fully satisfy neither side of those issues. Russia's assessment of these crises likely has its roots not only in the Kremlin's nuanced calculations of Russian national interest. Rather, as noted political scientist Lilia Shevtsova has recently pointed out about Putin's Russia more generally, Moscow's positions derive from deeper, contradictory impulses within the Russian elite that seek simultaneously to create an image of Russia as a modern European state and also lead it to view the world with the "fears, phobias, and complexes" that accompany the regime's domestic hold on power, including the ingrained suspicion that the West is an enemy that cannot be trusted. These impulses are not likely to be resolved by a slickly managed whirlwind trip by the Russian president, nor by Lavrov's diplomatic dexterity. The Russian elites often demonstrate considerable tactical skills, Shevtsova reminds us, but clever tactics often mask the absence of a coherent strategic vision.Vladimir Putin took his latest step toward reorienting Russian foreign policy this week, travelling to Israel, the Palestinian West Bank and Jordan. The visit, his first to the Middle East since returning to the presidency last March, tried to achieve a difficult diplomatic balance: strengthening Moscow's already good ties with Israel while cultivating Arab world leaders. Putin also sought to show that the United States, the traditional great power in the area, is not the only outside power that can wield influence there.
The trip comes during a period of declining Russian influence due to the Syrian government's harsh suppression of its opposition and the failure of international efforts to subject Iran's nuclear program to strict international oversight. Russia is widely seen as tilting toward both regimes. Moscow is also concerned about the impact of the Arab spring, which has brought to power new leaders less beholden to the Kremlin and raised concerns in the Kremlin that the rise of militant Islamists could inspire similar movements in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Putin played a relatively weak hand this week with some bravado:
In Israel, home to a large Russian immigrant population, Putin unveiled a war memorial to commemorate the contributions of the Red Army to liberating Nazi death camps. He discussed Iran and other regional issues with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak. Putin reassured Israeli President Peres that Russia has "a national interest in preserving Israel's peace. However, he warned against any Israeli military action against Iran, noting that Jerusalem should learn from the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Putin described discussions with Natanyahu about Syria as "useful." In talks on Tuesday with Palestinian Authority President Abbas Putin praised his counterpart for what he said was a "responsible" position in negotiations with Israel, frozen since 2008, and said Russia has no problem recognizing a Palestinian state. He also criticized "unilateral Israeli actions, an apparent reference to Israeli settlement construction. Later in the day Putin discussed the Syria crisis, the stalled Middle East peace talks and the Iran nuclear program with King Abdullah of Jordan. Russia also may help Jordan with building a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes and modernizing an oil terminal on the Gulf of Aqaba.
Even as Putin played international statesman, Moscow's ultimate intentions regarding Syria remained nevertheless a matter of considerable uncertainty. On the one hand, according to Western press reports, Moscow has told former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that Russia backs his proposal for a national unity that could include opposition members. That plan, according to one draft, would exclude from power "anyone whose position could undermine a settlement" language implying Assad would have to go and suggesting to some observers that Russian support for the Syrian dictator may be slipping. The Russian press, moreover, has reported that Moscow cancelled a deal to supply S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Syria, a decision Israeli Defense Minster Barak attributed to Israeli lobbying during Putin's visit. (Sales of other weaponry to Damascus will apparently continue). The Annan proposal is to be discussed at a summit in Geneva on June 30 that Russia, the other permanent members of the Security Council, and other key players in the Middle East (Iran was not been invited to participate, despite Russian pressure).
On the other hand, Russia has repeatedly denied reports it would dump Assad at least as part of a negotiated deal that it considered externally imposed regime change. Foreign Minister Lavrov said at a press conference in Moscow June 28 that the Geneva meeting would focus on getting the Syrian opposition to soften their demands and condemned reports that Assad's fate has been decided as an "unscrupulous approach to diplomacy." Whatever Moscow's actual plan for Assad, Russia above all wishes to improve its standing in the region by appearing to act as a peace broker. [DJ Note: The Geneva meeting adopted a watered-down version of the Annan plan which left unanswered the question whether the Syrian leader must step down or could be a part of a transitional government].
Such a lack of clarity about Russian intentions is not limited just to the current Syria crisis. Moscow's approach in recent years to Libya and Iran also was a two-headed one that seemed to fully satisfy neither side of those issues. Russia's assessment of these crises likely has its roots not only in the Kremlin's nuanced calculations of Russian national interest. Rather, as noted political scientist Lilia Shevtsova has recently pointed out about Putin's Russia more generally, Moscow's positions derive from deeper, contradictory impulses within the Russian elite that seek simultaneously to create an image of Russia as a modern European state and also lead it to view the world with the "fears, phobias, and complexes" that accompany the regime's domestic hold on power, including the ingrained suspicion that the West is an enemy that cannot be trusted. These impulses are not likely to be resolved by a slickly managed whirlwind trip by the Russian president, nor by Lavrov's diplomatic dexterity. The Russian elites often demonstrate considerable tactical skills, Shevtsova reminds us, but clever tactics often mask the absence of a coherent strategic vision.
