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In his biggest presidential election campaign speech so far, Vladimir Putin called on his supporters on February 23 to be ready to fight for the country and die for it, invoking Napoleon's 1812 ill-fated invasion of Russia. What war is Putin preparing Russia for? How realistic is his threat assessment and his proposals to counter potential threats? How realistic and effective is Putin's defense modernization program? Is there a domestic political rationale in Putin's new jingoism? Putin has built his campaign around fighting not his opponents in the race (they do not present a serious threat to him and have been carefully pre-screened before being allowed to run), but enemies abroad, mainly the United States, who covet Russia's oil and other mineral resources while driving Russia's citizens to behave treacherously, i.e. dare to protest against Putin's return to the Kremlin for at least another six years.

On February 20, Putin published another one of his long-winded campaign manifestos, focusing this time around on national defense and international security issues. An abridged version of this text has even been reprinted in Foreign Policy Magazine.

Putin started with the premise that other countries are coveting Russia's natural resources and its vast territory. Although he did not name any particular nation that has advanced such claims against Russia, his supporters routinely ascribe such intentions to the United States. "In a world of upheaval there is always the temptation to resolve one's problems at another's expense, through pressure and force. It is no surprise that some are calling for resources of global significance to be freed from the exclusive sovereignty of a single nation. This cannot happen to Russia, not even hypothetically," he wrote.

To buttress his defense of Russia against a potential new invasion, Putin promised to dispense about $750 billion before 2020 for new weapons procurement and boosting pay for the military. Putin's arms modernization effort and his defense posture plans are centered on countering the U.S. threat and maintaining strategic nuclear parity with America. "We are being pushed into action by the U.S. and NATO missile defense policies. A global balance of forces can be guaranteed either by building our own missile defense shield ­ an expensive and to date largely ineffective undertaking ­ or by developing the ability to overcome any missile defense system and protect Russia's retaliation potential, which is far more effective. Russia's military and technical response to the U.S. global missile defense system and its European section will be effective and asymmetrical," he said.

At a meeting with leading Russian defense analysts last week, Putin said that maintaining strategic nuclear parity and mutual deterrence with the United States is "Russia's obligation before humanity," implying that without the Russian deterrence the United States might seek world domination. He claimed that the United States was seeking "a monopoly on invincibility" by developing strategic missile defenses and that the Russian response to the American missile defense should deny the United States this capability.

Putin also said that Russia would not undertake any additional mutual nuclear reductions with the United States without the involvement and corresponding reductions by other nuclear powers, thus crushing any hopes the Barack Obama administration might have had about further cuts in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Putin, however, did not discuss other threats to Russian security from different geographical directions, for example, from Central Asia, Middle East and China, although this is where, in the view of many Russian and Western analysts, most of the real threats to Russian security emanate from. Putin remains fixated on the United States and NATO as the primary source of the military threat to Russia that requires a forceful response.

Putin also hopes to convert his defense plans into Soviet-style technological modernization, with civilian spin-offs generated by the advanced defense industry. This is in contrast to Dmitry Medvedev's focus on the natural growth of the civilian innovation economy with international technology hubs like Skolkovo. "The huge resources invested in modernizing our military-industrial complex and re-equipping the army must serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research," Putin wrote.

Putin believes that defense modernization will not bankrupt Russia's treasury, although many leading economists, including Putin's former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, have warned that the planned defense outlays were unsustainable and were not really paid for with realistic revenue projections.

What war is Putin preparing Russia for? How realistic is his threat assessment and his proposals to counter potential threats? Should Russia focus on defense against the western threat or should it focus its defense efforts on threats from the south and the east? How realistic and effective is Putin's defense modernization program? Would the proposed investments in weapons procurement and defense R&D pay off in modernizing Russia's civilian industries and generating civilian innovation spin-offs? Is there a domestic political rationale in Putin's new jingoism? With his opponents now able to muster tens of thousands of supporters in the street, will Putin continue to need a "U.S. menace" bogeyman in order to rule effectively?

Dale Herspring, University Distinguished Professor, Kansas State University, Kansas City, M

This was not a war preparation speech, especially if one has been following the evolution of Russia's still incomplete military "modernization" program. Putin noted some "accomplishments" the Ministry of Defense believes it has made, but unfortunately he left out important areas where the Kremlin is yet to make hard decisions. To cite just one: he did not discuss the role non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are to play. Frankly, this appears to be one of the most difficult decisions facing the high command: just how much authority is it prepared to give such individuals, or is it going to keep junior officers doing the kind of things that NCOs do in the West. Based on what I have seen, this appears to be the primary reason for adding 70,000 officers after they had been giving their walking papers.

Putin also did not make it clear how the Kremlin is going to clean up the corruption that pervades the military-industrial complex. Dmitry Rogozin has been giving one speech after another on the issue, but it is not clear that he has a "realistic" formula for dealing with the topic

As far at the United States is concerned, in my opinion Putin is too pragmatic to make it a permanent enemy. If he wasn't, he would have torn up the papers dealing with Moscow's willingness to cooperate by transferring supplies for Afghanistan. This approach gives him cover in case a Republican wins. Once the U.S. election is over, I suspect Moscow will reevaluate relations at that time. In the meantime, relations will probably stay as they are

Eric Kraus, Private Fund Manager, Moscow

The question itself seems slightly absurd. One of the incontrovertible benefits of nuclear fusion has been the fact that frontal wars between great powers are now a thing of the past. Russia will no sooner be engaged in a land war with America than in a territorial war with China or, for that matter, in a replay of the Punic Wars.

This is not, of course, to suggest that warfare has suddenly become outmoded. Countries will continue to use military force to get their ways whenever they believe they can do so.

Since 1945, warfare between the great powers has been conducted via proxy wars. The American invasion of Vietnam in response to a fictional Chinese threat, the Bay of Pigs, the devastation of Cambodia, Soviet actions in Africa and Afghanistan and the NATO bombings of Serbia and Libya are all examples of modern asymmetric warfare ­ in which the great powers tend to attack countries that are unable to defend themselves or to inflict reciprocal damage on the aggressor.

The Georgian aggression against South Ossetia, encouraged and funded by the United States, certainly demonstrated the very unfortunate necessity for Russia to be able to field an adequate military response to dissuade adventures. There is a very real danger of unrest in the newly independent Southern republics, as well as a likelihood that at some point, Russia will be compelled to see off a Western attack on a friendly country. Certainly, the supine approach of a debilitated and traumatized Boris Yeltsin administration to the NATO attack upon Serbia would not be repeated under a Putin administration.

It was hoped that the end of the Cold War would yield a peace dividend. Unfortunately, the actual outcome was very much the opposite. The United States has effectively bankrupted itself with its military adventures in the Middle-East, Europe continues to spend money it does not have on military technology, and Russia has little choice but to respond in kind or to be faced with the risk of having to cede to the threat of military pressure.

Despite claims to the opposite, one can imagine no global situation more dangerous than that of a single military power able to work its will unimpeded upon any of its neighbors. Even if one were to believe that the current holder of this unique power was benevolent, even a perfunctory look at history will show that political systems can quickly slide into outright malevolence given the vagaries of politics. It is certainly not a risk that Russia can afford to run.

Global political alignments are currently moving into a system of multiple political blocs, in some way reminiscent of the beginning of the 20th century. Russia will almost certainly find its place alongside China ­ perhaps in its shadow, perhaps as a junior partner ­ but very certainly in alignment. That effective alliance has constituted the great own-goal of the Western powers and their insane Russia policy, a policy blunder that future generations of historians shall long discuss.

Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC

In anticipation of victory in Sunday's presidential election, Vladimir Putin has published a bold manifesto outlining Russia's national security agenda. Macho comments of this nature are in keeping with politicians running for high office almost everywhere and should be taken with the preverbal "grain of salt." Nonetheless, since Putin controls a nuclear strike force capable of destroying much of the world, his comments are deserving of serious scrutiny. They have perplexed analysts both inside of Russia and abroad.

First off, given its awesome nuclear arsenal, it is inconceivable that any adversary would wage war against Russia. This is certainly the case of the United States, which Putin has demonized in what amounts to a presidential campaign. His counterparts in Washington know that his intemperate remarks are for domestic consumption, but when the leader of a great country makes them, they have consequences. They not only make Russia's neighbors anxious, they unnerve leaders in the West, including some who continue to harbor the same Cold War demons that haunt Putin and his associates.

Since Putin has the capacity to win this Sunday's election without any saber rattling, they are gratuitous. And it is troubling to those in Washington who want to cooperate with Russia ­ despite areas of friction ­ in addressing shared international security problems

Secondly, to protect itself Russia must have a conventional as well as a nuclear deterrent capability. That said, some of Putin's critics at home warn that if Putin intends to create a conventional capability that matches the American one, he will fail. To reach that conclusion all one needs to do is to compare Russia's population and economy with the world's only superpower.

Efforts to reform the military must be aligned with Russia's capabilities and the growing economic expectations of its people. Above all, those military planners who use Cold War criteria to justify a surge in the country's conventional forces must instead assess the strategic environment as it truly exists in the early 21st century, i.e. one where large general purpose forces may not serve Russia's military requirements.

Thirdly, many proponents of Russian modernization have expressed concern with Putin's assertion that "The huge resources invested in modernizing our military-industrial complex and re-equipping the army must serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditures fund new jobs, support market demand, and facilitate scientific research." But economists deem it a mistake to rely upon Russia's military-industrial complex to take the economy to a new level of development.

If the Kremlin chooses this path, it will eventually take the country down a "dead-end." Russia is blessed with enormous natural resources and gifted scientists, engineers and well-educated men and women capable of producing a prosperous country. But to tether Russia's future to a problematic military development drive is neither in the interest of Russia nor the world community. It ultimately will lead to stagnation and an upsurge in public discontent. Now is the time to take a more productive course, one that requires a truly pluralistic political system.

Unfortunately, those individuals who have become wealthy as a consequence of Putin's system will fight any effort to change it even if it is the national interest to do so. There are those among the elite that realize that this contradiction guarantees a problematic future for the country, but they do not possess the means to reboot Putin's "power vertical." That is unfortunate for the surging middleclass, the more enlightened members of the elite who could find a path out of the existing cul-de-sac.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Is Putin preparing Russia for war?

In his treatise "Epitoma Rei Militaris," Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (4th to 5th century AD) states "si vis pacem, para bellum" ­ "if you want peace, prepare for war." This is one of the constants of all recorded human history: strong military powers are not attacked, disarmed nations invite aggression. This truth is well understood in the Pentagon, where analysts define peace as "the temporary suspension of hostilities." Observe the words "temporary" and "suspension."

The ugly reality of human history is that only evident and overwhelming military strength is a deterrent that sustains peace. This was true in the times of the Pharaohs, in Vegetius' time and remains true today.

Therefore, by initiating an armaments strategy for Russia Putin is following Vegetius' advice, and in fact is trying to provide Russia with solid peace ­ by increasing the credibility of its military deterrence. He is not preparing Russia for war.

Russia is a special country concerning war experience. Over centuries of its history Russia has had to repel many aggressors at huge social costs ­ most recently, during 1941 to 1945 (in less than four years) Russia lost some 20 million of its people. There is literally no family in Russia that has no wartime losses. From this perspective, a need to maintain a strong military flows logically from Russian historic experience and a realistic assessment of the present world, with its constant warfare.

Putin's armaments budget, spread until 2020 ­ eight years from our present ­ works out to an annual expense rate of $90 plus billion. As comparison, the U.S. defense budget for just the fiscal year 2012-2013 is over $520 billion ­ almost six times greater than the equivalent proposed by Putin. Note that America has nowhere near the tragic history of social impact of war that Russia has. The last time a foreign army operated on U.S. continental territory was in 1812 ­ 200 years ago.

The conventional economic contraposition "guns or butter" is very antiquated. Even in the late 19th century defense establishments became so diversified, complex and integrated into national economies that it is no longer "guns or butter," but "guns are butter." The annual $90 billion of defense expenditure proposed by Putin will be a strong economic stimulus for Russia's domestic economy and for its imports. Economies thrive when building anything, and armaments are no exception.

At least 85 percent of modern technological advance is due to defense initiatives. One only needs to consider the computer (the "bombes" of Bletchley Park), jet aircraft, space flight, antibiotics, nuclear power, the Internet. The United States has an entire innovation sector for defense ­ DARPA, which quite remarkably Russia is yet to replicate.

Is Putin's program aimed at America? Actions speak louder than words and the reality is that over the past two decades, U.S. actions regarding Russia have had more hostile content than peace-building one.

Just as Russia was actively reducing its strategic posture toward the United States, Washington was unwilling to self-restrain and expanded NATO, dismantled Yugoslavia, and now is adamant about not promising that the euro-ABM system, which will be deployed by the United States, will not be used against Russia in the future. Add to these actions numerous statements by such prominent Washingtonians as Senator John McCain and former State Secretary Madeleine Albright, who once lamented the "unfairness" of Russia having so much territory rich in natural resources ­ and one can understand why America is so prominent in Russia's leadership strategic planning. Imagine what the American response would be if the situation was diametrically reversed.

Keywords: Russia, Foreign Policy, Security - Russia News - Russia

 

In his biggest presidential election campaign speech so far, Vladimir Putin called on his supporters on February 23 to be ready to fight for the country and die for it, invoking Napoleon's 1812 ill-fated invasion of Russia. What war is Putin preparing Russia for? How realistic is his threat assessment and his proposals to counter potential threats? How realistic and effective is Putin's defense modernization program? Is there a domestic political rationale in Putin's new jingoism?

Putin has built his campaign around fighting not his opponents in the race (they do not present a serious threat to him and have been carefully pre-screened before being allowed to run), but enemies abroad, mainly the United States, who covet Russia's oil and other mineral resources while driving Russia's citizens to behave treacherously, i.e. dare to protest against Putin's return to the Kremlin for at least another six years.

On February 20, Putin published another one of his long-winded campaign manifestos, focusing this time around on national defense and international security issues. An abridged version of this text has even been reprinted in Foreign Policy Magazine.

Putin started with the premise that other countries are coveting Russia's natural resources and its vast territory. Although he did not name any particular nation that has advanced such claims against Russia, his supporters routinely ascribe such intentions to the United States. "In a world of upheaval there is always the temptation to resolve one's problems at another's expense, through pressure and force. It is no surprise that some are calling for resources of global significance to be freed from the exclusive sovereignty of a single nation. This cannot happen to Russia, not even hypothetically," he wrote.

To buttress his defense of Russia against a potential new invasion, Putin promised to dispense about $750 billion before 2020 for new weapons procurement and boosting pay for the military. Putin's arms modernization effort and his defense posture plans are centered on countering the U.S. threat and maintaining strategic nuclear parity with America. "We are being pushed into action by the U.S. and NATO missile defense policies. A global balance of forces can be guaranteed either by building our own missile defense shield ­ an expensive and to date largely ineffective undertaking ­ or by developing the ability to overcome any missile defense system and protect Russia's retaliation potential, which is far more effective. Russia's military and technical response to the U.S. global missile defense system and its European section will be effective and asymmetrical," he said.

At a meeting with leading Russian defense analysts last week, Putin said that maintaining strategic nuclear parity and mutual deterrence with the United States is "Russia's obligation before humanity," implying that without the Russian deterrence the United States might seek world domination. He claimed that the United States was seeking "a monopoly on invincibility" by developing strategic missile defenses and that the Russian response to the American missile defense should deny the United States this capability.

Putin also said that Russia would not undertake any additional mutual nuclear reductions with the United States without the involvement and corresponding reductions by other nuclear powers, thus crushing any hopes the Barack Obama administration might have had about further cuts in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Putin, however, did not discuss other threats to Russian security from different geographical directions, for example, from Central Asia, Middle East and China, although this is where, in the view of many Russian and Western analysts, most of the real threats to Russian security emanate from. Putin remains fixated on the United States and NATO as the primary source of the military threat to Russia that requires a forceful response.

Putin also hopes to convert his defense plans into Soviet-style technological modernization, with civilian spin-offs generated by the advanced defense industry. This is in contrast to Dmitry Medvedev's focus on the natural growth of the civilian innovation economy with international technology hubs like Skolkovo. "The huge resources invested in modernizing our military-industrial complex and re-equipping the army must serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research," Putin wrote.

Putin believes that defense modernization will not bankrupt Russia's treasury, although many leading economists, including Putin's former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, have warned that the planned defense outlays were unsustainable and were not really paid for with realistic revenue projections.

What war is Putin preparing Russia for? How realistic is his threat assessment and his proposals to counter potential threats? Should Russia focus on defense against the western threat or should it focus its defense efforts on threats from the south and the east? How realistic and effective is Putin's defense modernization program? Would the proposed investments in weapons procurement and defense R&D pay off in modernizing Russia's civilian industries and generating civilian innovation spin-offs? Is there a domestic political rationale in Putin's new jingoism? With his opponents now able to muster tens of thousands of supporters in the street, will Putin continue to need a "U.S. menace" bogeyman in order to rule effectively?

Dale Herspring, University Distinguished Professor, Kansas State University, Kansas City, M

This was not a war preparation speech, especially if one has been following the evolution of Russia's still incomplete military "modernization" program. Putin noted some "accomplishments" the Ministry of Defense believes it has made, but unfortunately he left out important areas where the Kremlin is yet to make hard decisions. To cite just one: he did not discuss the role non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are to play. Frankly, this appears to be one of the most difficult decisions facing the high command: just how much authority is it prepared to give such individuals, or is it going to keep junior officers doing the kind of things that NCOs do in the West. Based on what I have seen, this appears to be the primary reason for adding 70,000 officers after they had been giving their walking papers.

Putin also did not make it clear how the Kremlin is going to clean up the corruption that pervades the military-industrial complex. Dmitry Rogozin has been giving one speech after another on the issue, but it is not clear that he has a "realistic" formula for dealing with the topic

As far at the United States is concerned, in my opinion Putin is too pragmatic to make it a permanent enemy. If he wasn't, he would have torn up the papers dealing with Moscow's willingness to cooperate by transferring supplies for Afghanistan. This approach gives him cover in case a Republican wins. Once the U.S. election is over, I suspect Moscow will reevaluate relations at that time. In the meantime, relations will probably stay as they are

Eric Kraus, Private Fund Manager, Moscow

The question itself seems slightly absurd. One of the incontrovertible benefits of nuclear fusion has been the fact that frontal wars between great powers are now a thing of the past. Russia will no sooner be engaged in a land war with America than in a territorial war with China or, for that matter, in a replay of the Punic Wars.

This is not, of course, to suggest that warfare has suddenly become outmoded. Countries will continue to use military force to get their ways whenever they believe they can do so.

Since 1945, warfare between the great powers has been conducted via proxy wars. The American invasion of Vietnam in response to a fictional Chinese threat, the Bay of Pigs, the devastation of Cambodia, Soviet actions in Africa and Afghanistan and the NATO bombings of Serbia and Libya are all examples of modern asymmetric warfare ­ in which the great powers tend to attack countries that are unable to defend themselves or to inflict reciprocal damage on the aggressor.

The Georgian aggression against South Ossetia, encouraged and funded by the United States, certainly demonstrated the very unfortunate necessity for Russia to be able to field an adequate military response to dissuade adventures. There is a very real danger of unrest in the newly independent Southern republics, as well as a likelihood that at some point, Russia will be compelled to see off a Western attack on a friendly country. Certainly, the supine approach of a debilitated and traumatized Boris Yeltsin administration to the NATO attack upon Serbia would not be repeated under a Putin administration.

It was hoped that the end of the Cold War would yield a peace dividend. Unfortunately, the actual outcome was very much the opposite. The United States has effectively bankrupted itself with its military adventures in the Middle-East, Europe continues to spend money it does not have on military technology, and Russia has little choice but to respond in kind or to be faced with the risk of having to cede to the threat of military pressure.

Despite claims to the opposite, one can imagine no global situation more dangerous than that of a single military power able to work its will unimpeded upon any of its neighbors. Even if one were to believe that the current holder of this unique power was benevolent, even a perfunctory look at history will show that political systems can quickly slide into outright malevolence given the vagaries of politics. It is certainly not a risk that Russia can afford to run.

Global political alignments are currently moving into a system of multiple political blocs, in some way reminiscent of the beginning of the 20th century. Russia will almost certainly find its place alongside China ­ perhaps in its shadow, perhaps as a junior partner ­ but very certainly in alignment. That effective alliance has constituted the great own-goal of the Western powers and their insane Russia policy, a policy blunder that future generations of historians shall long discuss.

Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC

In anticipation of victory in Sunday's presidential election, Vladimir Putin has published a bold manifesto outlining Russia's national security agenda. Macho comments of this nature are in keeping with politicians running for high office almost everywhere and should be taken with the preverbal "grain of salt." Nonetheless, since Putin controls a nuclear strike force capable of destroying much of the world, his comments are deserving of serious scrutiny. They have perplexed analysts both inside of Russia and abroad.

First off, given its awesome nuclear arsenal, it is inconceivable that any adversary would wage war against Russia. This is certainly the case of the United States, which Putin has demonized in what amounts to a presidential campaign. His counterparts in Washington know that his intemperate remarks are for domestic consumption, but when the leader of a great country makes them, they have consequences. They not only make Russia's neighbors anxious, they unnerve leaders in the West, including some who continue to harbor the same Cold War demons that haunt Putin and his associates.

Since Putin has the capacity to win this Sunday's election without any saber rattling, they are gratuitous. And it is troubling to those in Washington who want to cooperate with Russia ­ despite areas of friction ­ in addressing shared international security problems

Secondly, to protect itself Russia must have a conventional as well as a nuclear deterrent capability. That said, some of Putin's critics at home warn that if Putin intends to create a conventional capability that matches the American one, he will fail. To reach that conclusion all one needs to do is to compare Russia's population and economy with the world's only superpower.

Efforts to reform the military must be aligned with Russia's capabilities and the growing economic expectations of its people. Above all, those military planners who use Cold War criteria to justify a surge in the country's conventional forces must instead assess the strategic environment as it truly exists in the early 21st century, i.e. one where large general purpose forces may not serve Russia's military requirements.

Thirdly, many proponents of Russian modernization have expressed concern with Putin's assertion that "The huge resources invested in modernizing our military-industrial complex and re-equipping the army must serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditures fund new jobs, support market demand, and facilitate scientific research." But economists deem it a mistake to rely upon Russia's military-industrial complex to take the economy to a new level of development.

If the Kremlin chooses this path, it will eventually take the country down a "dead-end." Russia is blessed with enormous natural resources and gifted scientists, engineers and well-educated men and women capable of producing a prosperous country. But to tether Russia's future to a problematic military development drive is neither in the interest of Russia nor the world community. It ultimately will lead to stagnation and an upsurge in public discontent. Now is the time to take a more productive course, one that requires a truly pluralistic political system.

Unfortunately, those individuals who have become wealthy as a consequence of Putin's system will fight any effort to change it even if it is the national interest to do so. There are those among the elite that realize that this contradiction guarantees a problematic future for the country, but they do not possess the means to reboot Putin's "power vertical." That is unfortunate for the surging middleclass, the more enlightened members of the elite who could find a path out of the existing cul-de-sac.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Is Putin preparing Russia for war?

In his treatise "Epitoma Rei Militaris," Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (4th to 5th century AD) states "si vis pacem, para bellum" ­ "if you want peace, prepare for war." This is one of the constants of all recorded human history: strong military powers are not attacked, disarmed nations invite aggression. This truth is well understood in the Pentagon, where analysts define peace as "the temporary suspension of hostilities." Observe the words "temporary" and "suspension."

The ugly reality of human history is that only evident and overwhelming military strength is a deterrent that sustains peace. This was true in the times of the Pharaohs, in Vegetius' time and remains true today.

Therefore, by initiating an armaments strategy for Russia Putin is following Vegetius' advice, and in fact is trying to provide Russia with solid peace ­ by increasing the credibility of its military deterrence. He is not preparing Russia for war.

Russia is a special country concerning war experience. Over centuries of its history Russia has had to repel many aggressors at huge social costs ­ most recently, during 1941 to 1945 (in less than four years) Russia lost some 20 million of its people. There is literally no family in Russia that has no wartime losses. From this perspective, a need to maintain a strong military flows logically from Russian historic experience and a realistic assessment of the present world, with its constant warfare.

Putin's armaments budget, spread until 2020 ­ eight years from our present ­ works out to an annual expense rate of $90 plus billion. As comparison, the U.S. defense budget for just the fiscal year 2012-2013 is over $520 billion ­ almost six times greater than the equivalent proposed by Putin. Note that America has nowhere near the tragic history of social impact of war that Russia has. The last time a foreign army operated on U.S. continental territory was in 1812 ­ 200 years ago.

The conventional economic contraposition "guns or butter" is very antiquated. Even in the late 19th century defense establishments became so diversified, complex and integrated into national economies that it is no longer "guns or butter," but "guns are butter." The annual $90 billion of defense expenditure proposed by Putin will be a strong economic stimulus for Russia's domestic economy and for its imports. Economies thrive when building anything, and armaments are no exception.

At least 85 percent of modern technological advance is due to defense initiatives. One only needs to consider the computer (the "bombes" of Bletchley Park), jet aircraft, space flight, antibiotics, nuclear power, the Internet. The United States has an entire innovation sector for defense ­ DARPA, which quite remarkably Russia is yet to replicate.

Is Putin's program aimed at America? Actions speak louder than words and the reality is that over the past two decades, U.S. actions regarding Russia have had more hostile content than peace-building one.

Just as Russia was actively reducing its strategic posture toward the United States, Washington was unwilling to self-restrain and expanded NATO, dismantled Yugoslavia, and now is adamant about not promising that the euro-ABM system, which will be deployed by the United States, will not be used against Russia in the future. Add to these actions numerous statements by such prominent Washingtonians as Senator John McCain and former State Secretary Madeleine Albright, who once lamented the "unfairness" of Russia having so much territory rich in natural resources ­ and one can understand why America is so prominent in Russia's leadership strategic planning. Imagine what the American response would be if the situation was diametrically reversed.