Will Putin and Obama Reset the "Reset?"
- JRL 2012-113
This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama met for an extended face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Mexico, just more than a month after Putin snubbed Obama and skipped the G8 summit in Camp David. Could Putin and Obama reset the "reset?" Is the "reset" even salvageable? Can Syria break its back? What will happen to U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran? How would the Kremlin react to the Magnitsky Act? Will Obama replace his ambassador to Russia to save the "reset?"
Observers looked for signs of whether the much touted "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations, a policy launched by Obama to salvage the relationship from the abyss where it ended up toward the end of George W. Bush's second term, is still alive and kicking, or whether Russia and the United States are sliding back toward a bitter and, on certain international issues, confrontational stance incompatible with the "reset" agenda.
Early signs did not augur well for a productive meeting. Russia and the United States are at loggerheads on Syria, where Russia refuses to help the West topple the Bashar al-Assad regime either through an international armed intervention sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, or through an international mediation effort aimed primarily at convincing Assad to resign and leave the country.
Moscow balked at both approaches, knowing full well that its intransigence gives it a central role in the Syrian crisis. But were Russia to agree to Western demands, its role would deflate considerably and its views would be ignored, as it happened in Libya. Moscow is proposing an international conference on Syria with Iran's participation something the United States and Britain have ruled out.
On June 18 Moscow hosted the 5+1 talks with Iran on its nuclear program the last international effort to reach a peaceful settlement before new Western sanctions against Iran kick in. Since the talks largely failed to achieve any progress, the door may still be open for an Israeli-U.S. military strike aimed at Iranian nuclear facilities. Were this to happen, U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran, one of the principal accomplishments of the "reset," would be no longer tenable.
To make a complex and tense situation worse, the Obama administration decided not to oppose the Magnitsky Act, sweeping human rights legislation that would impose visa bans and asset freezes on a host of Russian officials implicated in Sergei Magnitsky's death. Moscow angrily warned that it would retaliate if the Magnitsky Act is passed.
And as per his custom, Obama's "undiplomatic" ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, has further infuriated the Kremlin with a host of outlandish statements that have ranged from accusing Moscow of bribing the Kyrgyz president to kick out the American airbase in Manas in 2008, to assuring the Kremlin that while the George W. Bush administration did sponsor "color revolutions" in the former Soviet Union, the Obama crowd has definitely not. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nearly forced to ask Obama to recall his ambassador, and even threatened to cut off his political access after the State Department advised Moscow to "get used" to McFaul's behavior.
Could Putin and Obama reset the "reset?" Is the "reset" even salvageable? Can Syria break its back? What will happen to U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran? How would the Kremlin react to the Magnitsky Act? Will Obama replace his ambassador to Russia to save the "reset?"
Eric Kraus, Private Fund Manager, Moscow
There is nothing to reset but the "reset" itself.
In its first version, the "reset" was an anachronism, harkening back to a heliocentric universe where all of the planets revolved around America. While the said "planets" had significant relations with each other, it was their relationship to the United States that counted the most. The rise of China and the BRICs, with a corresponding decline in the economic and diplomatic preponderance of the United States, as well as the failure of the U.S. military in two out of its three most recent adventures, have led to a Copernican revolution, disrupting the previous order of the diplomatic universe.
The end of the spectacularly incompetent Bush administration left the United States faced with a pressing need to normalize its damaged diplomacy, and not just with regard to Russia. Unfortunately, the first "reset" was based upon the premise that Russia was a penitent state, allowed to regain its place at the top table under the presidium of the sole superpower with the proviso that it subscribe to the diplomacy, economic policy, and indeed, spin-management style of Washington a total non-starter for Putin.
Any illusion Russia may have had in regard to the fundamental benevolence of the West was shattered by the Georgian war, as well as the perceived betrayal when Russian acquiescence to the UN resolution was hijacked to effect regime change in Libya. Diplomatic relations will henceforth be based upon realpolitik, with Russia engaging in a series of trade-offs with other great powers aimed solely at furthering Russian interests.
Fortunately, as American governance falls under the control of the business lobbies, despite all the indignant bluster, improved economic relations are in the cards. As Russia joins the WTO and seeks technology and capital to develop its northern mineral resources, Jackson-Vanik will be repealed, not out of admiration but due to pressure from agricultural and industrial lobbies.
If, as seems likely, the U.S. Senate kowtows to the Republican Party, arrogating the right to interfere in domestic Russian affairs with the Magnitsky Act, several U.S. companies will be punished, but the economic "reset" will continue. As one example, while after the revision of the Sakhalin 1 PSA there is no love lost between Exxon and the Russian state, the U.S. major desperately needs new oil provinces while Russia needs Exxon's deep water and unconventional oil and gas technologies. Decisions will be made based upon economic logic, not upon political alignment. A singularly amateurish U.S. ambassador to Russia (who a decade ago warned me that "the Russians were so afraid of China that they would be forced to sue for a military alliance with Washington under whatever terms Washington chose to dictate") may spoil the mood, but not the substance. He is irrelevant.
Neither Russia nor America is of overwhelming importance to each other's geopolitical alignment the relationship is important, but not fundamental. Russia has achieved an unaccustomed string of successes on the Eurasian front, seeing off the Western powers while seeking a balance with Chinese economic interests.
On the geopolitical front, for the past 15 years I have argued that Russia must look toward Asia for its primary economic and diplomatic orientation. China is now far and away Russia's top trading partner, with Putin's first major foreign trip being to Beijing, leading to the signing of some large and very concrete investment agreements. The best diplomatic relationships are based not upon ideology or affinity, but upon common interests. China desperately needs Russian resources mineral, agricultural, hydrological and energy. Meanwhile, Russia craves Chinese investment and technology. Both need each other to stand up to aggressive Atlantic diplomacy, in particular in the UN. The rest is literature.
Edward Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow, and Professor of World Politics, Moscow State University, Washington, DC
Putin and Obama's "normal" meeting in Mexico and their calm and professional discussion is definitely a welcome sign. It is doubtful, though, that the two leaders will be able to turn around the highly negative, even bitter and confrontational, atmosphere that has been created not only by politicians but to a large degree by the media.
At present, the main reason for such a sad state of affairs seems to be Syria. It is, however, a relatively new development, and the situation before the Syrian factor came into play was not much different.
Opponents of good U.S.-Russian relations will always find new reasons to disrupt them. During U.S. elections, said to be a "good time for bad politics," the chances for the voices of reason to be heard are minimal. Actually, Ambassador Michael McFaul, despite his sometimes controversial statements, is perhaps one of the very few U.S. officials who are trying hard to salvage the "reset," but he is under constant attacks by the media in Washington and Moscow.
If the Kremlin thinks McFaul is not good enough, just wait and see who Mitt Romney's choice would be. As the U.S. economy's problems mount and unemployment rates rise, the prospects for Romney's victory rapidly improve, too. If he wins, we should prepare for really difficult times in U.S.-Russian relations. Those who did not see the latest Neocon manifesto should take a look to get a feeling of what Obama's defeat will entail.
However, it is not only the Neocons who are after Putin's blood. "Punish the Russian abusers!" scream the editors of the Washington Post, widely known these days as "Pravda on the Potomac." Back in the Soviet Union, the original Pravda would have said, "Punish the American Aggressors!" So what's the difference?
The fairly unusual, and most dangerous, factor in the current situation is that the U.S. media both on the left and on the right is almost unanimously against the "reset." In Soviet times, those of us who supported Ronald Reagan's anti-communist crusade were attacked by the left-leaning and liberal media as warmongers, while their criticism of the Soviet Union was always much milder than that coming from the right. Nowadays, however, it is hard to say where there is more hatred for Russia, on the left or on the right.
My good friend Martin Sieff, former chief foreign correspondent for the Washington Times, wrote several articles expressing views that are different from the mainstream media's take on Syria, the Magnitsky Act, or the U.S. policy of spreading democracy around the world through so-called "color revolutions." His articles have been turned down by The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Times, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, the Christian Science Monitor, and American Conservative to name a few. Thanks to the blogosphere, one can find them, for example, on America-Russia.net. But the situation does say quite a good deal about the aforementioned papers' editors: they provide generous space for the most vicious attacks on Russia, Putin, and the "reset," and refuse to let the public hear alternative views.
There appears to be a strong unanimous desire to portray Russia as the top U.S. enemy. I wouldn't even be surprised if Russia were to be added to the "rogue states" list in the not-too-distant future. Romney's "geopolitical enemy number one" definition implies as much or something even worse than that. Admittedly, Moscow is partly to blame for miserably failing in this informational warfare.
However, the main problem is with America's bad foreign policy and the media's dangerous push toward worsening U.S.-Russian relations that will undermine the United States and its allies' security interests. It looks more likely that whatever gains Obama was able to achieve with his "reset" policy to correct the mistakes of his predecessor, these gains are quickly dissipated by the stupidity of politicians, the influence of the lobbies for special interest groups and the media's irresponsible stance.
Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA
Ever since it entered the vocabulary of Russian-American relations, the word "reset" seems to be misinterpreted by a vocal, optimistic and enthusiastic segment of the Muscovite punditry. The word "reset," one should point out, does not mean "to improve" it only means to return to an initial (or neutral) state. It is true that even a return to a neutral initial state would compare as a net improvement in relations. But this is just evidence of how unproductive the situation had become before Obama's election to the presidency.
Thus the original "reset" was in itself not a guarantee of improvement, but only an opportunity for a possible future consensus. Did that "reset" yield the results that were expected? For those observers who are more realistic, that answer will probably be "yes," with the qualification that the yield so far is not very abundant the ratification of the START-III treaty by the U.S. Congress was slow, difficult and incomplete. Other observers, who probably expected the blossoming of an "entente cordiale" between Washington and Moscow, may be disappointed and are seeking means to "repair" the "broken" process.
One is forced to observe that, at least publicly there has been a drumbeat of demands from Washington on Moscow, accompanied by statements about Russia being a geopolitical foe, accusations of invalid elections (i.e. implied refusals to recognize the legitimacy of the newly elected Russian legislators and, later, the president). There have been no visible indications of any relaxation of tensions, or any kind of flexibility on the part of Washington vis-à-vis the Kremlin. This visible American hard line really does create a worldwide impression that the original "reset" was not much more than a sloppy PR incident, with a silly button prop erroneously (prophetically?) mislabeled "peregruzka" ("overload") instead of "perezagruzka" ("reset").
The expected abrogation of Jackson-Vanik should not be seen as a "reset" achievement. When explaining the need to eliminate it, Obama pointed out in Los Cabos the effect of this legislation on American economic interests. He was not quoted in explaining that the amendment is obsolete and unfair, because it does not apply to other former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine or Georgia which as constituents of the Soviet Union should have inherited this restriction as Russia did; or that the elimination of the amendment would simply improve relations with Russia. The only declared goals for the abrogation were U.S. economic interests, which is completely correct and legitimate. However, what was not said (or not reported) were words that would have advanced the view that the "reset" was intended as a tool for improvement. This was highly symptomatic.
The Magnitsky Act is actually not "sweeping." But it is disturbing and structurally hostile to Russia. The contents of the list are reported to be secret, which could lead the Kremlin to suppose that any official may be included. In response, Russia's leadership may actually cut official travel to the United States to a minimum, which could actually harm American interests. Generally, the action of the U.S. Congress in this matter does not appear well thought-out. The project mingles business interests and concerns about human rights; Congress is judge, jury and executioner regarding a matter in foreign jurisdiction. This will just feed anti-American propaganda inside Russia and elsewhere as well.
If the "reset" has in reality achieved its original objectives, then at least from the American perspective there is not much more to do in that direction. What the Russians want to do in this regard is not very relevant the "reset" was a Washington-only initiative.
Anthony T. Salvia, Director, American Institute in Ukraine, Kiev
There is no "reset." In the face of Washington's reluctance, and indeed refusal, to accommodate Russia's legitimate national interests, no "reset" understood as rapprochement is possible.
Obama announced the "reset" in conjunction with his (wise) ditching of the Bush-era plans to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. He promptly undid his own initiative by traveling to Moscow and telling Russia it had no right to a "sphere of influence" in its own backyard, which was tantamount to saying Russia had no right to a foreign policy.
Obama drove another nail in the "reset" coffin when he revived the missile defense scheme in a different configuration, prompting an exasperated Vladimir Putin to ask, "So where is this 'reset?'"
When the United States prevails in ramming its initiatives through the UN Security Council, even against the misgivings of many of its members (as with Libya), all members are expected to swallow the bitter pill and go along with it. When Russia's views prevail in the Security Council (albeit through Moscow's veto power), it's never the last word. Washington begins to look for ways to undo or circumvent the vote.
The "reset" is meaningless if one party refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the other. Washington's attitude is "what's ours is ours, and what's yours isn't even negotiable."
Like the previous administration, the current one continues to follow a policy of "selective cooperation," whereby Washington demands Moscow's support for its latest enthusiasm (now it's Syria), while feeling perfectly free to disregard Moscow's interests.
Since the 1990s, the Kremlin has frequently given Washington what it wanted. It supported the United States in the Security Council in the run up to the first Gulf War, accepted (however grudgingly) the absorption of the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO, and came to NATO's rescue in Kosovo by abandoning Slobodan Milosevic at the last minute. The Kremlin was Washington's staunchest ally in the immediate wake of the attack on the United States on September 11. More recently, it acquiesced in NATO's assault on Libya.
What did Russia receive in return? Nothing.
Russia should link its support for Washington's aims to Washington's support for specified Russian aims. The United States frequently resorted to this practice called "linkage" during the Cold War. It linked trade to immigration in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and cancelled grain sales to the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan.
There are a host of issues Russia might usefully link to its support for a particular objective of Washington's. Here are just a few: cancel plans to install a missile defense system on Russia's doorstep; rescind NATO's invitation to Kiev and Tbilisi to join the Atlantic Alliance; ditch the Magnitsky Act; cancel the Nabucco pipeline project and other efforts to curtail Russian energy exports; and respect UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1244 on Kosovo.
More give-and-take in the relationship would be good for Russia, and even better for the United States, which needs to drop its pursuit of a global dominance it does not need and cannot afford, and return to its roots as a constitutional republic.
Dick Krickus, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC
To assess the future of the U.S.-Russian "reset" two events must be taken into account: the civil war in Syria and the American presidential election.
Last week, in response to the violence that has caused at least 10,000 deaths, the UN suspended its peacekeeping campaign in Syria. Since peace was the last thing on Bashar al-Assad's mind, no one was surprised by this development.
Meanwhile, the international media focused on images of dead children and others crying as doctors tried in vain to save them after they were brutalized by Assad's troops and Alawite "death squads." These horrible scenes were not new, but what was new was the growing chorus of voices among many in the global community that "the slaughter must be stopped even if that takes military intervention." More prudent commentators warned that an intervention of this nature would provoke fighting throughout the Middle East with far more deaths and dangerous unanticipated consequences. On this matter, Putin and Obama seem to agree. But the anti-Assad fighters are now getting arms and ammunition from Sunni governments and private elements in the region, and in spite of the odds against them they are determined to fight to the bitter end. What is more, while there are few objective observers who doubt that Assad's days are numbered, Obama and Putin disagree over his fate.
Obama rightly sees no resolution of the conflict without Assad's removal, while Putin resists that notion. As the world's media reported this week, "their body language" at a G20 news conference revealed a relationship of enmity. That was hardly surprising, since U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed Russia was arming Assad, while Kremlin officials asserted that the by allegedly supporting the rebels, the Americans were prolonging the killing in Syria.
The second approach to the survivability of the U.S.-Russian "reset" in relations involves the American presidential election. In the United States, growing public alarm about a second recession and doubts about Obama's leadership have begun to resonate, causing the White House grave concern. Obama is well-liked and polls indicate he enjoys a lead, but claims on the part of his Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, that he is an inept chief executive are taking a toll on his reelection bid. It is, of course, too early to make any firm predictions about the outcome of the presidential race, but the Obama camp is certainly on the defensive. Romney claims the "reset" is a blunder and has accused Obama of failing to stand up to Putin.
He continues to characterize Russia as America's premier international enemy. This ridiculous charge has been greeted with appropriate derision by responsible foreign policy commentators in his own party. But Romney persists in making it to court the lunatic fringe in the GOP base. Therefore, he has aligned himself with so-called conservative radio voices such as Rush Limbaugh, who makes a plethora of unjustified claims for example, that Russia, along with Iran and China, is about to conduct the largest military exercise ever conducted in the Middle East.
Despite real points of disagreement with Putin, Obama wants to salvage the "reset," but his Russian counterpart is not likely to receive concessions from him. At best, the "reset" will be put on hold until after the U.S. elections. Should Romney win the election, the "reset" is history.
One final observation: during the frigid days of the Cold War, neither American nor Soviet strategists worried about the other side launching a nuclear strike "from the blue." What they really feared was a confrontation that was initially sparked by their allies or clients in the Middle East. Of course, today a Russian-U.S. military confrontation of any kind is implausible but a new Cold War could be in the making in the turbulent Middle East.
Keywords: U.S.-Russian Relations - Russian News - Russia
This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama met for an extended face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Mexico, just more than a month after Putin snubbed Obama and skipped the G8 summit in Camp David. Could Putin and Obama reset the "reset?" Is the "reset" even salvageable? Can Syria break its back? What will happen to U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran? How would the Kremlin react to the Magnitsky Act? Will Obama replace his ambassador to Russia to save the "reset?"
This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama met for an extended face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Mexico, just more than a month after Putin snubbed Obama and skipped the G8 summit in Camp David. Could Putin and Obama reset the "reset?" Is the "reset" even salvageable? Can Syria break its back? What will happen to U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran? How would the Kremlin react to the Magnitsky Act? Will Obama replace his ambassador to Russia to save the "reset?"
Observers looked for signs of whether the much touted "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations, a policy launched by Obama to salvage the relationship from the abyss where it ended up toward the end of George W. Bush's second term, is still alive and kicking, or whether Russia and the United States are sliding back toward a bitter and, on certain international issues, confrontational stance incompatible with the "reset" agenda.
Early signs did not augur well for a productive meeting. Russia and the United States are at loggerheads on Syria, where Russia refuses to help the West topple the Bashar al-Assad regime either through an international armed intervention sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, or through an international mediation effort aimed primarily at convincing Assad to resign and leave the country.
Moscow balked at both approaches, knowing full well that its intransigence gives it a central role in the Syrian crisis. But were Russia to agree to Western demands, its role would deflate considerably and its views would be ignored, as it happened in Libya. Moscow is proposing an international conference on Syria with Iran's participation something the United States and Britain have ruled out.
On June 18 Moscow hosted the 5+1 talks with Iran on its nuclear program the last international effort to reach a peaceful settlement before new Western sanctions against Iran kick in. Since the talks largely failed to achieve any progress, the door may still be open for an Israeli-U.S. military strike aimed at Iranian nuclear facilities. Were this to happen, U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran, one of the principal accomplishments of the "reset," would be no longer tenable.
To make a complex and tense situation worse, the Obama administration decided not to oppose the Magnitsky Act, sweeping human rights legislation that would impose visa bans and asset freezes on a host of Russian officials implicated in Sergei Magnitsky's death. Moscow angrily warned that it would retaliate if the Magnitsky Act is passed.
And as per his custom, Obama's "undiplomatic" ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, has further infuriated the Kremlin with a host of outlandish statements that have ranged from accusing Moscow of bribing the Kyrgyz president to kick out the American airbase in Manas in 2008, to assuring the Kremlin that while the George W. Bush administration did sponsor "color revolutions" in the former Soviet Union, the Obama crowd has definitely not. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nearly forced to ask Obama to recall his ambassador, and even threatened to cut off his political access after the State Department advised Moscow to "get used" to McFaul's behavior.
Could Putin and Obama reset the "reset?" Is the "reset" even salvageable? Can Syria break its back? What will happen to U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran? How would the Kremlin react to the Magnitsky Act? Will Obama replace his ambassador to Russia to save the "reset?"
Eric Kraus, Private Fund Manager, Moscow
There is nothing to reset but the "reset" itself.
In its first version, the "reset" was an anachronism, harkening back to a heliocentric universe where all of the planets revolved around America. While the said "planets" had significant relations with each other, it was their relationship to the United States that counted the most. The rise of China and the BRICs, with a corresponding decline in the economic and diplomatic preponderance of the United States, as well as the failure of the U.S. military in two out of its three most recent adventures, have led to a Copernican revolution, disrupting the previous order of the diplomatic universe.
The end of the spectacularly incompetent Bush administration left the United States faced with a pressing need to normalize its damaged diplomacy, and not just with regard to Russia. Unfortunately, the first "reset" was based upon the premise that Russia was a penitent state, allowed to regain its place at the top table under the presidium of the sole superpower with the proviso that it subscribe to the diplomacy, economic policy, and indeed, spin-management style of Washington a total non-starter for Putin.
Any illusion Russia may have had in regard to the fundamental benevolence of the West was shattered by the Georgian war, as well as the perceived betrayal when Russian acquiescence to the UN resolution was hijacked to effect regime change in Libya. Diplomatic relations will henceforth be based upon realpolitik, with Russia engaging in a series of trade-offs with other great powers aimed solely at furthering Russian interests.
Fortunately, as American governance falls under the control of the business lobbies, despite all the indignant bluster, improved economic relations are in the cards. As Russia joins the WTO and seeks technology and capital to develop its northern mineral resources, Jackson-Vanik will be repealed, not out of admiration but due to pressure from agricultural and industrial lobbies.
If, as seems likely, the U.S. Senate kowtows to the Republican Party, arrogating the right to interfere in domestic Russian affairs with the Magnitsky Act, several U.S. companies will be punished, but the economic "reset" will continue. As one example, while after the revision of the Sakhalin 1 PSA there is no love lost between Exxon and the Russian state, the U.S. major desperately needs new oil provinces while Russia needs Exxon's deep water and unconventional oil and gas technologies. Decisions will be made based upon economic logic, not upon political alignment. A singularly amateurish U.S. ambassador to Russia (who a decade ago warned me that "the Russians were so afraid of China that they would be forced to sue for a military alliance with Washington under whatever terms Washington chose to dictate") may spoil the mood, but not the substance. He is irrelevant.
Neither Russia nor America is of overwhelming importance to each other's geopolitical alignment the relationship is important, but not fundamental. Russia has achieved an unaccustomed string of successes on the Eurasian front, seeing off the Western powers while seeking a balance with Chinese economic interests.
On the geopolitical front, for the past 15 years I have argued that Russia must look toward Asia for its primary economic and diplomatic orientation. China is now far and away Russia's top trading partner, with Putin's first major foreign trip being to Beijing, leading to the signing of some large and very concrete investment agreements. The best diplomatic relationships are based not upon ideology or affinity, but upon common interests. China desperately needs Russian resources mineral, agricultural, hydrological and energy. Meanwhile, Russia craves Chinese investment and technology. Both need each other to stand up to aggressive Atlantic diplomacy, in particular in the UN. The rest is literature.
Edward Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow, and Professor of World Politics, Moscow State University, Washington, DC
Putin and Obama's "normal" meeting in Mexico and their calm and professional discussion is definitely a welcome sign. It is doubtful, though, that the two leaders will be able to turn around the highly negative, even bitter and confrontational, atmosphere that has been created not only by politicians but to a large degree by the media.
At present, the main reason for such a sad state of affairs seems to be Syria. It is, however, a relatively new development, and the situation before the Syrian factor came into play was not much different.
Opponents of good U.S.-Russian relations will always find new reasons to disrupt them. During U.S. elections, said to be a "good time for bad politics," the chances for the voices of reason to be heard are minimal. Actually, Ambassador Michael McFaul, despite his sometimes controversial statements, is perhaps one of the very few U.S. officials who are trying hard to salvage the "reset," but he is under constant attacks by the media in Washington and Moscow.
If the Kremlin thinks McFaul is not good enough, just wait and see who Mitt Romney's choice would be. As the U.S. economy's problems mount and unemployment rates rise, the prospects for Romney's victory rapidly improve, too. If he wins, we should prepare for really difficult times in U.S.-Russian relations. Those who did not see the latest Neocon manifesto should take a look to get a feeling of what Obama's defeat will entail.
However, it is not only the Neocons who are after Putin's blood. "Punish the Russian abusers!" scream the editors of the Washington Post, widely known these days as "Pravda on the Potomac." Back in the Soviet Union, the original Pravda would have said, "Punish the American Aggressors!" So what's the difference?
The fairly unusual, and most dangerous, factor in the current situation is that the U.S. media both on the left and on the right is almost unanimously against the "reset." In Soviet times, those of us who supported Ronald Reagan's anti-communist crusade were attacked by the left-leaning and liberal media as warmongers, while their criticism of the Soviet Union was always much milder than that coming from the right. Nowadays, however, it is hard to say where there is more hatred for Russia, on the left or on the right.
My good friend Martin Sieff, former chief foreign correspondent for the Washington Times, wrote several articles expressing views that are different from the mainstream media's take on Syria, the Magnitsky Act, or the U.S. policy of spreading democracy around the world through so-called "color revolutions." His articles have been turned down by The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Times, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, the Christian Science Monitor, and American Conservative to name a few. Thanks to the blogosphere, one can find them, for example, on America-Russia.net. But the situation does say quite a good deal about the aforementioned papers' editors: they provide generous space for the most vicious attacks on Russia, Putin, and the "reset," and refuse to let the public hear alternative views.
There appears to be a strong unanimous desire to portray Russia as the top U.S. enemy. I wouldn't even be surprised if Russia were to be added to the "rogue states" list in the not-too-distant future. Romney's "geopolitical enemy number one" definition implies as much or something even worse than that. Admittedly, Moscow is partly to blame for miserably failing in this informational warfare.
However, the main problem is with America's bad foreign policy and the media's dangerous push toward worsening U.S.-Russian relations that will undermine the United States and its allies' security interests. It looks more likely that whatever gains Obama was able to achieve with his "reset" policy to correct the mistakes of his predecessor, these gains are quickly dissipated by the stupidity of politicians, the influence of the lobbies for special interest groups and the media's irresponsible stance.
Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA
Ever since it entered the vocabulary of Russian-American relations, the word "reset" seems to be misinterpreted by a vocal, optimistic and enthusiastic segment of the Muscovite punditry. The word "reset," one should point out, does not mean "to improve" it only means to return to an initial (or neutral) state. It is true that even a return to a neutral initial state would compare as a net improvement in relations. But this is just evidence of how unproductive the situation had become before Obama's election to the presidency.
Thus the original "reset" was in itself not a guarantee of improvement, but only an opportunity for a possible future consensus. Did that "reset" yield the results that were expected? For those observers who are more realistic, that answer will probably be "yes," with the qualification that the yield so far is not very abundant the ratification of the START-III treaty by the U.S. Congress was slow, difficult and incomplete. Other observers, who probably expected the blossoming of an "entente cordiale" between Washington and Moscow, may be disappointed and are seeking means to "repair" the "broken" process.
One is forced to observe that, at least publicly there has been a drumbeat of demands from Washington on Moscow, accompanied by statements about Russia being a geopolitical foe, accusations of invalid elections (i.e. implied refusals to recognize the legitimacy of the newly elected Russian legislators and, later, the president). There have been no visible indications of any relaxation of tensions, or any kind of flexibility on the part of Washington vis-à-vis the Kremlin. This visible American hard line really does create a worldwide impression that the original "reset" was not much more than a sloppy PR incident, with a silly button prop erroneously (prophetically?) mislabeled "peregruzka" ("overload") instead of "perezagruzka" ("reset").
The expected abrogation of Jackson-Vanik should not be seen as a "reset" achievement. When explaining the need to eliminate it, Obama pointed out in Los Cabos the effect of this legislation on American economic interests. He was not quoted in explaining that the amendment is obsolete and unfair, because it does not apply to other former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine or Georgia which as constituents of the Soviet Union should have inherited this restriction as Russia did; or that the elimination of the amendment would simply improve relations with Russia. The only declared goals for the abrogation were U.S. economic interests, which is completely correct and legitimate. However, what was not said (or not reported) were words that would have advanced the view that the "reset" was intended as a tool for improvement. This was highly symptomatic.
The Magnitsky Act is actually not "sweeping." But it is disturbing and structurally hostile to Russia. The contents of the list are reported to be secret, which could lead the Kremlin to suppose that any official may be included. In response, Russia's leadership may actually cut official travel to the United States to a minimum, which could actually harm American interests. Generally, the action of the U.S. Congress in this matter does not appear well thought-out. The project mingles business interests and concerns about human rights; Congress is judge, jury and executioner regarding a matter in foreign jurisdiction. This will just feed anti-American propaganda inside Russia and elsewhere as well.
If the "reset" has in reality achieved its original objectives, then at least from the American perspective there is not much more to do in that direction. What the Russians want to do in this regard is not very relevant the "reset" was a Washington-only initiative.
Anthony T. Salvia, Director, American Institute in Ukraine, Kiev
There is no "reset." In the face of Washington's reluctance, and indeed refusal, to accommodate Russia's legitimate national interests, no "reset" understood as rapprochement is possible.
Obama announced the "reset" in conjunction with his (wise) ditching of the Bush-era plans to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. He promptly undid his own initiative by traveling to Moscow and telling Russia it had no right to a "sphere of influence" in its own backyard, which was tantamount to saying Russia had no right to a foreign policy.
Obama drove another nail in the "reset" coffin when he revived the missile defense scheme in a different configuration, prompting an exasperated Vladimir Putin to ask, "So where is this 'reset?'"
When the United States prevails in ramming its initiatives through the UN Security Council, even against the misgivings of many of its members (as with Libya), all members are expected to swallow the bitter pill and go along with it. When Russia's views prevail in the Security Council (albeit through Moscow's veto power), it's never the last word. Washington begins to look for ways to undo or circumvent the vote.
The "reset" is meaningless if one party refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the other. Washington's attitude is "what's ours is ours, and what's yours isn't even negotiable."
Like the previous administration, the current one continues to follow a policy of "selective cooperation," whereby Washington demands Moscow's support for its latest enthusiasm (now it's Syria), while feeling perfectly free to disregard Moscow's interests.
Since the 1990s, the Kremlin has frequently given Washington what it wanted. It supported the United States in the Security Council in the run up to the first Gulf War, accepted (however grudgingly) the absorption of the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO, and came to NATO's rescue in Kosovo by abandoning Slobodan Milosevic at the last minute. The Kremlin was Washington's staunchest ally in the immediate wake of the attack on the United States on September 11. More recently, it acquiesced in NATO's assault on Libya.
What did Russia receive in return? Nothing.
Russia should link its support for Washington's aims to Washington's support for specified Russian aims. The United States frequently resorted to this practice called "linkage" during the Cold War. It linked trade to immigration in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and cancelled grain sales to the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan.
There are a host of issues Russia might usefully link to its support for a particular objective of Washington's. Here are just a few: cancel plans to install a missile defense system on Russia's doorstep; rescind NATO's invitation to Kiev and Tbilisi to join the Atlantic Alliance; ditch the Magnitsky Act; cancel the Nabucco pipeline project and other efforts to curtail Russian energy exports; and respect UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1244 on Kosovo.
More give-and-take in the relationship would be good for Russia, and even better for the United States, which needs to drop its pursuit of a global dominance it does not need and cannot afford, and return to its roots as a constitutional republic.
Dick Krickus, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC
To assess the future of the U.S.-Russian "reset" two events must be taken into account: the civil war in Syria and the American presidential election.
Last week, in response to the violence that has caused at least 10,000 deaths, the UN suspended its peacekeeping campaign in Syria. Since peace was the last thing on Bashar al-Assad's mind, no one was surprised by this development.
Meanwhile, the international media focused on images of dead children and others crying as doctors tried in vain to save them after they were brutalized by Assad's troops and Alawite "death squads." These horrible scenes were not new, but what was new was the growing chorus of voices among many in the global community that "the slaughter must be stopped even if that takes military intervention." More prudent commentators warned that an intervention of this nature would provoke fighting throughout the Middle East with far more deaths and dangerous unanticipated consequences. On this matter, Putin and Obama seem to agree. But the anti-Assad fighters are now getting arms and ammunition from Sunni governments and private elements in the region, and in spite of the odds against them they are determined to fight to the bitter end. What is more, while there are few objective observers who doubt that Assad's days are numbered, Obama and Putin disagree over his fate.
Obama rightly sees no resolution of the conflict without Assad's removal, while Putin resists that notion. As the world's media reported this week, "their body language" at a G20 news conference revealed a relationship of enmity. That was hardly surprising, since U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed Russia was arming Assad, while Kremlin officials asserted that the by allegedly supporting the rebels, the Americans were prolonging the killing in Syria.
The second approach to the survivability of the U.S.-Russian "reset" in relations involves the American presidential election. In the United States, growing public alarm about a second recession and doubts about Obama's leadership have begun to resonate, causing the White House grave concern. Obama is well-liked and polls indicate he enjoys a lead, but claims on the part of his Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, that he is an inept chief executive are taking a toll on his reelection bid. It is, of course, too early to make any firm predictions about the outcome of the presidential race, but the Obama camp is certainly on the defensive. Romney claims the "reset" is a blunder and has accused Obama of failing to stand up to Putin.
He continues to characterize Russia as America's premier international enemy. This ridiculous charge has been greeted with appropriate derision by responsible foreign policy commentators in his own party. But Romney persists in making it to court the lunatic fringe in the GOP base. Therefore, he has aligned himself with so-called conservative radio voices such as Rush Limbaugh, who makes a plethora of unjustified claims for example, that Russia, along with Iran and China, is about to conduct the largest military exercise ever conducted in the Middle East.
Despite real points of disagreement with Putin, Obama wants to salvage the "reset," but his Russian counterpart is not likely to receive concessions from him. At best, the "reset" will be put on hold until after the U.S. elections. Should Romney win the election, the "reset" is history.
One final observation: during the frigid days of the Cold War, neither American nor Soviet strategists worried about the other side launching a nuclear strike "from the blue." What they really feared was a confrontation that was initially sparked by their allies or clients in the Middle East. Of course, today a Russian-U.S. military confrontation of any kind is implausible but a new Cold War could be in the making in the turbulent Middle East.