JRL HOME - RSS - FB - Tw - Support

Another Putin-Medvedev Swap: Does the Russian Tandem Have a Future?
Vladimir Frolov, Vladimir Belaeff, Dale Herspring, Dick Krickus, Alexandre Strokanov - Russia Profile
- russiaprofile.org - 5.4.12 - JRL 2012-81

As Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Mevedev prepare to trade places as they announced last September, they have agreed on another so-called "castling" right after Putin's inauguration on May 7. This time around they will trade places at the helm of the United Russia Party. Will United Russia swap revive the tandem? Why has Medvedev agreed to lead an unpopular political party he has never called home before? What does he need to do as a party leader to turn things around at United Russia? File Photo of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin with Heads Bowed Over Microphone
file photo

At a meeting with United Russia leaders last week, Putin announced that, having been elected president, he would have to be a non-partisan figure for all Russians, and thus would resign as the chairman of United Russia, a position he has held since 2008 without actually being a party member (a peculiar feature of Russian political life).

Furthermore, Putin proposed that United Russia elect outgoing president and future prime minister Dmitry Medvedev as their new chairman. Despite rumors that he was reluctant to lead United Russia, which reportedly does not match Medvedev's reformist image, Medvedev announced on Russian television that he would become a member of United Russia. The swap will be made official at the United Russia party congress on May 26.

Some analysts have argued that the switch is beneficial solely to Putin, who has shaken off a politically burdensome connection to an organization that over 30 percent of Russians view as "the party of crooks and thieves." The swap will allow Putin, as is his custom, to rise above the fray once again and don the cloak of Russia's national leader.

For Medvedev, Russian analysts claim, the negatives of joining and heading United Russia far outweigh the positives. As the incoming prime minister (he is set to be confirmed by the United Russia majority in the Duma at a special session on May 8), he might benefit from controlling the largest faction in the Duma and in many regional legislatures, thus making it easier to pass reform legislation. Medvedev will secure a viable political vehicle which he has lacked as president and he might try to mold United Russia to fit his liberal, pro-Western image, while jettisoning its leftist populism and ideological incoherence.

The downside for Medvedev is obviously the negative image that United Russia has developed and its bureaucratic rigidity that would adversely affect Medvedev's faltering approval ratings. Medvedev indicated that he might run for president again in 2018 (provided that Putin does not seek another term) and running as the leader of the unpopular party of power would put him at a serious electoral disadvantage.

Yet Putin's desire to keep Medvedev on the front lines of Russian politics both as prime minister and leader of United Russia indicates his interest in continuing the tandem arrangement of power. This allows Putin to share political responsibility more broadly and provides a safety escape hatch for Putin if criticism of the government hits fever peak. Putin may either put the blame on Medvedev and dump his government and his party or once again safely turn over the keys of governance to a loyal and proven successor were he to decide that he had enough of running the country.

Will the United Russia swap revive the tandem? Why has Medvedev agreed to lead an unpopular political party he has never called home before? Do the positives outweigh the negatives for him? What does he need to do as a party leader to turn things around at United Russia? Were United Russia to move to the right and become a liberal-centrist party would there be a political space for another liberal party led by a figure like billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov or former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin?

Alexandre Strokanov, Professor of History, Director of Institute of Russian Language, History and Culture, Lyndon State College, Lyndonville, VT

The difference between Putin and Medvedev is tremendous. Vladimir Putin was, and still is, a national and charismatic leader. Dmitry Medvedev was never capable of playing such a role and it is unlikely that he ever will be. That is why his decision to join and lead the United Russia party is quite logical and easily explainable, since he decided to remain in politics and not to return to teaching law.

First, it will legitimize his appointment as Russia's new Prime Minister. Although, United Russia is not as strong as it was a few years ago, it is still holds a majority in the State Duma. In this case, Dmitry Medvedev will become prime minister because he leads the party that won majority of seats in the election. Throughout the 1990s and up until 2008, Russia's prime minister was never a leader of the party that won a majority of seats in the State Duma. This might be a step in right direction, towards the establishment of a rule that this position is going to be reserved for the leader of a winning party in the State Duma election, or for a leader of coalition of parties that hold a majority there.

Secondly, the party has seen better days. Consequently, Dmitry Medvedev gets a chance to show his political skills by modernizing the party and making it more attractive to the electorate. If he is capable of accomplishing this task, his political future looks bright, and if not, he knows who to blame. The major focus of Medvedev in this regard should become the democratization of the party itself. The primaries that were run before the State Duma election in December 2011 were a right step in the right direction, but were not sufficient. United Russia should become a model for intraparty democracy and transparency in its appointments of senior officials. It should serve as the most attractive "political elevator" in the country. This may require a "purge" within the party, and United Russia will only benefit from it. Medvedev is capable of arranging such a "purge", and it is possible that he is traveling that route already.

Third, it is not going to be a liberal-centrist, but rather a conservative-centrist party, as it actually is now. I do not think that ideologically the party will undergo any change, if such a thing as ideology even exists in United Russia.

The new law regarding political parties will lead to a sufficient restructuring in the field of Russian politics, but it will affect other parties much more seriously. Another inevitable change is associated with the natural generational change that the country will be going through in the next few years. Such old heavyweights as Communist Party Chairman Gennady Zyuganov and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and even A Just Russia head Sergey Mironov, soon will be replaced by new leaders who will have to prove their ability to keep their parties on the political Olympia of Russia. As a consequence, a new configuration of political parties will emerge before the next State Duma election in 2016.

Actually, I think the major challenge for Dmitry Medvedev should be expected not from Prokhorov or Kudrin (even if they decide to form their own political parties), but from Dmitry Rogozin and the revival of the Rodina political party. Liberal political parties in Russia probably have an electoral ceiling of approximately 15 percent at best, and competition for this percentage is not limited only to Prokhorov and Kudrin, but also leaders of the current non-systemic opposition, including Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov etc.

A much more interesting and intriguing struggle will take place with the parties to the left of United Russia. Beyond the traditional Communist Party, we will see several smaller political parties formed out of the most likely collapsing Just Russia. Everybody from Sergei Udaltsov to Vladimir Ryzhkov together with Gennady Gudkov, and others will be involved. However, it seems to me that in case of unsuccessful "reformation" of the Communist party, the major position on the left will be occupied by Rodina, which may represent a mixture of social-democratic ideas with national-patriotic rhetoric. This cocktail may turn out to be very successful in Russia.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Evidently, the two key members of the "tandem" have answered the question for themselves; and in this aspect only their opinions really matter. In any democracy, including Russia, the people elect a particular leader (an individual, or a political party) in either the executive, or the legislature or in both, and it is up to the elected to arrange the minutiae of their government.

The "tandem" has a future because its members, Putin and Medvedev, have chosen to give it a future. As long as this choice stands, the "tandem" will have a future.

There is a lot of emotional commentary regarding the duumvirate, much of it caused by ideology or political aesthetics, and this does not help objective analysis of the situation.

For example, the description in the introduction above of United Russia as [the party that over 30 percent of Russians view as "the party of crooks and thieves" includes all Russians in an unsourced statistical reference, more appropriate in an electoral slogan, leading to erroneous conclusions.

If the 30 percent mentioned in this statement refers to the result of an opinion poll, then the statistical base, the design of the poll and the statistical margin of error must be cited. If the 30 percent figure refers to results of the recent elections, then one cannot speak of "Russians" in general, but of that fraction of the electorate (60 percent) which actually voted, and then 30 percent of the voter turnout converts to just 18 percent of the entire Russian electorate; which itself is almost, but not quite "all Russians."

And we do not know how many of the those voters who did not select United Russia acted because they dislike this party (for whatever reason, including a rejection of "crooks and thieves" ­ who are surely also present in all Russian parties, like elsewhere in the world) and how many did not vote for United Russia because they favor another party. Russian communists will vote for Zyuganov's party regardless of how clean or dirty United Russia is, and their rejection of United Russia has nothing to do with the attractiveness of this party. Communists vote for the communist party, not against United Russia.

Contemporary Russia has not reached the level of political pluralism that existed 99 years ago (the Tsarist Duma in 1913 included deputies from 14 political parties) but Russian voters have elected four parties to the federal legislature, and more parties are represented in local legislatures. By comparison, the US Congress has 2 parties and both are descendents of a single party from the 19thcentury.

Political parties evolve. There is no reason why United Russia under the guidance of Medvedev with time may not change some of its strategic definitions, although one should point out that the modern ideologies of "compulsive liberalism" and of dehumanized capitalism are unlikely to become Russia's future political trajectory. It is notable that Medvedev, who is change-oriented, at present sees United Russia as a living, manageable organization and is willing to lead its natural growth and transformation. He does not see other political groups (including the emerging ones) as being more viable or attractive prospects.

The Russian electorate has choices and if the United Russia party ­ under any leadership ­ fails to meet the wishes of the majority of the electorate, then it will lose ground. In December 2011 this party did receive a warning that it must improve or otherwise fail in elections. However, any improvement mandated by the electorate must be in harmony with the majority's values, needs and expectations ­ which most likely do not coincide with the ideology of United Russia's fundamental opponents.

Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC

As the presidential inauguration of Vladimir Putin approaches and political pundits anticipate the appointment of Dmitry Medvedev as his prime minister, Kremlin-watchers are preoccupied with the question: "Does the Russian tandem have a future?"

In an attempt to answer this question, William Shakespeare comes to our assistance. The question and the uproar about whether or not Medvedev is going to compromise his political career by choosing to manage the discredited United Russia Party prompts one to embrace the line "full of sound and fury but signifying nothing."

Putin called the shots when Medvedev was president and he will continue to do so for the next six or perhaps 12 years. The really significant question is whether Putin will make the changes required to achieve Russia's economic and political modernization. Most observers see little hope of that happening if one assumes that Putin is not prepared to compromise his system of "managed democracy" that has served him and his associates very well since 2000. Some changes on the margins, perhaps, but nothing of real substance.

To provide some perspective consider the plight of Mikhail Gorbachev soon after he gained power in 1985 and correctly concluded that dramatic changes had to be made to sustain the Soviet Empire. Toward this end, he adopted a host of modest initiatives to make it a more pluralistic society and so he urged the media to actually provide the people with honest news reporting (to a degree) and to empower ordinary folk through new grassroots organizations. Indeed, he even allowed free elections to be conducted in February-March 1990 for the legislature that I witnessed as an international monitor in Soviet Lithuania at the invitation of one of those popular front movements, Sajudis.

But he failed and in August 1991 he fell to a coup and perhaps to an even worse fate if Boris Yeltsin had not come to his rescue. He failed because he tried to adopt fundamental economic and political reforms within the framework of a dying system. Observers noted that his quest was doomed much as if a pilot tried to change jet engines in the midst of a transcontinental flight. Reactionary critics like Igor Ligachev were right: Perestroika would result in the Soviet Union's demise. But more liberal minded critics were also right in warning that Gorbachev was bound to fail because he assumed positive changes could take place within a doomed social system. Yes, the reactionaries might have survived for several more years but their fate was sealed by a corrupt, lawless, and dysfunctional system that could not long survive the tectonic changes taking place abroad in the larger world.

The lesson that Putin and his associates should derive from this is that if they continue to make only modest changes within the confines of their "power vertical system" it may survive for a number of years; but the twin-tsunami of the information revolution and globalization will eventually sweep them from power. This appears to be the consensus of seasoned Kremlin-watchers both inside of Russia and abroad. But that said, there are a number of Western commentators who would agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski that while there is cause for pessimism in the near-term, if one looks further down the road, a more positive appraisal of Russia's joining the West is plausible. The problem is that in a period of transition, a great deal of uncertainty and perhaps alarming turbulence can be expected.

Dale Herspring, Distinguished Professor, Kansas State University, Kansas

My response to such a question is why not? I don't claim to be an insider who knows the intimate details of the personal relationship between Putin and Medvedev and I have no doubt that there is infighting between their staffs on some issues. But why shouldn't the two continue to be able to work together? Putin is clearly the senior partner, but it is helpful to have someone around to work on non-security issues in which you are not especially interested. I have no doubt that if Putin puts his foot down, he wins, but instead of having to deal with everything from education to corruption, Medvedev is useful to Putin as someone who can focus on certain issues.

Keywords: Russia, Government, Politics - Russian News - Russia

 

As Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Mevedev prepare to trade places as they announced last September, they have agreed on another so-called "castling" right after Putin's inauguration on May 7. This time around they will trade places at the helm of the United Russia Party. Will United Russia swap revive the tandem? Why has Medvedev agreed to lead an unpopular political party he has never called home before? What does he need to do as a party leader to turn things around at United Russia? File Photo of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin with Heads Bowed Over Microphone
file photo

At a meeting with United Russia leaders last week, Putin announced that, having been elected president, he would have to be a non-partisan figure for all Russians, and thus would resign as the chairman of United Russia, a position he has held since 2008 without actually being a party member (a peculiar feature of Russian political life).

Furthermore, Putin proposed that United Russia elect outgoing president and future prime minister Dmitry Medvedev as their new chairman. Despite rumors that he was reluctant to lead United Russia, which reportedly does not match Medvedev's reformist image, Medvedev announced on Russian television that he would become a member of United Russia. The swap will be made official at the United Russia party congress on May 26.

Some analysts have argued that the switch is beneficial solely to Putin, who has shaken off a politically burdensome connection to an organization that over 30 percent of Russians view as "the party of crooks and thieves." The swap will allow Putin, as is his custom, to rise above the fray once again and don the cloak of Russia's national leader.

For Medvedev, Russian analysts claim, the negatives of joining and heading United Russia far outweigh the positives. As the incoming prime minister (he is set to be confirmed by the United Russia majority in the Duma at a special session on May 8), he might benefit from controlling the largest faction in the Duma and in many regional legislatures, thus making it easier to pass reform legislation. Medvedev will secure a viable political vehicle which he has lacked as president and he might try to mold United Russia to fit his liberal, pro-Western image, while jettisoning its leftist populism and ideological incoherence.

The downside for Medvedev is obviously the negative image that United Russia has developed and its bureaucratic rigidity that would adversely affect Medvedev's faltering approval ratings. Medvedev indicated that he might run for president again in 2018 (provided that Putin does not seek another term) and running as the leader of the unpopular party of power would put him at a serious electoral disadvantage.

Yet Putin's desire to keep Medvedev on the front lines of Russian politics both as prime minister and leader of United Russia indicates his interest in continuing the tandem arrangement of power. This allows Putin to share political responsibility more broadly and provides a safety escape hatch for Putin if criticism of the government hits fever peak. Putin may either put the blame on Medvedev and dump his government and his party or once again safely turn over the keys of governance to a loyal and proven successor were he to decide that he had enough of running the country.

Will the United Russia swap revive the tandem? Why has Medvedev agreed to lead an unpopular political party he has never called home before? Do the positives outweigh the negatives for him? What does he need to do as a party leader to turn things around at United Russia? Were United Russia to move to the right and become a liberal-centrist party would there be a political space for another liberal party led by a figure like billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov or former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin?

Alexandre Strokanov, Professor of History, Director of Institute of Russian Language, History and Culture, Lyndon State College, Lyndonville, VT

The difference between Putin and Medvedev is tremendous. Vladimir Putin was, and still is, a national and charismatic leader. Dmitry Medvedev was never capable of playing such a role and it is unlikely that he ever will be. That is why his decision to join and lead the United Russia party is quite logical and easily explainable, since he decided to remain in politics and not to return to teaching law.

First, it will legitimize his appointment as Russia's new Prime Minister. Although, United Russia is not as strong as it was a few years ago, it is still holds a majority in the State Duma. In this case, Dmitry Medvedev will become prime minister because he leads the party that won majority of seats in the election. Throughout the 1990s and up until 2008, Russia's prime minister was never a leader of the party that won a majority of seats in the State Duma. This might be a step in right direction, towards the establishment of a rule that this position is going to be reserved for the leader of a winning party in the State Duma election, or for a leader of coalition of parties that hold a majority there.

Secondly, the party has seen better days. Consequently, Dmitry Medvedev gets a chance to show his political skills by modernizing the party and making it more attractive to the electorate. If he is capable of accomplishing this task, his political future looks bright, and if not, he knows who to blame. The major focus of Medvedev in this regard should become the democratization of the party itself. The primaries that were run before the State Duma election in December 2011 were a right step in the right direction, but were not sufficient. United Russia should become a model for intraparty democracy and transparency in its appointments of senior officials. It should serve as the most attractive "political elevator" in the country. This may require a "purge" within the party, and United Russia will only benefit from it. Medvedev is capable of arranging such a "purge", and it is possible that he is traveling that route already.

Third, it is not going to be a liberal-centrist, but rather a conservative-centrist party, as it actually is now. I do not think that ideologically the party will undergo any change, if such a thing as ideology even exists in United Russia.

The new law regarding political parties will lead to a sufficient restructuring in the field of Russian politics, but it will affect other parties much more seriously. Another inevitable change is associated with the natural generational change that the country will be going through in the next few years. Such old heavyweights as Communist Party Chairman Gennady Zyuganov and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and even A Just Russia head Sergey Mironov, soon will be replaced by new leaders who will have to prove their ability to keep their parties on the political Olympia of Russia. As a consequence, a new configuration of political parties will emerge before the next State Duma election in 2016.

Actually, I think the major challenge for Dmitry Medvedev should be expected not from Prokhorov or Kudrin (even if they decide to form their own political parties), but from Dmitry Rogozin and the revival of the Rodina political party. Liberal political parties in Russia probably have an electoral ceiling of approximately 15 percent at best, and competition for this percentage is not limited only to Prokhorov and Kudrin, but also leaders of the current non-systemic opposition, including Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov etc.

A much more interesting and intriguing struggle will take place with the parties to the left of United Russia. Beyond the traditional Communist Party, we will see several smaller political parties formed out of the most likely collapsing Just Russia. Everybody from Sergei Udaltsov to Vladimir Ryzhkov together with Gennady Gudkov, and others will be involved. However, it seems to me that in case of unsuccessful "reformation" of the Communist party, the major position on the left will be occupied by Rodina, which may represent a mixture of social-democratic ideas with national-patriotic rhetoric. This cocktail may turn out to be very successful in Russia.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Evidently, the two key members of the "tandem" have answered the question for themselves; and in this aspect only their opinions really matter. In any democracy, including Russia, the people elect a particular leader (an individual, or a political party) in either the executive, or the legislature or in both, and it is up to the elected to arrange the minutiae of their government.

The "tandem" has a future because its members, Putin and Medvedev, have chosen to give it a future. As long as this choice stands, the "tandem" will have a future.

There is a lot of emotional commentary regarding the duumvirate, much of it caused by ideology or political aesthetics, and this does not help objective analysis of the situation.

For example, the description in the introduction above of United Russia as [the party that over 30 percent of Russians view as "the party of crooks and thieves" includes all Russians in an unsourced statistical reference, more appropriate in an electoral slogan, leading to erroneous conclusions.

If the 30 percent mentioned in this statement refers to the result of an opinion poll, then the statistical base, the design of the poll and the statistical margin of error must be cited. If the 30 percent figure refers to results of the recent elections, then one cannot speak of "Russians" in general, but of that fraction of the electorate (60 percent) which actually voted, and then 30 percent of the voter turnout converts to just 18 percent of the entire Russian electorate; which itself is almost, but not quite "all Russians."

And we do not know how many of the those voters who did not select United Russia acted because they dislike this party (for whatever reason, including a rejection of "crooks and thieves" ­ who are surely also present in all Russian parties, like elsewhere in the world) and how many did not vote for United Russia because they favor another party. Russian communists will vote for Zyuganov's party regardless of how clean or dirty United Russia is, and their rejection of United Russia has nothing to do with the attractiveness of this party. Communists vote for the communist party, not against United Russia.

Contemporary Russia has not reached the level of political pluralism that existed 99 years ago (the Tsarist Duma in 1913 included deputies from 14 political parties) but Russian voters have elected four parties to the federal legislature, and more parties are represented in local legislatures. By comparison, the US Congress has 2 parties and both are descendents of a single party from the 19thcentury.

Political parties evolve. There is no reason why United Russia under the guidance of Medvedev with time may not change some of its strategic definitions, although one should point out that the modern ideologies of "compulsive liberalism" and of dehumanized capitalism are unlikely to become Russia's future political trajectory. It is notable that Medvedev, who is change-oriented, at present sees United Russia as a living, manageable organization and is willing to lead its natural growth and transformation. He does not see other political groups (including the emerging ones) as being more viable or attractive prospects.

The Russian electorate has choices and if the United Russia party ­ under any leadership ­ fails to meet the wishes of the majority of the electorate, then it will lose ground. In December 2011 this party did receive a warning that it must improve or otherwise fail in elections. However, any improvement mandated by the electorate must be in harmony with the majority's values, needs and expectations ­ which most likely do not coincide with the ideology of United Russia's fundamental opponents.

Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC

As the presidential inauguration of Vladimir Putin approaches and political pundits anticipate the appointment of Dmitry Medvedev as his prime minister, Kremlin-watchers are preoccupied with the question: "Does the Russian tandem have a future?"

In an attempt to answer this question, William Shakespeare comes to our assistance. The question and the uproar about whether or not Medvedev is going to compromise his political career by choosing to manage the discredited United Russia Party prompts one to embrace the line "full of sound and fury but signifying nothing."

Putin called the shots when Medvedev was president and he will continue to do so for the next six or perhaps 12 years. The really significant question is whether Putin will make the changes required to achieve Russia's economic and political modernization. Most observers see little hope of that happening if one assumes that Putin is not prepared to compromise his system of "managed democracy" that has served him and his associates very well since 2000. Some changes on the margins, perhaps, but nothing of real substance.

To provide some perspective consider the plight of Mikhail Gorbachev soon after he gained power in 1985 and correctly concluded that dramatic changes had to be made to sustain the Soviet Empire. Toward this end, he adopted a host of modest initiatives to make it a more pluralistic society and so he urged the media to actually provide the people with honest news reporting (to a degree) and to empower ordinary folk through new grassroots organizations. Indeed, he even allowed free elections to be conducted in February-March 1990 for the legislature that I witnessed as an international monitor in Soviet Lithuania at the invitation of one of those popular front movements, Sajudis.

But he failed and in August 1991 he fell to a coup and perhaps to an even worse fate if Boris Yeltsin had not come to his rescue. He failed because he tried to adopt fundamental economic and political reforms within the framework of a dying system. Observers noted that his quest was doomed much as if a pilot tried to change jet engines in the midst of a transcontinental flight. Reactionary critics like Igor Ligachev were right: Perestroika would result in the Soviet Union's demise. But more liberal minded critics were also right in warning that Gorbachev was bound to fail because he assumed positive changes could take place within a doomed social system. Yes, the reactionaries might have survived for several more years but their fate was sealed by a corrupt, lawless, and dysfunctional system that could not long survive the tectonic changes taking place abroad in the larger world.

The lesson that Putin and his associates should derive from this is that if they continue to make only modest changes within the confines of their "power vertical system" it may survive for a number of years; but the twin-tsunami of the information revolution and globalization will eventually sweep them from power. This appears to be the consensus of seasoned Kremlin-watchers both inside of Russia and abroad. But that said, there are a number of Western commentators who would agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski that while there is cause for pessimism in the near-term, if one looks further down the road, a more positive appraisal of Russia's joining the West is plausible. The problem is that in a period of transition, a great deal of uncertainty and perhaps alarming turbulence can be expected.

Dale Herspring, Distinguished Professor, Kansas State University, Kansas

My response to such a question is why not? I don't claim to be an insider who knows the intimate details of the personal relationship between Putin and Medvedev and I have no doubt that there is infighting between their staffs on some issues. But why shouldn't the two continue to be able to work together? Putin is clearly the senior partner, but it is helpful to have someone around to work on non-security issues in which you are not especially interested. I have no doubt that if Putin puts his foot down, he wins, but instead of having to deal with everything from education to corruption, Medvedev is useful to Putin as someone who can focus on certain issues.


Top - New - JRL - RSS - FB - Tw - Support