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Does Medvedev Have a Political Future?
Vladimir Frolov, Vladimir Belaeff, Andrei Liakhov - Russia Profile Weel;y Experts Panel - russiaprofile.org - 2.24.12 - JRL 2012-35

With three months left on the job, Russia's outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev has begun dropping hints that he intends to run for president again in the future. At a meeting with Moscow State University students in January, he said that being only 46 years old, he expects a long life in politics, and that he never said he would not run for president again. Does Medvedev have an independent political future and another shot at the presidency? Or is he too compromised by his participation in a secret deal to keep the presidential seat warm for Putin? Will he stay on as Putin's prime minister, or will he distance himself from Putin to win the support of the anti-Putin protesters? Dmitri Medvedev

Earlier this week, at a meeting with the leaders of Russia's registered political parties, Medvedev made it clear that he would run again, and even promised to participate in presidential debates (which Putin avoided). He said that if he were to lose a presidential race, he would continue his career in politics as an opposition leader.

Legally, the next time around Medvedev could run for president will be in 2018, when Vladimir Putin's third term expires. Moscow's business and political elites made it clear last week in a Kommersant op-ed by VTB President Andrei Kostin that the country would be better off if immediately following his victory on March 4 Putin announced that he would serve only one six-year term, and would not seek reelection in 2018.

But Moscow's political circles have been abuzz with speculation that, given the intensity of the anti-Putin sentiment in the country, he might even resign earlier and call for a new presidential election before 2018. This does not seem realistic, though, as one can hardly see what or who might force Putin to retire ahead of schedule or even to commit to serving only one term. Still, expectations of that happening are quite widespread in this town. And this could present an earlier chance for Medvedev to run.

But would it really be a good idea for Medvedev to run again?

In the months since the announced "castling" on September 24, 2011, Medvedev has become the lamest of lame ducks and an object of intense scorn and ridicule. For several months he has been trying to recover his balance in nationally televised therapy sessions dubbed "meetings with his supporters" who had only good things to say to him. In an act of personal humiliation, he was given the thankless task of leading the electoral ticket for United Russia.

In response to the protests in Moscow, Medvedev tried to regain the political initiative by unveiling belated political reforms in late December to make for popular elections of governors, ease registration of political parties and presidential candidates.

But his former tandem partner and the frontrunner in the current presidential race Vladimir Putin made it clear that he had a more restrictive vision for Medvedev's reforms. Putin has publicly distanced himself from Medvedev and has all but erased Medvedev from his public remarks, while his campaign has even scorned the current president. Putin promised to undo some of Medvedev's initiatives, like his unpopular decision to abolish the switch to winter daylight savings time. It is no longer clear whether Putin will keep his promise to appoint Medvedev as his prime minister, since he never speaks of Medvedev as his trusted political partner.

Medvedev appears to be having second thoughts about his decision not to run in 2012 and not to contest Putin's desire to be the next president. At a meeting with students at Moscow State University he said somewhat sheepishly that he thought some protesters on Bolotnaya were driven by anger that he was not running for reelection. He seems to have launched his quest for the sympathies of the anti-Putin voters, and were he to run again, he is likely to run as an alternative to Putin.

Does Medvedev have an independent political future and another shot at the presidency? Or is he too compromised by his participation in a secret deal to keep the presidential seat warm for Putin? Will he stay on as Putin's prime minister or will he distance himself from Putin to win the support of the anti-Putin protesters? Will Putin opt for another loyal successor next time around, or will he stick with Medvedev? Who may Putin be grooming as his future successor? Would Medvedev have a chance in an open race against Putin's chosen successor? Should he really run again, or retire from politics?

Andrei Liakhov, Partner, Integrites International Law Firm, London

I think that to understand what the future could hold for president Medvedev we need to turn to his record, and not only his presidency, but also his tenure in the government. It seems that commentators paid very little or no attention to what Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev actually achieved in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections. Few Russia watchers now remember the much-publicized "national projects," campaign for which Medvedev was solely responsible. The fate of the "national projects" and the way they were realized were telling signs of what Medvedev's presidency would look like. The "national projects" started on a high note with a lot of clever speeches, well laid out plans and a good PR campaign. However, none of them went further than this and none was completed.

The same "modus operandi" (for the lack of a more suitable expression) was applicable to Medvedev's presidency: lots of plans, positive statements and PR, but very little or no action and, sometimes, even backtracking on what were obviously achievements of Putin's presidency.

It became obvious relatively early on that, unfortunately, Medvedev has neither the strong leadership character required to be successful in this office nor ideas that would be capable of captivating and leading the nation. Early on in his presidency Putin described himself as "the manager," and that describes well what he is trying to do, i.e. run the country as "Russia, PLC". While attempting to distance himself from Putin in the early stages, Medvedev failed to define the goals of his tenure. His vision of Russia as set out in his addresses to the nation never went beyond banalities and general populist slogans. No wonder he failed to create a strong team and relied on people who were "seconded" to him from Putin's team. Without a team it is impossible to achieve anything in politics, let alone return to the highest office.

The biggest question, in my opinion, is whether a weak post-Putin presidency was the original plan (to guarantee a third term for Putin), or a genuine mistake in the choice of successor. Conspiracy theorists (the number of which seems to be disproportionately high among Russia watchers) will claim the former; analysts with a more pragmatic view of Russia are likely to support the latter. I am inclined to think that the makeup of the new Government in May will help to answer this question. If (and I think it unlikely) Medvedev stays on as the prime minister, there will be a strong argument that this was planned in 2007 to 2008. If (as I expect) he will fade away and migrate back to Gazprom or get elected speaker of the Duma (or the Federation Council), or go and do something else, it will be a clear signal that the first attempt at "operation successor" failed.

As of right now, I cannot see Medvedev remaining in politics at all. He is not genuinely popular, his foreign policy record is dismal, he has no political beliefs of note (at least he has shown none), and no team to support and back him up. His entourage of aids, advisers, "friends" and confidantes will disappear by the end of May, and he has not shown enough character to be able to join any opposition (other than maybe the Gennady Zyuganov variety of social democrats calling themselves "communists"). But even that is unlikely.

I also think that Putin is likely to serve one term, and operation "successor two" is in full swing. Only time will tell who that turns out to be (with Igor Shuvalov being my current favorite, with Dmitry Kozak and Igor Sechin clearly positioning themselves for the campaign), but Medvedev's chances of returning to the Kremlin are very slim, if not non-existent. And I do not think he is a fighter capable of pulling himself by the hair from thr political abyss into which he is currently descending.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Certainly Medvedev has a political future in Russia, in 2018 and/or in 2024 as well, when he will be 58 years of age ­ young by any modern standard.

Moreover, Medvedev has demonstrated leadership mettle and executive skills both domestically and internationally, and has a much more positive genuine performance record than any of the current Russian presidential aspirants with the exception of Putin. Medvedev handled the Georgian attack of August 2008 quite well and achieved the reform of the Russian police force, using direct democracy techniques, which many countries would be wise to emulate. These two accomplishments alone would be sufficient credentials for a presidential candidate ­ and we also have Russia's overcoming the global economic crisis, the ratification of the new START treaty with the United States and Russia's relationships extending in new directions: the G20, the BRIC countries and the EU.

As in Washington's "inside the Beltway," there is in Moscow a small but highly vocal grouping of people who are fundamentally anarchistic (in the Prince Peter Kropotkin sense ­ non-violent, but structurally unwilling to accept any kind of governing authority). These people are highly emotional and speak loudly ­ mostly to their own kind. They only hear themselves and covertly despise opinions that do not agree with their particular views. Because of this self-absorption, these statistically insignificant groups tend to develop very grandiose perceptions of their own importance as a political force, accompanied by delusions that the electorate extensively shares their minority opinions.

Fundamentally, these fringe minorities are deeply undemocratic and unwilling to recognize that the democratic majority does not share their political religion. Such groupings are not entirely harmless. One such fringe party, the RSDRP(b), grabbed political power in a coup d'état in Russia in 1917 and held it until 1991 ­ violently suppressing the vast majority of citizens who did not agree with their particular world-view. America and other modern democracies have similar fringe groupings, with similar anarchistic tendencies and similar rejection of the democratically expressed will of the majority of the electorate. To these fringe political groups, all elections are a priori falsified because they demonstrate how tiny the minority really is ­ the truth disproves the delusion, so it is rejected.

Now these fringe groups in Moscow are turning on Medvedev because he failed to match their own delusional ideas about himself as some kind of "anti-Putin." And presumably they will not accept Medvedev unless he becomes a polar alternative to Putin.

The reality is that Medvedev will be a successful politician precisely if he does not ally himself with the Russian radical fringe intelligentsia, the followers of Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse or Ayn Rand. An intuitive sense of mismatch is probably the reason why some in that crowd are rejecting Medvedev as a "political has-been" in advance.

After the 2012 elections Medvedev has many possible roles to play in Russia, which will not only keep him productive, but also in the public view. Much of his future depends on his own personal choices, and as life goes on people develop and follow diverse alternatives. He is highly educated, articulate, competent, and evidently intelligent, and has demonstrated executive leadership ­ his future political career will be his own to build.


Keywords: Russia, Politics - Russia News - Russia

 

With three months left on the job, Russia's outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev has begun dropping hints that he intends to run for president again in the future. At a meeting with Moscow State University students in January, he said that being only 46 years old, he expects a long life in politics, and that he never said he would not run for president again. Does Medvedev have an independent political future and another shot at the presidency? Or is he too compromised by his participation in a secret deal to keep the presidential seat warm for Putin? Will he stay on as Putin's prime minister, or will he distance himself from Putin to win the support of the anti-Putin protesters?

Dmitri Medvedev

Earlier this week, at a meeting with the leaders of Russia's registered political parties, Medvedev made it clear that he would run again, and even promised to participate in presidential debates (which Putin avoided). He said that if he were to lose a presidential race, he would continue his career in politics as an opposition leader.

Legally, the next time around Medvedev could run for president will be in 2018, when Vladimir Putin's third term expires. Moscow's business and political elites made it clear last week in a Kommersant op-ed by VTB President Andrei Kostin that the country would be better off if immediately following his victory on March 4 Putin announced that he would serve only one six-year term, and would not seek reelection in 2018.

But Moscow's political circles have been abuzz with speculation that, given the intensity of the anti-Putin sentiment in the country, he might even resign earlier and call for a new presidential election before 2018. This does not seem realistic, though, as one can hardly see what or who might force Putin to retire ahead of schedule or even to commit to serving only one term. Still, expectations of that happening are quite widespread in this town. And this could present an earlier chance for Medvedev to run.

But would it really be a good idea for Medvedev to run again?

In the months since the announced "castling" on September 24, 2011, Medvedev has become the lamest of lame ducks and an object of intense scorn and ridicule. For several months he has been trying to recover his balance in nationally televised therapy sessions dubbed "meetings with his supporters" who had only good things to say to him. In an act of personal humiliation, he was given the thankless task of leading the electoral ticket for United Russia.

In response to the protests in Moscow, Medvedev tried to regain the political initiative by unveiling belated political reforms in late December to make for popular elections of governors, ease registration of political parties and presidential candidates.

But his former tandem partner and the frontrunner in the current presidential race Vladimir Putin made it clear that he had a more restrictive vision for Medvedev's reforms. Putin has publicly distanced himself from Medvedev and has all but erased Medvedev from his public remarks, while his campaign has even scorned the current president. Putin promised to undo some of Medvedev's initiatives, like his unpopular decision to abolish the switch to winter daylight savings time. It is no longer clear whether Putin will keep his promise to appoint Medvedev as his prime minister, since he never speaks of Medvedev as his trusted political partner.

Medvedev appears to be having second thoughts about his decision not to run in 2012 and not to contest Putin's desire to be the next president. At a meeting with students at Moscow State University he said somewhat sheepishly that he thought some protesters on Bolotnaya were driven by anger that he was not running for reelection. He seems to have launched his quest for the sympathies of the anti-Putin voters, and were he to run again, he is likely to run as an alternative to Putin.

Does Medvedev have an independent political future and another shot at the presidency? Or is he too compromised by his participation in a secret deal to keep the presidential seat warm for Putin? Will he stay on as Putin's prime minister or will he distance himself from Putin to win the support of the anti-Putin protesters? Will Putin opt for another loyal successor next time around, or will he stick with Medvedev? Who may Putin be grooming as his future successor? Would Medvedev have a chance in an open race against Putin's chosen successor? Should he really run again, or retire from politics?

Andrei Liakhov, Partner, Integrites International Law Firm, London

I think that to understand what the future could hold for president Medvedev we need to turn to his record, and not only his presidency, but also his tenure in the government. It seems that commentators paid very little or no attention to what Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev actually achieved in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections. Few Russia watchers now remember the much-publicized "national projects," campaign for which Medvedev was solely responsible. The fate of the "national projects" and the way they were realized were telling signs of what Medvedev's presidency would look like. The "national projects" started on a high note with a lot of clever speeches, well laid out plans and a good PR campaign. However, none of them went further than this and none was completed.

The same "modus operandi" (for the lack of a more suitable expression) was applicable to Medvedev's presidency: lots of plans, positive statements and PR, but very little or no action and, sometimes, even backtracking on what were obviously achievements of Putin's presidency.

It became obvious relatively early on that, unfortunately, Medvedev has neither the strong leadership character required to be successful in this office nor ideas that would be capable of captivating and leading the nation. Early on in his presidency Putin described himself as "the manager," and that describes well what he is trying to do, i.e. run the country as "Russia, PLC". While attempting to distance himself from Putin in the early stages, Medvedev failed to define the goals of his tenure. His vision of Russia as set out in his addresses to the nation never went beyond banalities and general populist slogans. No wonder he failed to create a strong team and relied on people who were "seconded" to him from Putin's team. Without a team it is impossible to achieve anything in politics, let alone return to the highest office.

The biggest question, in my opinion, is whether a weak post-Putin presidency was the original plan (to guarantee a third term for Putin), or a genuine mistake in the choice of successor. Conspiracy theorists (the number of which seems to be disproportionately high among Russia watchers) will claim the former; analysts with a more pragmatic view of Russia are likely to support the latter. I am inclined to think that the makeup of the new Government in May will help to answer this question. If (and I think it unlikely) Medvedev stays on as the prime minister, there will be a strong argument that this was planned in 2007 to 2008. If (as I expect) he will fade away and migrate back to Gazprom or get elected speaker of the Duma (or the Federation Council), or go and do something else, it will be a clear signal that the first attempt at "operation successor" failed.

As of right now, I cannot see Medvedev remaining in politics at all. He is not genuinely popular, his foreign policy record is dismal, he has no political beliefs of note (at least he has shown none), and no team to support and back him up. His entourage of aids, advisers, "friends" and confidantes will disappear by the end of May, and he has not shown enough character to be able to join any opposition (other than maybe the Gennady Zyuganov variety of social democrats calling themselves "communists"). But even that is unlikely.

I also think that Putin is likely to serve one term, and operation "successor two" is in full swing. Only time will tell who that turns out to be (with Igor Shuvalov being my current favorite, with Dmitry Kozak and Igor Sechin clearly positioning themselves for the campaign), but Medvedev's chances of returning to the Kremlin are very slim, if not non-existent. And I do not think he is a fighter capable of pulling himself by the hair from thr political abyss into which he is currently descending.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Certainly Medvedev has a political future in Russia, in 2018 and/or in 2024 as well, when he will be 58 years of age ­ young by any modern standard.

Moreover, Medvedev has demonstrated leadership mettle and executive skills both domestically and internationally, and has a much more positive genuine performance record than any of the current Russian presidential aspirants with the exception of Putin. Medvedev handled the Georgian attack of August 2008 quite well and achieved the reform of the Russian police force, using direct democracy techniques, which many countries would be wise to emulate. These two accomplishments alone would be sufficient credentials for a presidential candidate ­ and we also have Russia's overcoming the global economic crisis, the ratification of the new START treaty with the United States and Russia's relationships extending in new directions: the G20, the BRIC countries and the EU.

As in Washington's "inside the Beltway," there is in Moscow a small but highly vocal grouping of people who are fundamentally anarchistic (in the Prince Peter Kropotkin sense ­ non-violent, but structurally unwilling to accept any kind of governing authority). These people are highly emotional and speak loudly ­ mostly to their own kind. They only hear themselves and covertly despise opinions that do not agree with their particular views. Because of this self-absorption, these statistically insignificant groups tend to develop very grandiose perceptions of their own importance as a political force, accompanied by delusions that the electorate extensively shares their minority opinions.

Fundamentally, these fringe minorities are deeply undemocratic and unwilling to recognize that the democratic majority does not share their political religion. Such groupings are not entirely harmless. One such fringe party, the RSDRP(b), grabbed political power in a coup d'état in Russia in 1917 and held it until 1991 ­ violently suppressing the vast majority of citizens who did not agree with their particular world-view. America and other modern democracies have similar fringe groupings, with similar anarchistic tendencies and similar rejection of the democratically expressed will of the majority of the electorate. To these fringe political groups, all elections are a priori falsified because they demonstrate how tiny the minority really is ­ the truth disproves the delusion, so it is rejected.

Now these fringe groups in Moscow are turning on Medvedev because he failed to match their own delusional ideas about himself as some kind of "anti-Putin." And presumably they will not accept Medvedev unless he becomes a polar alternative to Putin.

The reality is that Medvedev will be a successful politician precisely if he does not ally himself with the Russian radical fringe intelligentsia, the followers of Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse or Ayn Rand. An intuitive sense of mismatch is probably the reason why some in that crowd are rejecting Medvedev as a "political has-been" in advance.

After the 2012 elections Medvedev has many possible roles to play in Russia, which will not only keep him productive, but also in the public view. Much of his future depends on his own personal choices, and as life goes on people develop and follow diverse alternatives. He is highly educated, articulate, competent, and evidently intelligent, and has demonstrated executive leadership ­ his future political career will be his own to build.