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The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, a piece of legislation moving through the U.S. Congress that is very likely to pass into law, is turning into a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, threatening to deal a fatal blow to Barack Obama's "reset" policy. What is the true significance of the Magnitsky Act? Is it an attempt by a foreign power to administer justice when the Russian state makes no effort to punish those guilty of Sergei Magnitsky's murder? Could it really positively impact the human rights situation in Russia? Russian officials really fear the visa ban?

The bill is named after Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer for the Hermitage Capital Management hedge fund who died in police custody in Moscow in 2009 (the Russian Presidential Council on Human Rights, after its own investigation in 2011, concluded that Magnitsky might have been beaten to death by police officers). After accusing a number of Russian law enforcement officials of embezzling tax funds from the state treasury, Magnitsky was arrested and held in detention without trial for almost a year. While in prison, Magnitsky repeatedly complained of worsening health conditions, but received no medical treatment. Despite an official investigation into Magnitsky's death and his allegations of embezzlement by Russian law enforcement agents, there have been no prosecutions and no convictions in Russia, making it look like the government is covering something up.

The bill originally sought to deny U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S. financial assets of Russian officials implicated in Magnitsky's death. But its scope has been broadened, and now it says that if a Russian government official uses his or her position to illegally arrest or harm a journalist or a human rights activist, that person and his or her family will lose the privilege of traveling to the United States and keeping assets there. They will also be publicly named and shamed.

Congress has linked the passage of the Magnitsky Act to granting Russia Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and graduating it from the infamous Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The Obama administration, while initially opposed to the Magnistsky Act as potentially disruptive for the "reset" with Moscow, has realized that it otherwise could not get the PNTR for Russia, a key requirement for ensuring fair treatment under WTO rules for American companies in Russia. Under pressure from the Obama administration, the bill will apply not only to Russia, but to any foreign country where such gross violations of human rights occur.

The Russians, predictably, took offense at the Magnitsky Act. Moscow officially warned that it would retaliate with a "symmetrical response," and has already compiled a list of U.S. officials (some implicated in Victor Bout's case, for example) to be denied visas and the privilege of banking in Russia. President Vladimir Putin, after meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama at the G20 summit in Los Cabos, downplayed the significance of the bill but confirmed that Russia would retaliate with similar visa bans against American officials.

Proponents of the bill, both in the United States and in Russia, argue that in the absence of the Russian government's efforts to do justice to those who are responsible for Sergei Magnitsky's death and to cover up the crimes by Russian government agents exposed by Magnitsky's investigation, the bill imposes some extraterritorial punishment by denying those Russian government officials the privilege of using U.S. territory and the U.S. financial system for their personal gain and pleasure. Given the fact that the Magnitsky visa ban list is likely to be adopted by Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the EU, the travel restrictions look significant.

Another argument in favor of the Magnitsky Act is that by broadening its scope to cover other human rights violations, it becomes possible to punish those Russian government officials who may be responsible for persecuting the political opposition in Russia, including the leaders of Russia's protest movement, such as Alexei Navalny. In this capacity, the Magnitsky Act would become a sweeping piece of human rights legislation with a highly personalized, targeted impact on individual Russian government officials, thus making it a more effective replacement for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (which imposed impersonal trade restrictions). Indeed, the Russian government's fear of the Magnitsky Act has just been put on display when the entire United Russia faction in the State Duma cosponsored the controversial bill that labels Russian NGOs receiving foreign funding as "foreign agents" after Ludmila Alekseeva, the leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, announced that she would recommend putting the sponsors of the bill on the Magnitsky visa ban list.

Russian opponents of the bill argue that it is a legal absurdity ­ it dispenses punishment without a court verdict finding an individual guilty of a crime. Worse, it is an attempt to legislate punishment for foreigners by the U.S. Congress ­ an entity not endowed with legal powers to adjudicate justice for foreign nationals.

Others are saying that it is basically another attempt by the anti-Russia lobby in the United States to disrupt the improvement in the U.S.-Russian relations, humiliate Russia and show that it would never be treated as America's equal partner. They argue that Moscow's best response would be to ignore the Magnitsky Act, which will soon prove to be useless.

What is the true significance of the Magnitsky Act? Is it an attempt by a foreign power to administer justice when the Russian state makes no effort to punish those guilty of Sergei Magnitsky's murder? Or is it a political tool to influence the domestic politics in Russia in a way favorable to the United States? Could it really positively impact the human rights situation in Russia? Or is it simply a way for the anti-Russia lobby in the United States to humiliate Russia? Will Russian officials really fear the visa ban? What will be the Russian response and how effective could it be in changing U.S. policy?

Dale Herspring, Distinguished Professor, Kansas State University, KS

If the Russians are smart, they will just ignore the Magnitsky Act. It is a typical right-wing response to a violation of "human rights," especially during a presidential election. If I remember correctly, we have just agreed to an improved visa regime. There is always the possibility that visas for the individuals concerned can be taken up privately, government to government. As I am sure my Russian friends will agree, we could find ourselves in a situation that would make Syria look like child's play.

In the 1970s, we used to hear the same arguments. Why are you negotiating with the Soviet Union while it is violating human rights? While we did not usually say it openly, the answer behind the scenes was simple: "We have bigger fish to fry" (i.e. limiting nuclear weapons).

Eric Kraus, Private Fund Manager, Moscow

As the question was formulated, there are two separate issues: the sad fate of Sergei Magnitsky and a bill before the U.S. Congress cynically piggybacking upon the Magnitsky name.

As for the first ­ no sane person can excuse what was done to Magnitsky. He was cruelly manipulated by both sides in the Hermitage tax investigation before being left to die from a lack of basic medical attention. The notion that he was murdered is insane ­ dead, he was of no possible use to either party, however egregiously the Russian judicial system was abused for his incarceration. Having said this, there is a vital issue here, missed by the vast majority of commentators: what possible business of the United States is any of this?

Washington is placed to give lessons on human rights precisely as Marquis de Sade was positioned to give advice upon the preservation of virginity. The United States incarcerates by far the highest proportion of its population of any industrial country ­ a large proportion of the inmates are black, imprisoned under penal conditions best described as feudal, and incarcerated based upon an institutionalized system of blackmail known as "plea-bargaining." Equally, it is the only industrialized country still applying the death penalty. Given the weaknesses of the American system of justice (and perhaps, more generally, of any human court system), it can be assumed that some meaningful proportion of the victims are, in fact, innocent. Equally, the violence rampant in the American penal system ensures that there are thousands of extra-judicial killings each year within that system. This is tragic, but it is a pressing issue for America ­ certainly not for the Russian government, which would have no conceivable business becoming involved in domestic American affairs for electoral gains. Indeed, a concern for human rights is totally irrelevant to the genesis of the bill ­ if it were, countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain would figure prominently. Instead, it has everything to do with American electoral politics, where a troglodytic Neocon faction, believing itself endowed with a God-given right to reign supreme over the nations of this Earth, would do anything in its power to trip up the Obama administration.

It can be assumed that, after their triumphant interventions in Iraq (ultimately providing a vital new ally for Iran) and Afghanistan, the Neocons will again succeed in disrupting U.S.-Russian relations ­ resulting in a travel ban on a number of Russian officials who had no conceivable intention of visiting the United States, with Russia reciprocating with a ban on an equal number of Americans who had equally little intention of vacationing in Russia. Presumably, the Russian side will take advantage of the few months remaining before WTO accession to bankrupt a handful of American poultry producers, and more generally, to favor European/Asian companies wishing to enter Europe's only growing large consumer market.

The assertion that Europe and Australasia would follow is laughable ­ European commentary on the Magnitsky bill has been almost uniformly hostile, and a crisis-stricken EU is desperate to attract Russian tourism and financial flows. Neither Australia nor New Zealand has evinced any interest whatsoever.

Readers who have followed my work in recent years may be somewhat surprised by the admission that I almost hope to see the bill enacted. The last 20 years have shown that attempts at alignment with the United States have regularly had catastrophic consequences, whether Washington had the best (Bill Clinton) or the worst (George Bush) of intentions. Given pressure from his electorate, Putin will be compelled to respond, with the Medvedev faction weakened and Russia's growing alignment with the People's Republic of China the main beneficiary.

Vlad Sobell, New York University, Prague

The proposal to punish egregious violators of human rights (in fact, in the Magnitsky case, alleged murderers allegedly protected by the Russian state) is, of course, very commendable. And the fact that other major Western countries as well as the EU back this proposal is to be applauded.

But why not go further? Why not use this unilateral initiative as a launch pad for a campaign to set up an international body that would seek to punish not merely the alleged Russian violators (and suspected criminals), but all such persons anywhere regardless of their domicile?
Modeled on the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC), such a body could operate under the auspices of the UN, ideally drawing on wholly reliable evidence provided by organizations such as Amnesty International. Unlike the ICC, which deals with particularly severe crimes such as genocide, the organization I propose would seek to punish transgressors of less severe but nonetheless serious crimes and would do so by inconveniencing rather than imprisoning them.

In light of the Congress's welcome resolve to step up its campaign against the violation of human rights, the United States would surely not undermine this body's prestige by refusing to submit to its jurisdiction (as unfortunately it has done in the case of the ICC)?

I am advocating a multilateral initiative based on universally accepted standards, rather than a unilateral (that is, U.S.-driven) one, because, as it now stands, the Magnitsky Act risks being perceived as a Cold War act motivated by Russophobic prejudice and geopolitics rather than genuine concern for human rights. In fact, it could be argued that misusing the struggle for human rights for partisan political objectives is deeply immoral and thus damages rather than aids the cause.

It is vital that the United States, still widely recognized as the beacon of democracy and as the ultimate arbiter of human rights standards, avoids such obvious pitfalls.

Edward Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow, Professor of Global Politics, Moscow State University

Who could argue against the concept that corrupt officials should be punished? Didn't we hear from the Russian leadership, including President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, that corruption is Russia's worst enemy? Why such an outcry, then, in Moscow as well as in the U.S. business community regarding the Sergei Magnitsky Act? It is currently moving through the Capitol Hill bureaucracy and, according to its sponsors, is supposed to help Russia fight its monstrous corruption.

This bill, which is turning into a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, threatening to deal a fatal blow to Obama's "reset" policy, references the death in Russia in 2009 of Sergei Magnitsky, who died while in pre-trial detention on a tax fraud charge after being refused medical treatment for his illnesses. The bill calls for U.S. visa denial and assets freeze for all Russian officials involved in mistreating Magnitsky or in some other "gross human rights violations."

Many observers have pointed to the fact that by pushing this bill, Congress is not only overstepping its authority, but also represents clear evidence of selective justice ­ something for which we frequently accuse Russia ­ since, regrettably enough, similar cases of deaths in prisons due to denial of proper medical care happen in many other countries, including, sadly, the United States. It is also worth mentioning that "gross human rights violations" occur in many other countries, including some of United States' staunchest allies.

Why, then, point the finger at Russia? Is it really the worst perpetrator of corruption and violator of human rights? Not by a long shot. Besides, the U.S. State Department has already compiled a black list of Russian officials to be denied U.S. entry visas. As for freezing their illicit assets, if it is proven in courts that they are indeed illicit, this can also be done by the executive branch of the U.S. government without congressional involvement.

Somehow, there is reason to suspect that the Magnitsky bill has little to do with fighting corruption or punishing Magnitsky's tormentors and much more with "baiting the bear" or, putting it more accurately, poking Vladimir Putin in the eye. Why the congressional sponsors of this bill would do that is anyone's guess. It is easy to see, though, that demonizing Putin, whose cooperation in many parts of the world we need, totally contravenes U.S. business and national security interests.

Some of the leading American business associations, such as USA Engage, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), U.S. ­ Russia Business Council, American Chamber of Commerce, and others uniting thousands of U.S. companies involved in foreign trade, are not very pleased with the Magnitsky Act either. NFTC President Bill Reinsch expressed the view that "this bill, if passed, will not only unnecessarily complicate U.S.-Russia relations, but it also has the potential to damage U.S. diplomatic relations worldwide. As the administration has already taken steps to enact appropriate measures regarding this human rights violation, we strongly urge Congress to refrain from taking any further steps that would put U.S.-Russian relations in unnecessary peril."

Another highly controversial action by Congress is the linkage of the Magnitsky Act to granting the PNTR to Russia by graduating it from the infamous Jackson-Vanik Amendment (JVA). Presenting this graduation from JVA to Russia as a carrot that has to be supplemented by a stick in the form of the Magnitsky Act is just too cynical for words.

The great irony is that it is not Russia that now needs the JVA graduation (if it does, then for moral satisfaction only), as the JVA has not been active since 1994, anyway. It is American business that needs this graduation to avoid penalties after Russia formally joins the WTO this month. In essence, the Jackson-Vanik nonsense would then become a sanction on American business.

As Martin Sieff from The Globalist points out: "Cheap demagoguery and policies based on tabloid emotionalism make for bad, even dangerous foreign policy. The progress of what's known as the Magnitsky Act through Congress is a classic example of this."

No wonder the latest congressional job approval ratings are in the single digits.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Every sovereign nation has the prerogative to deny entry to foreigners. Therefore, Magnitsky Act or not, the United States, like Russia and all sovereign entities with physical territory, may disallow entry or decline to issue visas if a visa regime is in place.

From this perspective, the act now in U.S. Congress will not be adding to the above discretionary authority. Otherwise, one could suppose that implicitly Russian persons not listed under this act are ipso facto entitled to enter the United States, and this is not the case.

In light of the above, the act ­ as currently formulated ­ seems to be more symbolic than practical. However, symbolism is in itself a very powerful political tool.

The expansion of the scope of the act to such undefined and open-ended categories as "persecution," "journalists" and "human rights activists" enables varied interpretations. Is every Internet blogger a journalist? If a blogger is a journalist, how do we treat a blogger who denies the Holocaust? Would the punishment in Russia of a Russian blogger who denies the Holocaust be "persecution" under the act? Are the striking coal miners in Spain and the "Occupy" groups in many countries, including the United States, human rights activists? Is police action against these groups persecution under the act? Or is the act aimed only against Russia? Is China exempt?

The above are just concise examples of the kind of contradictions that arise. The underlying philosophy for a broad interpretation of the scope of the act, involving foreign citizens in foreign countries, is fundamentally a denial that the target countries (Russia, in this case) have a legal system worthy of recognition. Thus, we are moving from a response to an egregious and tragic violation of legal procedures (the death in custody of Sergei Magnitsky) to an open-ended witch-hunt of the entire legal system of a sovereign country. Deaths in custody occur in America also, as well as wrongful death sentences and police torture. Are we prepared to apply the same standards of rigor to ourselves?

There are alternative, forceful methods to express congressional outrage for the death of a not-convicted (therefore, presumably innocent) person under investigative arrest. The Magnitsky Act does not seem to be the best course of action, particularly as its scope is expanded beyond the specific tragic episode.

A small number of influential American politicians reject the concept of the end of the Cold War. It appears that they would basically prefer Russia to disappear altogether, although they do not seem to consider who or what would take Russia's place and what the consequences would be for America. There is an opinion that these unresolved fixations on decades-old battles are one of the strong motivators of the act.

Will the Magnitsky Act harm Russian-American governmental relations? Well, it certainly will not improve them, especially if it loses its moral footing on the tragic fate of Sergei Magnitsky and becomes a catchall for any kind of initiative to "punish Russia."

Members of the U.S. Congress need to know that Russian public opinion is much more aware of foreign relations, especially with the United States, than American public opinion vis-à-vis Russia. Except a relatively small segment of pro-American Russians in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the U.S. government has a very serious negative image problem in Russia. While in America, only about six percent of the electorate care about international relations, in Russia that indicator is much higher. Actions that are widely seen in Russia as interference in that nation's internal affairs are not helping to mitigate this problem. And for the foreseeable future, Russia does matter.

Keywords: Russia, Assassinations, Beatings, Prison Deaths - Russian News - Russia

 

The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, a piece of legislation moving through the U.S. Congress that is very likely to pass into law, is turning into a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, threatening to deal a fatal blow to Barack Obama's "reset" policy. What is the true significance of the Magnitsky Act? Is it an attempt by a foreign power to administer justice when the Russian state makes no effort to punish those guilty of Sergei Magnitsky's murder? Could it really positively impact the human rights situation in Russia? Russian officials really fear the visa ban?

The bill is named after Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer for the Hermitage Capital Management hedge fund who died in police custody in Moscow in 2009 (the Russian Presidential Council on Human Rights, after its own investigation in 2011, concluded that Magnitsky might have been beaten to death by police officers). After accusing a number of Russian law enforcement officials of embezzling tax funds from the state treasury, Magnitsky was arrested and held in detention without trial for almost a year. While in prison, Magnitsky repeatedly complained of worsening health conditions, but received no medical treatment. Despite an official investigation into Magnitsky's death and his allegations of embezzlement by Russian law enforcement agents, there have been no prosecutions and no convictions in Russia, making it look like the government is covering something up.

The bill originally sought to deny U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S. financial assets of Russian officials implicated in Magnitsky's death. But its scope has been broadened, and now it says that if a Russian government official uses his or her position to illegally arrest or harm a journalist or a human rights activist, that person and his or her family will lose the privilege of traveling to the United States and keeping assets there. They will also be publicly named and shamed.

Congress has linked the passage of the Magnitsky Act to granting Russia Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and graduating it from the infamous Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The Obama administration, while initially opposed to the Magnistsky Act as potentially disruptive for the "reset" with Moscow, has realized that it otherwise could not get the PNTR for Russia, a key requirement for ensuring fair treatment under WTO rules for American companies in Russia. Under pressure from the Obama administration, the bill will apply not only to Russia, but to any foreign country where such gross violations of human rights occur.

The Russians, predictably, took offense at the Magnitsky Act. Moscow officially warned that it would retaliate with a "symmetrical response," and has already compiled a list of U.S. officials (some implicated in Victor Bout's case, for example) to be denied visas and the privilege of banking in Russia. President Vladimir Putin, after meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama at the G20 summit in Los Cabos, downplayed the significance of the bill but confirmed that Russia would retaliate with similar visa bans against American officials.

Proponents of the bill, both in the United States and in Russia, argue that in the absence of the Russian government's efforts to do justice to those who are responsible for Sergei Magnitsky's death and to cover up the crimes by Russian government agents exposed by Magnitsky's investigation, the bill imposes some extraterritorial punishment by denying those Russian government officials the privilege of using U.S. territory and the U.S. financial system for their personal gain and pleasure. Given the fact that the Magnitsky visa ban list is likely to be adopted by Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the EU, the travel restrictions look significant.

Another argument in favor of the Magnitsky Act is that by broadening its scope to cover other human rights violations, it becomes possible to punish those Russian government officials who may be responsible for persecuting the political opposition in Russia, including the leaders of Russia's protest movement, such as Alexei Navalny. In this capacity, the Magnitsky Act would become a sweeping piece of human rights legislation with a highly personalized, targeted impact on individual Russian government officials, thus making it a more effective replacement for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (which imposed impersonal trade restrictions). Indeed, the Russian government's fear of the Magnitsky Act has just been put on display when the entire United Russia faction in the State Duma cosponsored the controversial bill that labels Russian NGOs receiving foreign funding as "foreign agents" after Ludmila Alekseeva, the leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, announced that she would recommend putting the sponsors of the bill on the Magnitsky visa ban list.

Russian opponents of the bill argue that it is a legal absurdity ­ it dispenses punishment without a court verdict finding an individual guilty of a crime. Worse, it is an attempt to legislate punishment for foreigners by the U.S. Congress ­ an entity not endowed with legal powers to adjudicate justice for foreign nationals.

Others are saying that it is basically another attempt by the anti-Russia lobby in the United States to disrupt the improvement in the U.S.-Russian relations, humiliate Russia and show that it would never be treated as America's equal partner. They argue that Moscow's best response would be to ignore the Magnitsky Act, which will soon prove to be useless.

What is the true significance of the Magnitsky Act? Is it an attempt by a foreign power to administer justice when the Russian state makes no effort to punish those guilty of Sergei Magnitsky's murder? Or is it a political tool to influence the domestic politics in Russia in a way favorable to the United States? Could it really positively impact the human rights situation in Russia? Or is it simply a way for the anti-Russia lobby in the United States to humiliate Russia? Will Russian officials really fear the visa ban? What will be the Russian response and how effective could it be in changing U.S. policy?

Dale Herspring, Distinguished Professor, Kansas State University, KS

If the Russians are smart, they will just ignore the Magnitsky Act. It is a typical right-wing response to a violation of "human rights," especially during a presidential election. If I remember correctly, we have just agreed to an improved visa regime. There is always the possibility that visas for the individuals concerned can be taken up privately, government to government. As I am sure my Russian friends will agree, we could find ourselves in a situation that would make Syria look like child's play.

In the 1970s, we used to hear the same arguments. Why are you negotiating with the Soviet Union while it is violating human rights? While we did not usually say it openly, the answer behind the scenes was simple: "We have bigger fish to fry" (i.e. limiting nuclear weapons).

Eric Kraus, Private Fund Manager, Moscow

As the question was formulated, there are two separate issues: the sad fate of Sergei Magnitsky and a bill before the U.S. Congress cynically piggybacking upon the Magnitsky name.

As for the first ­ no sane person can excuse what was done to Magnitsky. He was cruelly manipulated by both sides in the Hermitage tax investigation before being left to die from a lack of basic medical attention. The notion that he was murdered is insane ­ dead, he was of no possible use to either party, however egregiously the Russian judicial system was abused for his incarceration. Having said this, there is a vital issue here, missed by the vast majority of commentators: what possible business of the United States is any of this?

Washington is placed to give lessons on human rights precisely as Marquis de Sade was positioned to give advice upon the preservation of virginity. The United States incarcerates by far the highest proportion of its population of any industrial country ­ a large proportion of the inmates are black, imprisoned under penal conditions best described as feudal, and incarcerated based upon an institutionalized system of blackmail known as "plea-bargaining." Equally, it is the only industrialized country still applying the death penalty. Given the weaknesses of the American system of justice (and perhaps, more generally, of any human court system), it can be assumed that some meaningful proportion of the victims are, in fact, innocent. Equally, the violence rampant in the American penal system ensures that there are thousands of extra-judicial killings each year within that system. This is tragic, but it is a pressing issue for America ­ certainly not for the Russian government, which would have no conceivable business becoming involved in domestic American affairs for electoral gains. Indeed, a concern for human rights is totally irrelevant to the genesis of the bill ­ if it were, countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain would figure prominently. Instead, it has everything to do with American electoral politics, where a troglodytic Neocon faction, believing itself endowed with a God-given right to reign supreme over the nations of this Earth, would do anything in its power to trip up the Obama administration.

It can be assumed that, after their triumphant interventions in Iraq (ultimately providing a vital new ally for Iran) and Afghanistan, the Neocons will again succeed in disrupting U.S.-Russian relations ­ resulting in a travel ban on a number of Russian officials who had no conceivable intention of visiting the United States, with Russia reciprocating with a ban on an equal number of Americans who had equally little intention of vacationing in Russia. Presumably, the Russian side will take advantage of the few months remaining before WTO accession to bankrupt a handful of American poultry producers, and more generally, to favor European/Asian companies wishing to enter Europe's only growing large consumer market.

The assertion that Europe and Australasia would follow is laughable ­ European commentary on the Magnitsky bill has been almost uniformly hostile, and a crisis-stricken EU is desperate to attract Russian tourism and financial flows. Neither Australia nor New Zealand has evinced any interest whatsoever.

Readers who have followed my work in recent years may be somewhat surprised by the admission that I almost hope to see the bill enacted. The last 20 years have shown that attempts at alignment with the United States have regularly had catastrophic consequences, whether Washington had the best (Bill Clinton) or the worst (George Bush) of intentions. Given pressure from his electorate, Putin will be compelled to respond, with the Medvedev faction weakened and Russia's growing alignment with the People's Republic of China the main beneficiary.

Vlad Sobell, New York University, Prague

The proposal to punish egregious violators of human rights (in fact, in the Magnitsky case, alleged murderers allegedly protected by the Russian state) is, of course, very commendable. And the fact that other major Western countries as well as the EU back this proposal is to be applauded.

But why not go further? Why not use this unilateral initiative as a launch pad for a campaign to set up an international body that would seek to punish not merely the alleged Russian violators (and suspected criminals), but all such persons anywhere regardless of their domicile?
Modeled on the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC), such a body could operate under the auspices of the UN, ideally drawing on wholly reliable evidence provided by organizations such as Amnesty International. Unlike the ICC, which deals with particularly severe crimes such as genocide, the organization I propose would seek to punish transgressors of less severe but nonetheless serious crimes and would do so by inconveniencing rather than imprisoning them.

In light of the Congress's welcome resolve to step up its campaign against the violation of human rights, the United States would surely not undermine this body's prestige by refusing to submit to its jurisdiction (as unfortunately it has done in the case of the ICC)?

I am advocating a multilateral initiative based on universally accepted standards, rather than a unilateral (that is, U.S.-driven) one, because, as it now stands, the Magnitsky Act risks being perceived as a Cold War act motivated by Russophobic prejudice and geopolitics rather than genuine concern for human rights. In fact, it could be argued that misusing the struggle for human rights for partisan political objectives is deeply immoral and thus damages rather than aids the cause.

It is vital that the United States, still widely recognized as the beacon of democracy and as the ultimate arbiter of human rights standards, avoids such obvious pitfalls.

Edward Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow, Professor of Global Politics, Moscow State University

Who could argue against the concept that corrupt officials should be punished? Didn't we hear from the Russian leadership, including President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, that corruption is Russia's worst enemy? Why such an outcry, then, in Moscow as well as in the U.S. business community regarding the Sergei Magnitsky Act? It is currently moving through the Capitol Hill bureaucracy and, according to its sponsors, is supposed to help Russia fight its monstrous corruption.

This bill, which is turning into a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, threatening to deal a fatal blow to Obama's "reset" policy, references the death in Russia in 2009 of Sergei Magnitsky, who died while in pre-trial detention on a tax fraud charge after being refused medical treatment for his illnesses. The bill calls for U.S. visa denial and assets freeze for all Russian officials involved in mistreating Magnitsky or in some other "gross human rights violations."

Many observers have pointed to the fact that by pushing this bill, Congress is not only overstepping its authority, but also represents clear evidence of selective justice ­ something for which we frequently accuse Russia ­ since, regrettably enough, similar cases of deaths in prisons due to denial of proper medical care happen in many other countries, including, sadly, the United States. It is also worth mentioning that "gross human rights violations" occur in many other countries, including some of United States' staunchest allies.

Why, then, point the finger at Russia? Is it really the worst perpetrator of corruption and violator of human rights? Not by a long shot. Besides, the U.S. State Department has already compiled a black list of Russian officials to be denied U.S. entry visas. As for freezing their illicit assets, if it is proven in courts that they are indeed illicit, this can also be done by the executive branch of the U.S. government without congressional involvement.

Somehow, there is reason to suspect that the Magnitsky bill has little to do with fighting corruption or punishing Magnitsky's tormentors and much more with "baiting the bear" or, putting it more accurately, poking Vladimir Putin in the eye. Why the congressional sponsors of this bill would do that is anyone's guess. It is easy to see, though, that demonizing Putin, whose cooperation in many parts of the world we need, totally contravenes U.S. business and national security interests.

Some of the leading American business associations, such as USA Engage, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), U.S. ­ Russia Business Council, American Chamber of Commerce, and others uniting thousands of U.S. companies involved in foreign trade, are not very pleased with the Magnitsky Act either. NFTC President Bill Reinsch expressed the view that "this bill, if passed, will not only unnecessarily complicate U.S.-Russia relations, but it also has the potential to damage U.S. diplomatic relations worldwide. As the administration has already taken steps to enact appropriate measures regarding this human rights violation, we strongly urge Congress to refrain from taking any further steps that would put U.S.-Russian relations in unnecessary peril."

Another highly controversial action by Congress is the linkage of the Magnitsky Act to granting the PNTR to Russia by graduating it from the infamous Jackson-Vanik Amendment (JVA). Presenting this graduation from JVA to Russia as a carrot that has to be supplemented by a stick in the form of the Magnitsky Act is just too cynical for words.

The great irony is that it is not Russia that now needs the JVA graduation (if it does, then for moral satisfaction only), as the JVA has not been active since 1994, anyway. It is American business that needs this graduation to avoid penalties after Russia formally joins the WTO this month. In essence, the Jackson-Vanik nonsense would then become a sanction on American business.

As Martin Sieff from The Globalist points out: "Cheap demagoguery and policies based on tabloid emotionalism make for bad, even dangerous foreign policy. The progress of what's known as the Magnitsky Act through Congress is a classic example of this."

No wonder the latest congressional job approval ratings are in the single digits.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Every sovereign nation has the prerogative to deny entry to foreigners. Therefore, Magnitsky Act or not, the United States, like Russia and all sovereign entities with physical territory, may disallow entry or decline to issue visas if a visa regime is in place.

From this perspective, the act now in U.S. Congress will not be adding to the above discretionary authority. Otherwise, one could suppose that implicitly Russian persons not listed under this act are ipso facto entitled to enter the United States, and this is not the case.

In light of the above, the act ­ as currently formulated ­ seems to be more symbolic than practical. However, symbolism is in itself a very powerful political tool.

The expansion of the scope of the act to such undefined and open-ended categories as "persecution," "journalists" and "human rights activists" enables varied interpretations. Is every Internet blogger a journalist? If a blogger is a journalist, how do we treat a blogger who denies the Holocaust? Would the punishment in Russia of a Russian blogger who denies the Holocaust be "persecution" under the act? Are the striking coal miners in Spain and the "Occupy" groups in many countries, including the United States, human rights activists? Is police action against these groups persecution under the act? Or is the act aimed only against Russia? Is China exempt?

The above are just concise examples of the kind of contradictions that arise. The underlying philosophy for a broad interpretation of the scope of the act, involving foreign citizens in foreign countries, is fundamentally a denial that the target countries (Russia, in this case) have a legal system worthy of recognition. Thus, we are moving from a response to an egregious and tragic violation of legal procedures (the death in custody of Sergei Magnitsky) to an open-ended witch-hunt of the entire legal system of a sovereign country. Deaths in custody occur in America also, as well as wrongful death sentences and police torture. Are we prepared to apply the same standards of rigor to ourselves?

There are alternative, forceful methods to express congressional outrage for the death of a not-convicted (therefore, presumably innocent) person under investigative arrest. The Magnitsky Act does not seem to be the best course of action, particularly as its scope is expanded beyond the specific tragic episode.

A small number of influential American politicians reject the concept of the end of the Cold War. It appears that they would basically prefer Russia to disappear altogether, although they do not seem to consider who or what would take Russia's place and what the consequences would be for America. There is an opinion that these unresolved fixations on decades-old battles are one of the strong motivators of the act.

Will the Magnitsky Act harm Russian-American governmental relations? Well, it certainly will not improve them, especially if it loses its moral footing on the tragic fate of Sergei Magnitsky and becomes a catchall for any kind of initiative to "punish Russia."

Members of the U.S. Congress need to know that Russian public opinion is much more aware of foreign relations, especially with the United States, than American public opinion vis-à-vis Russia. Except a relatively small segment of pro-American Russians in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the U.S. government has a very serious negative image problem in Russia. While in America, only about six percent of the electorate care about international relations, in Russia that indicator is much higher. Actions that are widely seen in Russia as interference in that nation's internal affairs are not helping to mitigate this problem. And for the foreseeable future, Russia does matter.

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