In mid-March, Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev appointed his special envoys for three breakaway states: Transdnestr (Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin), South Ossetia (North Ossetia's President Teimuraz Mamsurov) and Abkhazia (Krasnodar Region Governor Alexander Tkachev). No special envoy was appointed for Nagorno-Karabakh, though.What does the appointment of presidential envoys, particularly that of Rogozin, imply about the strategy deliberations in Moscow? Is Russia laying the groundwork for the recognition of Transdnestr as an independent state, were Moldova to reintegrate with Romania? And what would be the geopolitical ramifications of such a move?
Of these three, Rogozin's appointment for Transdnestr is the most intriguing, spurring speculation that Moscow is preparing to recognize Transdnestr as an independent state, since his appointment was mentioned in line with Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's, which Russia recognized as independent states after the August 2008 war with Georgia.
Rogozin toured Moldova and Transdnestr last week. There he did make some statements that indicate that Moscow might change its current position of recognizing Moldova's sovereignty over Transdnestr and shift toward recognizing its independence, or even annex it and make it part of Russia were Moldova opt for reunification with Romania as a means of joining the EU and NATO.
In South Ossetia, Moscow played tough during the recent presidential election, installing a former KGB boss as the new president and blocking an opposition candidate Alla Dzioyeva, who won the election last November, from taking office or participating in the runoff election.
Yet, despite this flurry of activity and the appointment of political heavyweights like Rogozin, it does not seem that Moscow has a clear long-term strategy for these breakaway states. It basically has three options.
The first is to recognize their independence and shoulder the burden of their "sovereignty," together with geopolitical ramifications. This has been done with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, apparently in the fog of war with Georgia. But while Abkhazia may have a shot at independent statehood and could be viable on its own (albeit under Russian security protection), South Ossetia's independence is a joke. Only a third of its 100,000 or so citizens reside in the country, which essentially lives on Russian aide.
The second is to integrate them into Russia. Obviously this might be an option for South Ossetia (it could "reunite" with Russia's North Ossetia, de facto it is already part of Russia), and perhaps Transdnestr (it also lives on Russian aide and energy subsidies), but not for Abkhazia, where such a move would be resisted by the local elites. The foreign policy downside of annexing parts of the internationally recognized territory of other sovereign states could be humongous.
The third is to push for an international settlement in which these breakaway territories fold back into Moldova and Georgia with a special, internationally guaranteed political status that protects their rights. This is still on the table for Moldova and Transdnestr, which continue to hold internationally sponsored "5+2" talks. But it is probably too late for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Each strategy entails quite different sets of policies for Russia in the respective regions and these sets of policies are not really compatible or interchangeable. Nor is there a domestic consensus in Russia on what course to pursue to maximize Russia's gains.
What should Moscow do? Which approach suits Russia's interests better? What does the appointment of presidential envoys, particularly that of Rogozin, imply about the strategy deliberations in Moscow? Is Russia laying the groundwork for the recognition of Transdnestr as an independent state, were Moldova to reintegrate with Romania? How likely is this scenario? And what would be the geopolitical ramifications of such a move?
Patrick Armstrong, Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada
Let's start with a little chronology. Abkhazia and South Ossetia won their wars against Georgia in the early 1990s and each declared independence. Moscow did not recognize them. The clock turned over: new decade, new century; Moscow still didn't recognize them. Georgia attacked again in 2008; Moscow recognized them.
Moscow has its own potential territorial problems: Kaliningrad, parts of Karelia, the "Northern Territories"; the border with China; North Caucasus "independentists." It is a status quo that prefers for everything to stay the way it is because Russia has other things to worry about. It has little sympathy with irredentist claims.
So why did Medvedev decide to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008? Let's ask him: "We restored peace, but we could not extinguish fears and hopes of the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a situation when Mikheil Saakashvili continued (with participation of and encouraged by the United States and a number of other NATO members) to speak of rearming his military and reestablishing control over 'the Georgian territory.' Russia was left with no choice," Medvedev was quoted by Regnum News on August 28, 2008 as saying. In short: recognition was the only way Moscow could think of to prevent Tbilisi from attacking again.
But why does Moscow care whether Tbilisi attacks again? My personal conviction is that its real fear is blowback. The last time Tbilisi ventured into South Ossetia and especially Abkhazia, North Caucasian militias (particularly Shamil Basayev's Chechen Brigade) intervened. In those days, there was a desire to recreate the short-lived "Mountaineer Republic" of 1918. Basayev and his fighters, having defeated Tbilisi and established the western end of the "Mountaineer Republic," returned to Chechnya to create the eastern end. Thus we can connect the Georgian attack on Abkhazia with the first war in Chechnya, the second war and Moscow's troubles in the North Caucasus today. Ergo, Moscow does not want that to happen again; ergo it must ensure that Tbilisi will not attack Abkhazia and South Ossetia again; ergo recognition means that Tbilisi will know that another attack means it faces Russia; ergo that should stop it from attacking again.
The other ex-Soviet "hotspots" are still negotiable. Transdnestr needs a guarantee that should Chisinau join Romania, this former piece of the Ukrainian Soveit Socialist Republic does not have to follow it, and Karabakhians need a guarantee that they won't be massacred by "Turks." These are still imaginable. These borders are Stalin-Jughashvili's creations and there's no reason the rest of us should take them as sacred and unchangeable.
Few Western capitals have figured this out. In the meantime, the status quo is endurable from Moscow's point of view. Therefore, as things stand today with fragile ceasefires holding, Moscow has no reason to recognize either Transdnestr or Karabakh.
Everyone should have followed Kiev's wise and just treatment of Crimea or Chisinau's wise and just response to Gagauz wishes.
But who in the West has ever heard of either?
Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA
The three cases are significantly different.
The Ossetians were a divided nation: Stalin's administrative partitioning of the Ossetian ethnic region into two separate units, assigned to two different constituent republics of the Soviet Union, created, after the separation of the Republic of Georgia, a natural political stress point. In practical terms, for Ossetians it is far more advantageous to be part of a major world power, a member of the G8 with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council than to be associated with a backwater in Western Asia, no matter how rustically charming, whose claims to be "European" are seen as rather quaint. Mountainous Switzerland is Europe. The mountainous Republic of Georgia is not Switzerland; and its flimsy claim to be "European" is entirely based on having once been part of the Russian Empire, which it abhors and has righteously abandoned.
Abkhazia has substantial ethnic and religious differences with the Georgians; its proximity to Russia and possession of an important stretch of the Black Sea littoral reinforce a sense of separate ethnic identity and political viability for sovereignty.
Transdnestr is a mainly non-Moldovan ethnic enclave, strongly opposed to either "Moldovization" or "Romanization," for many cultural, ethnic and historical reasons.
All these regions went through a period of sometimes intense military confrontation with regional claimants in the early 1990s. These wars for independence may be forgotten elsewhere, but remain quite vivid locally, and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia the aggression by Saakashvili revived the impetus for sovereignty. It must be noted, that for 14 years from 1994 to 2008, with involvement by Russia, neither of these two regions had made a final break with the Republic of Georgia. It was entirely the rash military adventurism of Tbilisi in August of 2008 that precipitated the final break. If Saakashvili had not attacked South Ossetia in August 2008, there was no reason why the "status quo ante" could not have been preserved far longer and a different solution to the local issues may have evolved.
Even so, at this time none other than the Russian Orthodox Church is helping the Georgian Orthodox Patriarchate to preserve ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the dioceses in South Ossetia and Abkhazia a very important position in these deeply religious regions.
Just as Russia was key to maintaining stability in the region from 1994 to 2008, Russia's strategy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia seems to be oriented to foster stability (which is not equal to stagnation), which will in turn result in general growth for the two countries. In some respects, this is a return to the situation pre-August 2008, with the important difference that both regions are now recognized by Russia as sovereign states. Similar situations involving other regions have existed for a long time in other parts of the world.
Transdnestr is significantly different because of the growing Romanian nationalist pressure to join Moldova with its neighbor to the West. No one seems to care how this will be accomplished from the perspective of Moldova's individual presence in worldwide organizations, like its membership in the United Nations, its obligations under diverse international treaties and protocols, etcetera. The Transdnestrian enclave is opposed (and ready to fight against) either "Moldovization" or "Romanization," either of which are openly stated objectives of Moldavian and Romanian nationalists in the region. A potential for armed conflict is real and not negligible. If Romania were to intervene for nationalist reasons, this would involve NATO, however tangentially. Thus, the Transdnestr situation is delicate and in need of senior attention by all involved in the quandary, including Russia.
Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC
What should Russia do with the breakaway states of Transdnestr, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? The answer is simple: let them break away.
Like their counterparts in Washington, Russian strategists must shed 20th century Cold War baggage as they wrestle with the challenges of this century. The latter include global economic, political and technological disruptions that are having a dramatic and traumatic impact upon their societies. The most daunting challenges are within both countries, not outside of them.
The problem is that after World War II, they crafted a massive warfare state many of whose members still perceive the world through a prism akin to the Cold War. Granted, neither side today is preoccupied with the Fulda Gap, but their arms and military establishment continues to dream about massive general-purpose forces supplied with weapons that dominated World War II battlefields. Meanwhile, defense intellectuals remain mesmerized by the "next threat" and help justify their martial policies. It is difficult to shed old narratives.
I recall right after the Soviet Union faded into the ash heap of history, a young marine lamenting "My God, my entire career has been structured by the Cold War, where do we go from here?" The neo-conservatives and George Bush would soon provide her with an answer when they created a bogus script that replaced the Soviet Empire with the global war on terrorism. Indeed, some even likened Osama bin-Laden and other Islamic fanatics with Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin, overlooking that the latter two psychopaths were responsible for at least 40 million deaths and the destruction of great metropolitan complexes. The capacity of jihadist maniacs to wreak havoc cannot be ignored, but bin Laden and his associates will never match the evil works of Adolph and Joe. Going forward it is clear that the single most compelling security challenge for the United States is domestic: namely, embracing painful reforms that address the turbulence not military in nature of globalization.
The same, of course, holds true for those members of the Russian establishment that remain preoccupied with Cold War threats and aspirations. But the time has come to face reality, and among other things, "push for an international settlement" of the "breakaway state problem" and in the process to begin a new round of cooperation with the EU.
The stark truth is that Russia's most serious problems have nothing to do with the future of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdnestr, and everything to do with fundamental reforms in Russian society. Namely, now that Vladimir Putin is secure in the knowledge that he will be in charge for six more years, he should embrace the following measures: make it easier to form political parties and to run for the presidency; provide for the direct election of governors; take measures to elect a new Duma; allow a free media to flourish; reconcile with the middle class reformers who want Russia to become a normal European country; and address the alienation of ordinary Russians by fighting corruption.
On the economic front the Kremlin must make a real effort at addressing economic inequality Russia has more billionaires than any country in the world and toward this end Putin should listen to those who are counseling him to diversify Russia's economy; make a larger share of public revenues available to ordinary people; and demonstrate to the local business community and foreign investors alike that the rule of law reigns in Russia, not the iron fist dictates of the economic warlords.
That said, recent reports from Russia indicate that there is little reason to be optimistic that any of these measures will be adopted.
Keywords: Russia, Foreign Policy - Russia, Georgia - Russian News - Russia
In mid-March, Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev appointed his special envoys for three breakaway states: Transdnestr (Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin), South Ossetia (North Ossetia's President Teimuraz Mamsurov) and Abkhazia (Krasnodar Region Governor Alexander Tkachev). No special envoy was appointed for Nagorno-Karabakh, though.What does the appointment of presidential envoys, particularly that of Rogozin, imply about the strategy deliberations in Moscow? Is Russia laying the groundwork for the recognition of Transdnestr as an independent state, were Moldova to reintegrate with Romania? And what would be the geopolitical ramifications of such a move?
Of these three, Rogozin's appointment for Transdnestr is the most intriguing, spurring speculation that Moscow is preparing to recognize Transdnestr as an independent state, since his appointment was mentioned in line with Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's, which Russia recognized as independent states after the August 2008 war with Georgia.
Rogozin toured Moldova and Transdnestr last week. There he did make some statements that indicate that Moscow might change its current position of recognizing Moldova's sovereignty over Transdnestr and shift toward recognizing its independence, or even annex it and make it part of Russia were Moldova opt for reunification with Romania as a means of joining the EU and NATO.
In South Ossetia, Moscow played tough during the recent presidential election, installing a former KGB boss as the new president and blocking an opposition candidate Alla Dzioyeva, who won the election last November, from taking office or participating in the runoff election.
Yet, despite this flurry of activity and the appointment of political heavyweights like Rogozin, it does not seem that Moscow has a clear long-term strategy for these breakaway states. It basically has three options.
The first is to recognize their independence and shoulder the burden of their "sovereignty," together with geopolitical ramifications. This has been done with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, apparently in the fog of war with Georgia. But while Abkhazia may have a shot at independent statehood and could be viable on its own (albeit under Russian security protection), South Ossetia's independence is a joke. Only a third of its 100,000 or so citizens reside in the country, which essentially lives on Russian aide.
The second is to integrate them into Russia. Obviously this might be an option for South Ossetia (it could "reunite" with Russia's North Ossetia, de facto it is already part of Russia), and perhaps Transdnestr (it also lives on Russian aide and energy subsidies), but not for Abkhazia, where such a move would be resisted by the local elites. The foreign policy downside of annexing parts of the internationally recognized territory of other sovereign states could be humongous.
The third is to push for an international settlement in which these breakaway territories fold back into Moldova and Georgia with a special, internationally guaranteed political status that protects their rights. This is still on the table for Moldova and Transdnestr, which continue to hold internationally sponsored "5+2" talks. But it is probably too late for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Each strategy entails quite different sets of policies for Russia in the respective regions and these sets of policies are not really compatible or interchangeable. Nor is there a domestic consensus in Russia on what course to pursue to maximize Russia's gains.
What should Moscow do? Which approach suits Russia's interests better? What does the appointment of presidential envoys, particularly that of Rogozin, imply about the strategy deliberations in Moscow? Is Russia laying the groundwork for the recognition of Transdnestr as an independent state, were Moldova to reintegrate with Romania? How likely is this scenario? And what would be the geopolitical ramifications of such a move?
Patrick Armstrong, Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada
Let's start with a little chronology. Abkhazia and South Ossetia won their wars against Georgia in the early 1990s and each declared independence. Moscow did not recognize them. The clock turned over: new decade, new century; Moscow still didn't recognize them. Georgia attacked again in 2008; Moscow recognized them.
Moscow has its own potential territorial problems: Kaliningrad, parts of Karelia, the "Northern Territories"; the border with China; North Caucasus "independentists." It is a status quo that prefers for everything to stay the way it is because Russia has other things to worry about. It has little sympathy with irredentist claims.
So why did Medvedev decide to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008? Let's ask him: "We restored peace, but we could not extinguish fears and hopes of the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a situation when Mikheil Saakashvili continued (with participation of and encouraged by the United States and a number of other NATO members) to speak of rearming his military and reestablishing control over 'the Georgian territory.' Russia was left with no choice," Medvedev was quoted by Regnum News on August 28, 2008 as saying. In short: recognition was the only way Moscow could think of to prevent Tbilisi from attacking again.
But why does Moscow care whether Tbilisi attacks again? My personal conviction is that its real fear is blowback. The last time Tbilisi ventured into South Ossetia and especially Abkhazia, North Caucasian militias (particularly Shamil Basayev's Chechen Brigade) intervened. In those days, there was a desire to recreate the short-lived "Mountaineer Republic" of 1918. Basayev and his fighters, having defeated Tbilisi and established the western end of the "Mountaineer Republic," returned to Chechnya to create the eastern end. Thus we can connect the Georgian attack on Abkhazia with the first war in Chechnya, the second war and Moscow's troubles in the North Caucasus today. Ergo, Moscow does not want that to happen again; ergo it must ensure that Tbilisi will not attack Abkhazia and South Ossetia again; ergo recognition means that Tbilisi will know that another attack means it faces Russia; ergo that should stop it from attacking again.
The other ex-Soviet "hotspots" are still negotiable. Transdnestr needs a guarantee that should Chisinau join Romania, this former piece of the Ukrainian Soveit Socialist Republic does not have to follow it, and Karabakhians need a guarantee that they won't be massacred by "Turks." These are still imaginable. These borders are Stalin-Jughashvili's creations and there's no reason the rest of us should take them as sacred and unchangeable.
Few Western capitals have figured this out. In the meantime, the status quo is endurable from Moscow's point of view. Therefore, as things stand today with fragile ceasefires holding, Moscow has no reason to recognize either Transdnestr or Karabakh.
Everyone should have followed Kiev's wise and just treatment of Crimea or Chisinau's wise and just response to Gagauz wishes.
But who in the West has ever heard of either?
Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA
The three cases are significantly different.
The Ossetians were a divided nation: Stalin's administrative partitioning of the Ossetian ethnic region into two separate units, assigned to two different constituent republics of the Soviet Union, created, after the separation of the Republic of Georgia, a natural political stress point. In practical terms, for Ossetians it is far more advantageous to be part of a major world power, a member of the G8 with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council than to be associated with a backwater in Western Asia, no matter how rustically charming, whose claims to be "European" are seen as rather quaint. Mountainous Switzerland is Europe. The mountainous Republic of Georgia is not Switzerland; and its flimsy claim to be "European" is entirely based on having once been part of the Russian Empire, which it abhors and has righteously abandoned.
Abkhazia has substantial ethnic and religious differences with the Georgians; its proximity to Russia and possession of an important stretch of the Black Sea littoral reinforce a sense of separate ethnic identity and political viability for sovereignty.
Transdnestr is a mainly non-Moldovan ethnic enclave, strongly opposed to either "Moldovization" or "Romanization," for many cultural, ethnic and historical reasons.
All these regions went through a period of sometimes intense military confrontation with regional claimants in the early 1990s. These wars for independence may be forgotten elsewhere, but remain quite vivid locally, and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia the aggression by Saakashvili revived the impetus for sovereignty. It must be noted, that for 14 years from 1994 to 2008, with involvement by Russia, neither of these two regions had made a final break with the Republic of Georgia. It was entirely the rash military adventurism of Tbilisi in August of 2008 that precipitated the final break. If Saakashvili had not attacked South Ossetia in August 2008, there was no reason why the "status quo ante" could not have been preserved far longer and a different solution to the local issues may have evolved.
Even so, at this time none other than the Russian Orthodox Church is helping the Georgian Orthodox Patriarchate to preserve ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the dioceses in South Ossetia and Abkhazia a very important position in these deeply religious regions.
Just as Russia was key to maintaining stability in the region from 1994 to 2008, Russia's strategy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia seems to be oriented to foster stability (which is not equal to stagnation), which will in turn result in general growth for the two countries. In some respects, this is a return to the situation pre-August 2008, with the important difference that both regions are now recognized by Russia as sovereign states. Similar situations involving other regions have existed for a long time in other parts of the world.
Transdnestr is significantly different because of the growing Romanian nationalist pressure to join Moldova with its neighbor to the West. No one seems to care how this will be accomplished from the perspective of Moldova's individual presence in worldwide organizations, like its membership in the United Nations, its obligations under diverse international treaties and protocols, etcetera. The Transdnestrian enclave is opposed (and ready to fight against) either "Moldovization" or "Romanization," either of which are openly stated objectives of Moldavian and Romanian nationalists in the region. A potential for armed conflict is real and not negligible. If Romania were to intervene for nationalist reasons, this would involve NATO, however tangentially. Thus, the Transdnestr situation is delicate and in need of senior attention by all involved in the quandary, including Russia.
Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Washington, DC
What should Russia do with the breakaway states of Transdnestr, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? The answer is simple: let them break away.
Like their counterparts in Washington, Russian strategists must shed 20th century Cold War baggage as they wrestle with the challenges of this century. The latter include global economic, political and technological disruptions that are having a dramatic and traumatic impact upon their societies. The most daunting challenges are within both countries, not outside of them.
The problem is that after World War II, they crafted a massive warfare state many of whose members still perceive the world through a prism akin to the Cold War. Granted, neither side today is preoccupied with the Fulda Gap, but their arms and military establishment continues to dream about massive general-purpose forces supplied with weapons that dominated World War II battlefields. Meanwhile, defense intellectuals remain mesmerized by the "next threat" and help justify their martial policies. It is difficult to shed old narratives.
I recall right after the Soviet Union faded into the ash heap of history, a young marine lamenting "My God, my entire career has been structured by the Cold War, where do we go from here?" The neo-conservatives and George Bush would soon provide her with an answer when they created a bogus script that replaced the Soviet Empire with the global war on terrorism. Indeed, some even likened Osama bin-Laden and other Islamic fanatics with Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin, overlooking that the latter two psychopaths were responsible for at least 40 million deaths and the destruction of great metropolitan complexes. The capacity of jihadist maniacs to wreak havoc cannot be ignored, but bin Laden and his associates will never match the evil works of Adolph and Joe. Going forward it is clear that the single most compelling security challenge for the United States is domestic: namely, embracing painful reforms that address the turbulence not military in nature of globalization.
The same, of course, holds true for those members of the Russian establishment that remain preoccupied with Cold War threats and aspirations. But the time has come to face reality, and among other things, "push for an international settlement" of the "breakaway state problem" and in the process to begin a new round of cooperation with the EU.
The stark truth is that Russia's most serious problems have nothing to do with the future of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdnestr, and everything to do with fundamental reforms in Russian society. Namely, now that Vladimir Putin is secure in the knowledge that he will be in charge for six more years, he should embrace the following measures: make it easier to form political parties and to run for the presidency; provide for the direct election of governors; take measures to elect a new Duma; allow a free media to flourish; reconcile with the middle class reformers who want Russia to become a normal European country; and address the alienation of ordinary Russians by fighting corruption.
On the economic front the Kremlin must make a real effort at addressing economic inequality Russia has more billionaires than any country in the world and toward this end Putin should listen to those who are counseling him to diversify Russia's economy; make a larger share of public revenues available to ordinary people; and demonstrate to the local business community and foreign investors alike that the rule of law reigns in Russia, not the iron fist dictates of the economic warlords.
That said, recent reports from Russia indicate that there is little reason to be optimistic that any of these measures will be adopted.