Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2005
From: Graham Stack <graham_stack@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: 9299-Johnson's Russia List, no. 16 Lavelle et al [re: Putin succession]
The recent flurry of speculation over whom Vladimir Putin / 'the Kremlin' will back as candidate in the 2008 presidential elections, prompted both by a general acceptance of Putin's sincerity in his long-standing claim that he will not run for a third term, and by a recent government reshuffle, proceeds from a common assumption: that the next elections will imitate the previous, in there being a single Kremlin-supported candidate who will enjoy unproportionally large and uncritical press coverage from state-controlled networks, in addition to the open support of the still extremely popular Putin.
This might indeed turn out to be the case. However, for a variety of reasons, it may be more logical from Putin's point of view for him to allow, or even encourage, a number of his colleagues in government, who want to and whom he deems suitable, to run for the office of president and thus compete among themselves.
I assume generously that the Kremlin's priority is to effect a transfer of power which will not destabilise the country and secure continuity, also of reforms. While this means that the Kremlin will not countenance self-professed opposition candidates (Rogozin, Kas'yanov, Zyuganov etc.) coming to power, it does not necessarily imply that Putin will have to push a single candidate, as the Kremlin did in 2000 or Kuchma last year. The point of backing a single candidate is to obtain in advance guarantees from the 'nominated successor' of immunity to prosecution etc. in exchange for his being placed in office. However, this strategy involves putting all eggs in one basket, and can backfire dramatically, as events in the Ukraine last year prove. It can lead to a de-institutionalisation of the electoral process, and undermines the domestic and international legitimacy of the successor president. It is general more suited to crisis situations such as the late Yeltsin or late Kuchma years, where the corrupt backers of an unpopular president seeks to protect their persons and property from the successor.
The current situation in Putin's Russia is quite different, and is unlikely to change dramatically over the course of the next two years. The president is broadly popular, legitimate and non-corrupt. Pushing one single candidate might thus destabilise more than would allowing a few acceptable candidates to compete among themselves. The speculation about Putin's successor has made it clear that there are both a number of plausible candidates, and at the same time no one obvious successor with qualifications and charisma that single him out, or with Putin's special trust. At the same time, with Rogozin's star on the wane and Kas'yanov's unlikely to rise very far, there are (currently) no opposition candidates who constitute a real threat.
The obvious objection to this thesis is that for a number of pro-Kremlin candidates to stand would split the pro-Kremlin vote and rule out an election victory in the first round of voting. This is probably true. But it would not necessarily matter, if the Kremlin could count on having two of its own approved candidates going through to the second round and facing off against each other. This scenario might be preferable to having another effectively uncontested election for a number of reasons: It would be considerably more democratic, without however destabilising, and thus could symbolise that the country had changed for the better. The degree of consensus among candidates, if three or four were pro-Putin, would change the tone of electioneering.
The root-and-branch populism of loony left, loony right and loony liberal would be shown up against more policy-related stances of current officials. Crowding the field with centristic pro-Putin candidates would push the radicals to the margins, also in terms of network coverage. It would be a far more subtle way for the Kremlin to secure itself an acceptable successor. Even if only one pro-Putin candidate won a place in the second round, Putin's openly expressed support (and that of the TV channels) would be sufficient to ensure that candidate's victory over any opposition candidate.
Put concisely: a victory in the second round, especially if Putin abstains from expressing a preference, might result in more legitimacy, thus more stability, for the next president, and for the political system as a whole, than would victory in the first round. The opposite was true for Putin in the crisis situation of 2000.
As recent analysis of potential candidates has shown, there is enough variety in political views and personal track record for a meaningful contest between current Kremlin-affiliated officials to take place: for instance, for the sake of argument, if we take the current three vice-premieres, Ivanov, Medvedev and Zhukov, and throw in some others (of the status of Matvienko, Lavrov, Khloponin, Kozak, Gryzlov etc.). This would make the first round of voting into something equivalent to primaries for choosing the Kremlin's candidate.
A naively optimistic scenario?