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#17 - JRL 9297 - JRL Home
From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Subject: The Rodina party: the rise and fall of President Putin's "spetsnaz"
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2005

On January 21, 2005, five Duma deputies from the Rodina faction, headed by their leader, Dmitry Rogozin, went on hunger strike. The strikers demanded that President Putin suspend the implementation of the law on monetization of social benefits and fire Social Welfare Minister, Mikhail Zurabov. The hunger strike that lasted for 11 days and resulted in hospitalization of one of the strikers has become a high point in the debate over the notorious Bill 122. It may also have become a point of no return for the strike leader, Dmitry Olegovich Rogozin.

In Russia's political vocabulary, the term "Rodina" ("Motherland") has three meanings: a Duma faction, a political party, and an electoral bloc. In September 2003, three "social-patriotic" parties ¬ the Party of Russia's Regions, the People's Will Party, and the Socialist United Party of Russia ¬ formed an electoral bloc called Rodina to participate in the upcoming Duma electi! on. The creation of the Rodina bloc was universally viewed as an attempt on the part of the Kremlin to weaken the Communist party (KPRF) by appealing to the same voters. Dmitry Rogozin, the then-leader of the Party of Russia's Regions, boasted to his supporters that President Putin considered the Rodina bloc his "personal project."

All initial indications showed that the "project" was a success. The 9% of the vote collected by the Rodina in December 2003 was characteristically close to the 12% lost by the KPRF, as compared to the previous Duma election (12.6% in 2003 vs. 24.3% in 1999). Rogozin became the leader of the 37-member Duma faction and later renamed his Party of Russia's Regions as the Rodi! na party. The party began growing in members and showing strong results in the regional elections. Rogozin's personal popularity began growing, too, and he has been receiving favorable coverage by the state-controlled media. Rumors started to circulate that the Kremlin wanted the Rodina to squeeze the Communists out of the "social-patriotic" niche and to replace the KPRF as the main opposition party to United Russia.

As typical for a Russian politician, Rogozin's ideological views were difficult to define. Half-Zhirinovsky/half-Zyuganov, he was mixing national-patriotic banners of the former with the social justice rhetoric of the latter. The issue where Rogozin did stand out was his virulent criticism of the oligarchs whose "shackles" he wanted the country to get rid of. The anti-oligarchic stance did not prevent Rogozin from taking campaign contributions from a wealthy banker, Alexander Lebedev. Nor was Rogozin apparently perturbed by the fact that one of the Rodina bloc leaders, Victor Gerashchenko, has become Chairman of YUKOS.

For some time, Rogozin has been successful in maintaining the Rodina's image as totally loyal to Putin, but at the same time, oppositional to the government which was, in Rogozin's opinion, full of "oligarch's agents." Rogozin publicly called on Putin to launch a fight against the "oligarch's dictate" and promised that in this fight, Putin can use the Rodina as his "spetsnaz."

The two sides of the Rodina ¬ loyalty to Putin and opposition to the government ¬ finally collided in January 2005, when the Duma began debating the implementation of the law on monetization of benefits, which just took effect and caused widespread public protests. Rogozin accused the government of poor planning and sloppy execution of the law. He claimed that the "social-economic" bloc of the government -- Social Welfare Minister Zurabov, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, and Economic Minister German Gref ¬ have betrayed Putin and tried to hide behind him to avoid responsibility. Rogozin insisted that the cabinet resignation ¬ or, at the very least, sacking Zurabov ¬ was the only way to save the reputation of the President.

Soon, it became clear that the dominated by United Russia Duma would never approve any drastic move against the Cabinet. Rogozin must have realized that his hopes to force government resignation by parliamentary means were futile. He then has made unprecedented for the Duma decision to go! on hunger strike. On January 21, 2005, immediately following the Duma's rejection of yet another resolution critical to the government, Rogozin and four members of his party entered Rogozin's spacious office in the Duma building where five air-mattresses were already waiting. An installed camera was broadcasting the event live on the Rodina website. There was no food, only water. The hunger strike had begun.

Later, Rogozin described the strike as "a well-thought action." But it is difficult to avoid an impression that, quite to the contrary, he has miscalculated just about everything. Instead of making Rogozin a center of attention, the state-controlled media have imposed on him an informational blockade. The leadership of the Duma ! ignored him. Moreover, the struggle of President Putin's "spetsnaz" attracted absolutely no interest ¬ much less support ¬ of President Putin himself. All of a sudden, Rogozin was trapped.

A decent way out came in the form of a resolution by the Rodina faction "directing" Rogozin to end the strike. Rogozin promptly obliged and proclaimed the strike a success. However, reflecting his changed attitude towards Putin, he has announced that the Rodina party is moving into opposition not only to the government, but to the executive power "as a whole." He also threatened that the party was switching from parliamentary forms of opposition to "street fights."

There is no simple explanation to why Rogozin has resorted to such a theatrical gesture as a hunger strike. Nor is it easy to believe that it was only Putin's lack of attention that has converted Rogozin from a loyal Putin supporter to his avowed opponent. A possible explanation may lie in the relations between the Rodina and the United Russia party. The latter has always objected to the Rodina's status as an "official" opposition. At certain point, United Russia's leadership might have persuaded Putin that "opposition" ought to be generated by United Russia itself, by creating two competing, liberal and social-conservative, platforms. Should this news have reached Rogozin, he could have realized that the opposition status of the Rodina was not granted anymore, but, rather, had to be earned. The hunger strike and subsequent declaration of opposition to the Kremlin were therefore meant as first steps to establishing a new party image.

The "new" Rodina obviously needed new friends, and their choice was somewhat surprising. The first was the KPRF, the very same party that the Rodina was supposed to compete with. However, having initiated a few anti-government initiatives with the Communists and being grateful to them for their support during the hunger strike, the Rodina has mutated to view the KPRF as it's major, if not the only, trustworthy ally. An idea was articulated to create a broad left-patriotic coalition, including the Rodina and KPRF, for the 2007 Duma election.

Another friend in the fight against the "oligarch's dictate" came in the shape of jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who, in his widely publicized article, "The left turn," was predicting an imminent Rodina ascension to power. Many observers interpreted this passage as Khodorkovsky's overture to the Rodina. This message was reportedly warmly-received by the Rodina leadership, a logical position, given that with deteriorating relations with the Kremlin, t! he party is in desperate need for alternative sources of funding. Andrei Savelyev, one of Rogozin's lieutenants, has even suggested that Khodorkovsky should be running for president.

So far, the opposition nature of the Rodina has failed to materialize in mass street protests promised by Rogozin at the end of the hunger strike. But the lack of spectacular deeds has been more than compensated by the abundance of harsh words. Although careful as ever in not directly criticizing Putin, Rogozin is relentlessly assaulting his political foes in the Cabinet, Duma, and United Russia. These verbal esc! apades have already earned him a formal reprimand by the Duma committee on ethics.

But much more damaging to Rogozin and his party was the July 2005 Duma decision (enthusiastically supported by United Russia) to allow the registration of yet another Rodina faction. The "second" Rodina, composed of members of Sergei Baburin's People's Will Party, has effectively shrunk Rogozin's faction by about a third. Adding to the insult, the faction was also stripped of the position of Duma Vice-Speaker, which was retained by Baburin.

Rogozin has accused the presidential administration of masterminding the split, and he seems to have a point there. The Kremlin has fully mastered the "divide and conquer" approach to promote the interests of its favorite United Russia party. Having used the Rodina to harass the KPRF in 2003, the Kremlin is now using Baburin's party to "conquer" the Rodina, which the Kremlin increasingly considers as being "out of control." If needed, more fracturing at the left flank could be achieved by employing Gennady Semigin's "patriots." The ultimate goal of the Kremlin seems to be the elimination of any meaningful center-left opposition in the next Duma. The social-conservative platform of United Russia will then n! aturally pour into the free space.

Rogozin is certainly aware that he is fighting for his political life. Reflecting new realities, the Rodina seems to have completely trashed its anti-oligarch ("social-patriotic") rhetoric and, instead, adopted an extremely nationalistic ("national-patriotic") platform, a position that multiple Rodina critics call xenophobic, or even fascist. Having made illegal immigratio! n a centerpiece of its election campaign for the Moscow City Duma, the Rodina is marching to the election under the "Moscow for Muscovites!" banner. It may well happen that for the 2007 Duma election, the inscription on the banner will change to "Russia for Russians!" Abandoned by the Kremlin, the Rodina is banking on a new hot issue: a growing public discontent with the influx of migrants from Central Asi! a, North Caucasus, and China. If the Rodina succeeds in playing out this trump card, it will reincarnate itself and jump-start the stalling political career of its leader. If it fails, it will go down in history as short-lived President Putin's "spetsnaz."