From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Subject: Putin’s presidency: the beginning of the end
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2005
It would seem that with the end of President Putin’s second term in office being so far away, the “Y2008 problem” could wait for at least another year and give way to more pressing issues facing the country. Not so. The question of power transition in 2008 has rapidly morphed from a popular topic of political “tusovka” into the most dom! inating issue of Russia’s politics. It looks like the first casualties of the changing political climate became liberal reforms which President Putin was supposed to be freely pursuing after his triumphant re-election last year. When encountered with widespread public protests over the implementation of the social benefits reform, the Putin administration responded by adopting a “declare victory and leave” approach. Amid cheerful official reports on the growing satisfaction of ordinary Russians with the monetization of benefits, the housing reform was folded even before being really unfolded, and the health care and education reforms have been shelved. The decision to de facto postpone the convoluted and potentially explosive municipal reform provided yet more proof that the Kremlin has lost any appetite to challenge the patience of Russian voters. The just-promised by President Putin influx of cash into social spending, however welcome and long-overdue, unfortunately does very little to address the vital issues of the inefficiency of state bureaucracy and wide-spread corruption.
The transition of supreme power has never been easy in Russia. Even the introduction of the post-Soviet legal framework regulating the electoral process has largely failed to make political transitions smooth, transparent, and void of unreasonable public anxiety. It is frequently said that it is the immaturity of Russia’s democratic institutions that makes every presidential election unpredictable – like a game played by different rules every time. True, but this is not the whole story. Much larger problem facing Russia today is the lack of even a tentative agreement – much less a consensus -- in society on the direction the country should head. Whether Russia should continue steering to the “right” or make a “left turn” remains an unsettled issue with different political forces articulating almost antagonistic solutions. Compounding the problem, the 1993 Constitution shifted the balance of power so much in favor of the president that he became dangerously capable of dramatically changing the country’s course with almost unchecked authority. No wonder that the 1996 presidential election was not viewed as a simple contest between two candidates -- Yeltsin and Zyuganov -- with opposing political platforms, rather, it was perceived – and presented to the public – as a choice between a bright gateway to “tomorrow” and a dark tunnel into “yesterday.” Nine years later, little seems to have changed, and the risk of a sharp U-turn by a newly-elected leader remains unacceptably high. Today, when leftist and nationalistic attitudes are gaining momentum, the Kremlin is apprehensive of a possibility that a “left” president will erase the achievements of the Putin presidency, however incomplete and ambiguous. Perhaps this is what deputy chief of the president
Yet another factor further complicating political transitions in Russia is the high level of state intervention in the economy. As Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on July 26, 2005, more than a third of Russia’s GDP in 2004 was accountable to only nine state-owned companies with operations in the energy, raw materials, transport, and banking sectors. Because top management of these companies is heavily staffed with members of President Putin’s close circle of aids and confidants -- including high-ranking officials from his administration -- any personnel changes would inevitably have a major impact on the economy, only adding to the anxiety and uncertainty of the transition period.
The curse of the third term
Article 81 of the Constitution explicitly prohibits President Putin from seeking a third consecutive term in office, and he has repeatedly said – as recently as just few days ago at the meeting with Western journalists and academics – that he would abide by the Constitution. Putin’s supporters would argue that his words match his deeds. Having made stabilization of Russia’s political system a major objective of his presidency, Putin is viewed as relying more on the constitutional institute of the presidency rather than on personalities. Shifting the accents from the institution back to the individual would jeopardize all the achievements in state development Putin might claim. This will also cause inevitable damage to his “legacy,” a thought Putin doesn’t seem to be oblivious to.
However, the president’s words don’t convince his numerous critics who keep insisting that he is planning to stay in power beyond 2008. Characteristically, many of them would concede that, personally, Putin doesn’t want to stay. Their argument is that it is the country’s “ruling class” that is mostly interested in having Putin at the helm. Having climbed to the top of the “power vertical” during P! utin’s years and having accumulated significant wealth in the meantime, this “coalition of ruling clans” – in the words of Panorama’s Vladimir Pribylovsky -- is looking to preserve their political and financial influence that may not be guaranteed in a successor regime.
Perhaps, the motives of Putin’s critics are not totally altruistic, because any meddling with the Constitution on the part of the Kremlin would give them a chance to remain relevant, attractive to the West, and eligible to a variety of foreign grants. Unfortunately, Putin and some of his alleged supporters provided enough help to the opposition to drum up the third term craze. First, Federation Council Speaker, Sergei Mironov, suggested that Putin may be forced to change the Constitution and extend his presidency if there were a real threat of the fascist putsch (Izvestia, March 2, 2005). Predictably, this statement was interpreted as an indication that the Kremlin would use any worsening of the situation in the country – or would even provoke such a worsening – to keep Putin in power. Then, Putin produced shock waves himself when – at a news conference in Germany back in April – he pointed out that the Constitution didn’t forb! id running for the third term after a break. Putin’s loyalists would likely argue that the president was just attempting to joke, however awkwardly. But the opposition interpreted the passage in a much gloomier way, by predicting that a “seat warmer” will be appointed in 2008, but Putin will return in 2012.
Then, there came a modified version of the “third term after a break” algorithm, and it came in the shape of “Moskalets’ amendment”, named after United Russia’s Duma deputy from Krasnoyarsk, Alexander Moskalets. The current reading of Article 32 of the law “On basic guarantees of electoral rights! and the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to participate in a referendum” prevents any elected official, including the president, from running for a new term if he or she had quit the office prematurely, for whatever reason. This reading was adopted four years ago after the Samara region governor, Konstantin Titov – enjoying high ratings at the time – quit his position six months ahead of time and three month later beat all of his caught-off-guard opponents in! a landslide. In June, Moskalets proposed an amendment to the Article 32 that would allow the head of state to run for office again if the by-election that followed resignation was pronounced invalid. That is to say, should the president resign and the by-election was deemed invalid for any reason, he could run again. In the opposition’s eyes, the amendment would have paved a clear way for Putin to solve the “Y2008 problem” by simply resigning prior to March 2008, ! and then holding a by-election featuring some fringe political personalities that wouldn’t attract voter attention. The by-election will then be pronounced invalid because of low turnout, either real or engineered, by the Central Election Committee (CEC). In the next by-election, Putin is able to run again because – formally speaking – he had not spent two full terms in office. Facing a storm of criticism from many corners, including the CEC, the Duma has soundly defeated “Moskalets’ a
After being crashed in the Duma, the third term idea has moved to regional legislatures. Two regional deputies, Adam Imadayev from Primorsky krai and Igor Rimmer from St.Petersburg, independently proposed changing the Article 81 to remove presidential term limits. This came on the heels of the initiatives by the Ivanovo and Magadan regional parliaments to extend the president’s term from four to seven years. Rimmer later rescinded his initiative, but Imadayev pressed on. He pointed out that Article 32 of the election law – in apparent contradiction to Article 81 of the Constitution -- poses no restrictions on the right of citizens to be elected. Although legal experts found little merit in the proposal, the Primorsky krai legislature was likely to approve it. If this was the case, a corresponding bill may reach the Duma sometime in the fall. According to Vedomosti (August 11, 2005), it might take about 18 months for the bill to become law. The Duma would have to approve the bill by at least 300 votes. Then the bill should be approved by no fewer than 132 members of the Federation Council, and then, within the next year, endorsed by at least 60 regional legislatures. To this end, Imadayev claims to enjoy “wide support” in at least 17 regional parliaments, and Vedomosti noted that Imadayev’s idea was met with warm support even in the Federation Council. Deputy Speaker of the Council Svetlana Orlova was reported to have suggested that the abolition of the two-term
The confusion of the parliamentary republic
As an alternative to extending Putin’s presidency, many analysts considered transformation of Russia from a presidential republic into a parliamentary republic headed by a strong prime minister, the leader of the Duma majority party. According to this algorithm, in 2007, Putin will lead a political party – presumably United Russia – to win the majority of seats in the Duma. Putin will then become the prime minister and may stay in power for as long as United Russia maintains this majority. To prevent possible confrontation between Putin and the newly-elected president, the Constitution would have to be changed to weaken the presidency by abolishing the direct presidential election. The leading expert on the parliamentary republic scenar! io, Olga Kryshtanovskaya of the Institute of Applied Politics, pointed out to Germany, where the president -- almost a ceremonial figure with no real say in policy-making – is elected by a special assembly made up of the low house of parliament and the “nation’s best people” (Profil, March 21, 2005). Recently, the idea of electing the president by the Duma rather than by a direct vote was echoed by Liberal Democratic Party’s deputy Alexei Mitrofanov.
There seems to be no consensus among the pundits on whether the Constitution must really be changed to make the prime minister a bona fide head of the country. For example, Pribylovsky sees no reason for that. He believes that the Kremlin could simply select someone as dependent and unassuming as Federation Council Speaker, Sergei Mironov, to be the president (Moscow Times, February 25, 2005). Director of the Institute of Regional Problems, Maxim Dianov, further argued that if the presidential representatives in the federal districts were made to report to the prime minister rather than to the president, the prime minister would automaticall! y assume the real control over the country (Izvestia, August 11, 2005).
So far, President Putin has been steadfastly rejecting the very idea of Russia becoming a parliamentary republic. During his first term, Putin kept saying that as a complex multi-ethnic and multi-faith country, Russia can be held together only by strong presidential power. “It is dangerous for Russia to be anything but a presidential republic” – were his words at a Kremlin news conference on June 20, 2003. More recently – as the speculations on the parliamentary republic began swirling – some of the president’s lieutenants publicly reiterated their boss’ position. Speaking to foreign reporters, Putin’s aide Igor Shuvalov was unambiguous: “The Constitution will not be changed, and Russia will remain a presidential republic.” At a meeting with United Russia’s Duma faction in March, Surkov didn’t mince words, either: “I categorically against a parliamentary republic; it will lead to the country collapse.” Given the strength of these statements, one would believe that the script for the parliamentary republic is not in the Kremlin’s playbook -- at least as a “permanent” Y2008 solution. It may still come to the forefront, however, should the “third term after a break” approach be employed. In this case, in 2008, Putin might become the prime minister and then run for the presidency in 2012 -- or before that.
The successor game: frontrunners and backbenchers
As consistently high approval ratings of President Putin would suggest, the majority of Russians support the policies he has been implementing for the past few years. But, at least for the moment, the public at large doesn’t appear to be ready for sweeping constitutional changes allowing Putin to stay in office beyond 2008. A logical solution for the Kremlin would be to promote a 2008 presidential c! andidate perceived as an heir to Putin’s legacy. It is this scenario that Russian voters seem to be the most comfortable with. According to a poll, 30% of responders said that they would strongly support any candidate endorsed by Putin, and an additional 40% indicated that they would at least consider such a candidate. Only about 20% insisted that they would vote against a Putin-endorsed candidate on principle.
Given the public acceptance of the successor scenario and the opposition’s apparent inability to mount any serious resistance, it seems abundantly clear that the successor will come from within the current power circle. The list of possible candidates includes both well-known politicians and “backbenchers” whose names are largely unknown to the public. Two clear frontrunners on the successor list are Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Duma S! peaker -- and Chairman of the United Russia party -- Boris Gryzlov.
Ivanov’s most obvious asset is being a “silovik,” and he is frequently said to have the best shot at the presidency if the situation in Russia deteriorates to the point that its integrity is threatened. Ivanov’s support in the Kremlin reportedly comes from deputy chief of presidential administration Igor Sechin, his friend since the time when they both worked f! or foreign intelligence. But Ivanov is unpopular in Moscow and among regional elites and, worse yet, is widely disliked by the Army. Ivanov’s plan to abolish college students’ exemption from army service had a detrimental effect on his popularity among regular voters, too.
Not all analysts agree on the issue of Ivanov’s rapport with the presidential administration. Alexei Makarkin of the Center for Political Technologies argues that Ivanov is a “lonely star,” and no one in the Kremlin is really supporting him. Besides, Ivanov, although being “formally” from St. Petersburg, has worked there for only limited time and has no real base there. The powerbrokers in the presidential administration may be concerned that, having become the president, Ivanov would bring aboard Muscovites at the expense of the current team, which is heavily staffed with people from St. Petersburg. To make things even more complicated for Ivanov, he! recently has been attacked by the Military Prosecutor office for large number of non-combat-related deaths in the Army. This attack was interpreted as an organized campaign by Ivanov’s foes, who are trying to make a larger (and potentially devastating for Ivanov) point: he had promised a sweeping Army reform but failed to deliver.
In all recent polls conducted to gauge the ratings of potential 2008 candidates, Ivanov has been consistently beaten by Boris Gryzlov, whom well-informed Stanislav Belkovsky of the National Strategy Institute considers the most likely successor of Putin -- and actually promoted by Putin himself (Sobesednik, February 23, 2005). Indeed, Gryzlov’s strengths are numerous. He’s a bona ! fide St. Petersburg man who has had successful careers in both business and politics. Of all candidates, he has the broadest experience in governance. For more than two years, he has served as Minister of Interior, a tenure providing him with important law enforcement credentials. In November 2002, Gryzlov became the leader of the United Russia party, and, after its victory in the parliamentary election in December 2003, was elected the Speaker of the Duma. Although not overly charismatic or eloquent, Gryzlov is a good-looking and telegenic fellow, and if he has skeletons in his closet, they have failed to materialize so far. Recently, Gryzlov has begun positioning himself as a “social-conservative” with an emphasis on “social.” If, as suggested by the lavish social spending in the 2006 budget, the Kremlin does “veer to the left” by making social justice its official slogan in the run-up to the 2007-2008! elections, Gryzlov’s candidacy will come as a natural choice.
There is a school of thought among Russia’s political analysts that being a frontrunner is a political equivalent to false start – if not to outright suicide. It is claimed that the “true” candidate will emerge just a few months before the election – exactly as Putin himself had emerged in the summer of 1999 – and then! will be aggressively PR-ed through a blitzkrieg-style campaign. In the meantime, a list of “backbenchers”, with each being capable of becoming the frontrunner in 2008, keeps oscillating by including/excluding little-known to the general public names of heads of federal departments, presidential envoys, and regional leaders. The backbenchers mentioned the most in the media are President of the Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin, Head of the Federal Agency of Federal P! roperty Management Valeriy Nazarov, presidential representatives Dmitry Kozak (Southern Federal District) and Sergei Kirienko (Volga Federal District), and regional governors Alexander Tkachev (Krasnodarsky Krai) and Alexander Khloponin (Krasnoyarsky Krai).
The cottage industry of 2008 predictions has recently come up with a new product – successor couples. Politichesky Zhurnal (May 4, 2005) quoted an anonymous source in the presidential administration as saying that Putin’s successor will be presented to the public along with the prime minister. If the situation in the country remains stable, then the president’s Chief of Staff, Dmit! ry Medvedev, will become the president and current Deputy Prime Minister, Alexander Zhukov, will be promoted to prime minister. Deterioration of the economic situation or an acute foreign crisis would give the upper hand to the “siloviki” camp. In this case, the duo of Sergei Ivanov as the president and current Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin as the prime minister was suggested. Or – if things get really bad – the combination of Igor Sechin and current Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, respectively, was mentioned. With any of the duos in charge, Putin is expected to retain enormous influence and remain – at least informally – the actual leader of the country. Although highly speculative at this point, the “couple” scenario may be spelling out something potentially very important: the Kremlin’s intention to come up with two candidates rather than! a single one. Naturally, for this plan to be successful, both candidates should be agreed upon in advance by different – allegedly feuding -- factions in the president’s entourage.
The opposition game: Kasyanov’s gambit
On February 24, 2005, former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov held a news conference to announce that he might run for president in 2008. If the timing of the announcement -- exactly one year since he was unexpectedly fired by Putin on the eve of the 2004 presidential election – was chosen to make an impact, it certainly did. With name recognition and experience in the government, Kasyanov was immediately catapulted to the top of the list of opposition candidates. He was, however, quick to distance himself from the “official” opposition, suggesting that it is the regime that is now in opposition to the “early” reforms of 2000-2004 – the time he’s been heading the first Putin cabinet.
The opposition’s reaction to Kasyanov’s gambit was mixed. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Carnegie Moscow Center, interpreted his comeback as a welcome sign that parts of Russia’s political elite – presumably close to the Yeltsin era oligarchs -- may be ready to challenge Putin’s authority.! But the leaders of liberal opposition movements had a somewhat measured response. Irina Khakamada, the leader of Our Choice and a former presidential contester, questioned Kasyanov’s desire or ability to unite desperately disunited opposition. Another prominent liberal politician, independent Duma deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov, has also expressed a lukewarm attitude to Kasyanov’s status as a unifying figure – not an unexpected ! position for Ryzhkov, who has presidential ambitions of his own.
In contrast, the Kremlin’s reaction was swift and unambiguous. On July 11, 2005, responding to a request by Alexander Hinstein, a Duma deputy from United Russia, the Prosecution General office opened an investigation into privatization of two luxury government houses that were put up for sale – allegedly illegally – by Kasyanov’s decree, just prior to his dismissal in 2004. Few in Russia believe that th! e investigation will ever end in criminal charges being brought against Kasyanov, much less in trial. But the damage has already been done. After images of the houses – one being presumably owned by Kasyanov – reached media outlets, any chances for Kasyanov to attract meaningful public support have evaporated. There has been no single poll where Kasyanov registered more than 1-2% of support.
Is Kasyanov serious about running in 2008? His regular public appearances since February would certainly prove his desire to stay in Russia’s politics for years to come. But the time is running out for Kasyanov if his 2008 bid is for real. He needs to first shake off his liberal image and to find ideas – or at least slogans – to offer to the more left-oriented electorate. He also needs to get stro! ngly affiliated with a political party, a requirement that is rapidly becoming crucial for any credible run in 2008. So far, Kasyanov has publicly refused to join any political party, although he was rumored to be interested in heading the Democratic Party of Russia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 6, 2005). It is likely that Kasyanov will forgo 2008 and instead focus on a more prepared bid later – in 2012 or 2016. After all, at a tender age of 48, Kasyanov has a lot of time ahead of him.
Shortly after Kasyanov made his announcement, two leaders of the Duma political parties – LDPR’s Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Communist Party’s Gennady Zyuganov – vowed to join the race. Both have a solid core of devoted loyalists and consistently gather up to 10% of electoral support in polls that exclude Putin as a contestant. Both have experience running for the presidency: Zyuganov ran in 1996 and came in second in the first round with 32% o! f the vote. He then lost to frontrunner Yeltsin in what was considered by many to be a rigged run-off vote. Zhirinovsky ran in 1991, 1996, and 2000 and registered the highest score – almost 8% -- in 1991. In his trade-mark arrogant way, Zhirinovsky promised to run in 2008 and then, if needed, in 2012 or 2016 (www.politru/news/2005/02/25).
The Rodina party leader, Dmitry Rogozin, has not made his plans public, but he’s widely expected to run, too. Many actually believe that young (he is only 41) and ambitious Rogozin has a decent chance to win. Being labeled as a “patriot” (some would say “nationalist”), Rogozin reportedly enjoys some support from the Kremlin’s “siloviki,” but precisely who in the presidential administration would sta! nd behind him is not entirely clear. At this point, the major concern for Rogozin may not even be 2008 but, rather, the outcome of the 2007 Duma election. Rodina’s rating in all recent polls is dangerously fluctuating around the “magic” 7%, the newly-established threshold to enter the Duma. A failure for his party to win Duma seats in 2007 will not only erase Rogozin’s chances to become the president, but it may in fact to! rpedo his whole political career.
The winner game: from Duma to Kremlin
Recent amendments to the parliamentary election laws – in addition to increasing the election threshold from five to seven percent -- prevent independent candidates from running in single-mandate districts and only allow election to the Duma through party lists. Parallel changes to the law on political parties significantly increase the number of registered members needed to make a party eligible to participate in federal elections: from 10,000 to 50,000. Taken together, these changes are likely to result in no more than five to seven larger parties being able to compete for Duma seats in 2007. It is tempting to speculate that the 2007 Duma election may in fact serve as the first “round” of the presidential election in 2008.
In a 1993 article, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination,” Stanford’s Scott P. Mainwaring argued that presidential regimes are generally hostile to political party development and a strong presidential republic is only compatible with the two-party system. Following Mainwaring’s logic, it is not President Putin’s authoritarian instincts – as his critics relentlessly charge – but, rather, the nature of the str! ong presidential republic established by the 1993 Constitution, that is to shrink Russia’s political party field sooner or later. It does appear, however, that the Kremlin wants to create the two-party system sooner rather than later. This possibility was suggested by UFG’s Christopher Granville (Moscow Times, June 27, 2005). Granville argued that without strong Communist opposition in the Duma, the United Russia party can now be safely split into ! two “establishment parties,” one center-left and the other center-right, that will separately compete in 2007 Duma election. Further, the person who emerges as a presidential candidate endorsed by Putin could indicate that the future prime minister would be selected from the leaders of those two successor parties. Granville believes that if the system matures sufficiently by 2012, the two establishment parties could each nominate presidential candidates.
With some modifications, the “Granville” algorithm could be applied in 2007-2008. The Kremlin is unlikely to risk splitting United Russia before the Duma election because of the confusion it may cause for rank-and-file members and potential voters. A solution could be going to the election as a single party and winning – based on today’s projections – about half of the Duma’s 450 seats. Then the party could split into two “factions.” Incidentally, the Duma has just registered an additional Rodina faction, and this was done by adopting a simple amendment to the Duma protocol. Each newly-created faction will nominate a candidate for the presidency and work hard to advance both into the second round of voting. Then, an absolutely open, transparent, and fair run-off vote can be held because any outcome was already agre! ed upon by the ruling elite.
What could be Putin’s role in this process – and for the rest of his term? His major job would be using his authority to broker the agreement on two candidates between all competing groups. He would also have to make sure that, in the eyes of Russian voters, United Russia could claim all the credits for the increase in social spending. Will Putin j! oin United Russia – as many predict – and later lead its center-right faction? Or will he become Russia’s Deng Xiao Ping in some other capacity? When asked about his plans, Putin simply promised to “stay in Russia,” and that is perhaps enough for all of us to know at this point.
President Yeltsin had left the country on the brink of chaos, but he ensured a smooth transition of power to a successor. The country President Putin would hand to a successor will be in much better shape. If, in addition, a quiet transition of the authority can be ensured, Putin’s presidency, when compared to Yeltsin’s, will be nothing but a success.