From: Ira Straus (IRASTRAUS@aol.com)
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2005
Subject: re Aslund and the multiple rejoinders
There have been many replies to the Anders Aslund article, some of them furious in tone. In the heat of it all, one might make the mistake of assuming it's all a matter of pro or con. Actually the lines of division have been a lot more subtle. There seems to be a lot of consensus -- not unanimity, but a pretty widespread view -- along two lines, supporting one part of Aslund's views while opposing the other:
1) upheaval in general should be expected to be more bad than good, and the West should not be promoting upheaval per se, certainly not any pre-2008 upheaval. Aslund's predictions in this regard, and his seeming welcoming of an overturn, were generally disapproved.
2) the West should be promoting free elections, in Russia as elsewhere, by peaceful means. This includes widespread monitoring of election conduct, scientific polling to promptly track results, and other ways of helping Russia meet its internationally agreed OSCE commitments in this regard. It also includes training opposition groups for these purposes and for purposes of maintaining self-discipline and peaceful conduct in any protest actions against fraud. Aslund's views in this regard were supported -- even by writers who seemingly were joining in the Russian official hysteria against "interference in internal affairs".
The relevant distinction was made by more than one of the writers -- that such peaceful involvement in support of free elections is not wanton, destabilizing, or pernicious interference in Russian internal affairs, nor denigration of legitimate sovereignty, because it is based on international agreements signed by Russia alongside the rest of the OSCE countries.
If it comes to an attempt to steal the next elections, the responsibility for the turbulence in such a situation falls on the would-be thiefs. As it did in Ukraine. Letting an illegitimate regime stay in power, based on stolen elections, is a lot more destabilizing than standing up and getting a legitimate regime. In case some of us didn't notice, Yushchenko is regarded as legitimate by a pretty big majority of Ukrainians, and this has been keeping stability despite a host of evils including the economic slowdown. Much of this slowdown would have occurred anyway even if Yanukovych had been in power and carried through on the same irresponsible social benefits promises, but without the legitimacy to stabilize the situation. "A too forward continuation of custom is itself a turbulent thing" (Francis Bacon - sometimes called the one person who might have averted the English Revolution).
I personally am against upheavals as a rule of thumb and I generally dislike revolutions because of the amount of disruption they do and the likelihood that things will be worse not better after them. But I'm in favor of people defending their ballots against stolen election tactics, when they can do it. I doubt that such a situation will arise in Russia in 2008 (unless on behalf of the Left opposition!), since the Right opposition is so weak, but anything's possible in theory. The prediction of an upheaval prior to 2008 is another matter, it seems to me nothing to hope for, as well as an improbable prediction. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that one should be aware of eventualities, and responsible governments should have contingency plans, NOT for playing a destabilizing role or for interfering wantonly, but for playing a constructive and stabilizing role as far as feasible in the event of such a dangerous circumstance.
Mr. Aslund might wish to clarify what role he would advocate in regard to such an eventuality. Is he really favoring Western financing of youth activism and other mass activism to the extent of revolutionary demonstrations before or in the absence of electoral theft -- as one of the respondents in effect accused him of doing, and Russian official paranoia may soon be citing him as doing, in justification of its counterrevolutionary preparations -- or is he only favoring support for peaceful efforts to defend election results, and meanwhile awareness of the objective possibility of instability even prior to 2008 and preparation for playing a stabilizing role in that event? I don't think he was entirely precise on these distinctions and he may wish to take the occasion to clarify.
Incidentally, there was also pretty broad consensus in favor of continuing foreign policy cooperation with Russia -- integration of Russia into the world economy, alliance against terrorism and proliferation, use of G-8 for constructive peer review and peer pressure not expulsion, and so forth. This seems to me a sign that, behind all the sound and fury, reasonableness remains predominant in the Russia-watching community.