Subject: Responses to comments on "Putin's Decline and America's Response"
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2005
From: "Anders Aslund" <aaslund@carnegieendowment.org>
Let me comment on a few points of substance that have been raised with regard to my Carnegie Policy Brief, "Putin's Decline and America's Response."
One allegation is either that Putin has not turned Russia authoritarian or that Russia was not more democratic under Yeltsin. Freedom House and multiple civil rights organizations have documented in great detail that Russia has become more authoritarian under Putin, though it is only mildly authoritarian, and it was never a full-fledged democracy under Yeltsin. The presidential elections in 1996 were truly competitive, and nobody knew how they would end. The results of the parliamentary elections in December 1993, with Zhirinovsky's strong performance, were a complete surprise.
During the First Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR in June 1989, I was in Moscow. People sat glued to the television, because for the first time anything could be said on television. You know freedom when you see it. Later, the quality of programming, especially on NTV, was just stunning, forcing the competitors to catch up. Yes, NTV political programs often had some tendency, usually in favor of Yavlinsky, but other channels pursued other lines. This was great television and real pluralism. Today it is gone, because Putin's friends have taken over one channel after another and muzzled them, as any cursory observer of Russia must have noticed. Many Russian media remain impressively independent and vocal, but these are mainly small newspapers and websites with limited reach.
The dearth of policymaking in Putin's second term is equally obvious. I do not see any real questioning of my main structural argument, only marginal comments. First, power has been excessively centralized and concentrated among a few people in the Kremlin, predominantly siloviki. Decision-making capacity has shrunk, and the quality of decisions has deteriorated. Second, the very centralization and restrictions on information flows render the decision makers poorly informed about what they decide. Third, institutional checks and balances have systematically been dismantled, notably the two chambers of parliament and the regional governors. No institutions are mediating between the Kremlin and the people, leaving them with few channels of complaint short of protest actions. Fourth, the consequence of over-centralization, poor information, poor policy formulation, lack of institutional intermediation and, from this year, a fear of the people, is a paralysis of government. The regime has buried its many planned reforms and even undone the local self-government reform set to start in January 2006, which was designed to reduce corruption and institute local democracy. The all-absorbing focus on 2008 reflects the common insight that this administration is intent on doing a minimum for the next three years.
While the second-term Putin administration does few reforms, it is enchanted with political management, PR and image-making. When somebody says that black is black, Kremlin propagandists energetically deny this obvious fact. The many small free media outlets function as safety-valves, informing the regime about its enemies, while making the elite feel more alienated from their own society. Another technique is the cooptation of journalists and politicians through suitable remuneration. Remaining opposition politicians are ostracized and cut down to size with administrative measures. Characteristically, the regime did not punish anyone for the law enforcement failure in Beslan, but ordered an oligarch to sack a conscientious editor in chief. Although the two regional governors in the Beslan area, actually appointed by Putin, failed to show up, this disaster was used to justify the appointment of governors.
A more controversial suggestion in my policy brief is that this regime is too dysfunctional to last long. I notice that Stanislav Belkovsky reaches a similar conclusion in The Moscow Times (August 11): "Putin is serving as the figurehead for a classical example of a canned, conservation regime trying to maintain the status quo.Conservation can only last so long, and a system that does not change will collapse." This regime's fundamental problem is that it is poor at handling crises, which often erupt. Suddenly, popular dissatisfaction with some policy failure may reach the boiling point. To me the present Russian regime appears so fragile and is decaying so fast that it is difficult to believe that it can survive for three more years.
The Putin regime reminds me of the Edward Gierek regime in Poland in the 1970s, initially popular and highly successful. Its political management was superb till the end, but its policymaking was paralyzed during its last four years. Then, Poles said with reference to the sharply improved standard of living: "Small apartments, small cars, and small minds." Finally, the workers in industrial cities on the periphery rose spontaneously without any prior organization. (I worked as Swedish consul in Szczecin those hot summers.) In Russia, the students appear more likely to act, and the most obvious bone of contention is the draft. But usually the eventual cause is something few have thought of.
Many do not believe that the Putin regime can collapse because of high growth rates and high oil prices. But Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out that the French revolution did not occur when things were getting worse but when economic growth was steady and taken for granted. Ukraine's Orange Revolution took place in the midst of an extraordinary boom. On the contrary, sound economic growth and a high level of GDP may boost the probability of a democratic breakthrough. Russia and Kazakhstan are simply too developed to be so authoritarian. China, by contrast, still has a GDP per capita that is only a fraction of Russia's. Even so, China has never been more liberal than now. A decade ago Russia was much more liberal that at present, though poorer and more chaotic. Russia's combination of relatively high economic growth and increasing authoritarianism is an uncommon but not unique contradiction, suggesting that either factor may give rather soon.
Ira Straus raises a potent argument I often hear from liberal Russians, that the Russian people are more inclined to be red-brown than democratic. Opinion polls provide ample support for this view, but I am somewhat sanguine for structural reasons. Russia's fast economic development and millions of private enterprises provide a sound ground for a pluralist society. Many red-brown views are nurtured by official propaganda, and such positions tend to fall by the wayside when a society opens up and lies are being exposed. After all, the red-browns have no success to point to, and both economically and militarily Russia is too weak to harbor realistic neo-imperialist designs. Why choose a dead end if there is a way out?
In US-Russia relations, Russia has less to offer the US today than three years ago, while the US has fewer demands. This change in the balance of interests weakens Russia's position. Three years ago, the US needed Russian support in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and connivance over Iraq. Russia's oil production was increasing fast, and US companies hoped for substantial projects. Putin appeared a modernizer and enjoyed international popularity. Today, Russia's policy in Chechnya appears to generate international terrorism, while Russia has little to offer in the war on terrorism. Russia is cheering the ejection of the US air base from Uzbekistan, and Putin has become one of the world's foremost advocates of authoritarianism. During the Ukrainian presidential elections, he even indulged in anti-Western rhetoric. In the wake of the Yukos affair, Russia's oil production has been stagnant for almost a year, dampening US interest in investment in the Russian oil sector.
Meanwhile Russia needs to accede to the WTO to secure market access for its steel and chemicals when the business cycle turns down. After all, it needs foreign investments of many kinds. The US and Russia have a common interest in blocking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In signing the Helsinki conventions of 1975, Leonid Brezhnev committed the Soviet Union to freedom and democracy in multiple specific ways. These internationally-binding conventions formed the basis for the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. Formally, Russia still recognizes them. For the sake of democracy in Russia, the US should insist that Russia live up to its international commitments to democracy. Russia's year as chair of the G-8, designed as a club of rich democracies, offers an excellent opportunity to make this point. Like other people, the Russians would of course benefit from democracy. Amazingly, some commentators consider the collapse of authoritarianism and the rise of democracy a doomsday scenario, and some argue that democracy would be bad for Russia.
These are revolutionary times in Eurasia. In the last two years, we have seen three democratic revolutions that have prompted regime changes in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and people in the other countries ask: "Why not us?" These democratic breakthroughs have occurred in mildly authoritarian countries with pervasive corruption and strong independent businessmen, and in connection with elections. The three countries that best fit this profile are Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan, but one must not confuse probability with causality or inevitability.
Anders Åslund
Director
Russian & Eurasian Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel.(202) 939-2284
Fax.(202) 483-3389
Email aaslund@ceip.org.