Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2005
From: Ben Bamberger <potatoesanddiamonds@yahoo.com>
Subject: Response to Anders Aslund's policy brief
Anders Aslund identifies four mistakes that he believes are systemic to the Putin presidency and will eventually lead to Putin's downfall before the next elections. This statement is unfounded due to Putin's overlooked successes and the fact that the mistakes Aslund identifies are not systemic but simply overanalyzed blunders that have been exaggerated by the Western media. Putin's presidency has little chance to collapse other than failing to find a suitable replacement in the upcoming elections. While his second term has not been as successful as his first, he nonetheless brought stability and economic growth to Russia, which will preserve his current position of power. Furthermore, Putin is following a unique path of development, which, while not always fully democratic, will serve Russia's interests much better than any Western style democracy ever could.
Aslund has shown the Khodorkovsky affair to be a failure in the rule of law. While this is certainly the case, it is not reasonable to state that a judicially prudent president like Putin would show such flagrant disregard for the law if he had no other motivations. The dismantling of Yukos had less to do with the rule of law (which has and always will be weak in Russia) and more to do with the unwritten rules Khodorkovsky broke while openly engaging in the political arena. His arrest dealt with a historical precedent in Russia where the ruling body has always been able to take away what it hands out. This was true during the reign of the Tsars, maintained during the rule of the Communists and holds true even today. Putin has created a desirable situation with the oligarchs allowing them to keep their money in return for a political truce. This has had the effect of creating political and economic stability while allowing the oligarchs to turn into actual law abiding capitalists (hopefully), not unlike the robber barons of the 1800's. Khodorkovsky's actions forced his own arrest by blatantly disregarding this advantageous system. Had Putin not supported the arrest it is probable that instability over the question of authority would have ensued. The only negative part of Khodorkovsky's arrest has been the decrease in economic growth due to less domestic and more so international investment. At the same time, most of this uneasiness has been exacerbated by the media who have not represented the necessity of the arrest. The situation now seems to have normalized and investment is returning. The Khodorkovsky affair is only a mistake in terms of failed public relations, but even this cannot fully be blamed on the Putin administration.
The recent Ukrainian election debacle is also mentioned as a costly mistake. While this was another large public relations error it was not pushed by undemocratic principles but rather it was a response to so called independent and democratic NGO's that were funneling money into the Yushchenko campaign. What Putin did was no worse than the underground support for the Yushchenko campaign by the United States. The mistake that Putin made was that his support was overt rather than covert. With the failure of Yanukovich and the blatant election fraud Putin did come across as "poorly informed, antidemocratic, anti-Western, and ineffective." Again though, this support was not based on any sort of antidemocratic principles but Russia's difficulty in dealing with the West's encroachment on traditionally Russian dominated locales. Nor should this event be considered such a horrid mistake in terms of domestic policy. Had Putin endorsed the Western oriented Yushchenko, or not endorsed the pro-Russian candidate as much as he did, it is probable the he would have lost more political capital within his own country and made himself susceptible to nationalistic criticism.
The social benefit reform failure was a terribly poor decision by the Putin administration given how poorly it was carried out. However, this mistake seems to reinforce the democracy that is in place in Russia at the moment. The reforms were inept and ineffective, yet through demonstrations they were overturned. Had Russia been as antidemocratic as many say these demonstrations would have never taken place. Putin, meanwhile, showed that he is not an unbending leader and will change an unpopular, inane policy if necessary.
The Beslan hostage situation is the only mistake out of the four that seems to have no logical explanation. Given Putin's KGB background and the absolutely violent response to the theatre hostage situation, the failure at Beslan is entirely questionable. The fact that Russian special forces were not prepared to diffuse the situation also raises questions about the role of the government in this situation. Aslund is correct, the government "ignored the crisis" and allowed a tragedy to take place. However, this has nothing to do with democracy and given the amazing ability of the average Russian to withstand violent and emotionally damaging events, Putin seems to escape this situation with little damage. Had this event occurred in America with the Bush administration using same tepid response, it is safe to say that there would have been serious repercussions to pay. Regardless, the situation happened in Russia and sadly enough the brutal history of this country has well prepared Russians to withstand events like these. Regardless, the administration is to blame for a lackluster response yet the terrorists hold the true guilt, something Aslund does not fully acknowledge.
Aslund uses these mistakes to show how weak the Putin administration is and how close it is to collapse. He states that the threat will likely come from KGB officers who consider themselves above Putin or from escalating protests. While the threat from inside is impossible to measure, these ex-KGB officers have little to gain by overthrowing Putin other than invoking the wrath of the international community and creating another wave of instability in Russia. As to the protests, Putin has showed himself to be flexible enough with the recent social benefits protests that it doesn't seem likely that he will be unflinching in a poor position if new protests arise. The mood I sensed while in Russia was one of optimism from the younger generation and thankfulness for the return to stability after a difficult transition from Communism during the Yeltsin administration, not excessive anger at the administration for the aforementioned mistakes. The quality of living is at its highest since the collapse of Communism and any sort of political struggle would threaten these gains. While protests may arise on the periphery, the majority of Russians would most likely not support any sort of unconstitutional measures. It is also erroneous to state that the "population.has been inspired by the recent revolutions in Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic." A majority of Russians hold negative views of the "Color Revolutions" and would rather not see one in their own country. Also, the level of international (mainly US) funding and involvement which was evident in the other "revolutions" would be impossible in Russia which would significantly hurt the chances of such a revolution ever being successful.
The question that arises is how the US should react to new developments in Russia. Aslund seems to endorse President Bush's ideological policy of democracy and nation building, but this is rather shortsighted for a number of reasons. Bush states that "stable, prosperous democracies are good neighbors, trading in freedom and posing no threat to anyone," and indeed this is mainly true. However, there is a philosophical question that needs to be asked. Simply, can we implant democracy into countries that have no historical precedent of democracy? Furthermore, to what extent should we violate a country's sovereignty in order to ensure that democracy? Russia has no historical precedent of democracy, and attempts at establishing a strong rule of law have generally failed. Historically, rulers tended to become more reactionary as their reign matured (Catherine the Great comes to mind). Because of this, can we expect a democracy in Russia to resemble those in place in the Western world? The resounding answer is no.
To support the monitoring of elections is prudent, simply because it does not abuse Russia's sovereignty in any manner. Russia is bound by the standards set by the OSCE and therefore should abide by those laws. However, to support activist organizations is dangerous and would make already cool Russian-American relations icier. The United States should side on democracy but characterizing Putin as a dictator not only shows callous disregard for the facts but is counterproductive as well. Putin is too important of an ally to lose over useless rhetoric about democracy. He has quietly accepted the expansion of NATO and the EU into previously Russian influenced areas, US military bases in Central Asia and the US involvement into Eastern European politics all without much of a protest. He has created some very successful reforms and even recently allowed for the judicial authorities to take over the prison system from the FSB, an incredibly progressive step away from the entrenched Soviet attitudes that sadly still linger. At this point in time Putin is the best man for the job and excessive criticism does not serve America's policies in any way.
The best policy, which Aslund does endorse, is one of economic integration. Prosperous nations are usually the most stable and peaceful. Integrating Russia into the international community only makes the administration more accountable for their actions. The movement to kick Russia out of the G-8 is not only idiotic but dangerous. The West only gains from a prosperous Russia given the soaring oil prices and Russia's many borders with Europe. The only area where prosperity does not always lead to peaceful interaction seems to be the Middle East. There, ideologically driven hatred occurs regardless of economic prosperity although the lack of prosperity plays a great part in creating such enduring hatred. However, Russia is no longer ideologically opposed to the West and so the route of economic prosperity seems to be the most logical.
Regardless, this ideological necessity for democracy that the Bush administration has created needs to cease. Democracy works well for Western countries; however, they have the luxury of having the Romans as ancestors who gave them the strong historical precedent of the rule of law. Russia does not have this nor will it ever. One would be hard pressed find a single average Russian who would advocate the democracy of the nineties over the stability of Putin's regime. And let us not forget how young the "democracy" in Russia really is. Twenty-two years into the American democracy the founding fathers were committing egregious offenses against the rule of law such as the Alien and Sedition Acts. These acts allowed for the "deportation of persons from abroad deemed dangerous and also the prosecution of any public assembly or publication critical of the government." Russia isn't even into its twentieth year of "democracy" and still hasn't enacted laws this offensive. Hopefully Russia will emerge into a true democracy, but like everything else in Russia it is unlikely to be the typical of what has become standard in the West. Advocating and expecting this is simply misguided.