#20 - JRL 9126 - JRL Home
From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Subject: LDPR: a mini-party of power?
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2005
Here is a Russian joke: what do a guinea pig and LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) have in common? The answer: a guinea pig is neither from Guinea nor a pig and LDPR is neither liberal nor democratic.
There is a trend to marginalize LDPR by reducing it to a mere bully pulpit for its eccentric leader, Duma Vice-Speaker Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky. Often caricatured as a "clown," Zhirinovsky consistently comes out of the polls as the second most popular Russian politician after President Putin. Famous for his larger-than-life personality, skillful showmanship, and occasional fistfights with fellow Dumers, Zhirinovsky undeniably is the face, the mouth, and the soul of LDPR. However, the party influence over the Russian political life seems to be spreading far beyond Zhirinovsky's entertaining appearances on the Duma floor or on TV shows. Even a cursory acquaintance with the party's stand on issues would lead to a surprising find that many aspects of the President Putin's domestic and foreign agenda seem to follow a blueprint of the LDPR's program documents.
One of the LDPR's strategic goals - as articulated in the party program and in numerous books written by Zhirinovsky - is to transform Russia from an "amorphous" federation into a strong unitary state. LDPR asserts that the current national-territorial principle of the state formation - with ethnically-based "national republics" having a special state status - represents a grave danger to the Russ! ia's integrity because it encourages separatism and may lead to interethnic conflicts. Besides, the very presence of 89 separate regions within Russia doesn't make any economic sense since no more than 20 of them are financially self-sufficient whereas the rest rely on federal subsidies. LDPR proposes reverting to the principles of state formation of the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire: dividing the country into 25-30 completely equal in their legal status territories ("guberniya") with approximately 5 million residents in each. These territories should be formed based on geographic and economic considerations only, have elected legislative assemblies but no constitutions of their own, and employ Russian as the only state language. The head of guberniya, the governor, should be appointed by the President.
It's easy to see that some elements of the LDPR's proposals have already been brought to life. In 2000, President Putin divided Russia into 7 federal districts headed by representatives appointed by the President and accountable only to him. Characteristically, the borders of the federal districts closely follow the borders of Russia's military districts, and 4 of the 7 president's representatives have military or law enforcement background ("siloviki"). By encompassing "traditional" regions -- regardless of their status - and creating a "supra-regional" level of authority, the federal districts clearly represent a key component of the strictly territorial principle of state formation. In parallel, the process of region enlargement is underway. So far, it has followed a similar pattern: a more economically developed region (e.g. Krasnoyarsky krai) is absorbing a weaker ethnic-based formation (e.g. Evenksky autonomous okrug). Finally, late last year, popular elections of regional governors were scrapped in favor of their appointment by the President.
In order to make the structure of central authorities fit the territorial principle of state formation, LDPR suggests electing - strictly by party lists -- a single-chamber Duma. The upper chamber of the parliament, the Federation Council, is to be dissolved and replaced with the State Council consisting of the President, Prime Minister, Speaker of the Duma, key ministers, and regional governors. Again, it seems quite evident that in some key aspects, President Putin's ongoing political reforms follow the LDPR's script. The law eliminating single-mandate districts and introducing strictly proportional system of the Duma formation was proposed by the President in the fall of 2004 and approved in the second reading by the Duma. Although there appear to be no immediate plans to eli! minate the Federation Council, its reform - in some way or another - seems imminent. In any case, the creation in 2000 of the "advisory" State Council - composed of the President and regional governors - has already seriously discounted the value of the Federation Council as a legitimate representative of the regions.
Surprisingly enough, footprints of LDPR can be found even in the Kremlin foreign policy. LDPR believes that Russian diplomacy has become too much Western-oriented and is failing to fully exploit the existing conflicts between the West and the East. LDPR therefore wants to re-build relations with the states - such as Libya, Cuba, and North Korea -- known for their open hostility toward the United States. Russia should also step up the strategic cooperation with its "traditional" allies such as India and Iran. To upgrade the level of such cooperation, Russia's foreign trade priorities must be refocused in favor of those countries.
Recent deals cut between state-owned Rosneft and oil companies from China and India can be justifiably viewed as an attempt to complement the European "vector" in Russia's foreign policy with the Asian one. It's also increasingly clear that Russia isn't afraid anymore of taking a confrontational a! pproach vis-à-vis the United States in order to advance its interests in the East. The decisions to sell nuclear technologies to Iran and the anti-aircraft missiles to Syria - in clear defiance of the U.S. position - seem to highlight this newly-acquired stand that was hardly imaginable only a few years ago.
There is no reason, of course, to believe that President Putin is taking his marching orders directly from Mr. Zhirinovsky. Rather, the appearance of the perceptible LDPR "flavor" in the Kremlin's policies is a reflection of the seemingly growing influence of siloviki on the decision making process of the Putin's team. Speaking metaphorically, while Putin's "liberals" are taking their inspiration in listening to speeches by United Russia's Bor! is Gryzlov, Putin's "chekists" would spend their pastime by reading books by Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
It is worth remembering that the LDPR creation in 1989 was backed - and most likely even initiated - by an influential group of the then Soviet Union leaders known as "statists." Belonging to the group were Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov and KGB Head Vladimir Kryuchkov, to name just a few. The very same people later led the August 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev. It is hardy incidental that Zhirinovsky - whose own ties with the KGB have been a subject of intense speculations for years - was the only non-Communist Russian politician who openly supported the coup.
It is tempting to see a correlation between the LDPR's electoral results and the number of "people with epaulets" in the upper echelons of power. In the 1993 Duma election, LDPR made a splash by outpacing all other parties with 22.9% of the vote and forming the second-largest Duma faction of 64 seats. However, with liberal ideas flying in the air and young Yeltsin's reformer economists taking the rein! s of government, the LDPR's appeal has been steadily waning down in the 90s. In 1999, the party barely surpassed the 5% threshold with only 6% of the vote and - having won no seats in single-mandate districts - formed a moderate 17-deputy faction. But in 2003, LDPR staged a remarkable comeback collecting 11.5% of the vote and more than doubling its representation in the Duma. The fact that the number of siloviki in the Kremlin has visibly grown during the first Putin! 's presidency could provide a reasonable explanation for this surprising reverse of fortune. Clearly, Mr. Zhirinovsky does have sympathizers in the presidential administration. As reported by Nezavisimaya Gazeta (March 31, 2005), it was a phone call from the Kremlin that saved Zhirinovsky his position as the Duma Vice-Speaker after the scuffle with Duma deputies from the Rodina faction.
Barred something completely unforeseen, one would predict that in 2007, LDPR will be among a few parties to overcome the 7% threshold to get in the Duma. Having traditionally struggled to win seats in single-mandate districts, LDPR will certainly benefit from the forthcoming shift to the proportional election scheme. LDPR has loyal voters, and Zhirinovsky's p! ersonal popularity shows absolutely no signs of abating. Besides, in the Duma, he's surrounded by a youthful and educated supporting cast. The average age of the LDPR Duma deputy is only 42 and about a third of them (12 of 35) hold degrees in law. In comparison, only 2 of 47 Communist party (KPRF) parliamentarians are lawyers, and their average age is 58.
The actual influence of LDPR in the next Duma might even increase. Should United Russia be unable to win more than a simple majority, the LDPR votes will be asked for every time when the constitutional majority would be needed. Is LDPR to become a "mini-party of power"?