#1 - JRL 8375 - JRL Home
Moscow Times
September 20, 2004
Last Bastion of Democracy
By Nikolai Petrov
Nikolai Petrov, a scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.

Shortly after the tragedy in Beslan, President Vladimir Putin and Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko unveiled plans to alter the political systems of their respective countries. Their proposals could have far-reaching consequences for the fate of democracy throughout the former Soviet Union. In essence, the Kremlin has laid claim to a monopoly on power at the regional as well as the federal level.

It was easy to get the impression that Putin's plan to return to the Soviet and chekist past was intended for the long term. Just the opposite is true. The consequences of Putin's plan have already become clear.

At issue is a rejection of federalism as the basis of the structure of the Russian state. Putin never tires of affirming his devotion to the Constitution. His plan will not require any changes to the letter of the Constitution, but it will alter the essence of Russia's basic law. Returning to the pseudo-federalism of the pre-Yeltsin years is a dead end that will lead to disintegration of the state, not to consolidation. There is no country in the world even remotely comparable to Russia in size -- with the exception of communist China -- where the heads of regional governments are appointed.

Also at issue is the end of representative democracy at the federal level. Whom will our elected officials now represent? The Kremlin -- via dummy political parties in the State Duma and Kremlin-appointed governors in the Federation Council.

Participatory democracy at the federal level has already been destroyed. By gutting it at the regional level, the Kremlin has further devastated the political landscape. Putin's proposed reforms mean that politicians will emerge from a single source, the Kremlin's vaunted executive chain of command.

Neither "public servants" nor the citizens they represent will have anywhere to learn about democratic politics, for the destruction of direct elections at the municipal level is sure to follow. In response to Putin's announcement, the governors tellingly demanded full control over municipal and district leaders, including the power to appoint them. Executive chain of command will soon be extended from the Kremlin all the way to City Hall.

Reaction to Putin's reform plan was muted. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the president's plan is long-term. The changes he called for are already having an impact. The proposed amendments to Russia's electoral laws have less to do with the 2007 elections and more to do with the loyalties of State Duma deputies and governors between now and then.

One of the obvious reasons for abolishing single-mandate seats in the Duma is to deprive governors (and oligarchs) of a powerful lever for influencing the lower house. The chorus of praise for Putin's plan from the governors makes clear how a single pronouncement from the Kremlin can alter the entire political situation.

The indifference of average Russians to Putin's plan is a product of the authorities' conscious effort, begun in the Yeltsin era, to undermine public confidence in the institution of elections. So-called managed democracy is also to blame for turning elections into a political show whose outcome is known in advance. Average voters didn't think they really had the power to elect their regional leaders anyway. Hence they stand idly by as the Kremlin formally strips them of this right.

Unlike the governors, who have come out solidly in favor of Putin's reforms, Russia's regional legislators and mayors have largely remained silent. Yet real resistance to the Kremlin's plan can only come from this level, especially the regional legislatures, which must pass the amendments to regional constitutions required before the reforms can take effect. Statements made by some regional parliamentarians suggest that such resistance is possible.

It seems likely that a number of regional leaders, especially in the republics, will channel their resistance to Putin's plan through the legislatures, which are harder for the Kremlin to control. Keep in mind that in a number of regions, the laws requiring that the head of government be directly elected were passed in popular referenda. I would venture to say that when the initial shock has worn off, regional elites will begin to act more decisively, and that the Kremlin will be unable to implement its proposed reforms in full before the year is out.