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Moscow Times
September 15, 2004
Putin's Reforms Are Dangerous for Russia
By Nikolai Petrov

In response to the recent wave of terrorist attacks that has stunned Russia, President Vladimir Putin on Monday announced a package of sweeping government reforms that will bolster the authoritarian direction of Russia's political development. Putin proposed a fundamental restructuring of the entire executive branch, making it far more rigid and centralized than before. His plan further weakens representative democracy by dismantling key institutions such as direct elections.

Of all the measures that Putin proposed, only the Special Federal Commission on the North Caucasus is directly connected to the tragedy in Beslan, which served as the occasion for announcing the entire package of authoritarian reforms. The reforms break down into two groups: emergency measures intended to help the Kremlin maintain control of the North Caucasus; and a number of broader anti-federalist and anti-democratic proposals.

The second group includes a return to the late-Soviet practice, also in place during the early years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, of appointing regional leaders, as well as what amounts to an attempt to restore a single-party political system. The first group consists of what could be called tactical measures, although Putin's plan for coordination between the heads of "district and regional anti-terrorism commissions" was in fact introduced in the Southern Federal District a month before the tragedy in Beslan. The Kremlin had been working on the second group for some time, however. Only now, it seems, did Putin decide that the time was right to put his plans into action.

In the name of strengthening the state and improving its ability to battle terrorism, Putin has proposed a fundamental revision of the democratic achievements of the Yeltsin years, including the main such achievements still in place -- direct parliamentary and gubernatorial elections. Party-list contests involving United Russia will differ little from Soviet-era elections in which people were invited to cast their votes for the "indestructible bloc of Communists and unaffiliated candidates."

Regional elections, unmanageable as they were, nevertheless played an extremely important role in teaching the voters about direct democracy and the regional political elite about public policy and responsibility to the electorate. It's also worth keeping in mind that a majority of governors are now serving their final term. Switching to a system of appointments means that they could remain in power.

The Constitutional Court now finds itself in a tricky position. Asked back in 1996 to determine the constitutionality of the charter of the Altai region, the court ruled that representatives of one branch of government cannot be in charge of forming another. That was a different time, of course. But from the legal point of view, nothing has changed since that ruling.

Putin's reform plan will require the revision of all regional statutes and constitutions. The package as a whole represents a major reform of the constitutional order that will entail the widespread revision of existing laws. The Constitution itself, however, will not need to be changed. Yet less than two years ago, in comments broadcast live on television and radio on Dec. 19, 2002, Putin said: "I have no desire to put appointed officials in charge of the regions. The leaders of the regions are elected by the people in a direct, secret ballot. That is what the Constitution prescribes, and that is how it should stay." You can still find this quote on Putin's official web site.

Putin also announced the creation of a so-called public chamber, which he described as a "forum for broad dialogue" and "a place for carrying out public analysis of key government decisions." "In practical terms," Putin said, "we are talking about civilian control over the work of the state apparatus, including law enforcement and the security services." The creation of such a chamber would put the finishing touches on a system of surrogate institutions intended to replace such weakened democratic institutions as parliament, the government, an independent judiciary and a free press.

This new system of shadowy doubles is nowhere provided for in the Constitution, and depends entirely on the president. Instead of parliament we will have the State Council and the public chamber. Instead of the government, we'll have the presidential administration, the Security Council and the maze of presidential advisory councils. Institutional systems of information gathering and public reception offices stand in for a free press. A transparent budget gives way to all sorts of off-budget funds and direct requisition from "socially responsible businesses." Governors are no longer elected and accountable to the voters, they are appointed by the Kremlin. Political competition is weakened and the state becomes sealed off and ineffective.

The main defect in this rigid, centralized system is its total lack of flexibility, its inability to adapt to changing situations and to react to crises. A system in which everything is bound to a single person, the president, is potentially extremely unstable.

The issue of personnel is also important. Putin had already assigned Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref to help the hapless siloviki in the North Caucasus. Now he is sending in the last of his reinforcements, the irreplaceable Dmitry Kozak. The former Cabinet chief of staff was named Putin's envoy to the Southern Federal District. The transfer means that Kozak will abandon his crucial work on administrative reform, including the demarcation of powers between federal and regional agencies and municipal reform. Unlike former presidential envoy Vladimir Yakovlev, who will now head up the resurrected Nationalities Ministry, Kozak has been given such extensive powers that he will serve essentially as a sort of governor-general in the south.

Until recently, the Kremlin was battling on two main fronts. On one front, it was pitted against the rebellious governors; on the second, it was dealing with a public backlash over unpopular social reforms. Many analysts assumed that to open a third front against terrorism the Kremlin would have to retreat in its standoff with the governors. Instead, Putin has opted to eliminate the governors as a more or less independent political class.

Beslan revealed that the federal government had learned nothing from the Nord Ost hostage crisis in 2002. The conclusions it has drawn from the most recent tragedy are contrary to common sense. Beslan demonstrated the inability of Putin's executive chain of command and the centralized state to meet the challenge of terrorism. We witnessed a total lack of responsibility within the government and chronic indecisiveness at every level of power save the very top.

Initial responses to Putin's speech from State Duma deputies and the governors unfortunately leave no doubt that the Kremlin's package of reforms will sail through parliament. The only hope is that cooler heads will prevail inside the Kremlin as the necessary legislation is being drawn up -- people who understand just how dangerous Putin's plan is not just for society, but for themselves.

Nikolai Petrov, a scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.