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Moscow Times
May 14, 2004
The Truth About Official Conservatism
By Lilia Shevtsova
Lilia Shevtsova, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. It is the last in a series of pieces written on the occasion of the Carnegie Moscow Center's 10th anniversary.

The current crisis of liberalism and communist ideas in Russia has created a vacuum which is gradually being filled by different ideologies. Among them, the attempt by some Russian analysts to formulate a brand of so-called conservatism particularly stands out. In the Russian context, conservatism typically connotes opposition to the authorities and a call to return either to the Soviet or pre-Soviet past. This type of conservatism is associated with the Communist Party and nationalists. The ideologues of the new pro-Kremlin strain of conservatism, however, are trying to justify the preservation of the status quo, rather than advocating a return to the past.

These attempts could be dismissed as the latest manifestation of conformism. However, this "official" brand of conservatism merits greater attention. The very emergence of a pro-Kremlin conservatism is both a reflection of the crisis of alternative ideologies and of the authorities' efforts to formulate an ideological base for its policies, which for the moment rely on ineffective stereotypes and cliches.

Given that this official conservatism avoids extremes and emotional excesses, and is outwardly plausible, it can appeal to a diverse range of people. It seemingly combines common sense, a moderate pro-Western orientation and moderate statism. Liberal technocrats, bureaucrats and oligarchs can all subscribe to it.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky's letter about the crisis of liberalism, in which he calls for cooperation with the president, could also be interpreted as acceptance -- albeit under duress -- of the official conservative position, which can be defined as follows: "Needs must when the devil drives. You have to cooperate with the authorities, otherwise you'll be crushed."

What are the main tenets of this conservatism? First, its apologists argue that ideal democracy is not possible and that criticism of the authorities should be seen as a naive striving for perfection. Second, they tell us that democratic development occurs gradually. Third, there are no liberal democratic alternatives to the existing regime and none on the horizon -- instead Russia is threatened by a communist or nationalist alternative; thus, it is better for us to sit back and enjoy what we have. Fourth, official conservatives are trying to convince us that Russia is progressively westernizing and even moving in the direction of the U.S. democratic model.

These arguments are rather simple and bear all the hallmarks of the traditional justifications used to support periods of restoration. But in this case, it is essential to take issue with these arguments for not only are they simplistic, they give a false picture of the direction of Russia's development.

It's all well and good to talk about stability, but stability la russe is the stability born of the need to survive and the adaptation of a large section of the population to lowered aspirations. "May it get no worse" is the mantra that underpins this stability. It does not provide any stimulus for development, on the contrary, it can only lead to stagnation.

What about economic growth? It has already become a banality to talk of the growth of a diversified economy, while Russia's narcotic dependence on world oil prices continues. Viewing criticism of the authorities as an attempt to introduce to Russia an unrealizable ideal model is tantamount to full reconciliation with the status quo, complete with all its imperfections and dirty tricks. If the conservative position is that everything is reasonably okay, then there is no point in asking how the situation can be improved. The same goes for the thesis about developmental gradualism: why get worked up if accelerating reforms is futile?

I accept that the argument about a left-wing or nationalist alternative to Putin is well-founded. But is it not the authorities' policies that have created the conditions for such a revanche and stirred extremist sentiments, as, for example, with the creation of the Rodina party?

Regarding Russia's movement toward the U.S. model, our conservatives have an idiosyncratic understanding of American political life. Do they consider the government of Mikhail Fradkov to be a U.S.-style presidential Cabinet transplanted onto Russian soil? This analogy might hold, but only if the position of prime minister were abolished and the government made directly subordinate to the president, and if there were a parliament and courts independent from the president. In the absence of these, we are talking about the typical Russian regime formula, where all levers of power are in the hands of the leader who, however, carries no responsibility for how the country is run.

This conservatism is a manifestation of the political class' loyalty to the authorities. Furthermore, the official conservatives are extremely consistent in the sense that no matter who is in power they say one and the same thing -- that the authorities are right and all the alternatives are worse. They said this under Boris Yeltsin and now they are repeating it under Vladimir Putin.

What is curious today, however, is that the pro-Kremlin conservatives have unexpectedly received support from their Western colleagues. A couple of months ago, an article entitled "Normal Country" was published in Foreign Affairs magazine, arguing that for a middle-level income country -- such as Brazil or Mexico -- Russia has a normal democracy. The article attempts to reinforce a simple argument: "What you have is what you deserve. Do not aspire to anything more." The thesis about the "normality" of Russia bolsters the scanty arguments of the official conservatives who can now happily trot out that the West supports our system and does not see alternative possibilities for development.

Official conservatism and its apologists are spreading like the plague. At the Russian Economic Forum in London last month, I was struck by the consensus of opinion among Russian and Western businessmen who, in unison, praised the stability and favorable business climate. It was all highly redolent of the Communist Party Congresses of old. One got the impression that forum participants sincerely believed that the Khodorkovsky affair and the absence of rule of law were marginal phenomena that certainly do not affect them. Well, good luck to them!

So what is the point in arguing with the official conservatives and their Western friends? Precisely because their defense of the status quo is the most serious obstacle today to debate about the present and future of Russia, the sources of development and stimuli for reform. Official conservatism distorts reality, lulls people into a false sense of security and encourages passivity. In the final analysis, this conservatism forms the basis of the Kremlin modernization project through returning to a traditional state. It may well become the basis for even bigger steps back in the direction of dictatorship, given that "the authorities are always right" and so forth.

The very emergence of this official brand of conservatism results from the Russian political class' strategic myopia and its focus on the here and now. Pro-Kremlin conservatives, wittingly or unwittingly, by preserving the status quo, remove from the agenda the question of the direction of Russia's development and encourage uncritical acceptance of the existing system.

What we are talking about is a sedative, which can only encourage complacency and distract us from unpleasant realities. In essence, it is an attempt to freeze Russia's incomplete reforms. In this context, conservatism, despite its outwardly civilized and decent appearance, inevitably is a force for regression.

And until liberal minded people begin to formulate a serious liberal alternative to the existing system, Russia's political class will enthusiastically march toward a new crisis under the banner of this new conservatism.