#7 - JRL 8193 - JRL Home
Moscow Times
April 30, 2004
Which Way Forward?
By Dmitry Trenin
Dmitry Trenin, a senior associate and director of studies at the Carnegie Moscow Center, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. He is co-author (with Alexei Malashenko and Anatol Lieven) of "Russia's Restless Border: The Chechen Factor in Post-Soviet Russia." This is the third in a series of articles on the occasion of the CMC's 10th anniversary.

The deterioration of the situation in Iraq this month raised many people's hopes that the United States would get seriously bogged down there. While some openly gloated at America's misfortunes, others argued that maybe the United States would tone down its arrogance and -- perhaps under a new president -- start to listen to other people's advice.

President Vladimir Putin reiterated his formula of a year ago that Russia does not want to see the United States defeated in Iraq, and the new foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, talked of the desirability of organizing an international conference on Iraq. The Russian political establishment, as is its custom, supported increasing the UN's role.

This position, however, raises a number of questions: What exactly is meant by "not wanting the United States to be defeated?" Not actively harming the U.S. cause, but leaving it to dig itself out, as the war is not "our war?" Or supporting the United States in the UN Security Council in return for its "understanding" vis- -vis Russian commercial interests?

And how realistic is the idea of an international conference, especially given the regional experience with such things? Do the Iraqis, for example, really want the involvement of Iran, Turkey, Syria or Kuwait in resolving their internal problems?

What is the UN in the final analysis? The representative but effectively "consultative" General Assembly, the influential but divided Security Council, or the UN apparatus headed by the secretary-general? It has long been clear that the UN is neither a world government nor a world parliament, but a platform for all states to express their views and an instrument for the international legitimization of actions agreed upon by a handful of leading powers.

Arguing today over whether last year's invasion of Iraq was justified is unproductive. Today, when Iraq has been transformed into a hotbed for Islamic extremists, there is no point in the countries that opposed the war a year ago saying: "We warned you." It is useful to look at what happened in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when it became an incubator for Islamic radicalism that spawned the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. What more will Iraq give rise to?

It is imperative to pool forces to deal with the challenge from the radicals. Iraq is no Vietnam. The extremists' objective is not only to force the United States and its allies out of Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East as a whole, but also to install radical regimes in those countries and to overthrow governments in the region's key states, from Pakistan and Uzbekistan to Saudi Arabia and Egypt; and, of course, the annihilation of Israel.

Such a fundamental challenge requires a comprehensive response, and the groundwork could be laid at the upcoming G-8 meeting in the United States.

The situation in Iraq, Iran and the Palestinian Authority is of crucial importance for the greater Middle East.

In Iraq, the United States should not just formally hand over administration to the Iraqis, they should transfer power to a representative body that enjoys the trust of the Iraqi people. It is necessary to reach agreement with influential Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds and to unite them around the idea of national modernization. A new brand of Iraqi nationalism (and not democracy, which still has to mature) could become the motor of modernization for the whole region.

Iran could become a partner to the United States in its relations with the Iraqi Shiites (as was the case in Afghanistan) if Washington were to revise its ideologized approach to Tehran and show willingness to take into account Iran's economic development needs. In the future, an economically and politically "advanced" Iran could become a pillar of the security system in the Persian Gulf.

The crisis of power and authority in the Palestinian Authority has long been obvious. There will be no peace with Israel until real power there is concentrated in one person who can build a functioning Palestinian state under an agreement with Israel. It would make sense for the United States and Europe to channel support to those Palestinian nationalists who could become modernizers in a future state.

In addition, the European Union must finally set the timetable for Turkey's accession to the EU. No other decision will have a more stabilizing effect on the situation in the greater Middle East than Turkey's inclusion in the EU.

Russia's fundamental interest is that the Muslim CIS republics not becoming a recruiting ground for the Islamists. This threat can be averted through accelerated economic development, a more even distribution of national wealth and broadening the political base of the regimes in these countries. At a time when business and geopolitical rivalry between Russia and its partners -- primarily the United States -- on the territory of the former Soviet Union seems to be on the rise, a serious dialogue is called for regarding national interests and common problems.

The UN system, like the "superimposed" bipolar system, was the result of World War II and relations between the "big three."

After Sept. 11, 2001, all leading world powers face a major challenge from forces opposed to modernization of the greater Middle East. There is a chance that the existing "anti-terrorist coalition" -- or rather, its core -- could form the basis of a new model of global governance, acting through a reformed UN. Much will depend on decisions made this year.

Iraq is not an isolated case. It is part of a wider problem.