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Izvestia
March 27, 2004
"View From Washington"
Russia Risks Becoming a “Miniature China”
By Nikolai Zlobin
Dr. Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Eurasian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC.

At one time, Russia’s departure from Communism was elegantly but incorrectly dubbed “the Second Russian Revolution” in the Western media. But the result of that Russian revolution was not a new and improved edition of the Soviet Union. Instead, the outcome has been the triumph of capitalism and the collapse of democracy. Russia has been transformed into a country with an authoritarian regime but a free market. In the last few years, Russia’s economy has showed strong progress, while the latest attempt at democratization from above has ended in failure. In the choice between freedom and capital, Russians have chosen capital. The Kremlin, with support from the masses, has won a political victory over the oligarchs, but the price of this victory has been an intensive strengthening of the state.

A regime of president Putin’s personal power has formed in Russia, a regime formalized by his administrative structure. This system is in essence anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, although it maintains all the features of a democratic system. It’s important to admit that these developments in many ways correspond to the desires of most Russians, and have a positive effect on the quality of their everyday life. Putin enjoys a high level of mass support because in many ways he personifies the traditional Russian understanding of how a state should govern, and what relations should exist between the state and society as a whole.

And yet, there are a number of unsettling tendencies. For instance, the rapid evaporation of the political class, its transformation into, on one hand, a nomenklatura that executes orders from the executive branch, and, on the other hand, into a lobbying structure - groups of special interests that push certain legislation through the executive branch. A deep devaluation of political structures and institutions is underway; politics are disappearing from public life. Not only is the Duma “not the place for political debates”, as one of its deputies put it recently, but neither is all of Russia. All power is becoming monopolized in the Kremlin. Political struggles will henceforth exist only within the Kremlin, fought among the few, and will be beyond public scrutiny. This will inevitably lead to the degradation of the concept of responsibility for the state of national affairs on all levels of the government hierarchy, and the latter’s loss of legitimacy. Moreover, the absence of political competition will inevitably lead to some bad decisions, no matter how benevolent the intentions of the President may be.

President Putin has infused the political structures with powers that will hinder the implementation of the liberal program comprising the declared agenda of his second term. Reforms announced by Putin cannot help but be directed against the new “party of power” on which Putin has leaned over the last few years. As a result, conflict between the two may be possible, leading to the President’s loss of support from a significant part of his current political base. And if he undertakes a series of unpopular reforms, while oil and gas prices go down, then Putin could conceivably lose his popular support as well. In the absence of public political discussion, this makes the president vulnerable and dependent on others, and limits his possibilities for reform.

Russia has practically legalized corruption on all levels of public life and made it an inevitable part of daily life for millions of Russians. There are no signs that the new government will be more effective in the fight against corruption. This fight, just like the movement announced by the President to increase the efficiency of the state apparatus, which was then handed over to the apparatus itself, will end in failure. Corruption may become the major obstacle to Russia’s modernization.

Many judged the exit of Kasyanov’s government as the final victory of the new “party of power” over the Yeltsin family. Putin, who was an appointee of the family, spearheaded the battle against it and spend four years to achieve this victory. Yeltsin did the same toward the system created by Gorbachev. Gorbachev manifested a similar pattern. The fight with the preceding power structure and its former representatives is becoming not only the main feature of the political agenda of any Russian leader, but also his way of struggling for and maintaining power. It can be supposed with a high degree of certainty that whoever becomes Putin’s successor will be forced to fight Putin’s system and replace members of Putin’s political family with his own loyal people.

No matter how stable Russia looks today, there are many factors that force a skeptical outlook about its stability in the medium term. The system of power and economy is designed to operate only in the absence of any crises. This limits its potential to modernize the country, to ensure stable economic development, to resolve demographic and social problems, and to create a civil society. It also limits Russia’s pull for foreign investors.

Today, all the attention is focused on President Putin. People are waiting to see how he will act in the coming weeks and months, and are thus suspending judgment about current events. Russia could become an economically developed democratic country, but if its domestic political orientation is not altered, it risks becoming a “miniature China” or a “big Kazakhstan”.