#19 - JRL 8054
From: Peter Rutland <prutland@wesleyan.edu>
Subject: re Gessen vs Starobin
Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2004

THE TIMES AND Mr. PUTIN
Peter Rutland, Wesleyan University

Masha Gessen accused the New York Times and other US papers (but not the Washington Post) of failing to inform their readers of the anti-democratic character of Putin’s rule. In reality, since Putin’s appointment as acting president at the end of 1999 the Times has adopted a commendably balanced approach to Putin, presenting the evidence and arguments for both the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of his rule.

I pulled out the following 40 articles on Russian domestic politics that appeared in the Times between January 2000 and October 2003, a mixture of editorials, op-eds and analytical reports. They are listed chronologically with a typical quote. The sample is not exhaustive, but I think it is representative.

Roughly speaking, I would say about half the articles are balanced or neutral, one third are anti-Putin, and one sixth could be construed as pro-Putin. The pro-Putin pieces do not defend his anti-democratic actions, they just argue that he can play a useful role for the United States.

The following trends appear.

1) The favorite editorial posture can be characterized as cautious optimism. They give the arguments for and against Putin. Is he trying to strengthen the state so as to introduce reform? They do not ignore his authoritarian tendencies. All 10 editorials in the sample fit this category.

2) In these editorials there is a strong undercurrent of Realpolitik, looking at Russia not in its own terms, but in terms of what can it do for the US. This theme was also the policy of the Bush administration, and was strengthened after September 11 and Putin’s decision to side with the US in the war on terror. A classic statement is in Keller 5/19/02.

3) The open-minded editorial line is balanced by generally negative coverage on the op-ed pages. William Safire was consistently hostile to Putin from the beginning. I counted seven articles by him devoted to Putin. Russian critics also got an airing. In 2002-03 they carried two articles by Yevgenia Albats and one by Anna Politkovksaya, and some by American critics such as McFaul (5/28/02, 4/11/01).

4) There are few obviously pro-Putin op-eds. (See for example Foreign Minister Ivanov (1/27/02) and Erofeyev 3/8/03). The “pro-Putin” op-eds by American authors focus on Realpolitk issues like oil and dealing with Iraq (Aron 5/5/02, Brzezinski 10/8/02). Thomas Friedman seems to like Putin (because of Moscow’s sushi bars, 12/23/01).

5) The news coverage did not shrink from describing Putin’s anti-democratic actions. Critics such as Sergei Kovalov were often quoted. But like the editorials the news pieces gave the arguments for and against. While certain topics were covered fairly well (Chechnya, the media) other aspects were not thoroughly covered (the rise of security personnel in state administration at all levels, the hollowness of the political parties).

The Times did not adopt a one-sided anti-Putin line from the moment he took office. To that extent, Gessen is correct. But she is incorrect in saying that the Times did not give its readers sufficient exposure to the facts about what Putin was doing and the arguments of his critics.

Russian liberals should not try to blame the New York Times for the sorry state of Russian democracy. Nor should they try to export their moral absolutism and ideological name-calling to American journalism. We have plenty of that already.

LIST OF RELEVANT ARTICLES

Editorial, “Putin’s Old-Style K.G.B. Tactics,” 29 October 2003.

“After laboring to project the image of a rational, law-abiding statesman, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has reverted to the vengeful violence of his old employer, the K.G.B.”

Editorial, “Keeping Vladimir Putin on Track,” 26 July 2003.

“It is proper to encourage Mr. Putin. But it is equally important not to look the other way when he gets off the track. “All that pomp is fine, so long as nobody forgets that the Kremlin pulled the plug this week on Russia’s last independent television channel, or that a lot of people are still dying in Chechnya, or that for all of Mr. Putin’s declarations, Russians are still involved in Iran’s nuclear program.”

Yevgenia Albats, “When Good Friends Make Bad Diplomacy,” 28 May 2003.

“An unaccountable authoritarian regime, driven by nationalism and equipped with nuclear weapons? That should worry even the world’s only superpower.”

Anders Aslund, “A Russia Resurgent,” 28 May 2003.

“Clearly, there are issues on which Russia and the United States can cooperate -- North Korea, for example….Economically, Russia also has much to offer.

Victor Erofeyev, “Even in a New Russia, Stalin Shadows Putin,” 8 March 2003.

Is Putin “a president who has opened the window to the West with one hand and closed it with the other?” “We haven’t got any other president, and won’t anytime soon. Mr. Putin needs intelligent help from the West, not harassment and unrelenting suspicion. So please, hold the window open from your side.”

Anna Politkovskaya, “Russia and the Wages of Terror, 8 November 2002.

Re atrocities in Chechnya.

Editorial, “The slaughter in Moscow,” 28 October 2002.

Re Nord Ost hostage rescue. “If the United States wants to be helpful, it should not give Mr. Putin a pat on the back after this debacle and tell him we are all fighting the same enemy. “

Yevgenia Albats, “The Chechen War Comes Home,” 26 October 2002.

“The desire for order and security has given birth to authoritarian politics that have nurtured a closed, unaccountable regime.”

Mark Brzezinski, “Bargaining With Russia,” 8 October 2002.

Argues that Russia will cooperate in a war on Iraq. “It is highly unlikely that, in the end, Russia will not stick with us.”

Stephen Sestanovich, “Putin Has His Own Candidate for Pre-emption,” October 2002.

Warns of Russian action in Georgia.

Stephen Sestanovich, “Russia’s Role in Iran and Iraq,” 3 June 2002.

Editorial, “Russia’s Compass Points West,” 23 May 2002.

“Ever since Peter the Great looked to Europe in the late 17th century as a model for modernizing Russia, the integration of Russia and the West has been an alluring but unfulfilled dream.” While encouraging this process, the editorial warns that “Mr. Bush should also speak up on behalf of a free press and the rule of law, principles that Mr. Putin has often been quick to bulldoze.” “Fully integrating Russia with the West will take years, and a great deal of skillful diplomacy by American, European and Russian leaders. Strong-arming Russia will not work.”

Michael McFaul, “Taking the Russia Summit a Step Further,” 20 May 2002.

“Unfortunately, the trend in Russia is going away from democracy. Most worrying has been Mr. Putin's disregard for human rights in Chechnya…. any one of the anti-democratic trends might not be cause for alarm. Taken as a whole, they cannot be ignored.” “He has settled into a Russia policy somewhere between the romantic notion that if we bend far enough we can save Russia from its darker instincts and the fatalistic idea that we should write it off as a hopeless cause.”

Bill Keller, “A Beautiful Friendship,” 18 May 2002.

“For those who just tuned in to the world last September, here are a few purely selfish reasons we want Russia on our side.” The list includes oil, nukes, and dealing with the axis of evil.

“Like Mr. Yeltsin before him, Mr. Putin has clearly decided that Russia’s future lies with the West. Unlike Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Putin does not feel quite the same need to be constantly pleading with America to bail him out of his domestic problems with an infusion of cash or a face-saving concession. To integrate his country with the West, Mr. Putin is willing to swallow a lot -- American missile defense, the expansion of NATO right up to his borders, American soldiers flying war missions from his backyard.”

Leon Aron, “Russian Oil and U.S. Security,” 5 May 2002.

Article devoted to prospects for US buying Russian oil. “Russia has been transformed in the last 10 years, and Vladimir Putin's solidarity with the United States since Sept. 11 has sealed that transformation.”

Michael Wines, “Russia’s Feuding Liberals Are Shoved to Fringes,” 23 March 2002.

On problems of liberal parties.

Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva, “Putin’s Message to the Media,” 24 January 2002.

Re closure of TV6.

Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, “Organizing the World to Fight Terror,” 27 January 2002.

Editorial, “Silencing Critics of the Kremlin,” 23 January 2002.

“As President Bush pursues his new friendship with Mr. Putin, he should not be shy about raising free-press issues with the Russian leader.”

Thomas Friedman, “Russia’s Last Line,” 23 December 2001.

In praise of Moscow’s Macdonald’s and sushi bars. “The saying here now is that there is only one line left in Russia -- the line for money.” “So keep rootin’ for Putin and hope that he makes it to the front of Russia’s last line.”

Editorial, “Russian Oil Power,” 30 November 2001.

Editorial, “Russia’s Economic Rebound,” 23 November 2001. Editorial, “Transforming Relations With Russia,” 12 November 2001.

Michael Wines, “Putin Grows in Job, Raising the Question: For Good or Ill?,” 6 November 2001.

Article gives voice to defenders and critics in equal measure. Quotes Mike McFaul “‘Still, the most troubling thing to me is that there are no really serious political opponents -- not as a party, not as an alternate political figure. That, to me, is a scary thing.” And Lilia Shevtsova “He’s created a political desert.”

William Safire, “Reading Putin’s Mind,” 10 December 2001.

Safire imagines what Putin must be thinking “I crushed my media critics. I neutralized NATO. My obliteration of Grozny is forgotten. I'm bringing prosperity to Russia by arming America’s enemies and fixing prices with the oil cartel.”

William Safire, “Reading Putin's Mind,” 23 July 2001.

“I will adopt China’s model: Centralize political control by cracking down on dissent and crushing democratic tendencies. At the same time, develop a controlled capitalism to generate profits that the state can tax to build military strength.”

William Safire, “Putin’s China card,” 18 June 2001.

“President Putin has shown himself to be duplicitous (ask the Chechens), anti-democratic (ask the remains of Russia's free press) and untrustworthy (ask the exiled oligarchs).”

Stephen Sestanovich, “The Un-Clinton and the Un-Yeltsin,” 15 June 2001.

“Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin must pay equal attention to the threats to political freedom that have increased since Mr. Putin took office and that are widening the gap between Russia and the West.”

Michael Wines, “Some Russians Are Alarmed At Tighter Grip Under Putin,”14 June 2001.

“Among intellectuals and advocates of a democratic Russia in the Western mode, a gnawing concern is arising that the relative freedom from state surveillance and restriction that citizens have relished in the last decade may be drawing to a close.”

Michael McFaul, “A Step Backward On Nuclear Cooperation,” 11 April 2001.

“Promoting nonproliferation programs in Russia, of course, directly benefits American national security….. Without question, Mr. Putin's negative activities in other areas -- whether stifling the independent press or trading weapons with Iran -- will make it more difficult to have meaningful and positive relations.”

Steven Erlanger, “Learning to Fear Putin’s Gaze,” 25 February 2001.

On East European reactions to Putin’s rise, quotes Istvan Gyarmati, a former Hungarian diplomat. “Putin is a bit like Peter the Great, opening to the West for capital and technology but at the same time recentralizing Russia and reinforcing authoritarian rule.”

William Safire, “Waiting for Righty,” 29 January 2001.

“Putin is building a corporate state along Peron-Pinochet lines. The K.G.B., the army and a selection of oligarchs rule through an elected president who maintains popularity by tight control of the mass media.”

Michael Wines, “Russia’s Latest Dictator Goes By the Name of Law,” 21 January 2001.

“A democracy, defined in terms of dictatorship: the concept is Russian to the marrow.” Article implies that strong state could lead to democracy, or maybe not.

John Lloyd, “The Autumn Of the Oligarchs,” Magazine, 8 October 2000.

“‘Putin thinks the Russian people are not prepared for democracy,’ says one insider, who refused to be identified. He says, ‘We need to push them toward democracy, using power.’ I asked him, ‘Don’t you think this is a contradiction?’ ‘I don't think so,’ he said.”

Celestine Bohlen, “Putin and the Press; An Invitation You Can’t Refuse: Be on My Team,” 24 September 2000.

“In Russia, rulers don’t just fight to take or keep power. They also fight to make sure they don’t have to share it. This was true for the czars, it was true for the Communist Party and, so far, it seems to be true for President Vladimir V. Putin.”

Patrick Tyler, “Russians Wonder If Putin Accepts Limits To Power,” 14 August 2000.

“the question that seizes many Russians is whether Russia’s democratic institutions are strong enough to resist the authoritarian streak that critics ascribe to the former K.G.B. official who is now president.” “‘The new team of our new president is energetically crushing freedom and democracy,’ said Sergei A. Kovalyov.”

Editorial, “Mr. Putin’s Political Gyroscope,” 6 August 2000.

“So far much of the action seems more clearly aimed at rebuilding a strong central government than at advancing democracy and reform…. as he learns to wield the nearly dictatorial powers that the Yeltsin-era Constitution gives him, Mr. Putin will have to decide whether he intends to build a durable democracy or just rebuild the machinery of state. ”

Michael Wines, “Russian Tycoon in New Role As Organizer of Opposition,” 18 July 2000.

Quotes Berezovsky “Today Russia is facing a choice: whether we will follow the Latin American model, with an authoritarian power and market economy, or the European model with a liberal power and market economy.”

Michael Wines, “Putin Describes an Ill Russia and Prescribes Strong Democracy,” 9 July 2000.

“The Kremlin’s heavy-handed treatment of some critics and its sweeping efforts to reassert its rule in the provinces have led some to charge that Mr. Putin is edging the nation into authoritarian rule.”

William Safire, “The KGB coup”, 19 June 2000; “Putinism Looms,” 31 January 2000; “Rhymes With Rasputin,” 6 January 2000.

Editorial, 9 May 2000.

“Mr. Putin, who spent most of his career working for the K.G.B. and its successor security organization, may be tempted to exercise the near-dictatorial powers that come with the Russian presidency. Russia needs constant, effective leadership, not a modern variation of authoritarian command. Mr. Putin’s promise to rebuild a strong central government should not become an excuse for drawing all power back into the hands of the state.”

Patrick Tyler, “Now, After the Battles, The Real Tests for Putin,” 26 March 2000.

Offers nine tests to see whether Putin turns out as “another tough authoritarian or as an enlightened democrat.”

John Lloyd, “The Logic of Vladimir Putin,” Magazine, 19 March 2000.

An exercise in “Searching for clues to the "real" Putin” Quotes supporters and opponents such as Sergei Kovalev, “Putin’s priority will be to increase the powers of the state, and in Russia that tradition is a grim one.”