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#4 - JRL 8038
From: "Robert Burns" <ctirip@earthlink.net>
Subject: NPRI SYMPOSIUM: THREE MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT (DAY 2)
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2004

PANEL I - U.S.-RUSSIAN LABORATORIES AND NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, POST-COLD WAR

During filmed opening remarks, Dr. George Woodwell, Founder and Director of the Woods Hole Research Center (http://www.whrc.org/), explained how nuclear weapons have moved beyond the limits of rational use or purpose, except for perhaps in the area of deterrence, and even that is doubtful. Under the leadership of the U.S., the world has gone from a policy of national to global suicide.

Dr. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratories (http://www.sandia.gov/), discussed "Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century." In his 20-minute presentation, Dr. Robinson explained his belief that nuclear deterrence will remain a cornerstone of national security. He doubts total elimination of nuclear arms will be a realizable goal in the near term. "I believe the world would be more dangerous, and not less dangerous, were U.S. weapons to be absent from the scene."

Dr. Michael May, Co-Director and Emeritus at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (http://cisac.stanford.edu/), spoke on "Developing Bunker Busters." Dr. May and Zachary Haldeman co-authored a June 2003 CISAC report on "The Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons against Buried Biological Weapons" (http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20216/May_Haldeman_final.pdf), the conclusions of which were presented today. In developing the research, the authors wanted to answer five questions: (1) What are underground targets?; (2) How well can underground targets be located?; (3) How deep can nuclear weapons penetrate?; (4) How effective are nuclear explosions?; (5) What else happens beyond the initial blast? In concluding, Dr. May stated that a penetrating 1-10 kiloton nuclear weapon could deliver enough heat and radiation to eliminate or sterilize biochemical weapons at depths of 10-30 meters, depending upon yield blast and depth of blast. However, the exact storage configuration of the biochemical weapons are essential for complete sterilization or elimination using nuclear weapons, and the surface effects of such bunker buster blasts will be considerable. He ended by saying that U.S. advertising of new missions for nuclear weapons seems to put at risk the rest of its anti-proliferation strategy in return for marginal goals, while lessening the value of NPT and nuclear restraint.

Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group (http://www.lasg.org/hmpgfrm_b.html) discussed the topic "What is Stockpile Stewardship?" The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is a euphemism for a program which designs, tests, manufactures, and maintains nuclear weapons. He added that we are unable to understand a nuclear weapons program without a prior commitment to not use them. Only a small percentage of the federal military budget is spent by DOE/DOD for nuclear weapons (about $6.5 billion). He emphasized the poor fiscal control of SSP. SSP is inherently innovative: its purpose has always been to provide the scientific, engineering, and institutional basis for weapons design, certification, manufacturing, and maintenance of our nuclear arsenal. SSP may require explosive testing, which requires legitimization of weapons of mass destruction in the U.S., while undermining U.S. policy of non-proliferation.

Philip Coyle, CDI Senior Advisor (http://www.cdi.org), discussed "The Role of Nuclear Weapons Labs in Sustainable Global Security." A main goal of all U.S. nuclear weapons labs is to ensure a safe, secure, and dependable stockpile. However, U.S. labs have lost much expertise and need to regain it. Not one U.S. lab is ready today to push for underground nuclear testing to ensure stockpile assurety. Dr. Dale Klein, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, began seeking sign-off from DOD for new bunker buster nuclear weapons in March 2003. Mr. Coyle explained that the use of low-yield nuclear weapons is questionable in view of current high-precision conventional weapons. He stressed that nuclear weapons labs must remain independent of their customer - DOD, and to "not just go along to get along." He concluded by saying that if labs don't speak out - for or against - nuclear weapons initiatives, then they run the risk of appearing to be just another defense contractor - putting money before common sense.

Dr. Raymond Jeanloz, member of the University of California Committee on Oversight of Department of Energy Laboratories (http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/regents/welcome.html), discussed "The Viability and Reliability of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." He explained how SSP helps to sustain an enduring nuclear weapons stockpile by: (1) monitoring for degradation; (2) responding to degradation (manufacture or remanufacture components, as needed); (3) maintaining nuclear weapons design expertise; and (4) maintaining underground nuclear weapons explosion testing capability. Statistical failure rate of U.S. nuclear arsenal shows a lack of significant aging, but discovery of minor (<0.1%) defect rate of original design. In effect, the U.S. arsenal "is, in a word, robust." U.S. labs and the STRATCOM Advisory Group forward annual assessments to DOE and DOD, who then forward them to the President. The SSP contains various checks and balances (Governmental/congressional = annual assessments, UC oversight of quality and effectiveness of work). Dr. Jeanloz believes that the above is not enough, and advocates more informed public discussions and more transparency of the SSP process.

Professor Anatoly Diakov of the Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies (http://www.armscontrol.ru/), presented "Non-Strategic Weapons: Are They Needed and Can They Be Controlled?" Non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) are nuclear weapons not covered by any formal arms control treaty (nuclear-capable land mines, artillery shells, naval depth bombs, etc.). The 1991-1992 presidential nuclear initiatives on removal, elimination, and consolidation of NSNW practically eliminated this category of weapons from the arms control agenda, thus making them "forgotten weapons." Prof. Diakov explained that current U.S. policy is increasing the threat of use of nuclear weapons (through its Advanced Concept Initiative (ACI), possible decision to use pre-emptive nuclear strikes, etc.). NSNW add nothing to strategic deterrence and would only be used against third countries (not Russia). Russian and U.S. maintain approximately 3,300 and 2,200 NSNW, respectively. Prof. Diakov argues that steps towards transparency in the NSNW arena would include: (1) U.S./Russian declarations of number of NSNW eliminated since 1991 and obligation not to explore, design, or produce new weapons; (2) exchange of information on principles, strategy of nuclear planning, numbers of warheads in stockpiles, and locations of NSNW storage facilities; and (3) discussions on how to eliminate warheads and signing of cooperative agreement on protecting NSNW.

PANEL II - THE MANHATTAN PROJECT AND BEYOND

The afternoon panel was moderated by Dr. Caldicott and included Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation (http://www.wslfweb.org/); Greg Mello; and Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (http://www.lcnp.org/). Dr. Burroughs reminded attendees that in the fall of 2003, the U.S. was the only country to not cast a vote for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He likened the U.S. to a country with a "manifest destiny" that is above the law. Global security treaties are necessary to establish global norms against genocide and WMD, and for human rights, thus ensuring global security.