#8 - JRL 8034
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <rware@siue.edu>
Subject: Dunlop (8027), Starr (8032) [Re: Moscow Hostage Crisis, Apartment Bombings, FSB]
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2004

Sound theories are developed and established through their capacity to respond to the genuine questions and anomalies that weaker theories can only evade. That's why thoughtful investigators welcome questions. I continue to hope for a genuine and serious response to issues and queries presented in JRL 8021 concerning the hypothetical involvement (JRL 8017) of the Russian FSB in the Nord Ost hostage incident, together with the four apartment block explosions and the invasions of Dagestan that occurred in August and September 1999. Thus far, there has been nothing approaching a clear, direct, and comprehensive response to the numerous questions that were previously raised.

Regarding the latest contribution to this discussion, it clearly is sometimes difficult to ascertain the deeper motives and intentions of political leaders from the postures and statements of their foreign emissaries, as illustrated by the judicious reluctance of President Putin's critics to rely upon assurances presented by his representatives regarding his intentions in Chechnya. In response to the call for further information here is the text of an article published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 2003) pp. 66-71.

Was Aslan Maskhadov Involved in the Moscow Hostage Crisis? Ralph Davis and Robert Bruce Ware Ralph Davis is a freelance writer specializing in Eurasian security issues. Robert Bruce Ware is an associate professor at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.

Who was behind the Nord-Ost hostage drama in Moscow in October 2002? Chechen commander Shamil Basayev has claimed responsibility, but Russian officials say that he did so to shield Chechnya’s former president, Aslan Maskhadov. Maskhadov has denied any involvement. At stake are the credibility of the Chechen cause and the possibility of a negotiated settlement for the conflict. Both may depend on whether Maskhadov is part of the problem or part of the solution.[1]

Shamil Basayev established his reputation as a hostage-taker as early as 1991 when he hijacked a Russian plane to Turkey with demands for Chechen independence. Similar tactics brought him to center stage in June 1995, when he led an attack on the Russian town of Budenovsk and held hundreds of civilians in a maternity hospital before fleeing with dozens of them to southern Chechnya. After the first war Basayev opposed Maskhadov in Chechnya’s presidential election, then served as his Prime Minister in 1997. The two leaders were at odds as often as not, and Maskhadov evidently was unable to prevent Basayev’s incursions into Dagestan in 1999, which precipitated the present conflict in Chechnya. Yet, while Maskhadov was unable to control radical Islamist warlords such as Basayev, Arbi Barayev, and Ibn ul Khattab, he was widely regarded as a moderate secularist official by many in the West, who viewed him not only as Chechnya's legitimate leader but also someone with whom Moscow can negotiate towards a workable peace.

But there is growing evidence of Maskhadov’s radicalization. At a July 4th (2002) conference chaired by Maskhadov and Basayev, Maskhadov presented a new formation of the Chechen wartime government. Basayev was appointed head of the Military Committee of the Majlis ul-Shura of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Yet, while assigning military responsibilities to Basayev, Maskhadov retained his position as commander-in-chief of all Ichkerian forces. He foresaw that the new structure would establish centralized command over Chechen military operations that previously took the form of isolated guerrilla actions. Maskhadov ordered all commanders to increase the scale and tempo of operations within their districts, whether inside Chechnya or outside. Presenting the war as part of the Great Holy Jihad, Maskhadov concluded with assurances that freedom would return to Chechnya under Islamic law.[2] At the same meeting, the Ichkerian constitution was amended to bring it into conformity with the laws of Shari’ah.[3]

In an interview with Kavkaz-Tsentr on Aug 14, Basayev reiterated that all combat actions have become more coordinated due to the reorganization of the Majlis al-Shura: "Even groups of mojahedin which were unknown earlier and acted independently, are trying to establish permanent contact with us and coordinate their actions in line with the common decision."[4]

At an extraordinary session of the Majlis al-Shura held at the western front during August (2002), Maskhadov stated that all mojahedin were now under the provisions of the nizam (law), which are based upon the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, i.e., Shari'ah law. Furthermore, Maskhadov stated that combat missions have been established which would soon force Russia from Chechen territory. "I hope," said Maskhadov, "that we will be able to change the situation by the end of this year and force the enemy to leave our lands. I am sure we will build our state - the Islamic state of Chechnya, God willing. Allah's law will prevail in our state. We will have no individual groups or disagreements. There will be a single nizam -- nizam of Allah."[5]

A militant video released after the downing of a Russian military helicopter on 19 August showed Maskhadov sporting the green epaulets of Islamist leaders while sitting in front of a banner saying "Allahu Akbar". On October 14, the regional headquarters of the North Caucasus intercepted radio communications from Maskhadov's message wherein he called for intensification of terrorist activities and sabotage in Russian territory.[6]

Evidence of Maskhadov's complicity in the Nord-Ost hostage crisis was provided by interviews with its two principal perpretrators, Mosvar Barayev and Abu Said. Since Maskhadov’s involvement has become a matter of controversy, it is worth examining these interviews.[7] On October 25, Barayev was interviewed by an NTV correspondent. The clip was aired the next day: [Correspondent Sergey Dedukh] "The [hostage-takers'] group consists of 35 people, 15 of whom are women. Translated from Arabic, the name of the group means Islamic kamikaze fighters. Movsar denies suggestions that the Nord-Ost attack was revenge for the murder of his relative [Arbi Barayev]. Barayev Jr says the operation was not planned abroad. It was sanctioned by Shamil Basayev and the president of Ichkeria, Maskhadov, was in the know. The terrorists' only and final goal is the end of the military operation in Chechnya and the withdrawal of [Russian] federal troops. [Movsar Barayev] "Our group is called [gives an Arabic name] Brigade, which means Islamic kamikaze fighters. Our goal - which we have declared more than once - is to stop the war and get the troops out [of Chechnya] [Correspondent] "What if you receive a proposal, for example, that a Russian official enters into talks with Maskhadov or with somebody else? [Barayev] "We are acting on orders from the supreme military emir. Our supreme military emir there is Shamil Basayev. You all know him very well. And Maskhadov is our president [words indistinct] although we have often heard that there is nobody under his command and nobody listens to him. All this is - I don't know how to say it in your language - it is a lie and slander. We are very much under his command and we very much listen to his opinion. Through the mediation of Aslan Maskhadov's representative in Baku, Ali Asayev, a reporter for the Azeri newspaper Zerkalo managed to conduct a telephone interview with Abu Said, Movsar Barayev's aid, on October 26. [Correspondent] Tell us, please, was Maskhadov or any other commander aware of your plans? [Abu Said] Of course. This is a specifically prepared plan. And this is the best plan from the point of tactics. We prepared it during the entire summer. We came here on God's will and we will achieve our purpose, Inshallah. [Correspondent] Have you an opportunity now to contact Maskhadov or [Chechen field commander] Shamil Basayev? [Abu Said] Yes, of course. [Correspondent] Do they know about events there at the current moment? [Abu Said] They know, they know everything. They telephone and learn about the situation. We have reported everything to them. [Correspondent] There is information that the Maskhadov headquarters has prepared the mechanism for transferring military operations to Russian territory if the talks on the settlement of the conflict do not start till spring. Is this [operation] part of this mechanism? [Abu Said] Yes, this is only one part. We have not yet started our actions. And if this is only one part, there are major plans for the future. If they do not fulfil our conditions, certain moves will be made. [Correspondent] When this operation was worked out, was Commander-in-Chief Aslan Maskhadov present there, was he informed? [Abu Said] Yes, this plan was worked out jointly. Yes, he knew. But the rank and file mojahedin were not aware of where we were going... On November 1, Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky chaired a press coverage that played excerpts from a taped conversation between Movsar Barayev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Maskhadov's emissary to the Middle East. Wherein Maskhadov was described as authorizing the mission. Following is the transcript of parts of that conversation as reported in Gazeta.Ru: "Is Aslan aware of this operation?'' inquires Barayev’s interlocutor identified as Yandarbiyev. Barayev answered that ''Shamil'', meaning Basayev, was present during preparations for the hostage-taking. ''When this operation was being prepared, Aslan (Maskhadov) and [top Chechen rebel commander] Shamil (Basayev) were present, but Shamil was fulfilling Aslan's instructions,'' Barayev said. He added that he was executing orders from his chief Basayev, but that the latter was subordinate to Maskhadov. ''Shamil has nothing of his own. Shamil was carrying out instructions from Aslan. But this operation was top secret. Only with Shamil and his people.'' Furthermore, a report that Maskhadov’s Baku representative, Ali Asayev, was able to contact and influence the hostage takers during the siege suggests complicity on the part of Maskhadov and/or his staff.[8]

Hence there is evidence: 1) that Maskhadov had undergone Islamist radicalization; 2) that Maskhadov was responsible for reorganizing the militant command structure last July in order to centralize operations and give himself comprehensive oversight; 3) that Basayev acquiesced to Maskhadov's centralization of operations; and 4) that Maskhadov ordered an increase in the tempo and scale of militant operations outside of Chechnya that would force Russia to end the war. If nothing else, events since the hostage crisis provide further evidence of Maskhadov's power over Basaev.

The hostage takers repeatedly said that Maskhadov had authorized their actions, and Maskhadov's centralization of the Chechen command structure suggests that this should have been the case. That would make him part of the problem. Alternatively, if Maskhadov had no advanced knowledge of the Moscow operation, and if he cannot control the Barayev's and the Basayev's of Chechnya, then how could he be part of a solution? Moreover, if Maskhadov was not complicit in the hostage crisis then why did he fail to condemn it while it was in progress?

The evidence suggests that Maskhadov was either implicated or impotent, that his leadership has been a failure and that peace and stability in the Caucasus requires that the people of Chechnya must choose another leader.

NOTES

1. Since its tragic conclusion last month, the incident has served to damage Maskhadov's reputation, being written off as "damaged goods." According to an unidentified U.S. official, Maskhadov has "forfeited any legitimacy he had...he's either unwilling to stand up to terrorists or incapable of it." "U.S. Rejects Chechen Separatist Chief"; Los Angeles Times, October 30 2002.

2. Transcript as published by Kavkaz Tsentr located at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RMSMC/message/1298

3. The text of the amendments as published by Kavkaz-Tsentr can be viewed at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RMSMC/message/1441

4. "Chechens launching coordinated operations against Russians, rebel commander"; Kavkaz-Tsentr news agency web site, 17 Aug 02.

5. url: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RMSMC/message/1387

6. "Chechen outlawed leader's voice intercepted by federal forces - spokesman"; Interfax-AVN military news agency web site, 14 Oct 02. 7. The two interviews and the Gazeta.Ru press coverage are available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RMSMC/message/1535

8. "HOSTAGE-TAKING IN MOSCOW GAVE IMPETUS TO CLOSER AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS"; The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Wednesday/November 6, 2002.