#6 - JRL 8005
RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies
Vol. 5, No. 1, 8 January 2004
"RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies" is prepared by Catherine Fitzpatrick on the basis of reports by RFE/RL broadcast services and other sources.
RUSSIAN ELECTION BOYCOTT: TREADING A FINE LINE.
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

Soon after their heavy losses in Russia's parliamentary elections in December 2003, liberals united in the Democratic Public Assembly gathered in Moscow and decided to boycott the March presidential elections or vote against all candidates. The Union of Rightist Forces (SPS), led by Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Lukin, a top Yabloko official, Lev Ponomarev of For Human Rights, and others called for the boycott, although other leaders in the same parties said a formal decision had not yet been made. Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinksii said his own party's decision was due to the fact that "free, equal, and politically competitive elections are impossible." Other commentators wondered if anyone would notice. "Izvestiya" said Yabloko likely lacked the resources to gather the 2 million signatures necessary for the presidential campaign within one month's time and to finance a national campaign (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 December 2003). To explain his decision, Yavlinskii said, "in the absence of independent courts, mass media, and sources of financing, real political competition, which is the essence of elections, cannot exist." Veteran human rights campaigner Elena Bonner also endorsed the boycott.

While Yavlinskii's complaints about the lack of independent courts, sources of financing, and media access are the kind of complicated, general issues that can make it difficult for boycotters to find a target, other political leaders who feel marginalized by the political process have more specific demands. Communist Party Gennadii Zyuganov told reporters on 17 December 2003 that his party might boycott the elections next year if there is no recount in a dozen oblasts and autonomous republics of Russia, such as Bashkortostan and Daghestan (see "Left, Right Parties Threaten to Boycott March Presidential Race," rferl.org, 18 December 2003). Zyuganov alleged that the Central Election Commission (TsIK) falsified 60,000 voting records.

Responding to the announcement of a possible boycott, President Vladimir Putin was quoted by pravda.ru as saying that those who advocated the protest were "cowards" and that the idea was "stupid and harmful" and proposed by "losers." Commentators of all persuasions have been debating in the Russian media ever since about the usefulness of such a campaign. Boris Dolgin of polit.ru, writing on 23 December 2003 about varying views of the "legality, morality, and expedience" of a boycott, dismissed the notion that such protests were illegal, as the Central Election Commission itself has already published a brochure explaining that unless such calls are accompanied by force, use of official position, or bribery they are not a crime. A boycott, especially if it called into question the 50 percent participation in the ballot required by law, could deprive Putin of legitimacy, Dolgin reasoned.

Vitalii Lebin, commenting in polit.ru on 23 December 2004, disagreed, saying that unlike the Georgian opposition, the Russian democrats do not have popular trust, because many people have come to associate the word "democracy" with economic deprivation. The basis for power in Russia is popular will, he says, and the people opted for Putin and the war against the oligarchs because they felt cheated by economic reforms. Therefore, democrats should not be working "against the foundations of legitimate power," in his view, and at any rate will fail for lack of massive support. Dolgin replied to this argument that popular will is merely a thin veneer applied to legitimize the "vertical" of power from the Kremlin. Still, he notes, if the opposition really had some clout, it would mount a credible alternative figure and participate fully in elections, and evidently lacking such a leader, they have turned to the idea of a boycott.

The word "boycott" entered the English lexicon in 1880. Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott, a land agent in Ireland for an absentee English landlord, refused to give his overburdened tenants a rent reduction. They retaliated by ceasing to work for him and even serving him in local shops, and he was forced to bring in outside volunteers under the protection of soldiers to harvest his crops belatedly. The story spread throughout the world and the word is used in many languages.

Opposition groups in countries of transition often resort to boycotts because they believe they are dealing with both an uneven playing field and intransigent opponents, either in the form of governments in power or other groups in society. In Afghanistan recently, for example, more than a third of the delegates to the Loya Jirga, or grand assembly, jeopardized the entire process by threatening to boycott the vote. Among the issues were language rights for Tajik and Uzbek minorities. In the end, the Pashtun majority reluctantly conceded official status for the minority languages. In this specific case, with the world watching, the pressure tactic worked, most likely because the goal was a very specific one.

Russia's situation is very different, and Russian opposition is different to opposition found in Azerbaijan or Belarus. Oppositionists there have tried and failed using boycott tactics, precisely because unlike the oppositions in Minsk or Baku, Russian opposition leaders have actually remained in parliament until now. They have been able to cast dissenting votes, or attempt to raise controversial issues like the war in Chechnya. In the case of the liberals, even if their numbers are small, they have had a platform through the Russian media -- or at least until the media itself began to be curbed by the government. Their lack of access is more a subtle matter of lack of "administrative resources" -- the use of government money and connections to run campaigns -- as well as the lack of access to main television channels, and "black PR" against them. The future of the Russian boycott will hinge on the decree to which divergent liberals as well as Communists can find common ground.

Given the overwhelming support for President Putin and the surge in votes for Rodina (Motherland), the new nationalist party, the liberals of Russia will also find themselves in a situation where their presence may not be missed, and the Communists may be placated for now in backroom deals. They may not be able to mount sufficient pressure on the public or the president to force an opening in the political process. Although the oppositions of Minsk and Baku (and others in the Caucasus and Central Asia with similar problems) had the prerequisite specific demands for a successful boycott -- to include opposition parties in the electoral commissions -- and although they had levers for pressure -- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Council of Europe officials intervening on their behalf -- the boycotts came and went without much impact. In the case of Russia, the demands will be more complicated, the outside levers even more uncertain, and therefore the message even more muffled.