#12 - JRL 8001
Izvestia
December 30, 2003
Nothing is the same anymore
A view from Washington
By Nikolai Zlobin, Center for Defense Information

Never before have I witnessed such unanimity among experts, journalists and representatives of the establishment in their evaluation of Russian reality as has come about now. Not long ago this small, but in my opinion, knowledgeable and qualified community energetically discussed Russia’s problems and the relationship between the two countries. Experts made forecasts and diverged, sometimes considerably, in their estimations and opinions. Today, everything looks different.

And the year began so well, after the optimistic inertia of 2002 formulated a high level of expectations, both in mutual relations and in the development of the situation in Russia. One year ago, the majority of forecasts were extremely positive; the optimism was supported by a visible empathy between the two presidents, which was widely seen as a prologue to something significant. The White House held a firm pro-Russian position, while individual skeptics sank into a sea of positivism. Persistent cynics, who maintained that nothing good should be expected from Russia and that there would never be a democracy there, were compelled to be quiet. Optimists celebrated victory and proudly called themselves realists, denouncing skeptics as apologetics of the Cold War.

Certainly, in part, this was the presentation of the desirable as the valid. However, the reforms that were begun by the energetic and seemingly confident Putin infatuated the U.S. elite. Naturally, problems, such as Chechnya, freedom of the press and the appointment of the Council of the Russian Federation, continued to exist, causing alarm and bewilderment. However, they seemed as exceptions in an iridescent picture, as annoying errors of reformation which would soon be corrected. The level of political trust which Moscow possessed a year ago in Washington, was comparable only to the time of the collapse of USSR. Oil prices remained high, a dizzying stream of currency flowed into Russia, and the government obtained a kind of freedom unknown in Russian history. For its part, Washington continued to press Europeans to open the door as widely as possible for Russia and to adopt a new position on visas, Kaliningrad, membership in WTO, and such.

Yet gradually, everything began to change. That which was recently considered an exception began to seem the rule. The split on Iraq showed that the idea of strategic partnership was, if not naive, clearly premature. Successful summits persistently failed to result in enrichment of relations and growth of trust. Bush did not manage to entice, by his own example, the elite of the country, which began to regard Russia with growing mistrust and frankly showed the weariness toward the intricacy of its behavior and multi-complexity of the Byzantine character of Russian political life. The President was subtly ridiculed for his attachment to his “friend Vladimir.” The sympathy of the American people, who were sincerely shocked by the Dybrovka tragedy one year ago, has started to look more like apathy, while the relationship between the two societies was reduced to a level almost comparable to the last years of the Cold War.

Therefore the Khodorkovsky case, though seen negatively in Washington, was no longer perceived as an isolated case, but as a logical link in a chain of events. The White House kept silent and faced significant criticism for that. If anyone here had doubts about the motive behind the arrest, these doubts disappeared after the term of imprisonment was extended until after the presidential elections. In these conditions, the results of the Duma elections were perceived as a natural outcome; while the pre-election campaign was not even seriously discussed here, for it almost fully complied with the descriptions of elections in soft authoritarian systems found in American political science textbooks. Most discouraging for Washington observers was not the result of the elections, but that it, most likely, was a true reflection of the present mood of the Russian population. That is, the problem is not in pre-election manipulations, but in deep-rooted processes within the Russian society, initiated in the last year or two.

As a result, the position of Russian supporters in Washington was unsteadied. Their recent optimism is now regarded as naivete, bordering on a lack of familiarity with their subject. Critics of Russia celebrate victory and now they are considered the realists ­ today the elite of the country listens to them. The White House hastily started to re-evaluate its strategy toward Russia and its employees openly say that relations today are much worse than they were one year ago. Here, the internal situation in Russia is regarded no less harshly ­ it is not a democracy. Russian political capital has completely evaporated and it is unlikely that anyone will stake their reputations upon a prediction of when it might reappear. American opportunities to influence Russia are very insignificant. Any positive motions will now be perceived in Washington with great skepticism. But Moscow needs to win the US back, or too many doors in the world will be difficult for it to open.

Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information, and editor-in-chief of the international news agency Washington Profile.

Translated by Olga Levitsky, CDI Research Assistant.