POLITICS
3. RUSSIANS ARE NOT UNDEMOCRATIC
SOURCE. Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, "Are Russians Undemocratic?" Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 18 No. 2 (April-June 2002), pp. 91-121.
The authors, professors at Harvard and Stanford University respectively, challenge the widely held belief that Russians are culturally predisposed in favor of authoritarian government by analyzing new survey data about public perceptions of democratic institutions and values. The data came from a three-stage panel survey conducted by the Demoscope group at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences during the 1999-2000 electoral cycle with a representative nationwide sample initially of 1,919 voters (falling to 1,748 at the third stage). Results were compared with data from interviews conducted after the presidential election of 1996.
Colton and McFaul confirm that by 1999 a large majority of Russians -- 80 percent, up from 57 percent in 1996 -- were dissatisfied with the country's political system. 64 percent thought that the system was working poorly or very poorly; and 84 percent agreed that "government officials do not especially care what people like me think."
As the political system in post-Soviet Russia is officially called a democracy, many have assumed that dissatisfaction with it would translate into disillusionment in democracy as such. The authors show that this has NOT happened. About 60 percent of respondents consistently gave replies indicating support for democracy in principle:
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64 percent said: "I support the idea of democracy." (18 percent
said they were against the idea.) |
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47 percent agreed that "democracy may have many problems, but it is
better than any other form of government." (17 percent disagreed with the
statement, adapted from Churchill's famous aphorism that "democracy is the
worst form of government except for all the others.") |
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60 percent agreed that "democracy would be a good way to govern
Russia." |
Majority dissatisfaction with the existing political system is compatible with majority support for democracy in principle because many Russians do not agree that "the political system that exists in Russia today is a democracy." In 1996, 34 percent agreed that the system is a democracy; 29 percent disagreed. By 1999 only 19 percent still agreed that Russia is a democracy, while over half (52 percent) did not agree.
Respondents were also asked which political system they preferred for Russia. Only 12 percent replied: "the political system that exists today." Two of the other three options offered specified democratic alternatives and were chosen by one half of the respondents: "democracy of the Western type" (9 percent) and "the Soviet system, but in a different more democratic form" (41 percent). One quarter chose the non-democratic option of "the Soviet system we had in our country before perestroika." Thus supporters of democracy in one form or another are in a clear majority, but by far the most popular variant remains the Gorbachevian ideal of a democratized Soviet system. (1)
The authors correlate attitudes to democracy with views on an optimal strategy for Russia. Opinion on strategy divided nearly evenly between selective borrowing from the West (50 percent) and following Russia's own unique path of development (47 percent). (2) Unsurprisingly, support for the idea of democracy was highest among those who favored selective borrowing from the West (76 percent for, 10 percent against), but a majority even of those who favored a unique path of development supported the idea of democracy (52 percent for, 28 percent against). Many Russians evidently do not consider democracy the exclusive property of Western civilization.
But do Russian supporters of the "idea" of democracy understand what democracy means in terms of specific institutions and practices?
Colton and McFaul found that overwhelming majorities valued freedom to elect the country's leaders (87 percent), freedom to have one's own convictions (87 percent), freedom of expression (87 percent), and freedom of the press, radio, and television (81 percent). Free choice of place of residence within the country was considered important by 75 percent, and religious freedom by 70 percent. Least valued was freedom to travel abroad (40 percent) -- no doubt (as the authors remark) because most Russians lack the financial means to exercise this freedom.
There is also quite wide support for the concept of balance of powers. 45 percent thought that president and parliament should have equal power, as against 33 percent who thought one should be much stronger than the other. Similarly, 53 percent favored a fairly even division of power between Moscow and the regions; only 11 percent wanted a highly centralized or decentralized state.
The multi-party system also enjoys fairly wide support, despite the low esteem in which existing political parties are held. More than one half of respondents (53 percent) agreed that "parties are necessary to make our political system work"; only 18 percent said that "parties are not needed in Russia." 40 percent agreed and 30 percent disagreed with the statement that "competition among various political parties makes our system stronger."
It is often claimed that Russians are willing to sacrifice democracy for the sake of order. However, survey questions on this theme commonly force respondents to choose between order and democracy: they are not given the option of saying that the two can go together. In fact, more Russians reject the assumption that democracy and order are antithetical than accept it:
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32 percent agree that "democracies are not any good at maintaining
order," but 35 percent disagree. |
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34 percent agree that "democracies are indecisive and have too much
squabbling," but 41 percent disagree. |
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18 percent agree that "in a democracy the economic system runs
badly," but 49 percent disagree. |
Various measures to limit democratic freedoms "to bring about order in the country" have widely varying support:
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69 percent support banning certain political parties (18 percent opposed) |
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44 percent support suppressing free exchange of the dollar (39 percent
opposed) |
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35 percent support limiting free movement into and out of the country (50
percent opposed) |
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32 percent support introducing press and television censorship (53 percent
opposed) |
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only 10 percent support declaring a state of emergency, i.e., military rule (76 percent opposed) |
Next the authors ask: Who are the friends of democracy in Russia? Their answers are not very unexpected. The young are more supportive of democracy than the old, and those who feel they won from the reforms of the 1990s are more supportive than those who feel they lost -- especially, in both cases, with respect to the current system or the Western democratic model.
Finally, how democratic is the Putin electorate, compared to those who voted for other presidential candidates? Colton and McFaul find that Putin's supporters are not on average significantly more or less democratic than the Russian public as a whole. Putin's electorate is less democratic than that of Yavlinsky, but more democratic than that of Zyuganov:
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68 percent of Putin voters support the idea of democracy (15 percent
opposed) |
| -- |
80 percent of Yavlinsky voters support the idea of democracy (12 percent
opposed) |
| -- |
50 percent of Zyuganov voters support the idea of democracy (31 percent
opposed) |
In conclusion, Colton and McFaul acknowledge that authoritarian tendencies may win out in Russia. There are many factors working against democracy, in particular in the country's institutions and its elite culture. But an anti-democratic disposition in public opinion is not one of these factors. Russians are not, on the whole, undemocratic.
NOTES
(1) Can this be reconciled with popular hostility toward Gorbachev as an individual? I think so. Gorbachev is blamed not for his ideal but for failing to realize it. Of course, he is also blamed for much else, above all for his failure in the economic sphere.
More reliable results would have been obtained if respondents had been offered another non-democratic option apart from the unreformed Soviet model. Those who support non-Soviet forms of authoritarian rule are presumably included in the residual category "other response or don't know" (12 percent).
(2) Only 1 percent chose the option of following the West in everything.
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