Johnson's Russia List
#6309
15 June 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
*******
RAS RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT
Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield
shenfield@neaccess.net
Issue No. 9
June 2002
For back issues go to the RAS archive at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-ras.php
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CONTENTS
========
POLITICS: WHITHER RUSSIA?
1. Zaslavskaya's scenarios for Russia's future
2. Wayne Allensworth. Fiddling while Rome burns:
The battle over Slavneft
3. The extreme right: decline or transmutation?
SOCIETY
4. Lawlessness above and below
5. The changing shape of the Russian media
ECOLOGY
6. Central Asia: melting of the glaciers
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
7. Ukrainian public opinion on Russia and the US
8. Russia--Kazakhstan--China: Struggle for the Irtysh
PSYCHOANALYSIS
9. Book review. Psychoanalyzing Russian nationalism
HISTORY
10. The name-glorifiers
11. Youth against Stalin
CULTURE
12. Tuvan music
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POLITICS: WHITHER RUSSIA?
1. ZASLAVSKAYA'S SCENARIOS FOR RUSSIA'S FUTURE
SOURCE. Kto i kuda stremitsia vesti Rossiiu?.. [Who
Strives to Lead Russia and Whither?]. Moscow:
Moskovskaia vysshaia shkola sotsial'nykh i
ekonomicheskikh nauk, Intertsentr [Moscow Higher School
of Social and Economic Sciences, Intercenter], 2001,
pp. 9-10.
The author, Academician Tatyana Zaslavskaya, is the
leading Russian scholar in the field of economic
sociology. In the 1980s she was a prominent member of
the "Novosibirsk school" of Academician Abel Aganbegyan,
the ideas of which were to influence the Gorbachev
reforms. A paper that she gave in 1983 at a closed
seminar attended by Gorbachev was leaked, revealing to
the world that radical changes in the Soviet economic
system were under serious consideration.
In this paper, read to one of the annual symposia of the
Moscow "Intercenter" in January 2001, Zaslavskaya (among
other things) outlines three scenarios that she
considers most probable for Russia over the next few
years:
(1) The authoritarian-coercive scenario, entailing a
drastic strengthening of the state, an enhanced role for
the force structures, stricter control over the market
sector of the economy, and a shift from democratic to
repressive practices.
(2) The conservative-statist scenario, in which market
relations and democratic procedures are formally
preserved but the state significantly strengthens its
control over the economy and other spheres of social
life.
(3) The semi-criminal oligarchical scenario, entailing
the reproduction in new forms of the quasi-democratic
and quasi-market regimes established under Yeltsin.
The author regards these scenarios as feasible because
each of them is in the interest of powerful social
forces:
-- The authoritarian-coercive scenario is backed by
the "siloviki" (the members of Putin's entourage with a
background in the KGB and its successors) and by the
pro-communist part of the state bureaucracy.
-- The conservative-statist scenario is promoted by
legal business and by the "rational" part of the state
bureaucracy.
-- The semi-criminal oligarchical scenario is favored by
the oligarchs, by semi-legal and criminal business, and
by the corrupted part of the state bureaucracy.
The fact that various sections of the state bureaucracy
are to be found in all three camps, remarks Zaslavskaya,
reflects the position of the state bureaucracy as the
most powerful social force in today's Russia.
Are no more inspiring scenarios possible for Russia?
Indeed, there are groups in Russian society that support
other scenarios, in particular the liberal-democratic
and the social-democratic scenarios. Both of these
scenarios envisage a state based on the rule of law,
although the liberal democrats want a free market
economy while the social democrats want the market to be
regulated by a partnership of labor, capital, and the
state. However, the author notes, the supporters of
these and other alternative scenarios have practically
no representation in the power elites. This makes their
realization extremely unlikely in the foreseeable
future.
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POLITICS: WHITHER RUSSIA?
2. FIDDLING WHILE ROME BURNS: THE BATTLE OVER SLAVNEFT
By Wayne Allensworth
The recent battle between rival "clans" for control over
the Slavneft oil company is reminiscent of the
privatization struggles of the Yeltsin era, with each
side using its influence in the Kremlin, the government,
the courts, and law enforcement agencies to tip the
scales in its favor as an "information war" rages.
The battle pits Chukotka Governor Roman Abramovich and
his Sibneft Company, together with other Yeltsin-era
"family" members, including Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov, against rival magnate Sergey Pugachev of St.
Petersburg's International Industrial Bank (MPB).
Pugachev has reportedly allied himself with the
"chekist" Kremlin faction, which is said to include
Federal Security Service (FSB) chief Nikolai Patrushev
and certain members of the Presidential Administration.
Each side is apparently attempting to use its political
influence to gain the upper hand as a new wave of
privatization approaches.
The Slavneft clash reveals that the oligarchical
politico-economic system that developed under Yeltsin
remains intact, despite repeated assurances from Putin's
Kremlin that business has now been separated from the
state. Lines between political leaders, the state
bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies, and big business
remain blurred. Murky intrigues, "information wars,"
political influence, and use of the law enforcement
agencies and the courts to pressure and intimidate
opponents are still the weapons of choice in business
disputes.
At stake in the Slavneft clash is the fate of one of the
more tempting slices of the state's economic pie. This
fall the state is planning to sell a fifth of its 75
percent stake in Slavneft, a company with "tremendous
oil reserves," a "well developed production structure,"
and the "biggest network of gas stations in Moscow and
St. Petersburg." (1)
The struggle has focused on the dismissal this spring,
on the orders of Prime Minister Kasyanov, of Slavneft
President Mikhail Gutseriev and the appointment of Yuri
Sukhanov as his successor. Sukhanov, who previously
worked for Sibneft, is widely viewed as Abramovich's
"placeman." Representatives of the MPB/chekist alliance,
who have their own candidate for the post, have
challenged his appointment in court. Most Russian
observers believe that whoever commands the company's
executive will have the edge in the upcoming auction.
The winner will probably control the company's
management and thus its "financial flows," regardless
of the remaining state interest in Slavneft. (2)
Slavneft Intrigues
Around the time of the Ingush presidential election in
April, as Slavneft President Mikhail Gutseriev backed
his brother Khamzat as a rival to the Kremlin's favored
candidate, (3) the State Property Ministry, acting on
Kasyanov's instructions, announced it would seek
Gutseriev's ouster from Slavneft. The Ministry called
for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting to replace
him. (4)
At the time, the apn.ru site claimed that Kasyanov had
been forced to take this step by Putin, supposedly angry
at Gutseriev's support for his brother against the
Kremlin's man in Ingushetia. A review of other sources,
however, paints a different picture, one that is
generally supported by subsequent events.
Mikhail Gutseriev reportedly had turned on his longtime
"family" associates, helping MPB and its ally Rosneft
infiltrate Slavneft management and challenge the
influence of "Sibneft's man" Sukhanov, who was a
Slavneft vice president. (5) An angry Abramovich then
decided to replace Gutseriev with Sukhanov. (6) Thus
"family" member Kasyanov's order to the State Property
Ministry to "ensure" the election of Sukhanov as
Slavneft president. (7)
Meanwhile, the MPB group had reportedly attempted to
halt the election by having a court in Ufa -- capital of
Bashkortostan, where the MPB is believed to wield
considerable influence -- issue a ruling to block the
shareholders' meeting. (8) Perhaps as a backup, the MPB
and its allies also had their own candidate for the
Slavneft presidency nominated -- Rosneft's Anatoly
Baranovsky. (9) The MPB and the "chekists" also
allegedly used their influence in the Interior Ministry
(MVD) in an attempt to discredit Sukhanov and force
Kasyanov to withdraw his candidacy: Sukhanov was charged
by MVD investigators with "abuse of power by a person
performing management functions." (10)
The allegations against the Slavneft managers were
related to a reportedly common practice in Russian
business. Slavneft sold oil marked for export at well
below market value to a series of middleman trading
companies. A Sibneft affiliate would make the final sale
to foreign firms at market prices after the products had
moved offshore. Thus the company management avoided
paying sales taxes, was presumably paid a kickback by
Sibneft, and enriched Gutseriev's oligarch patron
Abramovich at the expense of the company's
shareholders. (11)
Nevertheless, Sukhanov was elected at the shareholders'
meeting on May 13. According to Kommersant (May 14),
First Deputy Property Minister Medvedev opened the
shareholders' meeting by urging them to ignore the court
ruling against the gathering. Medvedev said that the
case against Sukhanov "has nothing to do with state
appointments policy [and has] no bearing on the
shareholders' meeting."
Sukhanov Election Seen as A "Family" Victory
Most media accounts of the Slavneft affair counted
Sukhanov's election as at least a temporary victory for
the "family" and Kasyanov over the MPB's Pugachev and
the "chekists," who had considerably over-estimated
their own influence. (12) Putin was portrayed by many
sources as handing a tactical victory to "the family,"
who are widely seen as responsible for his election as
Yeltsin's successor. Vremya MN, for instance, claimed
that Putin's "family obligations" prevented him from
ordering Sukhanov's removal, regardless of the latter's
suspected criminal activities (May 13).
For his part, Kasyanov has appeared confident, even
defiant, in the face of subsequent rumors of his
dismissal (for which the "chekists" have allegedly been
campaigning) and media attacks on him launched by MPB
owner Pugachev's Channel 3 TV. (13) Kasyanov's apparent
confidence has dampened rumors of his imminent firing,
and prompted more claims that the "family" had used its
hold on the president to protect him. (14)
The Latest Development
Meanwhile, the battle over Slavneft continued, with the MPB/"chekist"/Rosneft group resorting to familiar
"oligarchic" methods for resolving business disputes. On
May 24, as Presidents Bush and Putin were meeting to
discuss economic cooperation, the MPB's candidate
Baranovsky, accompanied by MVD officers, forcibly
entered the Slavneft president's office in an apparent
attempt to take the company by storm. In a bizarre twist
to what has become a familiar scenario in Russian
business disputes, a bomb scare forced the evacuation of
the building and defused the confrontation. (15)
Conclusion
The battle over Slavneft prompted a flurry of
commentaries in the Russian press on the apparent
renewal of "oligarchs' wars" under Putin. (16) Indeed,
the struggle provides analysts with a useful case study
of methods of conducting such a "war," including use of
the courts, law enforcement agencies, political
connections, and media "information warfare." Thus the
Slavneft affair gives a fairly comprehensive if
unflattering picture of how the post-communist system
in Russia works.
The claim that Putin has "tamed" the oligarchs and
separated business from the state appears to be a myth
concocted by the Kremlin to enhance Putin's popularity.
Heretofore the "clans" had appeared to play by new rules
designed to support the myth: their battles were (by and
large) conducted clandestinely and players -- Kasyanov,
for instance -- were not forced to take sides publicly.
Meanwhile, like the politicians, they paid lip service
to the need for legality and "transparency" in business.
But the Slavneft company proved too tempting a morsel:
the "clans," jockeying for dominance in Putin's Kremlin,
have returned to open warfare. Putin has shown himself
too weak to restrain them.
Thus the Slavneft affair shows that the "oligarchy" has
survived the post-Yeltsin transition. Russia's elites
continue to fiddle as Rome burns, dissipating their
energies on palace intrigues and political games as the
country faces the collapse of its infrastructure,
instability on its southern border, and a demographic
freefall. There are few signs that anyone in power will
seriously attempt to deal with these problems.
NOTES
(1) Versiia v Pitere, April 29
(2) Vedomosti, May 15; gazeta.ru; Kommersant, May 14
(3) The Kremlin backed FSB General Murat Zyazikov, who
was elected as the new president of Ingushetia on April
7 (Izvestiia, April 4 and 9).
(4) Interfax, April 5; Kommersant, May 13
(5) Kommersant and politkom.ru, May 14; Vedomosti, May
13; gazeta.ru, May 1
(6) gazeta.ru, April 19
(7) Vedomosti, May 13. According to Versiia v Pitere
(April 29), Abramovich may have set Gutseriev up for
dismissal, encouraging Khamzat to run in Ingushetia,
then spreading rumors about Slavneft's financing of the
campaign in order to anger Putin.
(8) Izvestiya, May 15; Kommersant, May 14
(9) Kommersant, May 13; gazeta.ru, May 1
(10) Kommersant, May 13; gazeta.ru, April 24
(11) RenTV, May 16; Versiia v Pitere, Novaia gazeta,
April 19
(12) The Moscow Times, May 22; Novaia gazeta, May 20
(13) Kommersant-Vlast, May 21
(14) Vek, May 24; Kommersant, May 20; grani.ru, May 15;
Vremya MN, May 13
(15) Nezavisimaia gazeta, May 27
(16) See, for instance, Vedomosti (May 15) and
politkom.ru (May 14).
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POLITICS: WHITHER RUSSIA?
3. THE EXTREME RIGHT: DECLINE OR TRANSMUTATION?
SOURCE. Andreas Umland. Toward an Uncivil Society?
Contextualizing the Recent Decline of Extremely Right-
Wing Parties in Russia. Working Paper No. 02-03 of the
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, May 2002.
Andreas Umland is a young German researcher with an
extensive knowledge of the extreme right both in Russia
and in other countries. In this paper he argues that
although the Russian extreme right appears to be in
decline it may only be in the process of changing its
form and strategy.
In the sphere of party politics, the extreme right has
been in decline since the mid-1990s, and the decline is
very likely to continue. In particular, the new law on
political parties makes it very difficult for small
parties of any kind to participate in elections. But,
warns the author, one should not conclude from this that
an electoral revival of the extreme right is ruled out
for all time. Drawing a parallel with German experience,
he points out that antisemitic parties were in decline
in late imperial Germany; nevertheless they succeeded in
infiltrating their ideas into the political mainstream,
thereby preparing the ground for the rise of the Nazis
in the Weimar Republic.
Moreover, each of the four main parties that represented
the extreme Russian nationalist right in the 1990s was
handicapped by some contingent factor that prevented it
from taking full advantage of social distress:
-- Many potential supporters were alienated from the
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia by the fact that
Vladimir Zhirinovsky is half-Jewish by origin.
-- Russian National Unity likewise alienated many
patriotic Russians by its use of symbols taken from
Nazi Germany (the swastika and the raised-arm salute).
-- Many were repelled by the National-Bolshevik Party
because its leader, the writer Eduard Limonov, was
openly bisexual ("a little insect who writes
pornography," as Alexander Solzhenitsyn called him).
-- The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was,
for all of Zyuganov's efforts, unconvincing as a vehicle
of Russian nationalism in view of its historical origin
in a left-wing internationalist movement.
Umland provocatively suggests that these four parties,
by occupying the Russian nationalist niche in political
life so ineffectively, may have blocked the rise of a
much more effective Russian nationalist party. In the
future there may not be parties able to perform this
blocking function.
The author's main argument is that Russian nationalists
are adapting to the barriers now facing them in
electoral politics by shifting the focus of their
energies to work in non-party settings: trade unions,
mutual aid and humanitarian associations of various
kinds, the Church, youth music subcultures, literary
journals, educational institutions, and so on. (1)
This sphere, commonly referred to as "civil society,"
is generally supposed to foster democratic tendencies,
but Umland (and a few other observers, myself included)
stresses that it can be exploited to equal effect by
anti-democratic forces: thus his term "uncivil society."
The paper devotes special attention to the networks and
think-tanks through which the extreme right attempts
with some success to influence the intellectual
atmosphere of Russian society. Above all he is concerned
about the activities of the prolific and erudite
"Eurasianist" or "New Right" intellectual Alexander
Dugin. (2) Despite the fantastic and neo-fascist
character of Dugin's ideas, he enjoys close relations
with the Academy of the General Staff and headed an
advisory group in the office of the former Speaker of
the State Duma Gennady Seleznev. In spring 2001 he
established the Socio-Political Movement "Eurasia."
Among those occupying prominent positions in this
movement are: senior Orthodox, Moslem, Jewish, and
Buddhist religious figures; Alexander Panarin, who
holds the chair of political science at Moscow State
University; and Mikhail Leontiev, a TV journalist at
Russia's First Channel ORT who is reputed to be a
favorite of Putin. Indeed, there appear to be ties
between "Eurasia" and figures in the Presidential
Administration, notably the Kremlin's "political
technologist" Gleb Pavlovsky.
NOTES
(1) One example cited is the Movement in Defense of
Childhood discussed in RAS No. 4, which is closely
connected to some communist parties.
(2) For an account of Dugin's earlier career and his
ideas, see my Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies,
Movements (M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 190-220.
The latest news is that Dugin has created a Eurasian Party of Russia, which claims the allegiance of between 32 and 40 Duma deputies. His closest associate in this new venture is Abd al-Wahed Niyazov, a Russian convert to Islam who entered the Duma on the Unity list along with some other members of his own proto-Eurasian Refah Party. Information thanks to Dr Mark Sedgwick of the American University in Cairo. -- SDS
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SOCIETY
4. LAWLESSNESS ABOVE AND BELOW
SOURCES. (A) S. A. Pashin, "Chelovek v rossiiskom pravovom prostranstve" [Man in the Russian Legal Space], pp. 157-166 in volume used for item 1.
(B) M. A. Shabanova, "Institutsional'nye izmeneniia i nepravovye praktiki" [Institutional Changes and Illegal Practices], pp. 319-327 in volume used for item 1.
These two sources are highly pertinent to the issue of lawlessness at different levels of Russian society. Pashin, a jurist and retired federal judge now at the Moscow Humanitarian-Social Academy, spills the beans on how the courts and procuracy (1) really operate in Russia today, while Shabanova, a sociologist at the "Intercenter," analyzes public attitudes toward breaking the law.
A favorite saying in Russia's Supreme Court, Pashin tells us, is: "If you don't know what to do, then act in accordance with the law." He adds the ironic comment: "But as judges usually do know what to do (and if someone doesn't know, it will be explained to him), they do not act in accordance with the law as often as one would like."
The courts and procuracy carry out two functions:
-- At the higher levels of society, they prosecute and punish people on a selective basis. Selection is guided by political considerations. The use of juridical criteria would not be feasible because "everyone is forced to evade the law and commit crimes."
-- At the lower levels of society, they shunt petty thieves and delinquents, the homeless and unemployed, and other social misfits into prisons and camps.
Russia has 970,000 prisoners. Before the May 2000 amnesty there were 1,500,000. These figures include the enormous numbers of suspects awaiting trial in investigative isolators. The author compares the rate of imprisonment with the much lower rates in Western Europe and Japan. (Comparison with the United States, in this as well as other respects, would have been much less unfavorable to Russia.)
Of the total figure of 970,000 prisoners:
* almost 650,000 are in for theft
* 115,000 are in for drug offences
* about 100,000 are in for armed attacks or robbery
* about 30,000 are in for possessing weapons or explosives (or perhaps just one or two bullets)
Very harsh sentences are routinely handed down for even the pettiest of thefts, for instance:
-- For stealing twelve heads of cabbage, a mother of four gets four years.
-- For pulling up part of her neighbor's fence, an old woman gets eight years.
-- For stealing two hamsters from a pet store, a 15-year-old boy gets three and a half years.
-- For stealing two flasks of deodorant, another youngster gets four years.
Thus a majority of Russia's prisoners either have not been found guilty of any crime or are petty offenders who clearly present no danger to society. At any rate, they present no danger before their arrest. Many no doubt present a danger by the time they are released, if only because they have picked up TB.
Pashin lists a series of common practices of the police, courts, and procuracy that although illegal are standard operating procedure. These "conveyor technologies" include:
* the torture of suspects in the first few days after arrest, even before formal charges have been filed (2)
* the procedure by which the procuracy covers up evidence of police torture
* the procedures by which the courts disregard petitions to exclude evidence obtained by illegal means, falsify the record of their proceedings, and prevent the tape-recording of court sessions
Lawlessness on the part of the state encourages and legitimizes lawlessness among the citizenry. Shabanova analyzes public attitudes toward the law on the basis of a series of surveys conducted in Novosibirsk Province and the Altai Territory between 1995 and 1999.
Almost all respondents say that their legal rights have been infringed over the past 3-4 years; only 1.5 percent say that this has not occurred. For example, 66 percent report that their wages have been illegally withheld, and 44 percent say they have been illegally deprived of their bank savings. Moreover, 42 percent believe that their rights are now infringed more often than they were before the market reforms; only 5 percent take the opposite view.
Of respondents who say their legal rights have been infringed, only one-quarter have tried to do anything about it. The other 75 percent have done nothing either because they lack the necessary resources or because they consider that making complaints is useless or even dangerous. 42 percent think that illegal means of defending one's rights are more effective than legal means; 29 percent say that legal means are more effective.
Under these conditions illegality continues to be (as in the late Soviet
period) a social norm, justified by sayings like "this is the accepted way" or "everyone does it." 62 percent of urban and 65 percent of rural respondents do not condemn theft from the workplace. Many respondents, including over 40 percent in rural areas, say they want their children and grandchildren to take a critical attitude to laws and not to be afraid of breaking them "if necessary" because the law "rarely solves human problems." They do not want them to have a "guilt complex" about breaking the law. (3)
Entrepreneurs say that concealing income from the taxman "has become a matter of honor." "The state is stronger, but business is more cunning."
NOTES
(1) The procuracy, an agency inherited from the Soviet period, combines the functions of public prosecutions and general oversight of the judicial system.
(2) For a fuller analysis, see "Confessions at Any Cost: Police Torture in Russia" (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Website at http://www.hrw.org
(3) No figure is given for urban respondents. In any
case, the true figures are presumably higher: some respondents must be wary of telling a strange interviewer that they approve of breaking the law.
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SOCIETY
5. THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE RUSSIAN MEDIA
SOURCES. (A) B. Varetskii. Shelest stranits, kak shelest znamen: Pressa Rossii v trekh politicheskikh rezhimakh [The Rustle of Pages as the Rustle of Banners: The Russian Press Under Three Political Regimes]. Moscow: "ReSK" "Inform Forte" 2001, pp. 242-250. (B) B. V. Dubin, "Strana zritelei: massovye
kommunikatsii v segodniashnei Rossii" [Country of Viewers: Mass Communications in Today's Russia], pp. 297-310 in volume used for item 1 above.
The heyday of the Russian press, recalls Varetskii, was the late 1980s, when readers were still entranced by the novelty of glasnost and still able to afford lots of periodicals. The peak year was 1990, when national newspapers came out in runs of 8-14 million and the weekly "Argumenty i fakty" reached a circulation of 32 million, winning it a place in the Guinness Book of Records.
By 1994 the total print run of newspapers had fallen by
almost half, though the number of different newspapers
held roughly constant. Magazines were affected even more
drastically: by 1995 total print run was only 6 percent
of the 1990 level, while the number of different
magazines more than doubled to 2,546 in 1999. Total
print runs somewhat increased in the second half of the
decade to about two-thirds of the 1990 level for
newspapers and about one-fifth of the 1990 level for
magazines.
This, however, is far from the whole story. The overall
figures conceal the extent of the decline of the national
political newspapers, the total print run of which
hovered around one-third of the 1990 level between 1993
and 1999. At the same time, the total print run of local
newspapers bottomed out in 1993 and by 1997 was over
two-thirds ABOVE the 1990 level.
Thus the relative weight of national and local
newspapers was reversed in the course of the 1990s. In
1990 total distribution of national newspapers was
roughly double that of local newspapers. In 1994 the
local press overtook the national press, and in 1997-99
total distribution of local newspapers was roughly
double that of national newspapers.
Moreover, the category "national newspapers" now
includes many new periodicals that have little or no
serious political content. The number of different
national newspapers grew from 43 in 1990 to 222 in 1992
and 285 in 1999. Most of the 200+ new papers are devoted
to business, farming, advertising, hobbies, sex, and
mysticism (such as "Golos vselennoi" [Voice of the
Universe], "the press organ of the supreme reason of the
creation").
In short, the national political press, besides
suffering from the general decline of the press, has
lost ground to the local press on the one hand and to a
variety of non-political national periodicals on the
other.
Information on books, radio, and television as well as newspapers and magazines is provided by Dubin, an analyst at the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM). So far as books are concerned, the number of titles has increased, from 41,234 in 1990 to 50,085 in 2000, but the average print run has fallen from 38,000 in 1990 to just 8,000 in 2000.
Dubin gives an interesting breakdown of the proportion of respondents in a 1997 survey who read magazines of different kinds. The most popular category is magazines about TV programs (19 percent), followed by glossy women's magazines (18 percent for thin Russian ones, 8 percent for the thick mostly foreign variety). Next come crossword magazines (7 percent). 5 percent read political weeklies, while the thick literary journals that played such a big role during perestroika are still read by 1 percent. Over half of
respondents (52 percent) practically never read magazines of any kind.
The winners are radio and especially television. An urban survey conducted in October 2000 showed 68 percent of respondents listening to the radio and 91 percent watching TV every day. Only 2 percent watch TV less than twice a week. A third of respondents do not turn the set off all day long. Television is "a symbolic focus" and "a synonym for home and family": on returning home from work, people either turn it on straight away like the light switch or find it already on. "Without it the place feels dead." Sounds familiar?
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ECOLOGY
6. CENTRAL ASIA: THE MELTING OF THE GLACIERS
The future of Central Asia is often discussed in terms
of oil. But even more crucial is another vital resource
-- water.
Almost all of Central Asia's water comes from the rain,
snow, and ice of the humid mountains of eastern
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and
Xinjiang on the region's eastern and southeastern
edges. The mountain waters feed the two great rivers,
the Amudarya and the Syrdarya, which flow west through
Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. On
the way, vast quantities of water are consumed -- much
of it still used to irrigate cotton and rice fields --
or else lost to evaporation and seepage. Only a little
reaches what was once the Aral Sea, now reduced to a
few stretches of shallow water surrounded by swirling
masses of dry sand.
Into this hydrological system, already so damaged by
human activity, intrudes a new disturbing factor --
global warming. As in other parts of the world,
temperatures have been rising and precipitation falling.
The hot dry deserts of western Central Asia grow even
hotter and even drier, while the cool wet mountains in
the east become somewhat less cool and less wet. Thus
between 1920 and 1990 the average winter temperature in
the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek (formerly Frunze) rose
from -2.5 to 0 degrees C. (1) In the basin of the River
Chon-Kyzyl-Su in northeastern Kyrgyzstan, the average
summer temperature in 1973-91 was 9.8 degrees C., up
from 9.4 degrees C. in 1948-72, while annual
precipitation fell from 637 to 595 mm. (2) It is
forecast that by 2025 the year-round average temperature
in the Tien Shan (Mountains of Heaven) will have risen
by another 1--1.5 degrees C. (3)
One might therefore expect the flow of water in the
Amudarya and Syrdarya gradually but steadily to diminish
from year to year.
In fact, that is not what has been happening. "The 1990s
saw a high flow cycle," writes Philip Micklin. "Average
combined discharge of the two rivers exiting the
mountains averaged 104 cubic km for 1990-98, compared to
a 40-year (1959-98) figure of 94 cubic km." (4) As a
result, the dessication of the Aral slowed down during
the 1990s, with an average annual inflow to the sea
estimated at 14-15 cubic km. Micklin forecasts that in
the early 21st century the flow will be substantially
less than it was in the 1990s, though probably above the
low level of the 1980s (annual average 87 cubic km). He
does not explain the basis of his forecast.
The observations taken by meteorologists in the Alatau
range of Kyrgyzstan's Tien Shan (Mountains of Heaven)
help us unravel the puzzle. They point out that although
precipitation (rain and snow) has declined ice melt from
the mountain glaciers has risen -- from 177 cm. per year
in 1948-72 to 210 cm. per year in 1973-91. (5) Thus the
flow in some mountain rivers -- those fed by summer rain
and the melting of winter snow -- has decreased
significantly over recent decades, exactly as one would
expect in the light of global warming. But the flow in
other mountain rivers -- those fed by run-off from ice
melt in glaciers -- has increased, more than
compensating for the reduced flow from non-glacier
surfaces.
In short, the glaciers are melting and shrinking. The
area covered by them is steadily contracting, and they
are increasingly restricted to the highest altitudes.
As the glaciers continue to melt, the total flow from
the mountains into the great rivers will stay high. It
may even rise further, and places downstream from big
glaciers may find themselves in peril from summer
floods. (Ice melt peaks in July and August.) But
eventually, certainly by mid-century, the mountains
will be bare and the glaciers gone. And then Central
Asia will face a drought to end all droughts -- for it
is by no means clear what, if anything, can ever bring
it to an end. Some Central Asian politicians have
called for the revival of the Soviet plan to divert
Siberian rivers southward, but it is hard to imagine
Russia undertaking such a gargantuan effort to rescue
its southern neighbors.
NOTE. Readers may like to consider the problem of
Central Asian water in the broader context of the
world environment. The United Nations Environment
Program recently published its third Global
Environment Outlook, which surveys environmental
degradation over the past 30 years and analyzes
prospects for the next 30 years under alternative
scenarios. The GEO3 report can be ordered from
http://www.earthscan.co.uk
For further information go to http://www.unep.org
REFERENCES
(1) Ekologiya Kyrgyzstana: problemy, prognozy,
rekomendatsii [The Ecology of Kyrgyzstan: Problems,
Forecasts, Recommendations]. Bishkek: Ilim, 2000,
pp. 69.
(2) op. cit., p. 82.
(3) op. cit., p. 81.
(4) Philip Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia.
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000,
p. 21.
(5) Ekologiya Kyrgyzstana, op. cit., pp. 82.
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RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
7. UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON RUSSIA AND THE US
SOURCE. Ukrainians Drifting Away From U.S., Getting
Cozier With Russia. Opinion Analysis M-27-02. Office of
Research, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520,
March 27, 2002. Analysis by Regina Faranda (tel. 202-619
5129; e-mail rfaranda@pd.state.gov).
The report analyzes the evolution of Ukrainian attitudes
toward Russia and the US over the past decade, drawing
on findings of surveys commissioned in Ukraine by the
State Department Office of Research. (1)
Ukrainian perceptions of Russia have become much more
positive since the mid-1990s. 85 percent of Ukrainians
now have a generally favorable view of Russia; only 10
percent have a generally unfavorable view. The
proportion of respondents expressing confidence in
Russia's ability to deal responsibly with world problems
has risen from around 30 percent in 1995-96 to 64
percent now. Over the same period, the proportion who
see Russia as a threat to Ukraine's security has fallen
from 21 percent to a mere 5 percent.
This shift in perceptions is reflected in Ukrainians'
foreign policy stances. 60 percent of respondents now
support some kind of confederal union with Russia and
Belarus. (34 percent remain opposed.) About the same
proportion support close security relations with Russia
and the CIS. A large minority (39 percent with 51
percent opposed) want to go further and merge Ukraine
and Russia into a single state.
The regional differentiation of Ukrainian attitudes,
with people in Eastern Ukraine most favorably disposed
toward Russia and people in Western Ukraine least
favorably disposed, is still very clear. Nevertheless,
the shift in attitudes has affected all regions alike.
Thus 75 percent of respondents in Eastern and Southern
Ukraine want a union with Russia, but even in Western
Ukraine support for a union has increased from just
11 percent in 1995 to 31 percent now (with 62 percent
still opposed). Western Ukraine is no longer quite the
stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism that it used to be.
The analyst points to two factors associated with the
pro-Russian shift in Ukrainian opinion:
-- The economic upturn in Russia makes close relations
with Russia appear more advantageous. (2)
-- Ukrainians like Putin: the proportion of respondents
viewing him favorably was 69 percent in 2000 and is now
79 percent.
While attitudes toward Russia have improved, attitudes
toward the US have deteriorated. The proportion of
respondents expressing confidence in the US' ability to
deal responsibly with world problems has declined from
59 percent in early 1995 24 percent now. The proportion
who see the US as a threat to Ukraine's security is now
10 percent -- double the proportion who still see Russia
as a threat!
The analyst identifies the crucial factor underlying
this shift as anxiety over the possible consequences for
Ukraine of US military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan. "The fear doesn't seem to be that the
US will attack Ukraine, but that any stirring up of
conflict in the world increases Ukraine's chances of
being attacked by someone."
NOTES
(1) Two pieces in previous issues have been on related
themes: Issue No. 4 item 9 on Russian policy toward
Ukraine, and Issue No. 8 item 10 on public attitudes
toward Europe in Ukraine and other East European
countries.
(2) For analysis of the economic upturn in Russia since
1998, see RAS Issue No. 8 item 1.
--------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
8. RUSSIA--KAZAKHSTAN--CHINA: STRUGGLE FOR THE IRTYSH
SOURCE. A. G. Zinchenko, "Problemy i perspektivy
rossiisko-kazakhstanskikh otnoshenii" [Problems and
Prospects of Russia-Kazakhstan Relations], pp. 88-96 in
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na postsovetskom prostranstve
[International Relations in the Post-Soviet Space].
Moscow: Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 2000.
The River Irtysh rises in the Altai Mountains along the
Chinese-Mongolian border, flows west through the
northern part of China's Xinjiang Province (Jungaria),
and then enters Kazakhstan. Here it flows northwest,
following a scenic path roughly parallel to Kazakhstan's
northeastern border and passing through the cities of
Semei (formerly Semipalatinsk) and Pavlodar before
crossing into Russia. It continues north, winding its
way through Omsk and Tyumen Provinces in western
Siberia and finally merging into the Ob, one of the
great Siberian rivers that empty into the Arctic Ocean.
Thus the Irtysh connects the Central Asian and Siberian
river systems.
The Irtysh is important to northeastern Kazakhstan and
southwestern Siberia as a source of drinking and
irrigation water, for hydropower, and as a navigation
route. 90 percent of the population of Omsk Province,
including the more than one million inhabitants of the
city of Omsk, rely on the Irtysh for their water.
During the Soviet period, work was begun on a reservoir
and hydrological complex at Shulbin to regulate the flow
along Kazakhstan's stretch of the river. The project was
never completed: a reservoir exists, but it has less
than a third of the capacity specified in the original
design. Another Soviet-era plan envisaged a reservoir,
irrigation system, and hydrological complex south of
Omsk to regulate the flow along Russia's section of the
Irtysh. Work never began on this project, although it
still has its supporters.
In recent years Kazakhstani and Russian downstream
consumers have suffered from water shortages during the
dry summer and fall months, when the level of the Irtysh
falls sharply. Water pollution has become worse as the
river has lost its ability to purify itself. More than
200,000 hectares of fertile land have had to be removed
from cultivation in Omsk Province alone due to lack of
water. Navigation has also been affected.
The author blames the situation on the foreign companies
to which Kazakhstan has sold its hydrological assets.
These companies are interested only in the generation of
hydropower, and do not ensure that reservoirs hold
sufficient quantities of water.
But worse threatens. China is carrying out preparatory
work on the construction of a canal in northern Xinjiang
(the Black Irtysh--Karamai Canal). When the canal is
opened -- and China clearly has no intention of dropping
the plan -- it will divert about a quarter of the flow
of the river, leaving much less for Kazakhstan and
Russia. The canal, opines the author, will turn crisis
into catastrophe.
What can Russia do? The author is against proposals to
revive the plan for a hydrological complex south of
Omsk. Besides the great expense, the reservoir would
flood a large area of valuable arable land and have
other undesirable ecological consequences. It would be
much better to reach an intergovernmental agreement with
Kazakhstan to complete the Shulbin project. Even if
Russia undertook the greater part of the cost, as it
would no doubt have to, it would still not cost half as
much as the South Omsk project.
The author also urges enhanced cooperation between
Russian and Kazakhstani enterprises and regional
authorities with an interest in the Irtysh. An
Association of Irtysh Water Consumers already exists in
Kazakhstan, and a similar association is being formed at
the interstate level.
--------------------------------------------------------
PSYCHOANALYSIS
9. BOOK REVIEW: PSYCHOANALYZING RUSSIAN NATIONALISM
Daniel Rancour-Laferriere. Russian Nationalism from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective: Imagining Russia.
Lewiston NY, Queenston (Canada), and Lampeter (UK): The
Edwin Mellen Press, 2000.
Professor Rancour-Laferriere, director of the Russian
program at the University of California in Davis, is
unique among writers on Russian nationalism in taking a
psychoanalytic approach to his subject. He argues that
psychoanalytic concepts can be applied not only to the
individual's relations with real people but also to his
or her relations with imaginary figures who personify
nations or countries. The main such figure is the
quasi-mother who personifies Russia (the mother-land) or
the collective of Russians -- although Europe may also
be imagined as a mother of a different, stricter kind.
Just as the baby has to pass through various stages of
interaction with the mother, starting in symbiosis with
her and then gradually separating from her and achieving
individuality, so the ethnically engaged Russian or
"matriot" faces the analogous problem of breaking loose
from the suffocating embrace of mother Russia and the
Russian collective as he or she imagines them. (Matriot
and not patriot because Russia is imagined as a mother,
not a father.) This conceptual framework
("ontogenetics") derives not directly from Sigmund Freud
but from the theory of human psychological development
created by the British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein.
In order to apply psychoanalysis to nationalist thought,
one has to take its metaphoric content seriously. A
political scientist is inclined to see verbal images --
e.g., the picture drawn by Vasily Rozanov in 1913 of
Russia as a drunk and sinful mother who falls down dead
and has her bones picked dry by the Jews -- merely as
metaphor, a vivid literary or rhetorical device. But
the author assumes that such pictures are more than
mere metaphor: they reflect fantasies with a real
existence in the matriot's psyche, meriting analysis in
their own right. That assumption is hard to prove, but
I suspect it is right. The material is certainly such
as to invite psychoanalysis.
Besides maternalism (my coinage) and collectivism, the
author finds several other traits typical of the Russian
matriot:
-- narcissism, tending at the extreme to self-adoration,
to compensate for feelings of shame and inferiority in
relation to Europe or the West
-- xenophobia and paranoia, often accompanied by
megalomania, because narcissism requires an enemy on
whom to project one's own inadequacies
-- moral masochism, entailing the willingness to undergo
suffering for its own sake (and sometimes physical
masochism as well, exemplified by the custom of being
beaten or beating oneself with birch twigs in the
bath-house)
While there is a very strong sense of contrast between
the familiar "ours" [svoi] and the alien "theirs"
[chuzhoi], the boundaries between the two categories are
confused and permeable. The dominant urge is not to
destroy the alien but to absorb it, to make it Russian.
Thus biological racism is not characteristic of Russian
nationalism. A minority of nationalists are racists, but
most define Russianness in cultural or emotional terms,
if only out of an awareness of Russians' mixed ancestral
origins. ("Scratch a Russian and you'll find a Tatar" --
or vice versa.)
Complementary to assimilationism is universalism. The
Russian is perceived -- by Dostoyevsky among many others
-- as the "pan-human" [vsechelovek], able to empathize
with all other human groups and incorporate their spirit
into his/her own. Thus "Russian" comes close to meaning
"authentically human." In one form or another, whether
cultural, religious (Orthodox) or ideological (Soviet),
universalism is the essence of the much-sought "Russian
idea." (1) Russian universalism has an undoubted appeal,
but as the author points out it has its "hateful side":
suspicion and intolerance of those who prefer not to be
assimilated into Russian "pan-humanity."
One's attitude to Professor Rancour-Laferriere's book
will inevitably depend on one's attitude to Freudian
psychoanalysis in general and the developmental
theory of Melanie Klein in particular. My own initial
skepticism was gradually eroded as I worked my way
through the book. The author is at pains to point out
that the psychological approach to Russian nationalism
is intended to supplement and not replace other more
conventional approaches (cultural, historical, socio-
economic, etc.). Indeed, the book's title lays claim
to an interdisciplinary and not just a psychological
perspective. I am not sure, however, that he really
achieves such an ambitious goal. For example, I do not
doubt that projection of inadequacies on to out-groups
is a significant factor in ethnic hatred, but it does
seem to me that he gives this factor too much weight
and neglects other factors that have a bearing on
inter-ethnic relations.
Full justice to this remarkable work cannot be done
in such a brief review, but I think I have conveyed
at least some of its content and flavor. I would add
that the book not only gives ample food for thought but
is also entertaining to read. The material presented
and analyzed includes poetry and ethnic jokes as well
as political and philosophical tracts from the past
two centuries. (2)
NOTES
(1) Here I diverge a little from Professor Rancour-
Laferriere, who falls into the easy temptation of
dismissing the "Russian idea" as "empty" on the grounds
that it can mean anything and therefore means nothing.
(2) Some may criticize the juxtaposition of material
taken from such a long period as "ahistorical." However,
the reader will soon realize that the ideas, feelings,
and images of Russian nationalists have not greatly
changed since the beginning of the nineteenth century.
--------------------------------------------------------
HISTORY
10. THE NAME-GLORIFIERS
SOURCE. N. K. Bonetskaia, "Bor'ba za Logos v Rossii v XX veke" [The Struggle for Logos in Russia in the 20th Century], Voprosy filosofii 1998, No. 7, pp. 148-169.
NOTE. My full translation of this article will appear in an issue of the M. E. Sharpe translations journal Russian Studies in Philosophy devoted to the early 20th century Orthodox theologian Father Pavel Florensky.
Down through the centuries many dissident movements have arisen in the Russian Orthodox Church, such as the Old Believers who refused to accept the church reforms of Peter the Great, the so-called "Judaizers," and the pacifist Molokans and Dukhobors. Given the close alliance of church and state, these movements inevitably had a political as well as a religious dimension. What I for one did not realize before coming across this article was that a new movement of this kind arose in the dying days of the tsarist regime.
The movement, which came to be known as "name-glorification" [imeslavie], took its inspiration from a book entitled "On the Mountains of the Caucasus," which went through several editions in the early part of the 20th century. The author was a hermit monk named Ilarion who lived in the Caucasus mountains (in Abkhazia to be exact) in the 1890s. In his book Ilarion describes how he regained his faith following a period of deep depression through the contemplation of nature. Then on the basis of his mystical experiences he sets out a doctrine that his critics were to condemn as pantheistic. Moreover, from his discovery that God is present everywhere and in everything he draws a deduction that was to become the main slogan of the name-glorifiers: "God's name is God Himself!"
The church hierarchs accepted that the names of God, Christ, and the Mother of God were, like icons, religious symbols deserving of reverence [pochitanie]. But like icons, they should not be confused with God Himself, to whom alone (in His various incarnations) worship [poklonenie] was due. They accused Ilarion and his followers of investing names with the mystery they possess in pagan magic and of making God's name into a fourth person of
the godhead alongside the existing trinity.
Ilarion's book circulated widely not only in Russia itself but also among the monks in the Russian monasteries on Mount Athos in Greece, and it was here that the movement took off. In 1913 the movement turned into a rebellion against the authority of the church hierarchy when name-glorifying monks at the Andreyev Monastery removed their father-superior for resisting the new doctrine. A boycott was declared against the insurgent monastery: it would no longer be supplied with mail and provisions from Russia.
However, the movement spread rapidly to other Russian monasteries on Mount Athos. The Church Synod (ruling council) sent Archbishop Nikon Rozhdestvensky to try to bring the rebels to their senses, and just in case they also asked the government to send along soldiers. The situation was finally brought back under control by forcibly repatriating about 1,000 monks and dispersing them among monasteries in Russia. The Russian position on Mount Athos was greatly weakened.
The center of gravity of the controversy then shifted to Russia. Many articles and books were written for and against name-glorification. The name-glorifiers' side was taken by the intelligentsia and liberal church circles, including such well-known theologians as Pavel Florensky and Sergei Bulgakov, while traditionalist theologians backed the church hierarchy. The stance of the liberal intelligentsia is rather curious seeing that the name-glorifiers were more obscurantist and less in tune with modern science than the church hierarchs. I suppose it was a knee-jerk reaction to side with rebels against church and state, whatever they might stand for.
After the revolution, name-glorifiers set up secret monasteries in the Caucasus Mountains. The secret monks believed that the revolution and the Bolsheviks' persecution of the Church were God's punishment for the Church's own persecution of the name-glorifiers. Their theological views became more
radical: now they held not only that "God's name is God" but also that "God is God's name." Florensky, who somehow managed to keep up a correspondence with them, felt that this was going a bit too far and tried to persuade them that their latest doctrinal innovation made no sense.
The secret monasteries survived through the whole of the Soviet period and still exist today. In 1996 there appeared a new book about name-glorification by one of the formerly secret monks. "The spark of holiness," Bonetskaya concludes, "still burns in the night of sin that has shrouded the world."
--------------------------------------------------------
HISTORY
11. YOUTH AGAINST STALIN
SOURCE. Juliane Furst, "Prisoners of the Soviet Self?-- Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54 No. 3, May 2002, pp. 353-376.
We are accustomed to thinking of the Stalin regime as exercising surveillance over society so tight as to make organized dissent virtually impossible. But in fact that was not the case. On the basis of newly accessible NKVD (secret police) archives, interviews with former participants, and published memoirs, Juliane Furst (London School of
Economics) has provided the first systematic account of one type of such dissent -- anti-Stalinist youth activism. Focusing on the postwar period (late Stalinism), she found evidence of no fewer than 27 illegal anti-Stalinist youth organizations with a combined membership numbering in the hundreds. True, all but one of these organizations was eventually discovered and suppressed by the NKVD.
The majority of organizations were active in large cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk [Yekaterinburg], and Tbilisi (in Georgia). But some of the organizations were based in medium-sized provincial centers: two were in Voronezh, including the Communist Party of Youth (KPM) with as many as 53 members, and another two in Astrakhan. There was even one organization in a village in the Stavropol Territory.
All the young anti-Stalinists claimed to be loyal to the Soviet system and true Marxism-Leninism, which they believed Stalin had perverted. Their Leninism is reflected in the names they gave their organizations (e.g., Union for Struggle for the Revolutionary Cause). In their hierarchical structure and many of their practices as well as in the language they used, they tended to imitate the official Communist Youth League (Komsomol). Indeed, some recruited only Komsomol members. It sometimes took NKVD investigators several months to make up their minds whether the social criticism voiced by members of a particular organization was or was not within permissible limits. Should they be considered basically loyal to the regime or branded as "counter-revolutionaries under the mask of revolutionary slogans"?
The public activity of the anti-Stalinist youth groups was severely constrained by the need for secrecy, though some did distribute fliers and write graffiti on walls. Despite the names of certain organizations such as "Army of the Revolution" and "Death to Beria," none of them ever committed any acts of violence.
The young anti-Stalinists took the risky step of forming illegal organizations because they could not stomach the abyss that separated idealistic official rhetoric from the grim reality surrounding them. Many felt marginalized and alienated as a result of their family background -- that is, their parents had been arrested in the purges or they were of Jewish origin. Some came from very prominent families: for instance, Boris Batuyev, founder of the KPM, was the son of the Second Secretary of the Voronezh Provincial Party Committee. Although their ideology had a certain resemblance to Trotskyism, they had worked it out on their own: they do not seem to have had any contact with oppositionists of the older generation, most of whom had by this time been killed or imprisoned.
What happened to these youngsters? For the first two years after the war, arrested anti-Stalinist activists were tried in local city or provincial courts and received relatively mild sentences, typically five years in camp. Many of these survived to tell the tale: some changed their political convictions in later life, others did not. In 1947 it was decided to send such cases to military tribunals, which handed out far harsher punishment, generally 25 years. The leaders of the last organization to be tried under
Stalin, in 1952, were executed.
--------------------------------------------------------
CULTURE
12. TUVAN MUSIC
SOURCE. James Griffiths, "Throaty terror. World music.
Yat-Kha," The Guardian Weekly (a very useful compilation
of selected articles from The Guardian, Le Monde, and
The Washington Post: see http://www.guardian.co.uk),
April 25 - May 1, 2002. Copyright belongs to The
Guardian, reproduced with permission.
From the remote mountains of Tuva in southern Siberia
comes a sound so deep that it will shake you to your
bones. It is called khoomei, throat singing. This
ancient folk art has been placed in a modern context by
a young Tuvan musician called Albert Kuvezin.
Fronted by a female vocalist called Sailyk Ommun,
Yat-Kha could quite easily be mistaken for some sort of
terrifying oriental death-metal band. When Kuvezin
plugged in his electric guitar and led the band into the
opener at the Modal Convention in Sheffield [city in
northern England -- SDS], the effect was not unlike
having a steamroller driven over your head.
It came as a shock to hear the ethereal beauty of
Yat-Kha's studio creations translated into monolithic
folk-punk anthems. Kuvezin's guitar snarled malevolently
while the drums and bass pounded away and morinhuur
player Radik Tiuliush assaulted his banjo-like
instrument. Gradually, however, the sheer driving energy
became irresistible. The vibe was party-like, the
jubilant folk tunes gaining extra lustre amid the
adrenalin.
And then, of course, there was The Voice. Trying to
convey the rumbling quality of Kuvezin's singing is not
easy. In terms of depth, he makes Barry White sound like
Jimmy Somerville. When he plunged right to the bottom of
his range, the floor shook and the place erupted with
applause. Tiuliush also revealed himself to be an
accomplished throat singer, and the effect of both
voices working in unison was nothing short of
terrifying.
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