THE SECOND RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR
1. CHECHNYA AT A TURNING POINT [written in Feb. 2001]
By Stephen D. Shenfield
On January 22, 2001, President Vladimir Putin signaled a turning point in the Russo-Chechen war when he announced a major shift in Moscow's strategy, including the withdrawal of most of the federal troops currently in Chechnya.
The meaning of the shift has been interpreted in widely divergent ways. Putin says that the war has basically been won: only a few isolated groups of "terrorists" remain, and such a big army is not needed to finish them off. But there are observers who view the announcement in quite a different light, as a thinly camouflaged admission of failure. The war has not really been won, they argue. But Putin -- caught in a military stalemate and with public support for the war now in decline -- finds it politically convenient to pretend that it has been won. The possibility is even raised that he may be preparing public opinion for eventual defeat.
However the new policy is interpreted, it does at least imply recognition that large-scale combat operations have already served any useful purpose they may have had and are no longer effective or expedient. An impasse had been reached, and a change of tack was needed to break through it.
The likely motives behind the shift in strategy become clearer when one assesses the military situation that had developed in Chechnya in the preceding period. It is with such an assessment that I begin this article. Then I examine the change in strategy and consider its likely consequences.
The military situation before the shift
The current war in Chechnya has passed through three main stages. (1)
In the first stage, in the fall of 1999, federal forces repulsed the incursion of Chechen Islamist fighters into Dagestan and created a "security zone" in the traditionally loyalist lowlands of Chechnya which lie north of the Terek River. Some people within Russian ruling circles urged that the operation should stop right there, arguing that the security zone sufficed to contain the terrorist threat and that the rest of Chechnya could be effectively blockaded. These voices, however, were overruled. The goal was to be the "liberation" of the whole of Chechnya and the suppression of all armed opposition. And so in late November 1999, Russian troops began to cross the Terek.
During the second stage of the war, which lasted through the winter of 1999-2000 up until April 2000, federal forces occupied the whole of lowland Chechnya. Grozny was taken after a long siege. The main insurgent force chose not to put up serious resistance, but to retreat into the mountains of southern Chechnya. In fact, Russian commanders deliberately allowed them to retreat. Up in the barren and sparsely populated mountains, under constant bombardment and deprived of shelter and supplies, the insurgents suffered high casualties. They soon became both disorganized and demoralized. A number of Chechen commanders defected to the Russian side.
Thus in the spring of 2000 Moscow found itself in a strong position. The operation might at that point have been brought to a successful conclusion by withdrawing troops, handing over power to a civilian administration, and negotiating a settlement with Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov on favorable terms. The outcome might have been an autonomous Chechen Republic "united with the Russian Federation" (the formula used in the case of the Republic of Tatarstan) under a government of national reconciliation. True, the insurgents in retreating had left behind on occupied territory armed resistance cells, which would have continued to cause trouble for some time. But these cells did not yet have any effective leadership to coordinate their actions, and the security agencies and the armed police units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs could have coped with them on their own without help from the army. Violence would not have completely ceased, but it would at least have declined to the level of a relatively low-intensity policing operation. In other words, it would have made good sense to do at that point what Putin is, belatedly and only in part, doing now.
The chance was not seized, and as the months passed so the window of opportunity closed again. The insurgent command began to rethink its strategy in the light of the new conditions. Thus began the third stage of the war. Maintaining radio silence to avoid detection, most of the fighters made their way down from the mountains in small units and infiltrated behind enemy lines, where they beefed up the resistance cells and linked them into an effective network.
Guerrilla hit-and-run attacks on the occupation forces gradually became bolder, more frequent, and better coordinated. The Russian army, unable to identify insurgent fighters reliably, retaliated with extreme brutality against the peaceful population, turning many Chechens who would otherwise (more or less reluctantly) have accepted Russian rule into ardent supporters of the resistance. As a consequence, the insurgents were able to recruit into their ranks many young people who did not really sympathize with them politically but who were determined to exact blood revenge for relatives or friends who had been massacred by federal troops or savagely beaten and tortured in the notorious "filtration camps." (2)
Meanwhile, the insurgent command in the mountains, with the assistance of wealthy backers in the Moslem world, managed to establish a few well-concealed bases. The main function of these bases was not that of supporting fighting in the mountains, which was conducted only when unavoidable for defensive purposes, but that of coordinating the growing guerrilla campaign in the occupied lowlands.
While civilians suffered greatly as a result of Russian counterinsurgency operations, these operations were quite ineffective from the military point of view. Guerrilla attacks continued and grew in scale, and the Russian army had no rational plan for dealing with them. Troops that find themselves in such a plight over a long period become not only demoralized and cruel, but also undisciplined and corrupt, and over time lose all combat capability. The process of degeneration has been well described by Maskhadov himself:
"They have achieved little and the military machine has stopped, exhausted morally and physically. Once the machine stops it deteriorates: soldiers turn marauders, sell everything from weapons to food; the different structures of the invading forces -- the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the army, the Federal Security Service -- fight among themselves." (3)
Especially for Russian officers and kontraktniki (professional soldiers on contract), service in Chechnya, for all its dangers and inconveniences, has come to be valued as an opportunity for personal enrichment. Besides the sale of arms and other supplies, much of which of course ends up in the hands of the insurgents, there are several other ways in which income is extracted from the Chechen people and from what remains of the Chechen economy. In the spring of 2000, the thousand or so small "home" distilleries which were built under the separatist regime to process oil tapped (i.e., stolen) from the pipeline that passes through Chechnya came under the control of district and unit commanders of the Russian army.
Another lucrative business, similarly under the control of army or interior ministry personnel, is the collection of metal from the ruins of bombed-out industrial enterprises. The metal and the petroleum products are transported under heavy security out of Chechnya for sale in Russia proper.
A lot of money is also made from bribes for allowing people to pass through checkpoints on the roads (the standard payment is 50 rubles), and from ransom for the release of detainees from filtration camps. Indeed, it is common practice to detain people not because they are genuinely suspected of being insurgents but with a view to extorting money from their relatives (just as in the burgeoning Chechen kidnapping business). The release of a detainee accused of carrying a gun costs $5,000, the release of someone caught out of doors during a curfew $600, and the return of a corpse $200. (4)
Putin's motives
By the beginning of 2001, it must have finally become clear to Putin that the existing strategy was not yielding the results which his generals had promised. Prolonging it would have served no useful purpose. At the same time, Putin had a number of specific reasons for doing something to change the situation.
First of all, Putin had probably received intelligence reports detailing the demoralization and degeneration of army units in Chechnya. He was presumably concerned to halt the process, to restore the combat capability of these units, and to reassert central control over them.
Putin may also have taken some account of the political costs of the presence in Chechnya of a large number of brutal and corrupt servicemen. The Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, a former supporter of the secessionists who had come over to the Russian side and been put in charge of the Chechen civilian administration, is known to have long opposed the presence of so many troops in Chechnya, on the grounds that their corruption and brutality were undercutting the legitimacy of his administration. Kadyrov may well have exerted some influence upon Putin, with whom he met a number of times in the weeks preceding the announcement of the new strategy.
Secondly, the war had already served one of its main original purposes (critics of Putin would say its sole original purpose): it had united Russian society around Putin's leadership. With public support for the war now in sharp decline -- from a high of 70 per cent in February 2000 to 38 per cent in mid-January 2001 -- it was expedient from the point of view of domestic politics to start winding it down.
Thirdly, Putin may have wanted to reduce the economic cost of the war. According to prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, in the year 2000 the war had entailed additional military expenditure of about one billion dollars (2-3 billion rubles per month). (5) Even with the infusion of extra cash from the high world price of oil, Russia's overstretched and debt-ridden state budget could not tolerate additional expenditures of this magnitude for very long.
Finally, foreign policy considerations may also have played some part, though hardly a crucial one. It was no doubt hoped that the shift in strategy would assuage Western criticism of Russian conduct of the war and improve Russia's tarnished international image. Putin's announcement was timed to coincide with the opening of the winter session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which had set troop withdrawals as a condition of reinstating Russia's voting rights, suspended in April 2000 on account of human rights abuses in Chechnya.
The new strategy
The main components of the new strategy were set out in a series of presidential decrees issued in the days following Putin's announcement:
-- The army presence in Chechnya is to be reduced from the existing level of about 90,000 down to a permanent garrison of about 25,000 men, consisting of 16,000 army troops, up to 6,000 interior ministry troops, and specialized and support units.
-- There are to be small local garrisons deployed in about two hundred towns and villages. These are to be supported by the local Chechen militia under Kadyrov's control, the strength of which is to be increased from 5,000 to 15,000 men.
-- At the same time, in an effort to "Chechenize" the conflict and win over Chechen hearts and minds, the prerogatives of Kadyrov's administration are to be broadened. For instance, new civilian courts have started work under its control.
It needs to be borne in mind that most of these steps have yet to be taken. The troop withdrawal in particular is bound to be phased over a considerable period, perhaps several years. The departure of the first batch of 5,000 men was reported only in mid-March 2001. (6)
One might have expected the insurgents to lay low for a time in order to encourage a rapid withdrawal, with a view to resuming a high level of activity once the withdrawal is complete. In fact, guerrilla attacks have been continuing without apparent letup, which will presumably slow down, if not altogether jeopardize, the transition to the new strategy.
Overall command of operations has been transferred to the Federal Security Service (FSS), to which army and interior ministry forces in Chechnya have been re-subordinated. The FSS is assisted by a new interdepartmental group chaired by FSS head Nikolai Patrushev, an old colleague of Putin's from his days in the KGB. Other members of the group are named as interior minister Vladimir Rushailo, chief of general staff General Anatoly Kvashnin, and presidential representative in the North Caucasian Federal District General Viktor Kazantsev.
Although no further large-scale combat operations are envisaged, Putin emphasizes that the "anti-terrorist operation" is not being abandoned, but is to be "continued by other means." A prominent place among these "other means" is to be occupied by attempts to assassinate military and political leaders of the insurgents.
Likely consequences
Although Russian forces remain in formal daytime control of all centers of population in Chechnya, many reports indicate that their position is highly vulnerable. In Grozny, Russian troops move only in large detachments even during the day, usually supported by armor: going out alone means certain death or capture. At night, they barricade themselves in strong points while the insurgents move around freely. The planned dispersal of remaining forces in small town and village garrisons can only greatly heighten their vulnerability.
Increasing reliance is to be placed upon Kadyrov's Chechen militia, but the reliability of this force is doubtful. While the militiamen are willing to perform police functions, including that of dispersing protest demonstrations, they are reluctant to engage in serious battle with the insurgents. The cultural taboo against "Chechens killing Chechens" has an inhibiting effect, as do the mixed feelings toward the conflict even of nominally loyalist Chechens.
There are yet other reasons to be skeptical concerning the prospects of the new strategy. Experience suggests that army and interior ministry personnel will not willingly obey orders from officials of a rival agency, the FSS. The corruption of Russian servicemen will continue to facilitate the activity of insurgents, who will still be able to bribe their way past checkpoints, purchase arms and information, and so on.
Critics of the withdrawal within the Russian military argue that while the situation may at first be relatively calm, in two or three years' time the insurgents will have regained sufficient strength to launch an offensive that the Chechen militia and the residual Russian forces will be unable to withstand. They will then again recapture Grozny, as they did in 1996.
Such an outcome, while by no means wholly implausible, is not perhaps inevitable. The insurgents too have their weak points. In particular, funding from the Moslem world is a big financial advantage, but at the same time a big political liability. Even many Chechens who formerly supported the Dudayev regime have been increasingly alienated by the growing influence of foreign Islamists in the insurgent camp. Other things being equal, this might be expected to undermine the ability of the insurgents to attract new recruits while enhancing the recruitment potential of the Chechen militia. Kadyrov himself, after all, is a former secessionist. On the other hand, the frequent assassinations of Kadyrov's officials by the insurgents cannot but deter many who might otherwise be inclined to lend him their support.
At the same time, as the withdrawal of Russian forces proceeds, there will be fewer abuses inflicted on the civilian population. The number of Chechens driven to join the insurgents by the thirst for revenge may be expected gradually to decline. True, there are also many who join one side or the other neither for ideological reasons nor to obtain revenge, but simply for the sake of material survival, but these people are not highly motivated to fight and have minimal impact on the real correlation of forces.
Just how great a positive political effect the "Chechenization" strategy will have depends on how much real authority the FSS will allow Kadyrov to exercise. Will he, for instance, be able to guarantee full amnesty for insurgents who lay down their arms? Otherwise he will not be able to take full advantage of any disillusionment that may exist on the other side. How soon will the Chechen Republic take its place as a more or less "normal" subject of the Russian Federation, enjoying the same kind of cultural and administrative autonomy as other ethnic republics, such as Tatarstan or neighboring Dagestan? Will it ever do so?
The crucial factors, however, lie less in the sphere of politics than they do in that of economics. Living conditions in Chechnya are calamitous. Undernourishment and destitution are widespread. Most of the housing stock has been damaged or destroyed. Over 80 per cent of the able-bodied population are unemployed. The main sources of people's livelihood are money sent by relatives living outside Chechnya, humanitarian aid, the pay of those fortunate enough to be in the employ of the federal authorities, subsistence agriculture, and (last but by no means least) criminal activity. (7) No less calamitous is the situation in the field of public health. Tuberculosis and other diseases are rife, as are mental disorders.
No strategy aimed at defeating the insurgents primarily by political means and reintegrating Chechnya into the Russian Federation stands the least chance of success unless these problems are tackled urgently and on the necessary scale. Yet another task that will have to be accomplished if the insurgents are to be defeated politically is the resettlement of the 200,000 Chechen refugees currently living in atrocious conditions in camps in Ingushetia. It is these camps, even more than the population still inside Chechnya, which constitute a reservoir of support for the insurgents.
In short, the secessionist cause will lose its appeal only to the extent that Chechens get the help they need to rebuild a decent life for themselves in their devastated homeland. Those with nothing to lose feel that they might as well fight -- and fighting is something that many Chechens know how to do.
What resources will be made available, by the Russian government and the international community, to ameliorate these disastrous conditions and rebuild the republic's economy and infrastructure? (8) And what proportion of those resources will be lost down the deep well of waste and corruption?
Putin's attempt to demilitarize the Russo-Chechen conflict, however inconsistent and belated it may be, is not necessarily doomed to failure. However, the residue of bitterness is so huge, the cumulative devastation of two wars so enormous, the available resources -- both of money and of political wisdom -- so patently inadequate to the magnitude of the task at hand that it requires a great exertion of the will to feel even the least bit optimistic about the future of Chechnya.
Notes
(1) See Pavel Felgengauer, The Moscow Times 2/1/01.
(2) There is especially strong social pressure to avenge close relatives. The filtration camps are for the temporary detention of Chechens suspected of ties with the insurgents.
(3) Aslan Maskhadov, "Open Letter to the French Philosopher Andre Glucksman," Central Asian Survey, Vol. 19, Nos. 3-4, September-December 2000, pp. 309-314 at p. 313.
(4) These prices are mentioned by Maskhadov. For more detail on economic corruption of the federal forces in Chechnya, see the report by Ruslan Khasbulatov in Nezavisimaia gazeta 12/29/00.
(5) This figure took no account of the depletion of reserves of equipment and other supplies.
(6) Felgengauer in The Moscow Times 3/22/2001.
(7) For reports of conditions in Chechnya, see the Khasbulatov Report (note 4) and also "Dispatches from Chechnya," available by e-mail from the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe at idee@idee.org <mailto:idee@idee.org>.
(8) Putin pledged that 14.4 billion rubles ($529m) would be allocated for reconstruction in Chechnya in 2001, but it later turned out that only 4.5 billion rubles ($164m) was to be provided by the federal government, with the remainder supposedly to be contributed by the Unified Energy System (the electricity monopoly), Gazprom (the gas monopoly), and the Ministry of Railroads.
NOTE ON ORIGINS OF TEXT. I originally wrote this article for the Brown Journal of World Affairs, but as a result of misunderstanding the text that appeared there was a preliminary draft not intended for publication. So I am publishing the article here for the first time in its proper form.
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*** THIS IS CHECHNYA ***
[Following a zachistka in the village of XXX,] corpses with numerous signs of torture were turned over to relatives only after the latter signed receipts saying that the killed person was a participant in an "illegal armed formation." Payment of 1000 rubles was demanded for each body. Among those turned over to relatives for burial was the village mufti XXX, with cut off ears and nose, mutilated face, and fatal bullet wounds. His wife is afraid for her 17-year-old son. "How will I be able to keep him from taking revenge?" she asked. "What am I supposed to do to keep him from taking weapons in his hands?"
[Press release #163, 1/8/02]
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