RUSSIA AND THE CIS
DOES RUSSIA NEED AZERBAIJAN?
SOURCE: Azerbaidzhan i Rossiia: obshchestva i gosudarstva [Azerbaijan and Russia: Societies and States]. Moscow: Letnii sad, 2001, pp. 3-10.
This is the fourth in the excellent series of books on relations between Russia and neighboring societies issued by the Sakharov Museum and Public Center and edited and compiled by Dmitry Furman (Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences). The first three dealt with Russia and Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, and Russia and Chechnya (see RAS No. 1, item 5.) What follows is a synopsis of Furman's introduction to the volume. -- Editor
Russians know little about Azerbaijan. Their attention was drawn to the country in 1988 by the shock of the pogrom against Armenians in Sumgait, which shattered the Soviet myth of "the friendship of peoples" but reconfirmed older myths regarding the special cruelty of Turks and Moslems. These prejudices were exacerbated by the pro-Armenian bias of Russian press coverage of the Karabagh conflict.
In fact, the Popular Front that overthrew Soviet rule in Azerbaijan was guided by an ideology that was not only nationalist but also Western-oriented, secular, liberal, and democratic. Even the succeeding regime of President Heidar Aliev officially adheres to a similar ideology in a more gradualist form. This is not to claim that the Aliev regime lives up to liberal ideals in practice, or to deny its traditionally "oriental" traits -- nepotism, clannishness, lack of civic awareness, habitual disregard for law. But in the ideological sphere liberalism has no serious rivals: communist and Islamist parties exist, but are marginal to Azerbaijani politics. There is a good chance that the parties associated with the Popular Front will return to power and Azerbaijan resume its progress toward democracy.
Azerbaijan's Western orientation can be traced back to the independent republic of 1918-20 and beyond -- to the emergence in the second half of the 19th century of an Azerbaijani intelligentsia devoted to European culture. This European culture reached Azerbaijan through Russia, and encompassed Russian culture. True, Azerbaijani intellectuals denounced Russian imperialism, but they did so in a language learned from Russia.
The cultural ties between Russia and Azerbaijan grew even stronger during the Soviet period. Many Azerbaijanis now live and work in Moscow and other Russian cities. It would be natural for Azerbaijan to seek to realize the "colossal potential" of close relations with Russia, even as it expands its connections with the West. The two are not mutually exclusive.
What should Russia do to bring about such an outcome? It is not so much a matter of what Russia should do. It is more a matter of what Russia should NOT do. It should not meddle in Azerbaijani affairs with a view to installing a pro-Russian government. It should not demand military bases on Azerbaijani territory. In general, it should not do anything likely to revive anti-Russian feelings and provoke a hostile reaction.
Russia needs Azerbaijan. Not for its "strategic position" as a buffer zone in a supposedly eternal geopolitical contest. And not only for its oil. What Russia needs, above all, is an Azerbaijan progressing along the path of peaceful, democratic, and successful development. Such an Azerbaijan will serve as an example to inspire the evolution of Russia's other Moslem neighbors in a similar direction, thereby averting the looming danger of a civilizational clash between Russia and the world of Islam.
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