#7
Vremya MN
December 25, 2001
THE HIERARCHY OF 2001
Vladimir Putin hasn't done anything with domestic policy
Author: Leonid Radzikhovsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
PUTIN'S PRO-WESTERN CHOICE IS SERIOUS AND PERMANENT; ESSENTIALLY A STRATEGY OF INTEGRATION INTO THE WESTERN SOCIOPOLITICAL SYSTEM. BUT RUSSIAN LEADERS USUALLY ENCOUNTER PROBLEMS AT HOME. AND PUTIN'S DOMESTIC POLICY REMAINS A MYSTERY, JUST AS IT WAS A MYSTERY TWO YEARS AGO.
Boris Yeltsin made Vladimir Putin president exactly two years ago this week (officially, his presidency dates from the moment of his election in March 2000 but he actually became head of state in August 1999). That is why the political results of 2001 in domestic policy may be viewed as the political results of the first half of Putin's rule.
There may be different opinions on whether the new era began on September 11. There can be no doubt, however, that a new President Putin was born that day. Putin is the most western of all Russian politicians. He alone - not Nemtsov or Yavlinsky - would have dared say that the United States was entitled to make a retaliatory strike, and even that terrorists rather than Americans would be to blame for all future casualties. The answer to the question of "Who is Mr. Putin?" is provided in foreign policy. When the United States opted to withdraw from the ABM treaty of 1972, and Russia took the news in its stride, it became absolutely clear that Putin's pro-Western choice was something serious and permanent, that it was essentially a strategy of integration into the Western sociopolitical system.
Russian leaders usually encounter problems at home. And Putin's domestic policy remains a mystery, just as it was a mystery two years ago.
Putin had unprecedented oil prices and unprecedented rating playing into his hands all this time. It sees, however, that Putin cannot accept the praise for either.
Mikhail Gorbachev's rating in 1985, 1987, and 1988 was even higher that Putin's. Even more surprisingly, Boris Yeltsin's rating in 1992 and 1993 was fairly high! And the Russians' love was anything but fiscal then - living standards did not grow under Gorbachev and collapsed in 1992 and 1993. This is what we should have been stunned. As for Putin, it would have been more than odd had his rating failed to soar when economy was more or less recovering and living standards grew some as well. Putin's rating even survived his decision to take a pro-American position, not precisely popular with most Russians until then. On the contrary, pro-American tendencies in Russia grew when Putin chose the West... Even that is hardly surprising - Russia loves its presidents, has always loved them.
The problem is, all domestic policy of the past two years was restricted to declarations alone.
Chechnya is a bit quieter now, but the end of the war is not even in sight yet, and talking about Chechnya's reintegration into Russia is not even decent. The famous hierarchy of state power? Here are a few fresh examples. Take the elections for the Moscow municipal legislature. The mayor has a hierarchy here, controllable democracy, and - what really counts - the whole machine is working smoothly. Compare it with the election in Yakutia - where this same hierarchy has already defied ten attempts to establish it, with the whole nation watching and booing.
Or take the personnel fiasco. The much-discussed "St. Petersburg personnel revolution" is not something Putin would have chosen, had a choice been possible. It is just that he doesn't know whom he can rely on. What about the events of the last two months, when the two teams went at each other's throats and the president pretended he didn't see anything? What do they indicate? Either Putin is building a system of checks and balances this way - or he isn't in control of his team, or whatever passes for it in the Kremlin nowadays. If it is the latter, then we are facing a political catastrophe, no less, and the former possibility is not much better.
There are problems with political means; there are even worse problems with political ends.
Putin has proclaimed a liberal socioeconomic policy more than once. The Union of Right Forces is overjoyed - the president himself is conducting our symphony. But the music is what is lacking. Income tax rates have been lowered, this is the only thing that has been done. Great. But this is only part of the whole system of measures, right? Not even half a step has been taken to move from Russia as a natural resources provider to Russia as a technological state. We have the oil to last our lifetimes - it is also an economic strategy, and quite a liberal one. It took Russia a great deal of effort to have the parliament pass the law on land use, but the most important issue - agricultural land - is not even mentioned in it. Russia lacks a functional law on bankruptcy. The military reforms are restricted to hunting down conscripts. As for the reorganization of natural monopolies, that is something else again - we all know how Alexei Miller came to Gazprom, how he has been treated there, and how the Kremlin cannot change anything. Reorganization of the Interior Ministry? Citizens are afraid even to ask anything about it. They still prefer to steer clear of police stations.
Too much remains undone. Saying what has been done is easier. The regime has gelded the Duma, the Federation Council, and the media; and rooted out opposition. There is nothing alarming about this - dictatorship is the last thing Russia should worry about. The problem is there will be no public resistance to the authorities. All right. But what have the authorities been doing? Nothing, at least in terms of domestic policy. All we can do is wait. Nothing really depends on us.
