Johnson's Russia List #5610 21 December 2001 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: RUSSIAN POPULATION CONTINUES TO DIMINISH. 2. RIA Novosti: NOW VISAS FOR UP TO 72-HOUR STAY IN RUSSIA CAN BE ISSUED AT FRONTIER. 3. Reuters: Putin praises Russian spies for war against terror. 4. Reuters: Russian spy boss welcomes new Western cooperation. 5. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review. 6. The Russia Journal: John Helmer, PERFORMING MIRACLES IN RUSSIA -- PUTIN'S TASK IN 2002. 7. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Emil Pain speaks on the risks facing the United States in its war in Afghanistan. 8. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Russia may rethink its pro-Western policy. 9. Gordon Hahn's new book: Russia's Revolution From Above, 1985-2000. Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the fall of the Soviet Communist Regime. 10. gazeta.ru: Duma Appoves Amendments Curtailing Press Freedoms. 11. Vremya Novostei: Viktor Khamrayev, Code for the Builder of Capitalism. Duma Legalizes New Relations between Employers and Employees. 12. Versty: REDUCE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR TO ZERO. The US administration has announced its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty. What should Russia do? Academician Radiy ILKAYEV, Director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre.] ******* #1 Rossiiskaya Gazeta No. 247 December 20, 2001 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] RUSSIAN POPULATION CONTINUES TO DIMINISH From January to October 2001, Russia's population decreased by 711,900 people, or 0.5 percent, the State Statistics Committee reported yesterday. As of November 1, 2001, the Russian population stood at 144,100,000 people. Compared to last year, in 2001 the population has been decreasing faster: over the first ten months of 2000, it decreased by 611,200 people, or 0.4 percent. In January-October 2001, immigration compensated for the natural loss of the population by only 7.7 percent. This correlation, "despite a decrease in the natural loss, resulted from a marked reduction (compared to January-October 2000) in the number of immigrants," the State Statistics Committee's report said. ******* #2 NOW VISAS FOR UP TO 72-HOUR STAY IN RUSSIA CAN BE ISSUED AT FRONTIER MOSCOW, DECEMBER 20. /FROM RIA NOVOSTI'S CORRESPONDENT YELENA GLUSHAKOVA/ -- Starting from February 1, visas for less-than-72-hour stay in the Russian Federation can be issued straight on the border -- at Sheremetyevo (Moscow region) and Pulkovo (near St.Petersburg) airports and at the four checkpoints on the foreign borders of the Kaliningrad (Russia's westernmost tip) and Leningrad regions. A visa will cost 35 dollars and be glued into the tourist passport immediately on the border. In order to get a visa straight on the border a tourist willing to visit Russia has to apply for it 48 hours before the desired trip to a Russian tourist firm, or a hotel, and buy the tour, or book a hotel room. An entitled hotel, or a tourist firm, sends information on a tourist buying a tour, or reserving a hotel room, to the checkpoint through which the tourist is going to cross the border. Within 24 hours the tourist-related information will be verified. If everything is OK, the tourist will arrive in Russia and the visa will be glued into his passport on the border. ****** #3 Putin praises Russian spies for war against terror MOSCOW, Dec 20 (Reuters) - President and former spy Vladimir Putin praised Russia's intelligence services on Thursday for striking what he said was the first blow against international terrorism, an apparent reference to the campaign in Chechnya. Speaking on a day honouring the security services, the former KGB agent and ex-head of the post-Soviet FSB domestic security service, said Russia had been the first to confront terrorism on a large scale. "Our actions were the first serious strike on international terrorism -- terrorism in its new form," he said in remarks broadcast on Russian television. Putin and other Russian officials have been quick to link Moscow's military campaign in mainly Muslim rebel Chechnya to the U.S.-led war on international terrorism. The FSB runs Russia's operations in Chechnya. The Russian president, the Russian leader from the intelligence service, was the first foreign president to offer support to U.S. President George W. Bush after the September 11 hijack attacks on the United States. "We know from our own experience that the war on terrorism is hard and severe and each step demands a very high price," Putin said. Putin called for a minute's silence to commemorate all those in the intelligence services who had died in the line of duty. Interfax also quoted him as saying that the public has the right to know about the work of the security services. Since Soviet times, Russians have viewed professional spies as one of the few institutions above the corruption that was often inherent in high-ranking office. But a straw poll conducted by Ekho Moskvy radio station on Thursday showed that 72 percent of Russians would not like to work for the special services. ****** #4 Russian spy boss welcomes new Western cooperation By Robert Eksuzyan MOSCOW, Dec 20 (Reuters) - The head of Russia's SVR foreign intelligence agency, in a rare interview published on Thursday, welcomed new cooperation with the West but feared it would be forgotten once the U.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign was over. Sergei Lebedev, interviewed by the mass circulation Trud daily, also said his intelligence work was made easier by the fact that President Vladimir Putin was a former spy. He acknowledged that he and Putin had served at the same time in the former East Germany, but had never met then. Lebedev, 53, refused to comment on the failure by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation to prevent the September 11 attacks on U.S. landmarks, saying there was "much to be learned from their bitter experience." But events, he said, had forged new links with Washington. "A real turning point occurred after September 11. Exchanges of information between the countries of the world community now take place on a different, improved level," he told the daily. "Such exchanges were previously periodic and spontaneous, whereas now they are more constant. The world became more clever and came to understand the main threat came not from one or two countries but from a phenomenon -- international terrorism." But Lebedev said he was worried what the future might hold. "Suppose the operation in Afghanistan is completed and (Saudi-born millionaire Osama) bin Laden is found and all of a sudden everyone goes back to their 'own camps'," he said. "Will we again believe that each side has its own terrorists, its own cockroaches to be rid of? In the next few years, we will see whether mankind has become smarter after this drama or whether memory endures only a few years." He said the two sides had exchanged information concerning "threats to human life," but could disclose no more. CAREER IN GERMANY, UNITED STATES Lebedev was born in Soviet Uzbekistan and had intelligence training in Ukraine. He worked for 20 years in Germany, East and West and post-reunification, and in the United States before Putin appointed him to his current job in May 2000. His public pronouncements are rare, though he did offer to help Washington after the September attacks. Lebedev told Trud working with Putin was easy. Putin was a KGB agent for 15 years, including a 1984-90 stint in Dresden in East Germany, and went on to head the post-Soviet FSB domestic intelligence agency before becoming prime minister and then president on New Year's Eve 1999. "Naturally, the president's understanding of intelligence problems, of specific issues of such activity, makes it easy for me to talk to him," Lebedev told Trud. "If I need to, I can speak to the president at any moment. ...Yes, we worked together in the German region, but never met. This was no deliberate conspiracy, it just happened that way." Lebedev said he viewed "with the deepest contempt" traitors who had given away Russian spies operating abroad. Criminal cases had been launched against them, he said, but Russian intelligence had long abandoned exotic methods like "someone being run over by a car or pricked by an umbrella." He said young people were now coming to work for the intelligence services, but acknowledged problems like low pay. "At the moment, we are getting excellent guys. And they know full well that they are not liable to get the highest standards of living," he said. "The salaries of our foreign-based staff are not bad. And I constantly fight for higher pay for those in Moscow. Russian intelligence deserves better." ****** #5 ORT Review www.ortv.ru Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu) Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy at Boston University HEADLINES, - State Duma deputies have voted to put a five-year moratorium on human cloning in the Russian Federation. The Duma also established a 10 percent tax exemption for all print media and forbade all media sources to cite terrorists and extremists. Presidential Plenipotentiary to the State Duma Aleksandr Korenkov expressed his doubts that this law will be effective as far as the internet is concerned, since terrorists can disseminate their ideas over the world wide web from abroad. - The head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs Dmitry Rogozin has arrived in Israel, where he will meet with representatives of the Palestinian and Israeli leadership to discuss the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. - In London, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov met with his British counterpart Geoffrey Hoon. Tomorrow Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. - The production of a new model of the Kalashnikov rifle -- the AK108 -- has began at the Izhmash factory in Izhevsk. The new model is very much like its prototype, but thanks to an improved automatic-reloading system, the AK-108 will be able to fire 900 rounds a minute, while the AK-107 could fire only 600. - The Russian cabinet continued to review the 2002 investment program of the natural gas industry. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov noted that, above all, investment must be aimed at providing steady supply. - President Putin met with Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller today. The Russian President asserted that progress in relations between the two countries is clear, but that there is still a lot of work ahead. As an example, Putin pointed to the disproportional balance of trade. - Olympic champion Aleksandr Tikhonov, accused of plotting the assassination attempt against Kemerovo Region Governor Aman Tuleev has been placed on the federal wanted list. Tikhonov's whereabouts have been unknown since he left the clinic in Innsbruck, Austria, where he was undergoing treatment. - After the recent heavy snowfall, many cities and settlements throughout the Caucasus are still cut off from electricity and heat. - Sochi City Mayor Leonid Mostovoi announced that electricity supplies should be restored tomorrow in the second half of the day. - Pine tree bazaars will open throughout Russia in the next few days. Every year, about 15 percent of the pine trees remain unsold after Christmas and New Year celebrations are over. - Officers of five Russian special security services will celebrate their professional day today. These are the heirs of the All-Russian Cheka [Extraordinary Commission], which was established on December 20th, 1917. - A special telephone center has been opened in Moscow to take toll-free calls from all of Russia's regions: questions for President Putin's live appearance on ORT and RTR on December 24th. - The Russian Ministry of Culture announced that two important paintings -- "Unknown Woman" by Dmirtry Levitsky and "A Portrait of Daria Yakovlevna" by Vasily Borovikovsky -- will be retuned to Russia. The paintings were taken out after the October Revolution. ******* #6 The Russia Journal December 21-27, 2001 PERFORMING MIRACLES IN RUSSIA -- PUTIN'S TASK IN 2002 By John Helmer If you want to achieve the miracles required for sainthood, one of the great advantages of the Russian Church is that it allows you to perform after you are dead. This not only relieves qualifiers for canonization of a lot of pressure, while they are alive. It also gives them the benefit of more time and hindsight than ordinary mortals usually expect. You see, miracles in Russia are as much in the eye of the beholder, as they are in the hand of the miracle-maker. Take St. Sergius of Radonezh (Sergei Radonezhsky), for example. Born in 1314, Sergei managed to achieve his sainthood in 1448 -- fifty years after he had died. In his lifetime, Sergei started off as a hermit in the forests north of Moscow. His reputation for asceticism and hard work attracted a band of monks. With them Sergei began establishing a chain of monasteries. Holy Trinity, which still stands at Sergei Posad, was one; Simonov Monastery, near the Zil car works in Moscow, was another. As the 14th. century turned into the 15th. in Russia, churchmen like Sergei were leaders in the expansion of the landholdings around their monasteries, which in turn were also vital fortifications in the defence of Moscow, and of the lands and powers of the local princes. The politics of Muscovy's expansion also required the defeat of rival oligarchs in Lithuania and Kiev. They battled each other by all means, fair and foul. But to be stable, the winners needed legitimacy for their victories. That's what the the miracles of the saints were for. They were meant to demonstrate which side God was on -- and, incidentally, why it would be extra-risky to challenge Him. The hagiography that was sponsored by Moscow's grand princes after Sergei's death attributed miracles to him that had profound political effect. When the Blessed Virgin reportedly appeared to Sergei to assure him and his monastery of Her blessing, that was understood at the time as the sign She was backing Moscow's princes and prelates over Kiev. Indeed, every step in the shift of territorial and military power down the rivers and across the countryside was sign-posted by a miracle attributed to Sergei. Consider how little time President Vladimir Putin has to perform the miracles Russia needs. The coming year, 2002, is the last before his relection campaign starts in earnest; almost certainly his last opportunity to strip and reassemble the Kremlin and regional teams he should count on for the race. Not that there are any obvious rivals. Putin's polling, founded on the macro-economic recovery and his personal adroitness, have totally demolished Yevgeny Primakov, Yury Luzhkov, Alexander Lebed, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Boris Nemtsov, and Grigory Yavlinsky. Still, Putin's men understand how precariously popularity rests on indicators like real income, inflation, wage arrears. The arrears total was higher in November than at any time in the past year; even the much promised budget payments have begun arriving late. If inflation is taken into account, this may not be so painful as before. But a combination of rising prices and shrinking revenues next year could trigger a sharp popular reaction. That's not at all how the reelection campaign should kick off. So the President faces a number of short-term pressures, which will test his popularity. By itself, a high rating in the polls shouldn't be thought a miracle; nor does a string of high ratings, let alone reelection, assure the incumbent the political equivalent of sainthood. There are, however, two miracles which Putin must try to perform, if not achieve, in the new year. To do that, he must answer these questions. RECOVERY FOR WHOM? The rosiest of recovery assessments for the Russian economy can't hide the fact that Russians are dying at an accelerating rate. This year the population total is down to 144 million; down more than 700,000 this year. Last year, the loss was just over 600,000. The average loss each year since 1993 has been 500,000. Real income is recovering, but the gap between today's living standards and those of a decade ago is still so large, it is killing people. When Kremlin economic advisor Andrei Illarionov recently claimed that falling oil prices stimulate domestic employment,he didn't mention those who go missing from the growth statistics because they are dead. While it is clear from Putin's speeches that he is conscious of the problems, and their underlying causes, it is less obvious that, when confronted by the policies required for the remedies, Putin has the confidence and conviction to make the right choices. He may think that a healthy Russian society may depend on a healthy economy, but he has yet to respond to the fundamental distrust all Russians show -- should show -- towards those who are running the economy, and benefitting from the recovery. Private corporations are now free to impose the same harsh tax -- wage payment delay, layoffs -- whenever they want to transfer the burden of shrinking margins to the state. As a start-up miracle, the President should break into this cycle by wielding the tools of the Finance Ministry on behalf of the commonwealth and the greater good. To do that he should employ the Accounting Chamber to expose a decade of lying, corruption, bureaucratic arrogance, and repeated violations of law in the Finance Ministry. To make the Finance Ministry accountable, it is time the Kremlin endorsed legislation on official accountability which the Duma would be only too hapy to enact, and enforce. Implementation shouldn't be an executive prerogative. WHO SHOULD SUBSIDIZE WHOM? It is the thinking in several ministerial cabinets that, with income growing, inflation under control, and taxes falling, next year is the time for Gazprom and United Energy Systems (UES) to hike tariffs for gas and electricity. Investment houses opine that because Russia's gas and power prices are way below international levels, Gazprom and UES are subsidizing the rest of the Russian economy. Reform is the word used by those telling Putin that, if he will order an end to the cross-subsidies, and allow restructuring of both Gazprom and UES, he will trigger the investment impulse required to produce, not only more bountiful supplies of fuel and energy, but also lower producer prices. Any accountant can do the calculations to demonstrate what a huge value-destroying subsidy is generated by low prices. That is, if the accountant ignores the value of the resources discovered, and capital generated, by the state in building Gazprom and UES in the first place. Those who tell Putin it is time to turn Gazprom and UES into profit-making centres that generate value for their shareholders think their takeover of the assets at giveaway prices should incur no charges. They are wrong, arithmetically and morally. The reason it was right for Putin to dismiss Rem Vyakhirev from Gazprom is the same reason he should do the same thing to Chubais at UES. The reason Chubais is vilified in the country is that he was one of the masterminds of the theft of state property called privatization. Why should anyone trust him to manage UES any differently? To allow Chubais to dictate electricity prices would be no wiser than to allow aluminium companies to do the same thing. The choice isn't whether to eliminate price subsidies -- it is, who deserves to benefit? Ordinary people have venerated St. Sergius for more than five hundred years now, without knowing the politics of his time. It's difficult to believe in miracles if you study politics -- even more difficult if you are dead, and the miracles retrospective. That's why a president needs a few articles of faith, and why he must convince others what they are. A miracle at the Finance Ministry, a miracle at UES -- what leap of faith do these require? ****** #7 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace www.ceip.org Utility and Limits of Military Force: Lessons from Chechnya and the Current Campaign in Afghanistan December 13, 2001 Emil Pain speaks on the risks facing the United States in its war in Afghanistan. Emil Pain is the director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (INDEM Foundation). He is a leading scholar of ethnic conflicts, nationalism, and ethnonationalism and served as advisor to President Yeltsin on Nationality issues. In 2000, he was the first Galina Staravoiteva Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. Pain's presentation covered three topics: the risks for the United States in Afghanistan, how to avoid these risks, and the limitations on the use of force. Pain compared and contrasted the U.S. action in Afghanistan with that of Russia during the two Chechen wars. While there is some overlap between the situations, the U.S. actions in Afghanistan appear to be avoiding many of the pitfalls suffered by Russia in its military intervention in Chechnya. The first risk for the United States is one Russia has experienced in Chechnya: failing to locate and neutralize terrorist leaders. It is worth remembering that the first phase of both Chechens wars was successful for Russia; it consisted in the first three to four months of the conflict where the primary goal was advancing through enemy lines and establishing a formal zone of control. It was not until after the first phase of occupation ended that the subsequent guerrilla wars began after rebels had regrouped and local opposition coalesced. While the U.S. military force may be ten times better prepared to track down terrorist leaders, the geography of Afghanistan is twenty times larger as well as more difficult to deal with than Chechnya's. A second risk facing the United States is the danger of mission-creep. For the moment, the U.S. mission appears exclusively anti-terrorist. There is no indication that the U.S. seeks to occupy or annex Afghan territory in the long term nor are there signs that the U.S. is seeking even a permanent presence for its military forces. However, as the first stage of the Afghan conflict concludes, the U.S. may be tempted to expand the functions of its forces or take on additional tasks. Given the desire to establish a pro-U.S. administration in Afghanistan, the U.S. may well be tempted to take on less overt military tasks To avoid these risks, Pain posited that four principles should be followed: (1) refrain from any intervention unless there is a high degree of confidence that the operation can be concluded in under one year; (2) refrain from the use of force if the cost of failure is greater than the cost of inaction; (3) Intervention is not justified to simply punish or teach a lesson to terrorists; and, (4) regime building should not be mixed with anti-terrorist operations. In Russia's case it has failed in observing all four of these principles: it has been bogged down in Chechnya for years; its failure to crush Chechen rebels has encouraged other regions to think that they might secede and get away with it; and, Russia has increasingly had to take on regime building functions. Pain also made the point that the type of terrorism the U.S. was fighting against was what he termed 'inner-directed'. Its object is consolidating its own forces by provoking a chain reaction of retaliation. Interestingly, terrorists most likely see the Israeli actions against PLO Chairman Arafat and the U.S. actions in Afghanistan as being linked. Both could serve to unite Islamic radicals. The discussion then turned to the situation in Chechnya and possible analogies between the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Pain believes that Maskhadov wants to play the role of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He wants the international respect and legitimacy that such a role would provide him. Several discussion participants pointed out that unlike the Northern Alliance, Maskhadov has not openly condemned Chechen terrorists like Khattab and Shamil Basaev. There was debate as to whether such a stance by Maskhadov could help his image in the United States. Pain believes that it is tactically impossible for Maskhadov to condemn Khattab and Basaev given the current situation, but points to Maskhadov's many statements condemning Wahhabism and terrorism more generally. Next the discussion focused on what is the least Maskhadov could accept from the Russians and what is the most the Russians are prepared to offer him. The point of the question was to determine if there was any chance of negotiations leading to an end in the conflict. In general, Pain believes the recent negotiations between emissaries of Maskhadov and General Kazantzev are not serious and just a form of public relations by Russia to appease the Europeans and others who oppose the war. When pressed Pain stated that Maskhadov could being given de facto control over the Chechen territory with a provision that Russian military could operate in Grozny, protect pipelines, and have transit rights through the country. Unfortunately, no official in Russia is willing to deal with any Chechens seriously, and there is not much pressure on Putin for peace. In essence, Pain does not believe peace is possible during the short-term. However, there are steps that Russia could take in the short-term to make peace possible in the long-term. First, Russia needs to identify a person or group with which it can do business; Kadyrov was the wrong choice. Second, Putin or those who desire peace could work on changing the opinions of the elite to be more open towards a negotiated solution. When asked what role American policy could play in assisting Russia, Pain said that the U.S. should not allow the Russians to deceive themselves into thinking that the U.S. action in Afghanistan legitimized their own actions in Chechnya. Summary by Marc Fellman, Program Associate with the Russia & Eurasia Program. ******** #8 Asia Times December 20, 2001 Russia may rethink its pro-Western policy By Sergei Blagov MOSCOW - In the immediate aftermath of September 11, Russia somewhat drifted toward the West, and the Kremlin praised what it described as international solidarity against the terrorist threat. However, following the US decision to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty the Kremlin is seemingly mulling strengthening its ties with Beijing. Notably, Russia and China voiced a shared concern over the US decision to abandon the ABM treaty during the December 17-18 consultations on strategic stability between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov and his Chinese counterpart Wan Guanya in Moscow. Russia and China also discussed "practical cooperation, including military-technical areas", in the wake of the US withdrawal from the treaty, Russian official RIA news agency quoted anonymous Kremlin sources as saying. Russia and China will be keen to "coordinate" their respective policies relative to possible measures of response, the sources said. Moscow's and Beijing's "stern and non-hysterical" position relative to the US withdrawal from the treaty "has not changed and won't change", the sources said. Moscow believes that cooperation between Russia and China constitutes an important factor, which cannot be ignored by the United States, they said. Russia and China will continue consultations on strategic stability, well in line with the bilateral Treaty of Good Neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation signed last July, according to RIA. The treaty specifically states that the two nations are not forming a military alliance, while saying that bilateral "military-technical cooperation is not directed against third countries". In the treaty, Russia acknowledged that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China", and opposed "any kind of independence for Taiwan". The accord includes 25 articles and will be valid till 2021, then subject to automatic prolongation. The treaty is the first such concord since a 1949 pact between China and the Soviet Union, when Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong announced a Soviet-Chinese alliance. However, within a decade, official pronouncements of friendship were replaced by enmity, which bordered an outright war in the late 1960s. In the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, relations between Moscow and Beijing have improved and the two nations endeavored to forge a "strategic partnership". Some Russian analysts believe that the Kremlin's drift towards the West did not happen at all. "In the aftermath of September 11, we heard only speculations about Russia's alleged re-orientation towards the West," Dr Alexey Voskresensky, professor of Moscow-based Institute of International Relations, told Asia Times Online. There were no official statements from the Kremlin on this issue, he said. Russia and China reportedly agreed that the real US motives behind ditching the ABM differ from Washington's official pronouncements. Both sides believe, according to the Kremlin sources quoted by RIA, that the US administration wants to support private US companies at the expense of American taxpayers in order to achieve the US technological superiority. Russia and China also fear that the US move may entail militarization of outer space and subsequent arms race in space, the sources warned. The United States wants to achieve "absolute security" at the expense of other nations, notably by neutralizing Russia's and China's nuclear deterrence potential, RIA commented. However, both sides support "continuation of the dialogue between Russia and the US" and highlighted a "vital importance of sustaining of the international arms control system". Neither Moscow nor Beijing will undertake any "unilateral moves" following the US decision to skip the ABM treaty. The two also believe that it is very important not to cut a dialogue with the United States on strategic stability, RIA said. Last week Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Russia's position in telephone consultations with the leader of China. The Kremlin said that Putin discussed the situation surrounding the ABM treaty with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and the two leaders emphasized the need for further cooperation between their countries to uphold global stability. Arguably, Russia and China have managed to sustain their high level of confidence, Voskresensky argues. However, any joint Sino-Russian military moves following the US withdrawal from ABM are unlikely, he said. Russian opponents of the US decision to ditch the ABM treaty, including the State Duma deputy Alexey Arbatov, argued that the move could spark a new arms race war between Asian nuclear players China, India and Pakistan. Following September 11, the Kremlin's pro-Western stance seemingly indicated a significant shift in Russia's position. Notably, Russia supported and helped the US military action in Afghanistan. In contrast, in the past Moscow was fast to denounce US air strikes against Iraq and in Yugoslavia as unjustified violence aimed at strengthening US domination in the world affairs. In yet another significant policy reversal, last October the Kremlin announced that it would shut down of its Cold War era military facilities - a radar station in Lourdes, Cuba, and a navy support base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. This move was widely seen as an attempt to please Washington. Even Russia's once ultra-nationalist Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR) announced that it was dropping its anti-Western, anti-American and anti-NATO slogans. The party's leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, told the LDPR 13th Congress in Moscow that following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Russia should ally with what he described as "Northern civilization", notably the United States and Western Europe. The LDPR previously became notorious due to its trademark anti-Western and nationalist rhetoric. In the wake of the US withdrawal from ABM, Russian officials recalled some elements of anti-Western rhetoric. Notably, on December 19, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced in Brussels that Moscow was wary of NATO's eastward expansion. The NATO clearly wants to move its military outposts towards Russian borders, Ivanov stated. "Emerging mechanisms of cooperation between Russia and the Western civilization clearly fail to materialize," Ivanov was quoted as saying by RIA. The Kremlin has opposed the eastward expansion of the 19-member military alliance, which was formed to counter the former Soviet Union during the Cold War era, as Russia viewed the process as detrimental to Russia's security. On the other hand, Moscow still tries not to alienate the West. For instance, on December 19, Sergei Lebedev, the head of the Russia Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR, confirmed that his service was ready to cooperate with colleagues from the United States and Europe, as well as Asia, in order to combat international terrorism. ****** #9 Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 From: Steve Jacobs Subject: Gordon Hahn's Russia's Revolution From Above Marketing Director NOW AVAILABLE FROM TRANSACTION PUBLISHERS Russia's Revolution From Above, 1985-2000 Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the fall of the Soviet Communist Regime Gordon M. Hahn ISBN: 0-7658-0049-7 Cloth 460 pages $59.95 The fall of the Soviet communist regime in 1991 offers a challenging contrast to other instances of democratic transition and change in the last decades of the twentieth century. The 1991 revolution was neither a peaceful revolution from below as occurred in neither Czechoslovakia nor a negotiated transition to democracy like those in Poland, Hungary, or Latin America. It was not primarily the result of social modernization, the rise of a new middle class, or of national liberation movements in the non-Russian union republics. Instead, as Gordon Hahn argues, the Russian transformation was a bureaucrat-led, state-based revolution managed by a group of Communist Party functionaries who won control over the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in mid-1990. Hahn describes how opportunistic Party and state officials, led by Boris Yeltsin, defected from the Gorbachev camp and proceeded in 1990-91 to dismantle the institutions that bound state and party. These revolutionaries from above seized control of political, economic, natural and human resources, and then separated the party apparatus from state institutions on Russian Republic territory. With the failed August 1991 hard-line coup, Yeltsin banned the Communist Party and decreed that all Union state organs, including the KGB and military were under RSFSR control. In Hahn's account, this mode of revolutionary change from above explains the troubled development of democracy and Russia and the former Soviet republics. Hahn shows how limited mobilization of the masses stunted the development of civil societies and the formation of political parties and trade unions with real grass roots. The result is a weak society unable to nudge the state to concentrate on institutional reforms society needs for the development of a free polity and economy. Russia's Revolution from Above goes far in correcting the historical record and reconceptualizing the Soviet transformation. It should be read by historians, economists, political scientists, and Russian area scholars. Gordon M. Hahn has taught Russian domestic and foreign policy at Boston, American, and Stanford Universities and is visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. His articles on Soviet and Russian politics have appeared in the journals Demokratizatsiya, East European Constitutional Review, Europe-Asia Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Russian Review, and Russian History/Histoire Russe. ORDER INFORMATION: Call toll-free (US only) 888-999-6778 By Fax to 732-748-9801 By Email to orders@transactionpub.com Mail to: Transaction Publishers, 390 Campus Drive, Somerset, NJ 07830 ****** #10 gazeta.ru December 20, 2001 Duma Appoves Amendments Curtailing Press Freedoms By Lisa Vronskaya On Thursday the State Duma approved draft amendments to the "˜Law On Mass Media" and the "Federal Law on Combating Terrorism" after the first reading. The amendments are designed to prevent terrorists having access to the mass media. In effect the amendments are aimed at giving the state yet more control over the flow of information from Chechnya. The bill envisages amending Article 4 of the key media law providing for "inadmissibility of abuse of freedoms of the media". If amended, Article 4 of the mass media law will expressly ban "the use of means of mass media and computer information networks for propaganda or vindication of terrorism or extremism". The draft bill of amendments approved by the lower house on Thursday also contains a draft amendment to Article 15 of the Federal Law on Combating Terrorism. If parliament votes in favour of that amendment, the anti-terror law will prohibit media outlets from publishing or broadcasting, "statements made by terrorists, extremists and other persons who impede the conduct of counter-terrorist operations, who propagate and/or justify resistance to counter-terrorist operations in any form". Presenting the draft bill of amendments to the lower house, deputy Nikolai Kovalev, said that the initiative to revise the effective media and anti-terror laws first emerged after the savage terror attacks in Moscow, Buinaksk and Volgodonsk in 1999 in which hundreds of civilians were killed. From the very start of the investigation Russian law enforcers were convinced that Chechen terrorists were responsible for the attacks. Nikolai Kovalev said the amendments were designed "to ensure the personal safety of all people, including those who combat terrorism." In principal the State Duma deputies approved of the basic concept of the draft bill of amendments, nonetheless, members of almost all Duma factions said the draft requires serious revision before it is ready for the second, decisive, reading. Human rights activists and media observers have already noted that owing to loopholes and ambiguities in Russian law, the amendments to the media and anti-terror laws may pave the way for strict censorship and a considerable curtailment of democratic freedoms, primarily the freedom of speech and press and citizens' right to information. The popular TV6 and Ekho Moskvy political observer Andrei Cherkizov commented on Friday morning on the daily "Nazlo" programme that, even though the definition of a crime of "terrorism" is spelled out in contemporary Russian law - in the Criminal Code and in the Federal Law on Combating Terrorism, the term "extremism" has not been defined in any legal act. Therefore, he holds, the criteria for branding a person "an extremist" are vague. Besides, in the general sense of the word most of us tend to define "extremism" as adherence to or advocacy of extreme political opinions and or tactics. Such behaviour may be denounced but cannot be perceived as criminal. Human rights activists and prominent Russian lawyers continually remind Duma politicians and law enforcers of the golden rule of justice contained in the Federal Constitution of Russia: a person is innocent until proven guilty. That means that no person can be branded a terrorist until a court rules accordingly. As for extremism, the Russian Crime Code does not include such a crime as extremism; therefore, it cannot constitute a crime. If the amendments are introduced to the media law, journalists will have to be very careful about who they interview and whose statements to quote. Russian and foreign journalists experience serious problems reporting from the breakaway region of Chechnya, especially when they attempt to investigate violations of human rights of Chechen civilians by federal servicemen. For example Novaya Gazeta's correspondent Anna Politkovskaya claims she has been forced to leave Russia after receiving explicit threats from a Russian police officer, whom she alleged murdered an innocent Chechen boy. The popular Kommersant Daily has on several occasions been reprimanded by the Press Ministry for publishing interviews with Chechen rebel leaders, in particular with the president of the unrecognised breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov. It is worth noting that on December 19, leaders of the human rights watchdog Memorial Tatyana Kasatkina and Oleg Orlov told a news conference in Moscow that the Russian army and special services have set up death squads in Chechnya to exterminate Chechens suspected of involvement with rebel groups, but no Russian media outlet immediately reacted to the sensational allegation. Memorial's activists say that during the so-called clean up operations conducted regularly in populated areas in Chechnya, the military almost always detain Chechen males, many of whom have been found tortured to death. On December 20 the Spanish daily El Pais published a report about Memorial's news conference and only then did the Russian news sites inopressa.ru and NTVru.com report about Memorial's allegations, referring to the Spanish daily. Indeed it appears that many Russian journalists have been far more cautious since the state-orchestrated campaign against the critical NTV channel in early 2001. If the law regulating journalists' rights and obligations is subjected to further restrictive amendments contained in the draft bill of amendments approved by the Duma on Thursday, the Russian public will be able learn about the genuine situation in Chechnya almost exclusively from foreign sources. ******* #11 Vremya Novostei December 20, 2001 Code for the Builder of Capitalism Duma Legalizes New Relations between Employers and Employees By Viktor Khamrayev (therussianissues.com) The Russians will feel the first tangible advantage of the new Labor Code, whose draft went through the second Duma hearing on Wednesday, in February. The Fatherland Defenders' Day marked on February 23 will now be a day off. The new Code which one Duma deputy loftily described as a new labor constitution is believed to be more relevant in reflecting new market realities than the current Soviet-era Labor Code. The Government and the majority of deputies firmly believe that the Code will produce a positive impact on some aspects of our contemporary life. They say it will create social tranquility in society, give a sense of security to people and will increase popular trust in the Russian government. However, some deputies were openly opposed to the new Code. They claimed that it was no different from the current Soviet-time Labor Code except for the fact that it has stripped employees of some of their rights as compared to the current labor laws. The parliamentary minority predicts grave social consequences, including social explosions, if some provisions of the new Labor Code are adopted. Deputy Andrei Isayev from the Fatherland-All Russia faction said that for the first time in Russian history the minimal wage would be equal to the size of the subsistence level. Mr. Isayev emphasized that the clause had been included in the Code despite tough opposition from the Government which finally agreed to compromise. However, deputy Oleg Shein (the Regions of Russia Group) believes that the clause is merely declarative. Judging from earlier remarks by Vice-Premier Alexei Kudrin, the current minimal wage (450 rubles since December with the minimum subsistence level of 1,500 rubles) will not be raised in 2002, not to mention 2003 which is going to be a hard year for Russia. Another advantage hailed by the Duma majority during yesterday's debate was that employees will get increased pay for overtime work which cannot last longer than four hours so that a working day does not exceed 12 hours. The minority, in turn, tried to catch the majority in slyness. The period for calculating overtime hours is one year. That means that no employer can be accused of exploiting his employee even if once a year the latter has to overwork 10 hours a day in the course of one week. Besides, only the first four hours of overtime work will be paid at a higher tariff. However, the most heated and protracted debates were caused by collective agreements and trade unions' role. The Government and the Duma called for a kind of social partnership between the employee, the employer and the state that are supposed to sign trilateral agreements at the all-Russian, regional and city levels. Bilateral collective treaties will be signed by employers and employees' representatives (trade unions) at each enterprise. The government has obliged all the three parties to sign collective agreements and has even contemplated fines for those who refuse to sign them. A collective agreement will only include clauses on which agreement has been reached by the parties. All disputable issues will be inserted in a protocol of differences which must also be signed. The Duma majority believes that the new scheme places tough obligations on empolyers. On the contrary, their opponents claimed that the scheme would relieve employers of all liabilities. If an employer is free to sign only that contract which suits his interests, he can forget about a protocol of differences. Many questions were raised and posed when the Duma discussed the rights and obligations of employees or their representatives who are supposed to sign a collective agreement in their name. According to the draft Labor Code, only trade unions affiliating half of the workforce have the right to sign collective agreements. However, one enterprise can have several trade unions, and it is absolutely clear that the aforesaid provision is designed to defend the interests of large trade unions. Therefore, some deputies demanded that small trade unions should also be given the right to hold collective negotiations with employers. But those Duma deputies were in the minority. The majority of deputies that voted for the new Labor Code also disagreed that it it bans strikes. A whole chapter devoted to strikes says that trade unions have the right to nothing more than to initiate extreme protests, while the final decision to stage a strike can only be passed by an assembly of workers which at least half of all employees should attend. By the logic of Code's authors, employers and employees are supposed to settle disputes without resorting to extreme pressure. The minority, in turn, believes that employees will strike anyway and that these protests will assume the form of spontaneous revolts. Apart from the leftist factions, the Yabloko faction and the Regions of Russia group also found themselves in the minority on Wednesday. They fell short of four votes to defend the right of minor trade unions and remove the ban on strikes. Nevertheless, the draft was adopted by 283 votes. Only the leftist factions voted against it. The parliamentary minority plans to take a revenge later when amendments to other laws required to be made under the new Labor Code will be discussed. ****** #12 Versty No. 146 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] REDUCE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR TO ZERO The US administration has announced its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty. What should Russia do? Academician Radiy ILKAYEV, Director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre, answers this and other questions in an interview he granted to Mikhail DMITRUK. Question: The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty has changed the political situation dramatically. The world's most powerful state is speedily creating an anti-missile shield. Does Russia have the time and resources to build up the strength of its nuclear sword to render impotent the shield of the potential adversary? Answer: I have no doubt about this. The Americans should not have done this, because terrorists whom they fear above all today will not necessarily use missiles to deliver bombs or toxic agents to the USA. They can find many other methods to do this. It must be said that if the USA deploys the NMD system, Russia should have up its sleeve measures that would neutralise the use of the system against Russia. We have been working in this direction. The US withdrawal from the treaty was not a surprise to us; we expected this to happen for several years now. And we took into consideration this possibility. Question: Can you speak about your centre's greatest achievements in the past few years? Answer: Now that nuclear tests have been prohibited, we have to improve the calculating and computing base of our experiments. We have greatly advanced in this sphere of late, creating for our centre novel technologies that are many times more powerful than the ones we used before. We are creating sophisticated radiographic equipment that is ten times more powerful than the old one. For when creating an "item" (warhead) one should know in the smallest detail how individual parts of this item would act when we detonate the fuse that causes the fission of nuclear materials and initiates the chain reaction. To be able to do this, we must watch how the explosion begins, where the blast will move, how the explosive container breaks up, and so on. The same goes for the Luch (Beam) laser system, which we are creating now. We need it to simulate very complicated processes in high-temperature solid plasma. To create new thermonuclear weapons, we need to know how a substance will behave in extreme conditions, for example at a temperature of tens of millions degrees or under compression of thousands of grams per cubic centimetre, and so on. Such processes can be simulated only in very small volumes at powerful laser systems. For example, the Iskra-5 system occupies a large four-story building. It concentrates the energy of 12 lasers with the beam diameter of about a metre in a chamber that is not larger than one cubic millimetre. Only in these conditions we can achieve the energy density of thermonuclear weapons. And lastly, in the past few years we worked successfully to create conventional arms whose characteristics are similar to those of nuclear weapons. Question: You once said in a private conversation that the press would be able to write about these weapons in about ten years. But maybe we can tell our readers already now that these weapons can penetrate a metre-thick armour? Answer: You can do this. In a word, we have scored impressive achievements. Despite modest funds, our achievements are on a par with and sometimes are even better than those of foreign research centres. Question: Experts say that the unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will inevitably provoke a new round of the arms race. In which direction will the creation of nuclear weapons move in this case, if you can tell this? Answer: Certainly. Some ten years ago there was a great amount of powerful nuclear warheads in the world. Since then, their number and size have decreased. Why? Because the precision of their delivery has improved, with missiles, bombs and torpedoes hitting the target dead on and hence we do not need a powerful charge to destroy the target. The basic trend of the development of nuclear weapons is the diminishing number and yield. Question: And what about the nuclear winter, with which we have been scared for 30 years? They said that each nuclear power can destroy all life on earth many times over and hence a world nuclear war would inevitably lead to overkill, explosions of super-powerful bombs and missiles would provoke giant fires, with smoke turning day into eternal night on this planet. The Apocalypse. Oceans deep frozen for thousands of years... Answer: You probably noticed that nuclear physicists stopped mentioning overkill in the past few years. And this is logical, for the number and yield of warheads have decreased so much that there can be no nuclear winter now. The weapons we still have on this planet cannot seriously affect the climate. Don't think that the threat of a nuclear winter was invented to scare humankind and resolve political and economic problems. We really feared very much that a nuclear conflict would result in a nuclear winter, with the Earth's climate resembling the atmosphere on Mars. But these fears have been allayed. Thank God, the great powers have found the courage to reduce the number and yield of their warheads to a ceiling where nuclear weapons can be used to fulfil purely military tasks without changing the planet's climate. Question: This is good news. But I fear it can provoke undesirable changes in the public mind. In the past we abstained from nuclear conflicts because they were fraught with the death of humankind. But now hawks may pluck up the courage to launch a world slaughter. Answer: Have no fear. Nobody will launch a nuclear conflict, for a very simple reason: just recall the shock the USA had when the two skyscrapers crumbled. And then imagine that any, even the smallest possible nuclear strike will obliterate a whole city. The shock will be incredibly stronger. And I think that now, after the terrorist attacks in the USA, all reasonable people know that the threat of a nuclear war must be reduced to zero. For even a limited strike would entail extremely serious psychological losses for the world community. This is why we need not fear that there will be people who may think that they can use nuclear weapons with impunity. September 11 eradicated this fear. I think it is no longer possible to eradicate global civilisation. Yet we must know that the defence philosophy of Russia, which occupies a vast territory, should be based on deterrence weapons. Even a multitude of troops will not protect this country, even if it overcomes the economic crisis. Because there are billions of people around it and there are only 150 million of us. I believe that the world is changing only slightly and regrettably force is still being used in politics. You know this better than I do. And I see no reasons to expect that force would not be used in the 21st century. So, one of the main tasks of our centre is to be at the crest of all advance weapons technologies in order to provide Russia with modern weapons of world standards. * * * COMMENTARY Valery FEDOROV, Director of the Centre of Political Analysis: The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty means that the die was cast and the USA refuses to respect the interests of Russia, China and other nuclear powers. It is steering a policy of becoming the world's only power with a unique status in the 21st century. The USA refused to create a collective security system and actually put its interests above all and any international priorities. I can understand American desires, but the NMD system as it is designed is not just a shield but also a sword. A system of unilateral security is fraught with strategic threats, and not only at the so-called rogue countries against which it is formally spearheaded, but also at any other country that dares pursue an independent policy and does not want to move in the wake of US policy. They are facing a choice: either join a new round of the arms race, or accept the fact that their status and security level will be considerably lower than those of the hegemonic country. In principle, Russia has about six or seven years while the USA will test its NMD system. In that time it must do something to create an alternative collective security system or turn the US system into an international one. Otherwise Russia will be treated as a regional country in the 21st century, with the best it would be able to do is control the situation on its own borders. There will be no equitable participation in the global process. And yet, we should not see the US decision as a deliberate slap meant for Putin or Russia as a whole. It is nothing more than the usual pragmatic American attitude to the solution of internal problems. The Americans gave us a good lesson of how national interests must not be overshadowed by handshakes, embraces and even a solidary stand in the anti-terror struggle. *******