Johnson's Russia List #5607 19 December 2001 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. AP: Official: US Still Spies on Russia. 2. AP: Second Treason Trial for Journalist. (Pasko) 3. Argumenty i Fakty: RUSSIA-US: GENERALS DISSATISFIED BY THE "CLOSE FRIENDSHIP." Putin wants to avoid possible conflicts in the future. 4. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review. 5. San Jose Mercury News: Daniel Sneider, Russians yearn for past power, not communism. 6. San Jose Mercury News: Mark Ames, Russia: 10 years after the fall. 7. Washington Times: Helle Bering Dale, A fine romance. 8. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., Refuseniks Return to Reminisce and Join Forces. 9. New York Times: Sabrina Tavernise, Did Russia's Gas Giant Just Glimpse the Future? 10. New York Times: Alan Riding, Echoes of Contemporary Battle Lines in Old Russia. (re Mussorgsky's Khovanshchina) 11. therussianissues.com: Nikolai Ulyanov, Russia Between Europe and America. Russia has come to an historic crossroad. 12. BBC: James Schofield, Russian shoe factory finds its feet. 13. Vremya Novostei: Vera Brycheva and Gleb Cherkasov, SHUTTLE TRADERS DISAPPEARING. Possible close to the era of cheap goods brought in from abroad. ******** #1 Official: US Still Spies on Russia December 19, 2001 By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV MOSCOW (AP) - Despite the warming of Russia's relations with the West, U.S. and other Western intelligence services are still keen to steal Russia's military secrets, a senior Russian counterintelligence official said in an interview published Wednesday. ``If leaders of other countries shake hands with (Russian President) Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, that doesn't mean that intelligence services have laid down their weapons,'' said Gen. Valery Falunin, who is in charge of the military counterintelligence in the Moscow region. ``They are working, and working quite actively.'' Asked by the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets who are his service's top adversaries, Falunin said: ``The traditional set: the secret services of the United States and other NATO member states, plus neighboring countries.'' Falunin's interview contrasted with the statements of his patron, Nikolai Patrushev, the chief of the Federal Security Service, the main successor of the KGB, which includes military counterintelligence. Speaking at a meeting with Russian media editors Tuesday, Patrushev made no mention of U.S. spy activities - a significant omission apparently reflecting the improved relationship with Washington. Patrushev only mentioned the U.S. security services in the positive context - pointing at increased cooperation of Russian intelligence ``first of all with the American CIA and FBI'' in the effort to hunt down terrorists. But Falunin focused mostly on alleged U.S. espionage efforts. He referred to one case that he described as an attempt by U.S. military intelligence to obtain documents relating to state-of-the-art Russian military hardware. ``The Americans were acting in an extremely blatant way, practically in the open,'' Falunin said. ``They apparently believed that military counterintelligence was paralyzed and were quite surprised when they saw it wasn't.'' In connection with the case, a Russian court last month sentenced a Russian citizen to 15 years in prison for espionage. The convict was identified only by his last name, Kalugin. Two other Russian citizens, identified only as the Ivanov brothers, were sentenced to 1 1/2-year sentences for divulging state secrets. ******** #2 Second Treason Trial for Journalist December 19, 2001 By ANATOLY MEDETSKY VLADIVOSTOK, Russia (AP) - In his final address to the court hearing the second treason trial against him, Russian military journalist Grigory Pasko said he was critical of his country but had not betrayed it. Pasko is charged with high treason in the form of espionage for divulging state secrets on the combat-readiness of Russia's Pacific Fleet to Japanese media. He was acquitted of the treason charges in 1999, but found guilty on lesser charges of abuse of office. Seeking a full acquittal, Pasko appealed the verdict, as did prosecutors. The Supreme Court in Moscow sent the case back for trial by a different judge. The court has recessed until Dec. 25 when it is expected to hand down a verdict. Pasko and his supporters maintain the charges are retribution for his reports of alleged environmental abuses by the navy, which included dumping radioactive waste into the sea. ``I preferred to criticize my motherland, but not deceive it'' by failing to report on the abuses, he said, according to a copy of the speech he delivered Tuesday in the closed-door trial. ``This criminal case was born of a dislike for the truth.'' Pasko said that the Federal Security Service, or FSB, which investigated his case, was suspicious of his contacts with Japanese journalists - as if the agency were stuck in the era of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. ``The FSB, as in 1937, regarded my contacts with foreigners as espionage,'' he said, referring to the peak year of Soviet purges and spy mania. The prosecution last week demanded nine years in a maximum-security prison for Pasko, maintaining that his alleged treason was aggravated by the fact that Russia still has not signed a peace treaty with Japan after World War II, a defense lawyer said. Still, the sentence is three years lower than the minimal punishment for high treason. According to the lawyer, Anatoly Pyshkin, the prosecutor said a shorter sentence would be appropriate because Pasko had not done any harm to national security and has two minor children. Prosecutor Alexander Kondakov also dropped five charges from the initial 10-count indictment, Pyshkin said. ******** #3 Argumenty i Fakty No. 52, December 2001 RUSSIA-US: GENERALS DISSATISFIED BY THE "CLOSE FRIENDSHIP" Putin wants to avoid possible conflicts in the future Author: not indicated [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] AFTER AFGHANISTAN, PRESIDENT BUSH MIGHT ALSO DECIDE TO PUNISH SOMALIA, IRAQ, YEMEN, OR SUDAN. HOWEVER, RUSSIA THINKS THIS COULD REALLY HAPPEN, AND WANTS TO DRAW UP A TREATY WHICH WOULD SET OUT THE MECHANISM A SETTLING SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE FUTURE. George Bush's announcement that the US withdraws from the ABM Treaty was not a surprise for Russia. During the meeting at the Texas rancho the U.S. president told Vladimir Putin that he had made such a decision and proposed Moscow to seek for a way out of the situation by its own. Moreover, it is said that George Bush intended to make a public announcement of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty yet while in Texas, but our diplomats dissuaded him from doing so. After this move by the US, Russia found itself in a very difficult position. In order to maintain the appearance that Russia's views are taken into account, we have to persuade the Americans to at least resume consultations on the issue. Any rumor that missiles with multiple warheads might be deployed, or we might withdraw from the Conventional Arms Treaty is nothing more than rhetoric. Nobody in the West takes it seriously. Another problem arose inside the country. The discontent of the situation in which our country may found itself after the US withdraws from the ABM Treaty has been growing among the generals and inside the General Staff, our sources reported. The military keeps saying that the Americans will deceive us, while talking sweetly of friendship. Defense minister may also suffer from them. Even rumors of Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's possible dismissal started circulating last week. Meanwhile, Putin's position, even though it is not made clear, is as follows: for Russia a coalition with the US and NATO member states, which has taken shape as a result of joint efforts against the Taliban, is much more significant than retention of the ABM Treaty. At the same time the authorities do not rule out a possible quarrel with the US. After Afghanistan, if George Bush should decide to punish Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, or Sudan, the Kremlin will be forced to oppose this strongly. Therefore, in his negotiations with President Bush, President putin keeps insisting on some sort of official treaty between Russia and the US should be signed, which would set out the mechanism of consultations and resolution of similar conflicts between the states. (Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin ) ******* #4 ORT Review www.ortv.ru Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu) Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy at Boston University HEADLINES, Tuesday, December 18, 2001 - Three new volumes of documents from the series "Top Secret: From Lubyanka to Stalin Concerning the National State of Affairs" have been presented at the meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Most of these materials concern the NEP (New Economic Plan) period and mass collectivization. - Vera Volzhanina of Chelyabinsk won the small-business "Director of the Year" award. - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov met with his American counterpart Donald Rumsfeld to discuss bilateral cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism, and the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The defense ministers also agreed to begin talks concerning the terms and scale of strategic offensive weapons reduction in January. - A state of emergency has been announced in some regions of the Krasnodar krai, where over a meter of snow has fallen during the last 24 hours. - Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a State Council meeting devoted to the development of small business. President Putin noted that it is very important to review the taxation and legislation policies that affect small enterprises, which employ 13 percent of Russia's citizens. - Yuri Koptev, the head of the Russian Space Program discussed some future developments for the organization. He said that Russian involvement in international space programs will increase, as will ties with the European Space Agency. He also noted that if everything proceeds as planned, South African businessman Mark Shuttleworth will become the second "space tourist" this April. - Gazprom celebrated the extraction of the 10-trillionth cubic meter of natural gas since the start of operations. On December 20th, the company will present its investment program to the government. - Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov chaired a cabinet meeting to discuss the 2002 investment programs of the nuclear and electricity enterprises. The Ministry of Nuclear Energy is requesting 34 billion rubles and RAO Unified Energy Systems of Russia (RAO UES) asks for 100 billion rubles of investment. - President Putin met with Armenian President Robert Kocharian to discuss international security and bilateral relations. There are over 400 joint Russian-Armenian enterprises currently seeking improved mechanisms for industrial cooperation. - The winter session of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Council has began in Brussels. - Three more bodies have been found in the third section of the Kursk nuclear submarine. So far, 71 bodies have been found since the Kursk arrived at the Roslyakovo dock; 65 of these have been identified. - The Foreign Intelligence Service celebrated the tenth anniversary of its independent existence today. - In his final statement, journalist Grigory Pasko reaffirmed his plea of innocence. Pasko and his lawyers told journalists that they are positive he will be acquitted. A decision will be made in the beginning of next week. ******* #5 San Jose Mercury News December 16, 2001 Russians yearn for past power, not communism BY DANIEL SNEIDER DANIEL SNEIDER, the national/foreign editor of the Mercury News, was the Moscow bureau chief for the Christian Science Monitor from 1990 to 1994. Ten years ago in Moscow, on a cold Christmas Day, the Soviet Union came to an end. In a brief, televised address, the last president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics announced his resignation. The story I filed that day began: ``With sadness, anger and flashes of defiance, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev ends a momentous 6 1/2 years at the helm of his nation.'' That night, the red flag of the Soviet Union was hauled down from the Kremlin's floodlit tower, replaced by the tricolor of the Russian Federation. From a single once-powerful state, some 15 independent nations, former republics of the Soviet Union, now emerged. For Gorbachev this was a sad, even foreboding, moment. ``I am concerned,'' he said that day, ``about the fact that the people in this country are ceasing to become citizens of a great power and the consequences may be very difficult for all of us to deal with.'' History has proved Gorbachev right. Americans tend to focus on the end of communism as a system and an ideology as the signal event of this time -- something that was actually marked by the failure of the attempted hard-line Communist coup in August 1991. Dec. 25 marks, instead, the 10th anniversary of a more disturbing moment for Russians: the end of an empire. And although there remains some nostalgia for the order of the communist era, there is little real desire among Russians or other citizens of former Soviet states to return to their communist past. Distorted by corruption and inefficiency as they are, market economics and political pluralism, if not democracy, seem rooted in Russia. But what continues to trouble Russians is, as Gorbachev predicted, the disappearance of empire and of Russia's claim to great power status. The Soviet Union, despite the Bolshevik rhetoric about national self-determination, was in many ways a mere continuation of the czarist Russian Empire that preceded it. Stalin was as ruthless an enforcer of Slavic domination over the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Baltics as any czar. And Stalin could even claim to have pushed the empire to its greatest extent, taking all of Eastern Europe under Russian tutelage. Moment of liberation The collapse of that empire, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and paralleled by the rise of independence movements in the Baltics, Armenia and other Soviet republics, was stunningly rapid. Many Russians lamented these events. But this was a moment of liberation for the peoples under their rule. As a journalist covering the Soviet Union during the years before the fall, I traveled throughout the former republics and found almost universal yearning for freedom from Russian rule. The strength of that yearning eventually made a continuing union impossible. On Dec. 1, 1991, I covered a referendum in Ukraine for independence. Ukrainians were unlike most other peoples of the Soviet Union. They were fellow Slavs and, like the Byelorussians, treated almost as equals to the Russians; many held positions of trust and power. Yet even there, the sentiment for separation from the empire was overwhelming. Ukrainians defied Gorbachev's last-minute appeals and backed independence by an 83 percent vote. It proved to be the final, decisive blow against the Soviet Union. A week later, Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the Russian Federation and Gorbachev's rival for power, met with the Ukrainian and Byelorussian leaders in a dacha outside Minsk to declare a new commonwealth, effectively replacing the Soviet Union. Within weeks, most of the other former republics had joined them, leaving Gorbachev alone and powerless in the Kremlin. In the beginning many Russians, like Yeltsin, welcomed the loss of empire as a relief from an economic burden. Without having to subsidize Central Asia and other far-flung regions, Russia would finally prosper, they argued. Of course, the economic benefits did not come so easily. As life in Russia worsened, many began to see the end of the Soviet Union as the origin of their decline. And when the glow of the brief honeymoon with the West dimmed, many Russians saw the American embrace of the former republics as its way to reduce Russia to second-rate status. Russian strategists began to plot the restoration of their former sphere of domination -- from the oil fields of the Caspian to the reaches of Central Asia. The same fear of being diminished drove the disastrous Russian wars in Chechnya, beginning in 1994 and continuing today. Advocates of force reason that the independence of that small North Caucasian region could bring even further loss of empire. They worry that if Moscow cannot control Chechnya, how can it credibly assert its will in the rest of the vast territory of the Russian Federation, much less in the former Soviet Union? The yearning Vladimir Putin, the former KGB officer who now sits in the Kremlin, embodies the yearning to restore Russia's great power status. He has aggressively expanded Russia's presence around its borders -- even back into Afghanistan, where the failed Soviet military campaign in the 1980s helped sow the seeds for the Soviet collapse. He sees Russia's massive oil reserves as a tool to rebuild its power and influence. Russia is putting the squeeze as well on the oil-rich former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, situated around the Caspian Sea, by controlling the pipeline access to their energy deposits. The imperial nostalgia that still fills the Russian soul, even a decade after the end of the Soviet Union, should be expected. Britain and France, not to mention Turkey, are still coping with the loss of influence that came with the end of their empires many more decades ago. But Russia's imperial loss is freshest, and therefore more painful. For Russians, coping with the end of empire remains, as Gorbachev foresaw, the most difficult challenge emerging from the historic watershed we witnessed some 10 years ago. ******* #6 San Jose Mercury News December 16, 2001 Russia: 10 years after the fall By Mark Ames MARK AMES is an editor of the Moscow-based newspaper the Exile and co-author of ``The Exile: Sex, Drugs and Libel in the New Russia.'' A San Jose native, he has lived in Russia since 1993. Ames, whose work has appeared in Harper's and the Nation, wrote this article for Perspective. He was the first leader to call President Bush to pledge solidarity and support. Over the objections of his generals, he also offered crucial intelligence and gave the green light for the U.S. military to use bases in what Moscow still considers its sphere of influence, the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Putin may well have been moved by America's tragedy, but he no doubt also foresaw -- with surprising speed -- the advantages to be gained from siding with the United States when it felt vulnerable. So far, his actions seem to be paying off. The Bush administration is busy formalizing its own ``paradigm shift'' toward its former adversary. And although Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent trip to Moscow ended without a compromise on the ABM treaty, the United States has championed closer ties between Russia and NATO. More important, the Bush administration no longer fetes Chechen separatists or criticizes Putin's crackdown on democracy and press freedom. Meanwhile, the American media, which had treated Putin with suspicion and scorn until Sept. 11, have suddenly fallen for the diminutive ex-KGB apparatchik with a kind of reckless emotional zeal bordering on teen-magazine fandom. (The Los Angeles Times crowed ``Wow!'' in a recent editorial singing Putin's praises. And a Boston Globe columnist went so far as to call the former spy with the ``Mona Lisa smile'' hot.) Russia-watchers have been shocked by the changes -- especially by Putin's move away from a foreign policy focused on countering U.S. hegemony to one of nearly unbridled alliance. Just months ago, he was threatening to forge a loose alliance with China, North Korea and Iran to counter U.S. strength. And it wasn't just the policy shift that startled pundits; the bold style was also new. Until the terrorist attacks, Putin had changed things slowly and quietly, without the political earthquakes and bluster of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. But a closer look at Putin the politician reveals that his pro-American shift is consistent with the contradictory, adaptable political character he has revealed since he rose from obscurity just 2 1/2 years ago. That style has worked well in blunting criticism and building popularity at home. Now, it may also allow Putin to pursue a vision of his country that is pro-Western enough to gain economic advantages from the United States and others, but independent enough to make Russians feel they are not kowtowing to America. Taming the oligarchy When Vladimir Putin was named to replace Sergei Stepashin as Russia's prime minister in August 1999, it seemed to be another of the ailing Yeltsin's increasingly desperate and irrational moves. Putin, who briefly headed the group that succeeded the KGB, was the third prime minister in almost as many months. Yeltsin, and the clique of corrupt officials and ``oligarchs'' who made off with Russia's richest assets during the 1990s, worried that power could soon fall into the wrong hands. They stood to lose everything. So they chose Putin, a relative unknown with a reputation as the oligarchy's tool. He had worked as a deputy to a famously corrupt mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, and later as deputy to the head of the Kremlin Property Administration, Pavel Borodin, who was subsequently indicted in Switzerland for money laundering. Four months after being named prime minister -- in what now appears to have been a bloodless coup -- Putin became president as Yeltsin resigned. Less than a year later, Putin forced one of his own key supporters, Boris Berezovsky, into exile with a warrant out for his arrest on suspicion of misappropriating funds. The elite now has to live by certain rules, and the key rule is that no one is to cross President Putin. If he wants some portion of corporate taxes paid, taxes will be paid; if he wants good press, he gets good press. Like Putin's abrupt turn to America three months ago, this taming of the oligarchy came as a surprise, not only to pundits and Russia-watchers, but also to the very people who put him in power. The crackdown made him popular among the people, who had watched their country being looted as they faced real deprivation. And it clipped the wings of a powerful force that could have, if left unchecked, unseated him just as easily as it had installed him. But while the crackdown succeeded in strengthening Putin's power and served to redistribute choice assets to his friends, it wasn't nearly broad enough to make a dent in Russia's endemic corruption. Charm and adaptability Perhaps the most impressive thing about Putin -- beyond his uncanny ability to charm even past enemies -- has been his extraordinary ability to adopt and co-opt contradictory positions and ideologies. And he has done so while still being perceived as a decisive, resolute leader. Putin proved this in his first months of power, when he preached both the nationalist rhetoric of extremist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Western-oriented rhetoric of the liberals. He talked not only about restoring Russia's power, but also about creating free markets. He used underworld language to gear people up for the war in Chechnya (``We'll whack them even in the outhouse!''), then spoke calmly about streamlining Russia's tax code. It worked. From the moment Putin took over as prime minister, he appealed to several mutually hostile groups at once: the nervous oligarchy, the humiliated nationalists, the weakened pro-Western ``reformers,'' and even many of those nostalgic for the Soviet Union. In the 2000 presidential elections, Putin was supported by most of the liberal intelligentsia, as well as the corrupt business elite, the powerful bureaucracy, and nationalists as far right as Alexander Prokhanov, a friend of David Duke's. All have since been let down to one degree or another. Liberals decry the tight control of the press and the restoration of the Stalin-era national anthem; the oligarchs don't like paying even a small portion of their taxes; and Prokhanov no longer believes Putin is the next Stalin. Yet all defer to Putin as their leader. To liberals, he is a free-market champion and well-spoken intellectual; to the remaining oligarchs, he is a protector of stability and safety for their stolen goods; to the nationalists, he is a hero for his war against separatists in Chechnya and for standing up to the West. Even Jewish groups profess affection for Putin, the first Russian leader to publicly light a menorah. Putin's recent alliance with America in its war against terrorism -- while tipping the balance for many Russians too far to the liberal end of the spectrum -- hasn't seriously affected his broad appeal. Despite some melodramatic grumblings among nationalist and communist politicians, his moves are unlikely to weaken his support in any meaningful way. That is, unless the Bush administration slaps Putin in the face one too many times; the U.S. announcement last week that it intended to unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could be viewed as the first such rebuke. Benefits of alliance Many in Russia are asking what Putin has gained for all of his reaching out to the West. After all, NATO is still refusing to let Russia ride in the front of the bus with it, and America is still planning to scrap the ABM treaty. U.S. troops are crawling all over Russia's back yard, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Russia is still deep in debt to the West. But Putin's alliance with the United States has also yielded benefits. For one thing, Putin has won the affection of the American public and media, which will produce dividends now and down the road. Putin won us over not by groveling for handouts like Yeltsin did, but by giving us the impression that he'd take a bullet for us. Americans are suckers for that. In just one day, in one phone call, Putin earned more good will than Yeltsin and his bear hugs did in nine years. America doesn't just tolerate Putin for realpolitik's sake the way we are willing to tolerate, say, the Northern Alliance. No, Americans really like Putin. We want to be his friends. Beyond that, Putin has already secured some huge rewards for himself, and for Russia. First, the Taliban, which Russia viewed as the second-greatest threat after Chechen separatists, is now out of power in an operation paid for mainly with American dollars and Afghan blood. The group's defeat made it less likely that Islamist extremism would spread to Russia's southern borders anytime soon. And suspected Chechen terrorist camps inside Afghanistan, meanwhile, are thought to have been destroyed in the war. Second, Russian oil companies, run by the country's most well-connected tycoons, are poised to become world players now that the West is looking more seriously at lessening its dependence on Middle East crude. Russia's decision to hold off OPEC oil cuts in order to keep prices low wasn't just a friendly gesture to a superpower in need; it served a practical, selfish purpose. It endeared Russia's oil companies to big buyers in the United States. Perhaps most important for Putin, his recent overtures to the West have given him more freedom to do as he pleases within his own borders. U.S. criticism of the war in Chechnya is now almost absent, while the recent crackdown on the last quasi-independent television station barely raised a peep. Vision for Russia Putin's ingenious handling of his internal enemies -- as well as of public opinion at home and abroad -- provokes the question: To what end has he acquired so much power and popularity? And how does his bold alliance with America fit into this vision? Because Putin has been so hard to nail down, and because he has so successfully confounded all his observers, it would be almost reckless to guess what his real intentions are. Still, there is a certain pattern to his actions that provides clues of what he wishes for Russia. In a place where the employee was valued above the employer for decades -- at least in theory -- Putin's policies are unabashedly pro-business. New land and labor codes, as well as laws sharply reducing corporate and individual income taxes, have won favor from big business here and from foreign investors. The labor code (which has yet to pass a second reading in the Duma) would let businesses pay workers in barter. It also allows up to 56-hour workweeks with the ``consent'' of the employee. But Putin has also shown himself to be a Soviet-style patriot and disciplinarian. He has worked to eliminate opposition, enforce social obedience and remilitarize society. A decree he issued late last year calls for the re-introduction of Soviet-era military training for all 11th-graders. Meanwhile, a powerful new youth group, ``Movement Together'' -- something like the Soviet-era Komsomol -- has been formed to whip up support for Putin with pro-Kremlin protests by youths enticed with free train tickets and swimming lessons. And the upper house of parliament has been converted into an obedient rubber-stamp committee, while the once-rowdy lower house, or Duma, now rarely confronts the Kremlin. Taken together, those and other moves by Putin suggest that he is intent on styling a more modern and economically vital Russia, but not one that is in the image of the West. In the end, Putin, and his appointed elite, not to mention his electorate, would rather be doing business -- and vacationing -- in the West than in Pyongyang, North Korea. By capitalizing on the events of Sept. 11, Putin may succeed where his predecessors failed: He may at last have set the course for access and acceptance to the West's wealth and technology without sacrificing too much of Russia's independence or prestige. With his unique gift for politics, he seems to have found a way to accomplish those goals not just by imposing fear at home and abroad, but also by engendering heartfelt support for himself and his country. ******* #7 Washington Times December 19, 2001 A fine romance By Helle Bering Dale PALO ALTO, Calif. -- You have to grant this to Vladimir Putin — he knows how to take defeat like a man. One might not be inclined to grant the former KGB spy and current Russian president much else, of course. But the moderate way Mr. Putin last week handled President Bush's announcement of the end of the outdated Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has taken a lot of people by complete surprise, particularly the treaty-huggers who never saw a piece of paper they didn't like. Despite widespread predictions that the sky will fall, Mr. Putin does not seem to think so. He called Mr. Bush's decision "an erroneous one," and in a televised address to the Russian people had this to say: "Today, when the world has confronted new threats, one should not allow a legal vacuum in the sphere of strategic stability. One should not undermine the regime of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Hardly fighting words. The fact is that the Russians will continue to have enough nuclear warheads to overwhelm any missile defense system the United States might put in place, now and for the foreseeable future — even with the proposed reduction of their arsenal to 1,200 to 2,200 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Mr. Putin knows this and has decided that other assets of the U.S.-Russian relationship are too valuable to sacrifice in the name of a lost cause. This is just one of the extraordinary steps the Russian leader has taken in the aftermath of September 11 to align his country more closely with the United States. Mr. Putin's stated eagerness to join the fight against terrorism and his toned-down rhetoric on NATO expansion come to mind. The intriguing, if somewhat obvious, question remains, "why?" An informal survey of the scholars at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University — the mother of all think-tanks and a place where the Soviet Union and Russia has been studied for the better part of a century — suggests that Mr. Putin has not fundamentally changed, but is simply acting in what he believes to be Russia's long-term interest. Says Russia scholar and former U.S. arms control negotiator Richard Starr, "Look at his KGB background. It provides the prism through which he sees the world." Carte blanche on how to deal with Russia's own domestic uprising in Chechnya is a trade-off, and the Bush administration for now seems to give Russia that. The prospect of a proposed Russian pact with NATO, which may give the Russians effective veto rights over decisions on European security, is no doubt a motivating factor. Another is membership in the World Trade Organization, with the potential for foreign investment it brings. Indeed, Russia stands to gain much from a closer relationship with the United States. Just don't call Mr. Putin a convert to American values. Says John Dunlop, who among other things writes a weekly newsletter on Chechnya: "Everything he does is pretense. He is a virtual democrat, a virtual Christian. It is all rhetoric." "My guess is that we're moving into a period of sustained economic growth — coupled with Potemkin-like democracy," says Michael McFaul, author of "Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin." "Still, pseudo-democracy is better than none at all." Mr. Putin is moving his economic agenda forward at great speed, and at the same time as dividing his political opposition and cracking down on dissent. Barely a ripple was caused by the recent closing of Russia's last independent television station, NTV. Still, re-establishing Russia as a great power is a gargantuan task. In the ambition to achieve national greatness, Mr. Putin can look to Peter the Great — the man who made Mr. Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg the capital of the Russian empire. With a dramatically declining birth rate, Russia will have to rely on immigration for its work force. Its basic infrastructure is in an advanced state of decay; likewise, its education and health care systems. As for Mr. Putin's decision to allow the United States the use of Russian airfields (if only for humanitarian relief) and to give his blessing to the Central Asian republics to cooperate as well, Mr. McFaul believes that he simply had to go with his gut instinct, as opposed to advice from his military planners. To see Russia as a reliable American ally, in other words, is greatly premature. Says Mr. McFaul, "They are moving in the right direction, but they are France, not Britain." Helle Bering Dale is editorial page editor of The Washington Times. Her column appears on Wednesdays. ******* #8 Moscow Times December 19, 2001 Refuseniks Return to Reminisce and Join Forces By Andrei Zolotov Jr. Staff Writer Decades after they began to fight for the right to be Jews and leave the Soviet Union, several dozen former refuseniks returned Tuesday to Moscow from Israel and the United States to reminisce on the old battles with the KGB and set in motion a new cause: uniting Russian Jewry worldwide into a new organization. A two-day international conference called "Jews of Silence -- Jews of Triumph. Soviet Jewry: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" opened Tuesday, organized by the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia to commemorate the 25th anniversary of a 1976 symposium on Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. The symposium did not take place: The KGB put the handful of speakers under house arrest. But it was seen as the beginning of an organized movement of Soviet Jews that won international support and eventually helped bring down the Soviet system. "Our goal is to pay tribute to those who did so much for the formation of democratic regimes in the countries of the former Soviet Union," FEOR's executive director Valery Engel said at a news conference Tuesday. "But it is also a first step to uniting Russian Jewry." A new organization, tentatively called the World Congress of Russian Jewry, is to be set up by May, organizers said. "One would hope there is still some common denominator for people who have come from one country, who fought for some bright ideals 25 years ago," said Yuli Edelstein, a former refusenik who is now Israeli deputy absorption minister and a leader of the Yisrael Ba-Aliyah party of Russian Jews. In one room at Tuesday's conference, refuseniks and their helpers recalled the names of KGB operatives who followed them, the difficulties of reporting to Western media about yet another arrest of a Jewish activist and the courage it took to start Hebrew classes in the 1970s. In another room, organizers spoke on how the future congress of Russian Jews would lobby Russian and other governments for support of Israel. "Our common issue is to speak out in defense of Israel's security," Engel said. "There cannot be double standards in the approach to terrorism. Whether in Chechnya, Palestine or Afghanistan -- it is the same thing." Organizers were not certain of the methods the new group would use to formulate and implement its agenda. But they stressed the importance of cultural projects such as publishing textbooks on the history of Russian Jewry for both Russian and non-Russian Jews. Mikhail Chlenov, president of the VAAD Jewish umbrella organization, said the idea to unite Russian Jews worldwide arose in the early 1990s. Vladimir Gusinsky, a vice president of the World Jewish Congress, is one of several Jewish figures considering efforts in this field, Chlenov said. FEOR is a Kremlin-connected Jewish organization that was set up in late 1999 under the aegis of Lubavitcher Rabbi Berl Lazar, who was elected last year as an alternate Chief Rabbi of Russia. The measure was seen at the time as an attempt to undermine the influence of Gusinsky, who had previously dominated Jewish life in Russia as president of the Russian Jewish Congress. Earlier this month, former Yukos executive Leonid Nevzlin, who had replaced Gusinsky in March as president of the Russian Jewish Congress, left the post due to his election to the Federation Council where he now represents Mordovia. Yevgeny Satanovsky, a businessman and director of the Institute of Israeli and Middle Eastern Studies, was elected the new president of the RJC. Lazar, who has suspended his membership in the RJC board, boycotted the elections. ******* #9 New York Times December 19, 2001 Did Russia's Gas Giant Just Glimpse the Future? By SABRINA TAVERNISE MOSCOW, Dec. 18 -- Alexei Miller, the 39-year-old executive handpicked by President Vladimir V. Putin to run Gazprom, Russia's giant gas monopoly, has cleared the first major hurdle in his struggle to bring the sprawling gas company under his control. In an unexpected move, Mr. Miller forced Gazprom's board to vote on buying back control of a gas-producing subsidiary that had slipped out of Gazprom's control in 1999 in a transaction that investors call questionable. The vote on Monday approving the buyback of the company, Purgaz, was an important victory for Mr. Miller, who was plucked from obscurity by Mr. Putin in May and charged with taming Gazprom, a largely state-owned company with more than 360,000 employees that for a decade has been run as an empire unto itself. The vote seems to indicate that Mr. Miller is making progress. "Mr. Miller sprang this on people β€” there was a moment of silence, of uneasiness," in the boardroom, said Boris Fyodorov, a board member who represents minority shareholders. "This highly controversial question was finally resolved." The buyback decision capped months of struggle between Mr. Miller and the powerful interest groups he has been wrestling with since his appointment six months ago. He has come under siege by old-guard Gazprom managers and hungry oil companies, all eager to grab pieces of the business while the company is still in disarray. Mr. Putin has invested much political capital into bringing order to the company, which, as the supplier of one-quarter of Europe's natural gas, plays a crucial part in Russia's growing role as a world energy producer. Mr. Miller's "intentions are both to stop the stealing and to recover lost assets, but there are such powerful vested interests trying to stop him," said William Browder of Hermitage Capital Management in Moscow, which owns Gazprom shares. "He's not running the company like his own personal piggy bank. That's important." Rumors swirled this fall that Mr. Miller would be ousted. Then, in late October, when he was in the hospital, an Internet newspaper with ties to the Kremlin reported that he had been fired. The company denied the report, but its appearance showed how powerful the interests lined up against Mr. Miller are. "There is a plot to get this guy," said Charles Ryan, executive chairman of the United Financial Group (news/quote), a Moscow-based investment bank. "They all want a situation where Gazprom is in chaos. The oil companies would get cheap assets and a lot of the old management's thievery would be obscured." Mr. Miller took the helm at Gazprom after years of mismanagement and lack of investment had driven the company into decline. Production in Russia's gas industry, which controls a third of the world's reserves, has fallen 16 percent since 1990. Giant Russian fields, developed in the 1970's and 1980's, are producing less than they were a decade ago, and new fields must be tapped to halt the slide in output. "Relying on the supergiant fields of the past is no longer enough," said Simon Blakey, director at Cambridge Energy (news/quote) Research Associates in Paris. "The Russian gas industry is at a turning point." A major drag on Gazprom's development, analysts say, is low gas prices within Russia. The company sells gas at home for less than a tenth of prices in Europe. That means that Gazprom's European sales, though only a fifth of its total output in volume, make up two-thirds of the company's earnings. The government has been slow to react to Mr. Miller's requests to raise prices. So Gazprom's ambitious investment program remains "wishful thinking," Mr. Fyodorov said during a conference call for investors after the board meeting. At current prices, "the production level cannot be sustained," he said. "There was no point in discussing concrete projects when one-third of them would have to be thrown away." ****** #10 New York Times December 19, 2001 ARTS ABROAD Echoes of Contemporary Battle Lines in Old Russia By ALAN RIDING PARIS, Dec. 18 -- Even when history repeats itself, it rarely does so to music. And yet it was hard to emerge from Andrei Serban's acclaimed new production of Mussorgsky's "Khovanshchina" at the Bastille Opera without remarking almost too obviously on the parallels between 17th-century Russia and, say, Afghanistan, Iran and Russia today. Happily, there was no need for burkas, turbans or the leather jackets of the Russian mafia. Even with the dozen singers and a chorus of 120 decked out in the rich colors of period costumes, the political choices on offer β€” a known past facing an uncertain future, religious fundamentalism resisting secular power, conservatism versus reform β€” seemed very much of the moment. Mr. Serban, wary of overdrawing historical analogies, did draw a line. The opera's Old Believers who opposed westernization, he stressed, were not the Taliban. But he was nonetheless struck by how czarist Russia's struggle with the future resembled today's confused world, "where progress in the West leads nowhere, where divisions between peoples grow, where religious fanaticism is on the rise." James Conlon, who conducted the Paris National Opera's orchestra and chorus with panache last week, also felt swept up by "history with a big H," as he put it. "For these performances," he wrote in a program essay, "I want to find a solution that corresponds with the events of our world today in expressing the violence of the polarization between old tradition and modernization." There is that and more in "Khovanshchina," which takes place between 1682 and 1688, when Peter the Great was still a teenager and his older sister, Sophia, was the regent. Combating their reformist efforts in the name of God and Mother Russia are manipulated mobs; an abusive militia known as the Streltsy, led by some nobles; and the Old Believers, a mystical sect opposed to the use of Greek rites in the Russian Orthodox Church. In the confrontation between old and new, East and West, Mussorgsky the librettist does not appear to take sides. But Mussorgsky the composer displays his nostalgia for "old" Russia by giving more grandiose music to the people and to Prince Ivan Khovansky, the Streltsy leader, than he does to the reformists. Writing two centuries after the events he describes, it seems that Mussorgsky was himself still trapped by history. As it happens, this new "Khovanshchina," which runs through Jan. 12, is also a fruit of history. During the cold war, much of the Russian opera repertory was ignored outside the Soviet bloc. After the collapse of communism, Russian and Eastern European singers flooded into Western Europe to sing Mozart and Verdi. Soon, Valery Gergiev's peripatetic Kirov Opera was carrying Russian opera to Western stages. Now, Western opera houses are recruiting Russian and Eastern European singers for their own Russian productions. Following Tchaikovsky's "Eugene Onegin" and "The Queen of Spades" and Prokofiev's "War and Peace," "Khovanshchina" is the fourth Russian opera to enter the Paris Opera's repertory. Most of the fine singers now onstage were in these earlier productions, although two key roles have gone to newcomers here, the Russian bass Anatoli Kotscherga as Dosifei, the Old Believers' leader, and the Russian contralto Larissa Diadkova as Marfa, an Old Believer who loves Khovansky's son, Andrei. Mussorgsky, who died in 1881 at 42, left only a vocal line and a piano score for most of the opera. But his friend Rimsky-Korsakov, who then orchestrated the work, cut one-quarter and altered it substantially. It was only in 1958 that Dimitri Shostakovich completed the opera with a new orchestration that has now been widely accepted as the most authentic version. It is this score that Mr. Conlon has chosen for the new Paris production. It is not an easy opera to follow because, unlike Mussorgsky's better known "Boris Godunov," it is not built around one person but rather has three major roles β€” Dosifei, Marfa and Prince Ivan Khovansky (sung here by the Russian bass Vladimir Ognovenko) β€” as well as several significant parts, not least Prince Andrei Khovansky (Vladimir Galouzine), the czarist allies Golitsin (Robert Brubaker) and Shaklovity (Valeri Alexeev), a scribe (Konstantine Ploujnikov) and Emma (Tatiana Pavlovskaya), Andrei's love interest. In this production, with costumes and sets by Richard Hudson and lighting by Yves Bernard, the power struggle gripping Russia is immediately suggested when Prince Ivan arrives outside the walls of Moscow and is acclaimed by a mob of Streltsy militiamen, women carrying flowers and boys holding religious icons. A different power struggle erupts when Prince Ivan discovers Andrei trying to rape Emma, his own favorite. Then, as father and son wrestle, Dosifei arrives to impose order and assert his authority as a man of God. Thus, already in Act I, politics, religion and carnal desire are established as themes. Mussorgsky's personal sympathy for the downtrodden Russian populace leads him to compose sweeping laments for the chorus, which are highly evocative of Russian Orthodox Church hymns. But he never forgets that real power is exercised by leaders, and in Act II he brings together Dosifei, Prince Ivan and Golitsin for what resembles a political round-table, each arguing what is best for Russia. Nonetheless, it is Peter the Great and, above all, his sister who will have the last word, turning the czarist army against first the Streltsy, then the Old Believers. After Prince Ivan is murdered by Shaklovity, the Streltsy are pardoned. But when the Old Believers are surrounded by troops, Dosifei leads them to collective suicide by fire. The implication is that history is inexorable, although history itself proves otherwise. Still, if the Old Believers' fervent resistance to westernization reminded the Bastille Opera's audience of the Taliban, Mr. Serban suggests Dosifei's followers' triumph in a different, very Russian, way. "They are not primitives who destroy sacred statues or blow up planes," Mr. Serban wrote in a program essay. "Rather, they are fully aware that, by destroying themselves without harming anyone else, they give the spirit victory over the body." ****** #11 therussianissues.com December 18, 2001 Russia Between Europe and America Russia has come to an historic crossroad By Nikolai Ulyanov For instance, in the opinion of Professor Viktor Sheinis at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, in his commentary carried by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "at the end of the 20th century our country has come to an historical crossroad. One road implies persistent efforts to regain its superpower status, to build up, by all acceptable means, its ability to influence decisions regarding European and world affairs and not to spare any resources for achieving this goal." "The other road implies to concentrate on solving our extremely complicated domestic problems in order to become an organic - first of all, in respect to its economic and political structure - society so that subsequently it would be able to enter the system of western unions and alliances on the same terms and conditions that the big European countries united." "However, it is necessary to realize one thing: democratic Russia faces no military threat from the West. A real threat of aggression against Russia, as well as a threat to the entire world community, stems from international terrorist organizations and regimes that are irresponsible to their own citizens, that grant them (international terrorist organizations) bases, and that are trying in one way or another to acquire mass annihilation weapons. In the face of this new challenge, against which there is so far no effective means for repulsing it, Russia, the West and a considerable part of the third world states have common interests. The understanding of this can be seen quite clearly in President Putin's recent foreign political steps," Professor Sheinis writes. The author of an article in Izvestia, Andrei Kolesnikov, believes that "if Russia preserves its present vector of democratic and market development, its gradual return to Europe is inevitable. The situation in the world today is changing so swiftly that neither European bureaucrats nor Russian officials are capable of fathoming it." "Incidentally," he continues, "already it is possible to make out attempts to give a plausible analysis of what is happening now. The scientific community was recently presented a report "Between the Past and the Future: Russia in the Trans-Atlantic Context" that was prepared by a group of very prestigious experts, among which there were Alexei Arbatov, Andrei Kokoshin, Sergei Rogov and Nikolai Shmelev. In the part that deals with Europe, emphasis is placed on the fact that Russia's foreign policy is not limited to its very complicated relations with the USA and NATO, but underscores the fact that the EU offers a whole number of advantages as a partner in the sphere of politics and security." (To say nothing of economics: according to the data of the authors, Europe's share in Russia's trade accounts for 33-35%). Russian political scientists believe that Europe can become one of the world centers of influence only if it is united: "Separately, neither an expanded EU nor Russia will most likely be able to vie for that" and "the conclusion here seems to be self-evident," Mr. Kolesnikov argues. Meanwhile, Russia's mutual relations with the United States in the new conditions look quite promising, in the opinion of influential U.S. Congressman Dana Rorabacher, whose interview is in today's Vremya Novostei. The fact is, according to the newspaper, that this congressman is the person who coined the term "empire of evil" that was uttered by Ronald Reagan in his definition of the Soviet Union. In the 1980s he was the speechwriter for the U.S. president. According to the congressman, the fact that Mr. Putin extended his hand to the Americans at a moment when they were very seriously offended and very seriously injured is something that America will never forget. The congressman said that he had spoken with very many people at different levels about strategic prospects, about the fact that Russia and the USA, and perhaps India, should become long-term partners. If this idea was not accepted previously, then it is now being taken very seriously. In Rorabacher's opinion, a new world is now shaping out and everything is changing. In the old world, the Russians were seen as enemies, bringing the threat of Communism… Russia and the Russians today are among America's greatest allies, and that the biggest potential enemy today is China since there is no democratization there. In the American lawmaker's opinion, after September 11, nothing will ever be the same again. He believes that America's strategic stance will change, that America will have other relationships with Russia since Putin has thrown in his lot with America rather than with China. The congressman believes that September 11 made that choice a reality. More than that, he considers that in the future, the development of democratic processes in Russia and Kazakhstan could lead to the point where oil from those countries could take the place of oil from the Persian Gulf. In the Gulf countries, in his opinion, no steps are being taken in the direction of democracy. He hopes that the money America will be paying for Russian oil will be used for improving the life of Russians, for advancing democracy. After September 11, the vision of Russia as "our" big friend is deeply fixed in the minds of Americans. The Russians have a very good heart, and now America knows about that. ******* #12 BBC 19 December 2001 Russian shoe factory finds its feet By James Schofield from Moscow When the Soviet Union collapsed a decade ago, making money was the last thing the plant director worried about at the giant Kuznetskobuv, Russia's largest shoe factory. Employing 5,000 workers, the plant worked double shifts to supply millions of boots each year, many for the Red Army and to keep 800 warehouses around the country stacked to the ceiling at all times. Like many other state-dependent industries however, the factory hit hard times during the 1990s as the Russian government struggled to balance finances. Though orders kept flooding in and shoes were despatched on time, most ministries were simply unable to pay. Debts at the plant mounted, salaries went unpaid and by 1997 the government owed more than $11m. New business style But as tax revenues have soared during two years of strong economic growth since the financial crisis of 1998, the factory has enjoyed a rapid turnaround and developed a radical new operating strategy. Gone are the expensive-to-maintain warehouses and the production cycle from order to delivery has been slashed from months to just two weeks allowing the management to react more quickly to market demand. The government has paid back debts, wage arrears have been cleared and the plant, employing a still enormous 3,000 workers, insists on full and prompt payment for deliveries or refuses to service future contracts. Trucks bustle in and out of the main gates packed with consignments while women in faded overalls and headscarves joke and laugh with each other as they hurry to their next shift. State orders now account for just 60% of production and each such contract is won by competitive tender, a fundamental change to the way business is done which has forced the plant to cut costs and improve efficiency. Italian hopes "Our goal now is to concentrate on loading volumes and getting paid for it in good time," says Andre Kurenkov, deputy general director for Parizhskaya Kommuna, the parent company that owns the factory and 12 others across Russia. Churning out 2 million pairs of shoes and boots each year, the factory has just installed second hand machinery from Moscow worth $1m allowing it to make modern bonded uppers in demand in Europe. Thanks to the new equipment the plant hopes to conclude a vital deal soon with an Italian contractor worth millions of dollars for 6,000 pairs of civilian-use boots per day, equal to 30% of current production volumes. "The deal, if it happens, will be very important for us," says Mr Kurenkov. "It will guarantee payments and will be longer term than our government contracts, allowing us to plan for the future." Import threat But despite the factory's rapid recovery, the future is still a challenging place. The production range of the plant has remained the same for years and though popular, competition in the sector is stiff and likely to get tougher. As the rouble continues to appreciate against the dollar in real terms, imports are once again becoming popular and affordable. These new designs from abroad threaten to steal market share. And when Russia joins the World Trade Organisation, possibly as early as 2003, the sector will face a flood from mass produced, cheap shoes from its close neighbour China. ****** #13 Vremya Novostei December 19, 2001 SHUTTLE TRADERS DISAPPEARING Possible close to the era of cheap goods brought in from abroad Author: Vera Brycheva, Gleb Cherkasov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] ONE OF THE MOST WIDEPREAD PROFESSIONS OF THE 1990S MAY SOON CEASE TO EXIST. SHUTTLE TRADERS, WHO BRING GOODS INTO RUSSIA IN SMALL CONSIGNMENTS AND ARE SAID TO PROVIDE CLOTHING FOR HALF THE NATION, WILL BE DOOMED. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE MINISTRY HAS PLANS FOR THEM. One of the most widepread professions of the 1990s may soon cease to exist. Shuttle traders, who bring goods into Russia in small consignments and are said to provide clothing for half the nation, will be doomed. At least, such a prospect may be realized if new ideas of the Economic Development and Trade Ministry are implemented. According to head of the Department for tariff regulations and market security of the ministry Andrei Kushnirenko, the ministry of German Gref prepared a draft bill, according to which cargos of more than 50 kilos, brought from abroad, will be considered "a consignment of goods". And it means that the customs will take import tariffs, calculated by goods cost. At present, the following regulation is valid: cargos of 50 to 200 kilos are liable to one 30% tax, which is extremely profitable for shuttle traders. Making this decision, the Economic Development Ministry, according to Mr. Kushnirenko, was guided by the fact that there were almost no shuttle traders left. They were edged out by "cargo-firms", which clear goods through the customs, using advantages of shuttle traders. Thus, according to the ministry, shuttle trading turned into covering "gray imports" which reaches 90% in certain spheres, say, furs. The idea of eliminating the shuttle trade is not new. In 1997 the finance minister of that time, Yevgeny Yasin, wanted to do so. He believes that shuttle traders played their role in alleviating unemployment problems, as well as the problem of supplying the nation with goods. Now the era of shuttle trading is over. Speaking about disappearance of shuttle traders as a social class, both Kushnirenko and Yasin should have some data to prove it. But it is impossible to calculate how many citizens were ferrying goods from China, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Italy and other countries during the 1990s. According to estimates, up to 2 million people dealt with this kind of business, bringing goods for $10 billion. Most shuttle traders never tried to work on a larger scale, and avoided official registration whenever possible. Up to 1998 the state practically did not control shuttle trading - certain state representatives successfully dealt with it. However, on June 30, 1998 the State Trading Committee issued a regulation on procedures, which the Economic Development Ministry considers obsolete. Attempts to regulate the market served as the first blow at it, and the ruble devaluation, together with the financial crisis, undermined the shuttle trade even more severely. If the government approves the ministry's suggestion, shuttle traders will have no other option but quit. But if no more shuttle traders remain, the range of consumer goods will not change greatly. If shuttle traders do provide a considerable part of the abundance of goods, then the authors of the idea are likely to face not only economic, but also social troubles. And this will involve not only an inevitable increase in prices, but also people who might lose steady jobs and incomes. (Translated by Daria Brunova) *******