Johnson's Russia List #5606 19 December 2001 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Russian runaways find few willing to help them. This year Moscow police have brought in almost 30,000 children living in rail stations and the streets. 2. Vremya Novostei: WHAT RUSSIANS THINK OF THE GOVERNMENT. (poll) 3. RIA Novosti: US AND RUSSIAN FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS DO NOT CONFLICT, US POLITICAL SCIENTIST BELIEVES. (Dmitri Simes) 4. Itogi: Leonid Radzihovsky, Why did he refuse to extend his presidential term? Putin Chose a European Model of Development for Russia. 5. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Duma Official Criticizes U.S. Decision To Scrap ABM Treaty. (Aleksei Arbatov) 6. AP: Chechnya Conflict Dragging On. 7. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, The Temptations of the Presidential Elevator. 8. Moscow Times: Peter Lavelle, Christmas Dinner Chez Putin. 9. UPI: Russia catches 10 spies. 10. Parlamentskaya Gazeta: PRO-WESTERN COURSE OF REFORMS FAILS IN RUSSIA. (Interview with Gavriil POPOV) 11. Obshchaya Gazeta: Maksim Glinkin, Major Clash Shaping Up Between Rightest Politicians and Military Chiefs on Military Reform.] ******* #1 Christian Science Monitor December 19, 2001 Russian runaways find few willing to help them This year Moscow police have brought in almost 30,000 children living in rail stations and the streets. By Fred Weir Special to The Christian Science Monitor MOSCOW - Oleg Mukhin lives with several friends in a hollow beneath the platform of Moscow's Vikhino railway station. The thin, small and nervous 11-year-old insists that it's not a bad life. But sometimes, he says, the police try to round the kids up by spraying tear gas into their hiding places and hitting them with truncheons. A native of the central Russian city of Orel, Oleg ran away four years ago from a family he won't talk about and headed for Moscow. "I wanted to see the world," he says, with a touch of bluster. Like tens of thousands of street children who live in Russia's capital and belie official claims of an economic boom, Oleg makes do with a little begging, a bit of petty theft, and increasing help from grass-roots charity and social-action groups. He knows the working hours of every soup kitchen in Moscow, and speaks warmly of the charity volunteers who distribute food and clothing. As for the police, he says, there are good ones and bad ones, "but it's best to stay away from them in general." More than a dozen children questioned in three Moscow railway stations and the "Little Runaways" private shelter for homeless kids accused police of beating them, extorting money, and other forms of harassment. Yulia Segeyeva, who is 14, says police at Yaroslavl train station dragged her into an office and "attacked" her. She says she ran away. A Moscow police official, who asked not to be named, denied that such things are common and said police procedures are being overhauled to ensure no abuses occur. He said that street children quickly become "criminalized," and that their accusations are not necessarily credible. "No child can survive long on the street alone, because it is a very harsh environment," he says. "They find a surrogate family in gangs, where older criminals organize their lives and take the place of parents." Until recently, the only official faces most street kids ever saw were those of Moscow's police. And, even barring abuse, the only treatment a non-Muscovite street kid like Oleg could expect, if caught in one of the periodic police sweeps, was to be held in a juvenile prison and then returned to authorities in Orel. The Moscow Interior Ministry says it has scooped up 29,100 children in city railway stations and streets so far this year, most from other parts of the country. Most of them were "returned to their homes." Oleg says he's been sent back to his family twice, only to escape and make his way once again to the capital. "Unfortunately, Moscow has not handled the problem of homeless and runaway children very well," says Valentina Teryokhina, a Russian Labor Ministry official specializing in programs for minors. "They have tried to simply clear the city of street kids, rather than take responsibility for helping them. I believe this is going to change." A city of 10 million people, Moscow has two official shelters for children, where psychologists and social workers address individual situations, and these shelters are open only to kids registered as living in the capital. Estimates of how many children are on their own in post-Soviet Russia range from 50,000 to more than 1 million. Nine different official agencies are charged with dealing with the problem, including the Education Ministry, Labor Ministry, and Interior Ministry. In practice, little has been done as numbers of homeless kids exploded over the past decade. But this year a central commission, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko, was formed to coordinate policy and devise new approaches. "Our data suggest the problem is growing and requires urgent solutions," says Sergei Vitelis, who heads the effort for the Education Ministry. "Most runaways are children from dysfunctional families, where there is alcoholism, violence, and abuse. In the absence of anywhere else to go, these children fall under the influence of false 'families', such as criminal gangs. We must provide systematic alternatives for them." Oleg Mukhin and his friends at Vikhino station say they haven't seen any changes in the way the police deal with them. One small haven A more optimistic picture can be found at "Little Runaways," a private shelter in the Moscow suburb of Medvedkovo, funded by Assistance to Russian Orphans, a nongovernmental charity supported by various international agencies including USAID. The center was founded two years ago by Andrei Babushkin, a local politician and champion of children's rights whose main aim was to reach street children before the police did. Several former street children work as volunteer counselors for the shelter, and charity groups contribute food, clothing, and books. "We are creating a database of abandoned and runaway kids in Moscow," says Mr. Babushkin. "We bring them here, feed them, listen to their stories, and refer them on to other specialized agencies, foster homes, or back to their own families. We've made enough progress that the local police have started bringing street kids to us." Babushkin acknowledges that his center is not a solution, but he hopes that authorities will take note of the model. The cramped former communal flat has space for only about 20 children to sleep, and, he says, and its resources are "extremely meager." Still, several kids in the center's library/sitting room one day last week seemed clean and relaxed, and said they were happy to have found their way there. "You can't do anything with a young person until you get to know him or her personally," says Andrei Mayakov, 17, who spent three years on the streets before coming to work at the center. "But once you're friends, you can start helping them with their future plans." Babushkin agrees that Russian officials are becoming more sensitive to the plight of homeless children, but he smiles wryly at mention of the Matvienko commission. "There are two ways to deal with a problem: One is to do something, and the other is to form a committee," he says with a shrug. ****** #2 Vremya Novostei No. 227 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] WHAT RUSSIANS THINK OF THE GOVERNMENT Oleg SAVELYEV, VTsIOM press service At the end of November 2001, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) conducted a representative express-poll on Russians' attitude to the government (the poll covered 1,600 respondents). The answers to some questions of the poll are given below in percent together with the data of the VTsIOM public opinion poll held in November 2000. The statistical error of such polls is within 4 percent. ------------------------------------------------------------ Do you approve or disapprove, on the whole, of Mikhail Kasyanov's activities in the post of Russia's prime minister? ------------------------------------------------------------ 2000 2001 ------------------------------------------------------------ Approve 47 53 Disapprove 32 34 No answer 21 13 ----------------------------------------------------------- Do you approve or disapprove of the Russian government's activities on the whole? ----------------------------------------------------------- 2000 2001 ----------------------------------------------------------- Approve 38 46 Disapprove 46 45 No answer 16 9 ---------------------------------------------------------- Will the present Russian government be able to change the country's situation for the better in the near future? ---------------------------------------------------------- 2000 2001 ---------------------------------------------------------- Certainly "yes", rather "yes" than "no" 25 26 --------------------------------------------------------- Maybe "yes", and may be "no" 35 35 --------------------------------------------------------- Rather "no", certainly "no" 36 35 --------------------------------------------------------- It's hard to say 4 4 -------------------------------------------------------- ****** #3 US AND RUSSIAN FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS DO NOT CONFLICT, US POLITICAL SCIENTIST BELIEVES MOSCOW, December 18, 2001. /from a RIA Novosti correspondent/--The USA's and Russia's fundamental interests either coincide or do not contradict, President of the Nixon Centre Dmitry Simes, a well-known US political scientist, stated during a round table discussion in Moscow on Tuesday. Mr Simes listed the maintenance of international stability among the top spheres of mutual interest of the two powers. According to the political scientist, the USA is equally interested in Russia becoming a strong, prosperous and democratic state. At the same time, Russia is destined to objectively have special interests which could clash with those of the USA, Dmitry Simes believes. To illustrate this he recalled that both Moscow and Washington had their own historical experience of complicated relations with Iran. Partners may have differences, however, they should not be dramatised. The main thing is, that historically, the USA and Russia are "on the same side of the trenches", the US political scientist declared. ****** #4 Itogi December 18, 2001 Why did he refuse to extend his presidential term? Putin Chose a European Model of Development for Russia By Leonid Radzihovsky (therussianissues.com) A notion like presidential term may seem to be a formal constitutional clause which can be changed in a "working order". The duration of presidential stay in power varies from four years in some countries, including Russia, to five and even seven, like in France, to which it has become particularly fashionable to refer to in recent years. However, two fundamentally different aspects should be distinguished here. The Constitution may establish the duration of presidential term once and for all. Then, it is really unimportant whether it is four years or five. But an attempt to extend the existing presidential term clearly implicates something more than just a formal revision of the fundamental law. Putin perfectly realized the danger of such initiatives and crushed the idea in the bud on Constitution Day on December 12. The Russian elite was taught a tough lesson in political culture. Let's imagine what would have happened if Putin had kept silent. The supporters of this initiative would have cheerfully started a campaign in its favor. The idea would have attracted new supporters in the face of the Federation Council, the State Duma and regional governors. The consequences of that "PR-campaign" would have been felt both in regions and the federal center. The consequences would have been more apparent in the regions. Regional governors would have shown more than a Platonic love for the idea to extend the president's stay in office. It is clear that they would have tried to apply it to themselves in the first place. If the president has decided to extend his term and we have helped him in achieving that, then what can prevent us from doing the same at our own gubernatorial level. Furthermore, most regional bosses believe that the president simply must support them, especially in the name of a common and sacred goal to strengthen stability in this country. In that case Russia would have got 88 regional leaders, excluding Chechnya, each of whom, as Ligachyov once said, "is devilishly willing to work" for another seven or fourteen years (two extended terms at least) or even more than that. Extending one term would mean that other terms can also be prolonged. It is clear that governors will take fresh heart and will, with pleasure, break any power vertical in their time. "If I sit firmly in my post and live at state expense for another 10 years or so, who are all the ministers to me then. Today he is a minister, and tomorrow he is nothing!," any Russian regional boss would ask. In other words, Russia would have gotten a slightly modified version of the old regional formula: "Sit for as long as you can last!" Constitutional consequences could have been even graver. There are plenty of differences making a democratic system democratic. What are they? First of all, this is an entire system and a full package of political, economic and civil liberties, which, in fact, are clearly fixed in the current Russian Constitution which some want to revise: private ownership, freedom of speech, openness to the outside world, free parliamentary elections, human rights, etc. A firmly guaranteed replacement of the head of state and his clearly defined appointment by election are one of the major classical democratic principles. Very few lifetime rulers have left in contemporary world, predominantly in countries which no one will have the cheek to call democratic. But, removing just one stone, like the president's replacement, from the foundation of a democratic state will make the entire structure reel. The "Central Asian democracies" have made it clear that lifetime rule is incompatible with political freedom without which all other dice in a domino, like private ownership, civil liberties, etc, will start falling apart. But what does that have to do with an issue in question? Has anyone ever mentioned the possibility of abolishing presidential elections in Russia? Nevertheless, it immediately concerns each and all of us. Unlike in France, where presidents have been replacing each other for nearly 130 years, Russia saw its first peaceful and legitimate change of the head of state only in 2000. President Putin did not rise to power in succession of a dead leader (all Russian czars and Communist Party general secretaries), nor did that happen as a result of a plot (Khrushchev) or the country's disintegration (Gorbachev). A tradition to legitimately replace its first leaders is still very weak in Russia, while the idea of lifetime rule is deeply rooted in public consciousness. President Putin has chosen a European and pro-Western model for Russia. He has learned the historical experience and has disavowed the idea of revising the Russian Constitution. ******* #5 Russia: Duma Official Criticizes U.S. Decision To Scrap ABM Treaty By Francesca Mereu The chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Aleksei Arbatov, spoke yesterday with reporters about the recent U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Arbatov said the U.S. decision is not the result of true strategic or political necessity but rather has been prompted by the success of the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. As RFE/RL Moscow correspondent Francesca Mereu reports, the defense official said Russia accepted the U.S. decision and added the two countries can still cooperate on issues of mutual interest. Moscow, 18 December 2001 (RFE/RL) -- For the past two years, Russia has been warning the U.S. that withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty would rock the foundations of global security. But when the White House finally made the long-anticipated announcement that it was abandoning the historic treaty -- Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted with surprising equanimity, saying only that the decision was a "mistake." "This step was not a surprise for us. Nevertheless, we consider this decision a mistake," Putin said. "As we know, Russia -- like the United States and unlike the rest of the nuclear powers -- has spent a long time designing an efficient system for overcoming anti-ballistic missile defenses. So I can, with full confidence, say that the decision made by the U.S. president does not threaten the national security of the Russian Federation." Speaking with reporters on 17 December, Aleksei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, said he believes that the U.S. decision was, in fact, a surprise for Putin. But Arbatov added that for the Russia president to admit surprise would have been tantamount to admitting he made a mistake in adopting his new pro-Western stance. "President Putin couldn't say that [the U.S. decision] was unexpected. [He also couldn't say] that America's behavior was wrong and that it may have bad consequences for [Russian-U.S.] relations in other fields. If he said so, it would have [meant] that he was retreating from his [pro-Western] position. There would have been a lot of accusations from within the country," Arbatov said. "This is the reason why he reacted with moderation. He had to choose the right words to express his position in the matter. Even if -- I'm sure -- inside he was boiling. But he had to express himself diplomatically and to play down the [issue], English-style." Arbatov himself criticized the U.S. decision, saying the Americans had used their success -- aided by Russia -- in the Afghan military campaign to bolster support for abandoning the treaty. Arbatov says that in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, Russia and the U.S. seemed to find common ground and appeared to be growing closer. But December's decision to leave the treaty, he says, changed everything. "We [Russia and the U.S.] have many common interests. We have a common enemy. The problems that used to divide us could have been solved. Now I can't say that's true," Arbatov said. "The Americans [withdrawing] from this treaty -- that was very important for Russia from a military and a political point of view -- it demonstrated how they view our partnership and relations. It is like the relationship between a rider and a mule." Arbatov says those Russians who originally opposed supporting the U.S. in its antiterrorism campaign now believe that they were right: "The [ABM] treaty is broken. The mood [of Russians] has taken a blow. Those who backed [Russia-] U.S. relations in particular have been let down. But, in contrast, those who used to say 'No, you cannot change the Americans. We shouldn't help them in Afghanistan, they would never appreciate it.' [Now they say,] 'This is what we get for helping the U.S. for the past few months.'" The 1972 ABM Treaty, signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, bars the United States and Russia from unilaterally developing missile-defense shields, based on the premise that the threat of mutual assured destruction will prevent nuclear war. The U.S. says the treaty is outdated and an obstacle to building a limited missile-defense system. The system would be aimed at repelling missiles fired by terrorists or rogue states such as Iraq or North Korea. Arbatov says the U.S. is taking a large risk in pursuing a missile-defense shield since there is no indication that such a system will work. But he says the successful military campaign in Afghanistan has bolstered the confidence of what he called "non-intelligent" U.S. officials who support the defense shield. "The operation in Afghanistan has succeeded. Now there is a euphoric [mood in the U.S.] and this group [of American politicians] decided to demonstrate that the U.S. has not changed and that it will behave how it used to behave," Arbatov said. "The U.S. will take care of its own interests according to what this small group of non-intelligent politicians believe [America's] interests to be. They won't ask either Russia or their partners or anyone for advice." Arbatov went on to say that the U.S. decision would not pose a threat to Russian security, and that Russian officials should continue to cooperate with the U.S. on areas of mutual interest. At the same time, he called for revising Russia's nuclear-forces strategy. The chairman of the Federation Council's foreign affairs committee, Mikhail Margelov, said on 16 December that he does not rule out the possibility that Russia may respond to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by withdrawing from the START-2 treaty. Russia's RIA-Novosti news agency quoted Margelov as saying Russia's withdrawal from START-2 could prove to be "the most effective and pragmatic option aimed at maintaining the country's national security at the proper level." Margelov added, however, that he did not think such a step would be appropriate in the near future. Margelov also said the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty had been "long expected." The State Duma rejected on 14 December a draft message to the U.S. Congress, saying the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty contradicts the spirit of cooperation between civilized countries in resisting international terrorism, and "complicates the prevention of access to weapons of mass destruction." ******* #6 Chechnya Conflict Dragging On December 18, 2001 By DEBORAH SEWARD MOSCOW (AP) - Seven years after Russian troops entered Chechnya to end the republic's independence drive, the Kremlin is still fighting to bring the region to heel, the rebels battle on - and the general suffering is intense. Rarely does a day go by without violence in the small Caucasus Mountain republic: a firefight between Russian troops and rebels, a mine exploding, or a roundup of Chechen males. Senior Russian officials say the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States have led to greater understanding for the fight against Chechen rebels. The Kremlin calls them terrorists and claims the separatists receive support from outside forces, including Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network. Western criticism of how the Kremlin is waging war in Chechnya has subsided in recent months, and Russian officials appear heartened after enduring years of often withering disapproval. ``The situation has changed and is going better,'' Sergei Yastrzhembsky, President Vladimir Putin's spokesman for Chechnya, told reporters at the launching last week of a Kremlin-backed Web site on Chechnya that aims to rival an existing rebel site. Yastrzhembsky said U.S. recognition that al-Qaida had been active in Chechnya was ``a good service'' for Russia. Russian troops entered Chechnya, a mainly Muslim region a bit smaller than New Jersey, in December 1994, hoping to put a quick end to the republic's quest for independence. The Russians left in defeat and disgrace 20 months later, giving Chechnya virtual independence. Chechnya descended into lawlessness and the Russian military returned in September 1999 following Chechnya-based rebels' incursion into neighboring Dagestan and a series of apartment bombings blamed on rebels in which some 300 people were killed. This time Russian forces are determined to stay. They insist Chechnya will never become independent and they want to flush out foreign fighters. Chechen rebels do not deny they had contacts with the Taliban, the former Afghan regime that recognized Chechnya's independence in 2000. Some observers have also speculated that bin Laden could try to seek refuge in Chechnya, but Yastrzhembsky just laughed when asked about that possibility. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, a former president of Chechnya, denied this week that bin Laden, accused by the United States of masterminding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, funded the Chechen rebels. ``What we have are donations from Muslims who collected crumbs for us in the name of Allah,'' the Interfax news agency quoted Yandarbiyev as saying. ``Bin Laden has not had links with the Chechens.'' And he said fewer than 50 foreign fighters are active in Chechnya. The Russians persistently blame foreign fighters for the war. But pro-Moscow Chechen officials say the influence of outsiders is minimal, and the anti-terror war in Afghanistan will not have a huge impact on the war in Chechnya. Bislan Gantamirov, a former pro-Moscow mayor of the Chechen capital Grozny, said the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan had led to a drop in the number of foreign fighters in Chechnya, a cut in outside financing for the rebels and the loss of rebel access to training camps in Afghanistan. But Gantamirov said he was pessimistic about the impact the fighting in Afghanistan would have on the rebel war against the Russians. ``I don't think it will have an effect on their activities,'' he said. ``It (war) will all stop when we have the trust of the Chechen people.'' Gantamirov, now a federal inspector in southern Russia, and other pro-Moscow Chechen officials are trying to work up proposals for a new Chechen constitution. Recent talks between a rebel envoy and a senior Russian official represent dialogue, not negotiations. Meanwhile, the war grinds on. Human Rights Watch this fall said it had documented very serious violations of human rights in Chechnya by the Russian military, including summary executions, torture, forced disappearances, and indiscriminate bombing. But some human rights observers say there has been progress, including an effort by the Russian military to confront abuses by its forces. ``There seems to be more will that complaints are registered and followed up,'' said Nina Soumalainen, an adviser at the human rights division of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. ``It's a first step toward accountability by the military and the special forces.'' The plight of civilians does not seem to have improved in 2001. According to the Red Cross, 150,000 people who have fled Chechnya still are registered as displaced persons in Ingushetia, a poor republic that borders Chechnya. Thousands more live in nearby Russian regions, or have been forced from their homes but remain inside Chechnya. ``The conflict in Chechnya is not over, people continue to die, or live in fear and misery,'' said Lord Russell-Johnston, the head of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, in launching an appeal to the Russian authorities this month to improve the humanitarian situation in Chechnya. On the Net: Kremlin-backed site on Chechyna (Russian only), http://kavkaz.strana.ru Pro-rebel site, http://www.kavkaz.org ******* #7 Moscow Times December 19, 2001 The Temptations of the Presidential Elevator By Yulia Latynina The No. 1 in the state, Vladimir Putin, has corrected the No. 3, or to be more precise, Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov. Mironov got the new post thanks to a direct recommendation from the president. Indeed, one might say that he was raised to the summit of the parliamentary Olympus on the elevator of the president's good will. It is very unlikely that Mironov could have got to the top under his own steam; in fact, had he tried it is quite possible that he would have fallen into the first gully that he came to. Apparently he believes that the best state is one in which the president carries whomever wherever on his presidential elevator. And given that two presidential terms aren't really enough for this, Mironov proposed that the Constitution be amended. Well, you might say, what is a Constitution after all? As every Russian knows from the time of the Decembrist uprising, the Constitution is Konstantin's wife. That's what they shouted on Senate Square in any case: "For Konstantin and his wife the Constitution!" The Constitution is a silly old woman, in other words, and very much set in her ways. So why not change it? However, there are still some folks out there who crawled up the political Olympus on their own wits, spending the night in freezing caves and battling yetis with ice picks, and they were not particularly amused. So, like true Western gentlemen they stood up for the honor of their desecrated Constitution. As a lot of noise was being made, Putin decided to set the record straight and publicly stated that he had no intention of changing the Constitution. But, as is his way, he did not instigate Mironov's removal. About a month ago something similar happened. Apparently, Putin's inconspicuous St. Petersburg friends mentioned while passing him in a Kremlin corridor that Railways Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko had pinched $5 billion and that they were "investigating the issue." "Go ahead," came the response. Aksyonenko was hauled in for questioning. And then up popped Putin's other friends — the ones from the days of the Family — and started feverishly attempting to prove that this really wasn't the case. Then the inconspicuous friends were summoned and it emerged that it wasn't 5 but 50, and it wasn't billions but millions, and it wasn't dollars but rubles. "And you're hassling the guy for such a trifle?" So they let Aksyonenko go. The floating of trial balloons to test public opinion is an old KGB trick. And in the world of Russian politics it is being used to play warring clans off against one another. In the present situation none of them will win. First, the victorious clan will always rapidly fall into two warring factions. Second, the Family and the Inconspicuous Petersburgers are being played off against each other not so that one of the groups wins, but in order to keep tabs on everything that's going on in the country and so that there is always a bulldog at hand that can be set upon any rottweiler that gets too greedy. The only way to change the current situation is to tempt the president with absolute power. For having violated the Constitution, the president will become a hostage of those who advised him to do so. Permit me one more observation. A dictatorship in a collapsed country is not bad because it means power is wielded by one man, but because it means power is in the hands of thousands of mini-dictators, from the drunken RUBOP officer to the president's best friend. The dividends are reaped by some small-time swine, while only one man bears the responsibility. And, sooner or later, it will all end in something far more vile than dictatorship: a revolution. Yulia Latynina is a journalist with ORT. ****** #8 Moscow Times December 19, 2001 Christmas Dinner Chez Putin By Peter Lavelle With the year coming to an end, it is a good time to take stock. For the most part, 2001 has been a good year for the country. Good fortune has smiled on President Vladimir Putin's Russia, partly thanks to the political elite's own doing, partly due to simple dumb luck. In financial terms, Putin ends his second year in power with a surplus of political capital. So, with the season of good cheer upon us, who is on Putin's list for some goodies under the tree? Who will get a wrapped present with a signed card or a handsome stocking-stuffer? Who will be invited to take a seat at the Christmas dinner table? And who will leave cookies and milk near the fireplace for a Saint Nick who has no intention of visiting during the still of a cold winter's night? Most of the Cabinet can probably rest a little easy. The year ends with a number of reform packages debated and signed. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov showed the world (and Putin) that Russia would pay its debts, and that little spat with the Paris Club at the start of the year is all but forgotten. Kasyanov didn't step on the president's toes either. But those gnawing rumors of corruption have poured some cold water on an otherwise good performance. What do you bet that a brand new scooter will be sitting under the tree for Misha with a card saying "good job, well done -- now ride along?" German Gref, Alexei Kudrin, Andrei Illarionov -- the shock workers of the Putin brigade -- can look forward to the president's good favor. All year long, they have given the president solid advice. While not the best of buddies, collectively these engineers of "number crunching" have done a reasonably good job helping Putin steer the ship of state through some very rough waters. The reward for their good deeds will be the chance to serve the president for another year. Who knows, they just might make it to next year's Christmas dinner. The loyal cadres in the State Duma deserve something special. Passing a balanced budget for next year and backing just about every legislative initiative supported by the Cabinet, the deputies in this very thoughtful house of parliament are in line for a Christmas party with Rostik's doing the catering. Even the Communists will be invited; the opposition from these proud showmen of a deceased system they don't even believe in is never really serious. No special gifts, though; this body of lawmakers already sucks up enough of the people's limited resources. Yury Luzhkov and Sergei Shoigu are on the list for an after-dinner mint at the Kremlin -- though only one mint. Next year could be a bit austere and discipline needs to be maintained. Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, Grigory Yavlinsky, Vladimir Ustinov and Sergei Stepashin are invited to Christmas dinner -- though to be seated at the children's table. Chubais, prone to childish intrigues, will be seated there to show him how adults can and should enjoy themselves; Nemtsov and Yavlinsky because they belong there; and Ustinov and Stepashin will sit together so they can finally get the story on Nikolai Aksyonenko right. Aksyonenko and Yevgeny Nazdratenko are believed to be attending a different Family get-together not far from Lubyanka -- some bash organized by the State Customs Committee. The army will be rewarded with increased defense spending next year, even though it would appear there are those in the army who still find the war in Chechnya a profit-making exercise. This certainly must be wearing on Putin's feelings of good cheer for this group of gentlemen. But because there are some troops abroad fighting to make Afghanistan safe for democracy, all active servicemen are in line for a new "Putin 2002 Calendar" -- a real collector's item if ever there was one. As for the navy, well, they had better wait until next year. They would be well advised to get some Western PR agency on board in the nearest future. It has been a tough year for our seafaring friends, and I fear the cookies and milk will go to naught. The oligarchs will probably just get a card this year, though not all of them, of course. They have all the toys they could possibly want. If they have a foreign forwarding address, so much the better for all parties concerned. If an oligarch does not have such an address, it is advisable that he get one for next year, as one can easily be dropped from the mailing list. E-mail would be the best solution, in fact: no need to waste precious taxpayers' money on postage stamps for this infamous group of individuals. Because of the mess that has been made, LUKoil will be sponsoring a Christmas Eve television special on corporate citizenship and the media on TV6. Yevgeny Kiselyov and Press Minister Mikhail Lesin are expected to answer questions from a studio audience of foreign journalists and certified public accountants. Sources close to the Kremlin firmly deny that the presidential Christmas party-goers have plans to view the program. The self-declared Kremlin spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky will not be forgotten either. Because the president likes to think of himself as a good sport, Pavlovsky will get a token presidential card and a new crystal ball in a nicely decorated stocking. Forecasting political change in 2001 was not that difficult, but Pavlovsky is going to need all the help he can get for next year. Alexander Voloshin, the master of ceremonies at this year's Kremlin party, will decide for himself his reward for unwavering service. Voloshin should enjoy this Christmas as best he can, as next Christmas is several lifetimes away in the fast-moving world of Russian politics. So who besides the above-mentioned and the Putin family will attend the gala affair at the Kremlin? Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov will probably be there, as the General Staff didn't send him an invitation to their rather closed and quiet celebration. The other Ivanov is expected as well -- he doesn't seem to bother or offend too many people in the elite. Beyond that, I don't know. I suspect this year's party will be rather a private affair. Putin is the type of fellow who has few friends. During the last decade, many of Russia's problems have come about because Putin's predecessor had too many friends who had a poorly developed sense of goodwill toward their fellow man and who were only interested in what their country could do for them, rather than vice versa. All that remains is for me to wish the president and his family a very quiet, private and thoughtful holiday season. Peter Lavelle is head of research at IFC Metropol. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. ****** #9 Russia catches 10 spies MOSCOW, Dec. 18 (UPI) -- Counterintelligence officers at Russia's Federal Security Service had a busy year and have much to celebrate after the arrest of 10 foreigners caught spying against Russia, FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev announced Tuesday. Patrushev, who heads one of the successors of the Soviet KGB, revealed that 10 spies had been caught red-handed, while "the espionage and subversive work of more than 30 (agents) had been stopped," the official Itar-Tass news service reported. The secretive intelligence chief told Russian media editors that the FSB, as the agency is known, had carried out 43 security operations since the start of the year, and was monitoring the activities of 130 foreign agents. Patrushev said six Russian citizens were among the foreign spies apprehended by Russian secret service officers. "The special services of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have been stripped of their valuable informers," Patrushev said, adding that the secret services of China, Israel, Iran, North Korea and Kuwait had made attempts to spy against Russia. Patrushev mentioned the case of a V. Ojamae, a former Russian security service officer who had been charged with spying for Britain with Estonia acting as intermediary. Ojamae was sentenced by a Moscow court to seven years in prison on charges of espionage. The spy chief made no mention of U.S. student John Tobin, a Fulbright scholar arrested in the central Russian city of Voronezh. Tobin had been accused of links with U.S. intelligence agencies, but stood trial on charges of possession of marijuana. Tobin was sentenced to a one-year prison term, but was released after six months and allowed to return to the United States. Patrushev also skipped the tit-for-tat expulsion of 100 U.S. and Russian diplomats after the United States arrested FBI agent Robert Hanssen and charged him with spying for Moscow. ******* #10 Parlamentskaya Gazeta No. 234 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] PRO-WESTERN COURSE OF REFORMS FAILS IN RUSSIA The decade of the democratic reform under Yeltsin is drawing to a close. There are no more democratic dreams or illusions about the bright future. We have remained with hopes, and also mistakes, which we need to analyse and draw lessons from in order to avoid them in the future. Correspondent of Parlamentskaya Gazeta Tatiana TSYBA spoke with the last of the democrats of the first democratic wave, former people's deputy of the USSR, former first mayor of Moscow, Doctor of Economic Sciences and President of the International University in Moscow Gavriil POPOV to comment on that period. Question: What has happened to us and the country over the past decade? Can we draw up the results of the democratic reform? Did this reform actually take place? Answer: Our pro-Western course of reforms has come to a crasher while the democratic forces have failed to offer for the first time in the Russian history their own version of the country's development. I think that the reason consists in the fact that nobody believed that all this would happen so quickly. It seemed that the problem of the departure from communism was a matter of such distant future that it was not time for arguing on further actions. That is why, the democrats accepted what was offered to them: the Western model and assistance. But the West was not so naive to give us money for free and create new rivals. Apart from that, we failed to use properly even the meagre funds it gave to us. The government maintained reforms through the export of raw materials and Western loans. Parasitic capital appeared in the country. New Russian capitalists thought only about their capital augmentation; they were not interested in the production sphere. They were hardly concerned about entering the world market and winning their niche in it. These were parasites, rather than young wolves, who clung to the state to draw all the resources from it. Question: Why didn't you, people who were in power then, do everything possible to make the country embark on a proper course? There had to be someone to point to mistakes and help the President. Answer: I personally already saw at that time, although not quite distinctly, that we hadn't taken up any power. Having assessed the situation properly, I didn't find strength to make the correct conclusions. Of course, it is possible to refer to other leaders, to the situation and the sentiments of the people at that time. But I must be responsible before myself. I am sure that it would have been impossible all the same to change the course of history, and power all the same would have passed over to democrats-functionaries. However, it could have been possible within the framework of the inevitable historical process to create more conditions for the democratic versions of reform to implement what was realistic. Question: In your book "Democratic Alternative to Yeltsin" you write that Yeltsin had no other choice: either reform to be carried out by bureaucracy or nothing else but slaughter and bloodshed. What are Yeltsin's mistakes? Answer: Boris Yeltsin is one of bureaucrats-reformers. However, he was the only person from among the party nomenclature to link his further activity with the democratic movement long before the victory over the CPSU. It is not the elections that made him the leader. On the contrary, the elections only formalised the functions of the leader performed by him. Yeltsin was one of the first CPSU leaders to quit the party and join the people's revolution and this is his merit. He knew what had to be destroyed in the country; however, he did not know what had to be built and how. However, he is not to blame for that. The entire Russian intelligentsia, including me, is to blame for that. We have failed to develop the model of Russia of the 21st century. For Yeltsin there was no other choice: either bureaucratic reforms or nothing else but slaughter and bloodshed. The country had to get out of the quagmire of state socialism stagnation at the expense of the people. Yeltsin is not to blame for that, This is the trouble of the whole of Russia. Among various versions of nomenclature reforms he chose the worst one: the pro-Western and liberal reform. But he could have done nothing different because he had been taught all throughout his life: the quicker, the better. But still, Yeltsin is to blame for the choice of the worst of the possible scenarios. But this is his guilt to the Russian bureaucracy. However, Yeltsin's guilt before the people consists in quite a different thing. Having chosen this path, he didn't warn the people about the troubles in store of them. He did not protect them against the arbitrariness of bureaucracy. Question: But the past decade is characterised not only by failures, losses and mistakes. There have been achievements, too. What is the most important of them? Answer: But still, the main result of the past decade is Russian democracy. It does exist. I have a feeling that incumbent authorities will act more efficiently The people does not already experience the euphoria about authorities as was during the Yeltsin period. That is why, unless authorities act resolutely and efficiently, resistance may begin. I see the task of authorities in removing the barriers preventing people from actively and conscientiously building their life. Question: You have left the corridors of powers and have engaged in party building. You have been in opposition all these years. Why? Answer: I don't think that the guilt of our governments in the past few years is that they governed the country inefficiently. Their guilt is quite different: they failed to organise the process of elaborating the country's development model. Meanwhile, it is the intelligentsias's elite that can and must elaborate this model. I am in opposition because I believe it necessary to be an opponent to any government that carries out reform. This is like during the defence of a thesis: it may be good or bad but there must be an opponent. ******* #11 Major Clash Shaping Up Between Rightest Politicians and Military Chiefs on Military Reform Obshchaya Gazeta 13 December 2001 [translation for personal use only] Article by Maksim Glinkin on the opposition of military leaders to the urgent military reforms called for by the Union of Progressive Forces, particularly General Kvashin's opposition to the UPF's draft bill that would end the current conscription system and facilitate a transition to service by contract. Last Friday, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov conducted a conference at which Boris Nemtsov and Yegor Gaydar, leaders of the SPS [Union of Progressive Forces, hereafter UPF], presented their plan for military reform. The Prime Minister approved the program for the transition of the Armed Forces to a contract system for recruiting, beginning in 2003. However, the confrontation concerning the issues pertaining to [service] terms and the form for the modernization of the Army is just beginning to flare up. The right-wing politicians are saying that a unique replacement [of the old system] will occur. Although it was precisely at their suggestion that the Kremlin decided to start re-structuring the Army, the military is trying to seize the initiative. Instead of the plan of Nemtsov and Gaydar, according to which it is possible, and necessary, to set about making the reforms as early as 2003, the generals are attempting to persuade President Putin not to hurry and to wait until the year 2004, when the specialists in epaulets will present their own plan for modernization. And the service would, on the whole, begin implementing the new rules in the year 2010. That is, right after the end of the second term of the presidency of Vladimir Putin. "Of course, there are things in life which it is pleasant to do without hurrying. But the re-structuring of the Army is not included in that category." Professor Vitaliy Tsymbal, Director of the Laboratory of Military Economics of the Institute of Economics of the Transition Period [IETP] made that statement. He was the very person who headed the group of experts who, in compliance to the order of Yegor Gaydar, worked out a detailed (and economically and statistically well-founded) program for the gradual transition of the Army to a system that would bring it up to strength through the recruiting of contract soldiers. The "know-how" of the developers [of this system] from the Institute of Economics of the Transition Period consists of the following: fixed-term service must be reduced to six months and it must be based upon a completely new concept. Instead of spending two years in drills, cleaning the barracks, and building dachas for generals, the soldiers undergoing fixed-term service should acquire a specific specialty (and preferably, each soldier should acquire a specialty for which he is inclined) in six months [of training] and, after that, they should make their choice. They would either link their life up with the Army, which would provide the young person with a definite set of social guarantees and a stable wage that is above average or, after receiving the necessary training, they would transfer over to the reserve and be ready for mobilization at the first call of the their homeland. The authors of this project emphasize that is not necessary to change the Constitution in order to put such a reform into effect. The mandatory call-up would be preserved. But the call-up campaign would become much easier. The young people, who would agree not to gather together large amounts of money for bribing doctors and military commissars [note: reference here is to the current problem of bribery and draft-doging in the military commissariats] and who would receive initial military training (incidentally, at the other end of the world) for six months, would be immeasurably greater in number than those who are coming into the Army today, and [going] to the front. All the same, the military leadership has no alternative. Every subsequent call-up campaign takes place with a big creaking and crunching; those who are "drawn into the net" are only the poorest and darkest layers of the population. In such conditions, the Army is doomed to degradation. Changes in this system are necessary not only for the young people and their parents. With the expansion of the call-up base, the quality of the contract soldiers will also change [for the better]. A half year of fixed-term service will serve as its own kind of personnel filter. The contracts will be concluded not with "dark forces" from the street but with persons who have been checked out and tested in 6-8 months of training [i. e., after the six months of training, those young people who show an inclination toward life in the military will be offered contracts]. Opponents of the UPF plan ask: Will the number of those persons who want to conclude contracts be sufficient to [attain the troop levels] that are necessary for maintaining the defensive capability of the country? And will there be enough money for pay to those persons who go beyond fixed-term service, such that they will not be drawn away by [the enticements] of civilian life? On the whole, it is to these quantitative questions that the research of the IETP laboratory is devoted. By order of the Gaydar Institute, the VTsIOM [All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Issues] conducted an all-Russian survey (men from age 18 to age 28 filled out the questionnaires). The survey participants were asked what salary they would want if they agreed to serve, taking into consideration the fact that they would be fed, clothed, medically treated, and provided with roofs over their heads at no charge. The results of the survey were as follows: 400,000 young men would agree to sign a contract for 3,000 rubles per month (the survey was carried out in May) and, if the pay were 4,000 rubles a month, 900,000 thousand young men would be ready for [contract] service. But just how many contract soldiers are needed by our Armed Forces? The basis for the calculations were the rates at which the scheduled reduction of the Armed Forces will be conducted: By 2005, there should be 542 thousand privates and sergeants in the Armed Forces (see statistics at end of this article). According to the plan of the UPF, this goal will be achieved if the number of fixed-term conscriptees is brought to the level of 142,000 troops and the number of contract soldiers is increased from the present number of 150,000 such troops to the level of 400,000 troops. If the standard for pay is set at a level of 3,500 rubles, then, as indicated by the statistical calculations that have been presented, there will be more than enough young men who want to serve in the Armed Forces. It would be such that it would not be necessary to take one applicant after another for contract service. The contract soldiers could be selected by competition, with approximately two applicants competing for each position. At present, the generals can only dream of such selectivity in replenishing the troop levels. But will the people really go for the contracts? Have our sociologists made an assessment of the situation? The developers of the reform are convinced: Yes, they will go for the contracts and that is indicated by our own experience in recent years. In the middle of the 1990s, 300,000 contract soldiers were already serving (that is less, by a fourth, than the number needed) [i. e., the author is saying here that the figure of 300,000 is 100,000 contract soldiers less than the figure of 400,000 that he cited in the preceding paragraph]. Then, [After the middle of the 1990s], the number of contract soldiers in the Armed Forces was cut in half due to delays in pay for the soldiers and also because it [the pay] fell below the average pay [being received by workers] in the country. Incidentally, the authors of this program are making a special note: With the upward spiral of inflation, the pay for the soldiers must be indexed accordingly [i. e., the pay rate must be adjusted to the inflation rate] so that it [the soldiers' pay] can be maintained at approximately twenty percent above the average. But is that possible? Is there enough money in the budget? The calculations of the experts also make it possible to give a positive answer to that question: There is no need whatsoever for any special infusions into the military budget for reform. In four years, additional money for the modernization of the Armed Forces will consist of only 5 percent of the total amount of planned expenditures. So even the increased pay is only a meager part in the kitty [i. e., the over-all pool of funds] of the military. The critics of this plan have one more argument: You will not entice [young people into the service] with a good, stable rate of pay alone. It is necessary to create the appropriate working conditions for the contract soldiers and provide apartments for them. But, to be sure, there just isn't enough money for that, taking into consideration the fact that, at present, even the officers stand in line for years waiting for free housing. The plan of Tsymbal holds a trump card here too: Free housing will be provided only after 10 years [of service]. It is possible simply not to conclude a fourth contract with those who have served out three three-year contracts, in the case of personnel who don't turn out to be particularly valuable [to the military]. As for the working conditions and life in the military community, they, of course, must be improved. But, on the other hand, how long must the Russian soldier live in "cattle-pen" conditions? Will money be found for a transition from life in the barracks to life in a community home? The money will be found if the money obtained from [sale of ] the real estate that was vacated as a result of the over-all reduction of the Army is spent in a rational manner. Vitaliy Tsymbal made the following statement: "Over a period of ten years, the military has vacated an enormous number of housing accommodations and premises. Excellent private residences were transferred into private hands in the center of Moscow. Where is the money? That is the question being asked. Why has the sale of the vacated housing been having no effect whatsoever on the current [deplorable] state [of housing for the troops] in the Army? ". In a word, the transition to a contract basis [for recruiting soldiers] is completely realistic. People will link up their lot with the Army if the appropriate conditions are created. And the government has the resources for creating such conditions. Aleksey Kudrin, Minister of Finance, confirmed that, after he became familiar with the plan of the right-wing politicians. And Mikhail Kasyanov also came to that same opinion. After the conference, he declared that the concept is acceptable and that means that real funding for the program can be started as early as the year 2003. But, as before, the generals are speaking out against the plans of the UPF, particularly with regards to the [service] terms. At this same conference,[General] Kvashin, Chief of the General Staff, spoke about the impossibility of accepting the program of Nemtsov and Gaydar. He indicated that it is necessary to make a transition to the new system carefully and gradually, after first experimenting in individual units and arms of service. But that is subterfuge. Right now, there are military units and formations which are already completely manned by contract soldiers. [For example], there is the 201-st [Motorized-Rifle] Division in Tajikistan. Every single soldier in that division is serving by contract. The experiment was carried out long ago and there is no reason not to set about instituting the reform, without delay. But just why are the generals so opposed [to the plan] ? Is it not in their interests to have, among their subordinates, people who are exceptionally professional [i. e. people who are highly qualified], responsible, and interested in real service, not in the profanation of service [to their country] ? The problem, evidently, lies in the fact that, with a change in the quality of the Army, the quality of the generals themselves will have to improve. They will no longer be able to treat the rank-and-file soldiers as their serfs, as a free and dumb working force [i. e., the privates will no longer be available to the generals for the building of private dachas for them, etc.]. It will be necessary to arrange completely new relations between the military leaders and their subordinates. Having served in another system [i. e., the old system] all their lives, many people [in the military leadership] simply are not ready for such an in-depth psychological re-structuring. The military chiefs are also not pleased by the fact that this plan will require very many efforts on their part: It will be necessary to create conditions in the soldiers' work and way of life such that service in the Army will really be attractive. In this sense, it is much easier [for the generals] if nothing changes. Well, and finally, the reform will cause a big loss to those chiefs who will be deprived of their shady financial flows and dealings. If the previous call-up system were kept in place, they could continue to receive, on a regular basis, from the ?"hiding?"" young people [Russian: "kosyashchey" molodozhi]. The right-wing politicians fear that the military registration and enlistment offices will be the main obstacles on the path of reform. Indeed, if the desire is great, it will be possible to sabotage the transition to a professional system by disrupting [i. e., by intentionally obstructing] the campaign for the recruitment of contract soldiers. Although, after heated debates at the Prime Minister's conference, the Army leadership also approved the concept of Nemtsov and Gaydar, the resistance to it [on the part of the military leadership] will be great. That is demonstrated by the recent statements by the Minister of Defense. Sergey Ivanov [Minister of Defense] is asserting that, as it is, the number of contract soldiers will steadily grow and that the expenses for the UPF reform alone will exceed the total budget for the Armed Forces. If people who are preparing reports for the Minister of Defense are resorting to such blatant misinformation, that that means that they are ready do a great deal of things, if only not to allow a real modernization of the Armed Forces of Russia. The numerical strength of the ranks-and-file soldiers [soldiers who are not non-commissioned officers or officers] will change in the period 2001-2005, in accordance with the SPS plan, as follows: Soldiers serving two years in the system that is in effect will number 526, 000 at the end of 2001; 492,000 in 2002; 401,000 in 2003; 172,000 in 2004; and 0 in 2005. Soldiers serving 6-8 months in training centers of the reserve will number 0 at the end of 2001; 0 in 2002; 17,000 in 2003; 108,000 in 2004; and 142,000 in 2005. Soldiers serving by contract will number 150,000 at the end of 2001; 150,000 in 2002; 157,000 in 2003; 267,000 in 2004; and 400,000 in 2005. The total number of rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants will number 676,000 at the end of 2001; 642,000 in 2002; 575,000 in 2003; 542, 000 in 2004; and 542,000 in 2005. *******