Johnson's Russia List #5601 16 December 2001 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: DJ: In the last few days I have been receiving many bounced messages--returned to me as undeliverable--from hotmail.com and mail.ru email addresses. I'm not sure that any of these are getting thru and the reasons are unclear. Please get in touch with me if you are receiving as I am close to deleting all these addresses, and there are many. 1. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Decision time for Russia in Afghanistan. Putin must choose between working with U.S. and going it alone. 2. pravda.ru: MARINA ROMANOVA: PUTIN SETS HIMSELF TO YELTSIN'S "GUARDS." 3. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, CUTTING OIL EXPORTS IS NO BLUFF. But Rising Natural Monopoly Tariffs are Very Dangerous. 4. Sharon Tennison: Re: OPORA Conference in Moscow; and Moscow Times Simon Ostrovsky, Kremlin Befriends Small Business. 5. Prosecutor dismisses half of charges against Pasko. 6. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, USSR Breakup: Ten Years After, Russia Fights For Influence Over CIS States. 7. Center for Strategic & International Studies: ALEXANDER NIKITIN ON THE CIVIC FORUM. 8. Sovietskaya Rossia: Vyacheslav Tetekin, Putin's Ten Blows.] ******* #1 The Russia Journal December 14-20, 2001 Decision time for Russia in Afghanistan Putin must choose between working with U.S. and going it alone By ALEXANDER GOLTS The Russian authorities appear to be in some debate as to where to go from here in Afghanistan. On the day Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov gave assurances in Brussels that under no circumstances would Russian troops enter Afghanistan, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in the Tajik capital Dushanbe was not quite so categorical. Sergei Ivanov spoke at length on what kind of mandate international peacekeeping forces could obtain. Many journalists concluded that Moscow had not ruled out the idea of sending its troops to Afghanistan. Defense Ministry analysts seem not to have imagined the U.S. strikes would make the Taliban defenses crumble so fast. As a result, the Kremlin has found itself without a clear strategy with regard to Afghanistan. So far, Russia has cause to be happy with the way events in Afghanistan are unfolding. Russia had called the fundamentalist Taliban regime one of the greatest threats to its security and had plans to deploy a 50,000-strong group of soldiers to oppose this threat. But now the world’s most powerful country has taken military action and has liquidated the threat itself. Washington isn’t insisting in the slightest that Russia increase its participation. Indeed, the Americans have been rather skeptical of late about the need to deploy any foreign peacekeeping contingents. The Pentagon is aware of the risk of being dragged into a guerrilla war. "One of the lessons of Afghan history that we are trying to take into account in this campaign is that foreigners should not go into Afghanistan," said U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. "And if they do go in there, they shouldn’t stay too long." Afghanistan’s new rulers aren’t exactly overjoyed at the idea of a foreign military presence in their country, not when they have power struggles of their own looming. Gen. Rashid Dustum’s disagreement with the outcome of the Bonn conference on Afghanistan’s new government and the inter-factional fighting in Kandahar is just a taste of things to come. Western European leaders and United Nations officials worried that the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign could diminish their status on the world stage look to be the biggest supporters of sending in foreign peacekeepers. A similar thing happened in the early 1990s when individual countries and international organizations rushed to participate in the Yugoslavia peace process only in order to strengthen their own political authority. The Americans have not demanded that Russia take part in a peacekeeping operation. The United States is happy to have Moscow supply it with intelligence and the Northern Alliance with Soviet arms. Russia should now take advantage of the favorable international situation to concentrate on other more pressing issues, including military reform. But instead, Russia has got the Realpolitik itch again. With the United States looking increasingly likely to remain in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for some time – U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s recent visit only confirmed this – Russian geopolitical strategists are looking for ways to demonstrate a Russian presence in Afghanistan. Just recall the lightning setting up of a Russian hospital in Kabul under the protection of Emergency Situations Ministry troops. Powell called Moscow the next day to clarify the situation and assure himself that this was not a new "descent on Pristina." Given the complicated nature of the situation in Afghanistan, the Americans consider it very important that all foreign forces apply a common approach to the peace process in their dealings with the various Afghan groups and not play on the contradictions between the United States, Russia, Western European countries and a number of Muslim countries. Russia now faces the temptation of trying to raise its international prestige by following its own course, as it did throughout the Yugoslav peace process. It looks like Russian politicians want to repeat this experience in Afghanistan. This is what Defense Minister Ivanov was hinting at. What is more, the Russian media actively discussed rumors last week that Russian military specialists were already in Afghanistan, having arrived there along with dozens of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery equipment sent by Russia to the Northern Alliance. But these hopes and plans (fortunately or unfortunately) have little to do with reality. Russia’s experience in the Yugoslav peace process shows this. The Kremlin thought it was following its own policy, but in reality Belgrade was making cunning use of Moscow’s desire for an independent course and was playing Russia off against the West. As a result, Russia made no gains at all. In the end, what counted was not the brave stunt pulled off by Russian paratroopers when they seized Pristina’s airport, but the financial possibilities of countries participating in the peacekeeping operations and able to take on the decisive role in rebuilding a country that had seen its infrastructure destroyed by years of civil war. It is obvious that even if Russian soldiers did enter Afghanistan again, Moscow would not be able to play an independent role there. Above all, this is because Russia can afford no more than a symbolic presence – it simply does not have the required number of ground forces for more. And unless it makes serious investments in rebuilding infrastructure in Afghanistan (which Germany or Britain but not Russia can afford), it has no hope of gaining influence there. Finally, there is also no forgetting the history of Russia’s relations with the Afghans, which is complicated to say the least. President Vladimir Putin now has to decide what is more important – using his opportunities to help develop a common policy within the anti-terrorist coalition and helping to back it up with his "special relations" with some of the Afghan field commanders such as Gen. Dustum, or using his limited opportunities to follow some kind of independent policy. To take the second approach would mean that the Americans would go from seeing Russia as a partner to seeing it as an obstacle to the implementation of their own policies. Ultimately, Russia has to choose between playing a visible but nonetheless limited role in international affairs and an attempt to play the role of superpower once more. Russia’s future will depend on this choice. (The writer is a correspondent for Yezhenedelny Zhurnal.) ******* #2 pravda.ru December 14, 2001 MARINA ROMANOVA: PUTIN SETS HIMSELF TO YELTSIN'S "GUARDS" One of Boris Yeltsin's brothers-in-arms, Valentin Yumashev (former journalist, author of all Yeltsin's books, once-head of President Administration), who recently married Yeltsin's daughter, 41-year-old Tatyana Dyachenko, is afraid of turning Russia into a police state. Last week, Yumashev invited editors of influential Russian newspapers into an elite Moscow restaurant, where he sorrowfully warned them about a "persecution campaign in style of 1930s" and said that "after having brought Putin to power, members of Yeltsin's team start to feel uncomfortable near to their protege." Yumashev's criticism coincided with dismissal and in some cases even with criminal prosecution of some Yeltsin's former brothers-in-arms. In particular, the investigation of ex-communications minister Nikolai Aksenenko's activities is regarded by some observers as a kind of "challenge" to the "family". Aksenenko is accused of non-purposeful use of money in sum of 1.6 million pounds sterling, now he is officially on vacation. This November, press minister Mikhail Lesin also suddenly went on leave, after auditors started to check up his ministry's activity. First day of his tenure as acting president, Putin signed a decree guaranteeing Yeltsin's immunity from a criminal prosecution. This decision was preceded by scandals connected with corruption, which caused some questions to Yeltsin and Tatyana Dyachenko. According to experts, it is hardly possible that Putin will once break his word given to Yeltsin. Though Yeltsin's camp seems to be alarmed. ******** #3 From: "Stanislav Menshikov" Subject: CUTTING OIL EXPORTS IS NO BLUFF Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2001 "MOSCOW TRIBUNE", 14 December 2001 CUTTING OIL EXPORTS IS NO BLUFF But Rising Natural Monopoly Tariffs are Very Dangerous By Stanislav Menshikov The decision to cut Russian oil exports by 150,000 barrels per day has been called by some onlookers sheer pretence and bluff. Because the country usually sells abroad less oil than usual in the winter months the reduction would be discounted by the market and have no appreciable effect on prices. Andrei Illarionov, the president's economic adviser, believes that intervening in cutting exports is nonsensical particularly in the midst of an international recession. The government and president seem to think otherwise, and in this controversy we tend to take their side. Cutting exports is meant not only for the coming winter but also for the whole of 2002. If other oil exporters follow suit, as expected, the overall reduction of 2 million barrels coming on top of the previous cut of 3,3 million earlier this year should seriously influence prices. A lot will depend on actual demand, i. e. on the global economic slump. But it goes without saying that with significantly lower supply prices will be higher than if no action to cut production and exports was taken. Prices might not return to the $30 per barrel peaks of late 2000 but should be higher than the $10 troughs of 1998. An intermediate price of $20 would probably suit both producers and consumers. Unfortunately, there is too much politicking around oil. Russia has been criticised for siding with OPEC and thus negatively affecting its new relationship with the West. Well, every country seeks its best interest. Trying to assure adequate oil prices and a balanced federal budget is a legitimate national concern to follow. If Washington feels that it can abrogate the ABM Treaty despite Russia's objections, then it is only fair that Moscow is free to side with OPEC despite western objections. One should stress that in this matter Messrs Putin and Kasyanov had no other alternative. Had the West suggested a way of compensating Russia for its fiscal loss from low oil prices things might have worked out differently. However, exactly at this point the EU officially made it known that it would recognise Russia as a market economy only if Moscow discontinued export duties and halted double pricing in the energy sector. Fiscal compensation by the West was obviously never seriously considered. This message also came at a time when according to government statistics economic growth in Russia stopped in November for the first time in many months. Because industry is still operating at less than capacity the only reason is stagnating demand caused by slower capital investment and inadequate consumer purchases. This in turn depends on rising prices. In recent months, official inflation has been minimal. But opinion polls show that a large part of the public does not believe government price statistics and is concerned about falling real incomes. The government is promising to raise salaries of government employees (including low paid teachers and doctors) next year by an average of 60 percent, but, as it turns out, has not appropriated the necessary funds in its 2002 budget. The promise could easily become fiction. Moreover, in a recent cabinet meeting German Gref, the Economics Minister, suggested that the three natural monopolies - electricity, gas and railways - should be permitted to raise their tariffs next year by an average of 35 percent instead of only 20 percent envisaged by the federal budget. According to Mr. Gref this would increase general inflation in 2002 from 12 to 15,5 percent, which he did not consider excessive. According to the minister, the cabinet agreed. But Andrei Illarionov immediately protested saying that no decision was taken and that the cabinet should disagree with Mr. Gref. According to Mr. Illarionov, more inflation would tend to slow down general economic growth and thus add to the president's political troubles. In this particular case we tend to agree with Mr. Putin's adviser. The extra 3 percent in inflation next year could easily deduct the same amount from real GDP growth making it a miserly 1 percent instead of 4. Because Mr. Gref has not published his methodology, some experts believe that actual inflation next year could be much higher. Neither have the natural monopolies explained in plain language and straight figures why they need their excessive tariff increases. One argument is that Russian electricity and gas prices are way below western levels. But so are wages and other incomes that are needed to buy them. The EU may want Russia to discontinue double pricing in the energy and transport sectors but the reality is such that this can be done only slowly and without cutting into real incomes. Otherwise the economy may stop growing completely and easily end up in another crisis. As it approaches Christmas and New Year the government finds itself caught up in the difficult position of fighting on two fronts simultaneously - against low prices abroad and high prices inside the country. Whether it can safely navigate between Scylla of outside recession and Charibdia of its own natural monopolies is so far an open question. ****** #4 Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2001 From: Sharon Tennison Subject: Re: OPORA Conference in MOscow Dec 4-5, 2001 A conference designed to attract Russia's scrappy regional entrepreneurs occurred in Moscow Dec 4/5. I believe its happening is worth sharing with your readers. The OPORA conference was Putin-initiated, but entrepreneurial-driven by the 1100 entrepreneurs present (300 of them from CCI's US-based internship program, PEP). They streamed through the doors of the Academy of Sciences campus determined to be heard-and were taken seriously. At Putin's request, a handful of these home-grown entrepreneurs met with him at the conference's end. In private they challenged each other to identify and eradicate endemic corruption and other barriers to SME development. At a concurrent meeting, Illarionov and other Putin advisors met with additional SME regional owners, gathering specifics on how to attack the manifold obstacles to business development in Russia. News from this OPORA event and video footage was was given top billing every hour on the hour until midnight on several Russian TV channels. Since nothing has showed up in JRL or in American media about this conference (or OPORA next steps), would you be interested in a short article from the lone American who attended this conference? I thought your readers might enjoy the event's Moscow Times' assessment (MT is not known for being kindly predisposed to officially-blessed initiatives). It follows. Sincerely, Sharon Tennison President, Center for Citizen Initiatives Moscow Times Friday, Dec. 7, 2001. Page 5 Kremlin Befriends Small Business By Simon Ostrovsky Staff Writer A group of small- and medium-enterprise lobbyists came away from a meeting with President Vladimir Putin late Wednesday feeling hopeful and understood, saying, "We have a friend in the Kremlin." The lobbyists represented the Russian Entrepreneurial Organization's Union, or OPORa -- meaning "support" in Russian. Founded last spring, the group is the largest small-business lobby in Russia, with 70 entrepreneurial unions as members. The meeting signified a sea change in the government's attitude toward small and medium enterprise, or SME. At a news conference after meeting with Putin on Wednesday, OPORa leaders praised the president's detailed understanding of the problems the sector faces. "The president made it clear that his position is if we don't create a powerful layer of SMEs in our economy, Russia will remain an underdeveloped, export-oriented country, highly dependent on natural resources," said OPORa co-chairman Alexander Ioffe. However, the group was surprised by the government's inability to formulate a policy on supporting SMEs. "There is an understanding in dialogue, but it has to be filled [with concrete measures]," said OPORa co-chairwoman Dina Smekalova. To create a unified national policy on SMEs, a working group comprising 30 regional leaders and businessmen is writing a proposal that will be presented to the State Council, a consultative body of regional leaders, created and headed by Putin, on Dec. 18. The recommendations the State Council makes will be incorporated into a number of legislative reforms affecting SMEs. Ioffe, one of the members of the working group, outlined three major impediments to the development of small business: a subjective taxation approach, multiple administrative barriers and lack of financing. Administrative barriers routinely faced by SMEs range from the lengthy process of registering a company -- according to a recent Renaissance Capital report, it takes an average of three times longer than in other emerging markets -- to liquifying a company, and everything in between, including routine inspections by administrative and regulatory bodies. In response, Putin asked OPORa to prepare a list of departments and agencies that abuse their power to make money out of small business. The lack of financial backing for small businesses stems from the reluctance of banks to credit them because of "SMEs' inability to offer collateral on loans," said OPORa member Andrei Nasonov. "To obtain credit you need collateral. To have collateral, you need property, in most cases real estate. To have real estate, you need the law on land," Nasonov said. Although owning land will become possible under the new Land Code, this won't happen until contradictions in legislation are smoothed over. Meanwhile, tax reforms aimed at easing the life of small businesses are already under way. Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov said at a banking conference this week in London that new legislation will take effect in 2003, Prime-Tass reported. "We're working on making some amendments to the tax law," said Alexei Sorokin, head of the Finance Ministry tax policy department. "We hope to present new legislation to the government in the first half of 2002." But not all problems facing SMEs can be blamed on external barriers, according to Alexei Moiseyev, co-author of a Renaissance Capital report on small businesses in Russia. "Although administrative barriers and legislation are a major problem in Russia, a Soviet mentality among many proprietors themselves is a hindrance to the sector's growth, especially in the regions," Moiseyev said. The report describes how businessmen frequently work for their own interests at the cost of their companies. "The development of small business will be evolutionary," Moiseyev said. "Perhaps the children of today's businessmen will better understand the workings of the market." ******* #5 Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2001 Subject: Prosecutor dismisses half of charges against Pasko From: "John P. Deever" Dear David: Thorough summaries of the latest events in Grigory Pasko's 9-year sentence for treason are being quickly posted on the Bellona website, http://www.bellona.no. An short excerpt from Jon Gauslaa's most recent announcement from Friday's events follows. John P. Deever Publications Program Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia 1601 Connecticut Ave NW #301 Washington DC 20009 tel: 202-387-3034, fax: 202-667-3291 http://www.isar.org Charges significantly limited In his closing speech, prosecutor Aleksandr Kondakov dismissed more than half of the charges against Pasko. Kondakov also made other changes, that indicates that even he realises that his case is a weak one. Jon Gauslaa, 2001-12-14 20:41 Kondakov dismissed five of the ten episodes Pasko were charged with. Still he asked the Court to declare Pasko guilty in state treason under article 275 of the Penal Code, to strip him of all his military distinctions and to sentence him to nine years of hard labour. No helmet for Putin This is three years below the minimum sentence for state treason. The reason why Kondakov went way below the minimum sentence is that Pasko is the father of two children, and that it was not established that his actions had inserted any damage. The latter is interesting, as the admirals Dorogin and Zakharenko, who in early November were flown in from Moscow in order to testify, despite not being entered on the list of witnesses, both insisted that the damage caused by Pasko had been huge. Zakharenko even claimed that the Fleet had to re-work all its battle plans because of Pasko. However, there were also aggravating circumstances in the case, said Kondakov, and brought special attention to "the fact" that there is still an official state of war between Russia and Japan, since the two countries have never signed a peace-treaty after WW II. This lead to the following remark from Anatoly Pyshkin, one of Pasko's attorneys, -- How come then, that president Putin did not wear a battle helmet last time he visited Japan? The prosecutor's resurrection At the end of the prosecutor's speech, an argument erupted between Kondakov and Pasko's other attorney Ivan Pavlov, who asked the prosecutor if he had agreed his position with his superiors. The prosecutor returned the question and asked if Pavlov had agreed his position with his superiors as well. -- Do you mean with the CIA, Pavlov asked ironically. Kondakov remained silent, but this seemed to be exactly what he meant. [[remainder of this article available at www.bellona.no]] Journalist Grigory Pasko was arrested on November 20, 1997 on charges of espionage on behalf of the Japanese TV-channel NHK. He was acquitted in July 1999, but convicted of 'abuse of official authority' and freed under an amnesty. Seeking a full acquittal, Pasko appealed, but so did the prosecution, insisting he was a spy. On November 21, 2000 the Military Supreme Court sent the case back for a re-trial at the Pacific Fleet Court, where the re-trial has been going on since July 11, 2001. ****** #6 USSR Breakup: Ten Years After, Russia Fights For Influence Over CIS States (Part 2) By Kathleen Knox The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was originally seen as a surrogate for the Soviet Union. Now, however, it is widely derided as an ineffectual talking shop. Russia's efforts to treat the former Soviet republics as its special sphere of influence have had mixed results. Where, if anywhere, will Russian influence in the CIS remain significant? Prague, 14 December 2001 (RFE/RL) -- It's been 10 years since Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislau Shushkevich, the head of Minsk's Soviet-era parliament, in a forest villa in Belarus to sign the Soviet Union's death warrant. The Belovezh Agreement they struck on 8 December 1991 abolished the Soviet Union and established a commonwealth of independent states, initially between their three countries. Within two weeks, eight more republics -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- agreed to join the group. When Georgia finally signed up and Azerbaijan, after a brief absence, rejoined in 1993, all the former Soviet republics except the three Baltic states -- which struck out on a pro-Western path of their own -- had returned to the fold. Ten years on, however, the CIS is credited with accomplishing little beyond helping to prevent the violent disintegration of the Soviet Union -- the so-called "Yugoslav scenario." But the commonwealth did not prevent subsequent civil wars or conflicts among its member countries -- in Tajikistan, Moldova, and Georgia, and between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The CIS has fallen short of its original promise in other ways as well. At summit after summit, grand plans for greater regional cooperation have been aired -- including one for a free-trade area -- but with few substantive results. If the CIS has degenerated into a high-level talking shop, the reason for it may be clear: Many of the former republics fear Russia sees the regional grouping as a way to restore its control over them. Such Russian domination is perfectly acceptable to some -- notably Alyaksandr Lukashenka's Belarus, which has a largely symbolic union treaty with Russia. But it is decidedly not to others' taste. Recently, Ukraine's Kravchuk, now a deputy in the Ukrainian parliament, expressed this view: "If everything remains the same, [the CIS] has no future. The problem is that Russia, before and now, is trying to play a leading role in this body. An international body cannot be efficient if one country wants to be a leader in economic, political, military affairs of the CIS. This would not help boost the authority of this structure because you see inequality. When you have inequality the structure would have no perspectives." The quarrels over Russian influence were there from the beginning. Azerbaijan accused Russia of siding with Armenia in its conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Georgia accused Russia of supporting separatists in Abkhazia, which gained de facto independence from Tbilisi in 1993 after a short war. The darker side of Russian influence was articulated in an article in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" newspaper, published in early 1997 by two influential policy analysts, who urged Russia to sabotage any individual alliances between the successor states in order to keep them under its influence. Whether or not the blueprint accurately reflected Russian thought at the time, that same year, four of the CIS republics formed a pro-Western grouping -- GUAM -- comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. This effectively split the CIS into two groups -- a division that was further heightened two years later when Uzbekistan joined GUAM and, along with Georgia and Azerbaijan, pulled out of the CIS's collective security treaty. Svante Cornell is an expert at Johns Hopkins University's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. He says GUAM marked a reversal in the early 1990s trend toward increasing Russian influence in the former Soviet republics. "The late 90s showed a decrease of Russian influence and actually a splitting of the CIS into what we could call pro-Russian or integrationist, and anti-Russian [groups or] groups that were intent on diminishing the role of the CIS as an organization." Another regional grouping to emerge -- this time including countries outside the CIS area -- was the Shanghai Five, formed in 1996. Led by Russia and China, its aim was seen as providing a counterweight to U.S. and European influence in the region. The group included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan -- and added Uzbekistan this year, when it became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Cornell says the group's emergence fits into Russia's attempt -- since President Vladimir Putin came to power -- to restore its influence over the republics formerly under Moscow's yoke. For example, he says Putin exploited the threat of Islamic terrorism -- which both Russia and Uzbekistan say they are fighting -- to attract Tashkent back into the fold. "In the case of Central Asia, I think that was very successful until September 11, because by the summer of 2001, the Shanghai Five had become the Shanghai Six -- in fact, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- and was emerging as perhaps the leading regional forum or regional organization in Central Asia, which was counteracting Western -- especially American -- interests in the region, and also counteracting, by that same token, the factual independence of the Central Asian states. But that, I think, was changed significantly after September 11." Since the September attacks on the U.S., Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and -- most notably -- Uzbekistan have let foreign forces use their airbases for the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan said it would consider granting such a request, if asked, and Turkmenistan has opened its airspace to U.S. planes, but only for humanitarian flights. Cornell said "September 11 was a breakthrough in that it showed that the Central Asian states -- in cases that, granted, were of an extreme severity, such as deciding whether or not to acquiesce to U.S. demands or requests -- could actually act without, or even against, the wishes of Moscow. And I think that's extremely important to note." He says 11 September shifted Central Asia's geopolitical landscape and undid efforts to exert Russian-Chinese control over the region. For example, Uzbekistan -- newly empowered by its partnership with the U.S. in the antiterrorism campaign -- did not send representatives to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's first meeting after the attacks. But the long-term ramifications are still unclear, as it remains to be seen how long the U.S. will maintain a presence in the region. A prolonged stay could antagonize Russia, which is likely to see Central Asia as a sphere of influence for the foreseeable future. Helge Blakkisrud is head of the Center for Russian Studies at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. He says Russian influence is also likely to remain strong in Armenia, which has a military alliance with Moscow. And he notes that there have also been some pro-Russia noises coming from Ukraine recently. "For instance, from the Ukrainian convention in Moscow it was reported that the Ukrainian deputy prime minister said that Ukraine's way into Europe goes through Moscow. I'm not sure if that's a sign of a new policy or if it just should be interpreted as part of the electoral campaign. But it might mean that Ukraine again is tilting toward the East." Two recent initiatives within the CIS could result in considerable growth in Russian influence in the economic sphere. One is the Eurasian Economic Community, comprising Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. Founded last October, its aim is to promote integration and a single economic space. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, the driving force behind the grouping, urged closer ties between CIS members at the group's anniversary summit in Moscow at the end of last month. And he called on the CIS's oil-producing countries to establish an organization similar to OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. "I made a proposal to the Russian president. We should set up our oil and gas alliance in the CIS. For example, it is now evident that Kazakhstan and Russia are going to be the main oil exporters in our region. We can [also] ask Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan to join." Cornell says this idea has potential, depending on what Russia's role in such an organization would be. "If it would mean granting Russia a similar role to what Saudi Arabia has in OPEC, that means increasing Russian leverage over the oil producing states in the region, [and] I think that [the] other states would not be interested in joining that. But if it could be a true forum for cooperation among the oil-producing countries of the former Soviet Union, which would work for their common interests rather than only supporting or defending or promoting the interests of one dominant country, there are some possibilities to develop that idea." He says this would fit into a broader change in how Russia attempts to exert its influence over the CIS member states. With its economy in relatively good shape, economic pressure is proving more useful than political means and military threats. ******** #7 Excerpt ALEXANDER NIKITIN ON THE CIVIC FORUM RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM SEMINAR Center for Strategic & International Studies www.csis.org Washington, D.C. December 13, 2001 MR. NIKITIN: One more time, good day, and thank you for coming. The topic I'm going to discuss today has been discussed very actively in Russia …. There've been jokes going around in terms of this, because President Putin is surrounded by many people who are former generals, former military, and when asked how they would build civil society, they call everybody to attention, tell them to get into rows, and they say "Comrade General, we have a civil society." And for the first time in Russian history, on the 21st and 22nd of November, there was a meeting of representatives of civil society organizations and the authorities. It was done in the Kremlin. And a few statistics in Russia today from the Ministry of Justice. We found out there are over 350,000 registered NGOs and 90,000 active NGOs. And over 3,453 representatives of NGOs traveled to Moscow representing all various regions of Russia. Those people represented many different NGOs. Twenty percent of them, approximately, represented environmental and human rights NGOs. And the process of preparation for this meeting actually began on the 12th of June of this year after President Putin met with 12 representatives of NGOs. And at that meeting on the 12th, apparently there were a number of people called to meet with Mr. Putin that were deemed to be incapable of saying anything bad about the president. And, nevertheless, they said it is necessary for us to conduct some sort of a convention, and afterwards the convention became actually a forum. And the first meeting that was conducted at this not-so-small event was designed to be a political show where representatives of civil society would express a unified view in support of the president. And the first committee worked in this direction. In addition to that, there were committees set up in all different regions who were also electing candidates that would attend. But the organizers of this forum, approximately in September, actually approached environmental NGOs and human rights NGOs, in particular Memorial and the Helsinki group based in Moscow. They asked them to participate in this conference. And these organizations actually established some conditions for their participation. Firstly, the itinerary or the agenda would not be that as it had previously been designed, and a few other conditions as well, which I will discuss further. And these other conditions included that one-third of the composition of committees should remain as it was earlier, the people who had worked for these committees. One-third of the committees should be made up of the representatives of human rights and the environmental organizations; and one-third of the committees should be made up of representatives of the authority; in other words, the administration of President Putin. And in addition to that, one other demand they had was that the people who come to Moscow would not be chosen by the local authorities, but, instead, by people that were nominated and put forward by the society itself, that these are people who actually wanted to be there, and they wanted to meet with the authorities. And the organizers of this forum had nothing left to do but to agree, because otherwise it would look very funny, and it would have nothing but a negative connotation. And so I'll jump forward a little bit just to say that even though this forum was prepared in June, by the time it actually was proceeding in November, none of the organizers of the forum, none of the representatives of the NGOs, none of the representatives of the media had any idea -- they had no idea of what was going to happen, because, according to our thinking, to have such a grandiose Russian societal meeting that included more than 5,000 people, it would be something that would require at least a year's worth of preparation so that it actually would proceed and actually come up with some sort of a result, a meaningful result. Nevertheless, Ludmila Alekseyevna opened the conference on the 21st of November. She is the Moscow representative of the Helsinki Group. And this hall, which the capacity is 5,000 people, was completely full, and on the stage it was not a presidium. There were people who were going to be participating in the plenary sessions, and Ludmila Alekseyevna said that even though this hall was one in which we had party conventions conducted and maybe that spirit is there. This is not a party. This is not a party convention. And for this reason she said that this would not be a presidium. There would be no resolutions, there would be no banquets, and the budget of this forum would be completely transparent so that everybody could see where the money went, how it was spent, and approximately $1.5 million was spent on the forum. And also, as a condition for the opening of this forum, was that it would not play the Russian national anthem. And so the organizers agreed to this since they didn't want to have any disputes right from the start to see who would stand for the anthem, which would not stand for the anthem. And President Putin entered the hall after it got started. Everybody stood up to greet the head of the government. But you could say there were no enthusiastic outbursts. And after Ludmila Alekseyevna made her initial comments, she asked Mr. Putin to make his comments. President Putin, in my view, read a very proper and a very sober speech, which was written for him. And he said that the cooperation that the government had arrived at in this forum, this joint activity, came from a need for dialogue and cooperation with civil society and its representatives. And he continued on to say that it's absolutely unproductive, and even possibly dangerous, for civil society to be established from the top down. He said that civil society needs to be independent, have its own grassroots so that it can breathe the air freely. And he said that before the authorities there's just one task, one goal, which is to establish the best conditions possible for the establishment of civil society. And these more or less were the main thoughts of President Putin, and, of course, it's impossible to disagree with it. But the most important thing is that the words will actually correspond with the actions of the government. As far as we understand, to enable civil society, or provide the conditions for the development of civil society, there has to be, indeed, a real separation of powers. There has to be a parliament which is independent of the president or the executive branch. There has to be a media that cannot be dictated to by various different power structures, and there must be a non-criminal branch of authority, which, unfortunately, in Russia today there isn't one. I have to say that the administration made certain to protect the president from hearing any sort of negative comments, toward him, or toward the presidential authority. And with Ludmila Alekseyevna said that before the forum a gentleman approached her representing the president's administration and asked that she show a list of the speakers and in what order they will be making the presentations. And he, in turn, looked to her and said, you know, this is not right. Here you have people representing civil society and then the authorities, we need to have the authorities speak first, and then have the representatives of civil society. And so she responded by saying that the committee had actually decided upon the order in which the speakers would make their presentations, and the head of protocol looked at the list and said, okay, fine, let's just keep it this way. But, in fact, it turned out that the president was only in the hall for approximately an hour. And those people that made their presentations during that period are people that he hears every single day. The people who spoke there were speakers, Mr. Seleznev, Mr. Pavlovsky. From the constitutional court, we had Pamfilova. And at the end of their presentations, President Putin said, I'm sorry I have a lot of routine work that I have to do, it's a daily routine, and I can't stay with you much longer, and he left. My impression was such that the president could not not attend this conference. But he had some sort of interest, some sort of activity. And I was sitting fairly close and I can say that I didn't see any particular interest on his face. And what did those people in the hall do while the president was there? They were writing notes to each other with all sorts of requests that they were trying to pass up to the president. And so at one fine moment, when this mountain of notes almost got to the point where it blocked the view of the president, an assistant came up and gathered up all the notes. In Russian this is called making an appeal to the czar, when people used to get down on their knees in front of the czar and ask him for a favor. And after the president left there were representatives from various civil society organizations speaking. Nobody said a particularly harsh word about the president. It wasn't that different from things that I would say, but it appeared that they even didn't want to risk the possibility that the president might be there in the presence of these people. And the plenary session concluded before lunch, and then we broke up into our smaller groups. All the people who came to this conference broke up into smaller groups for the remainder of that day and the following day. They would break them into groups on thematic and specific subject matter. All in all, there were 21 different topics being discussed. I won't go down the whole list of all these different discussions and meetings that were going on, but they did include things like national security, national policy, social policies, military reform, media, environment, and at all of these different meetings there were supposed to be representatives, whether they were ministers, but there were supposed to be representatives of the authorities, whether there were individual ministers there or not. And, of course, they did discuss some of the difficult questions, whether it was Chechnya, refugees or immigration. These were discussed. And the conditions of the work at this forum were extremely difficult, because all of the discussions, all of the meeting groups were broken up and dispersed throughout all of Moscow. I don't know how many of you are familiar with Moscow, but they would have one meeting at the university, another meeting would be in the Kremlin, another would be in a museum somewhere or else on the other side of town. And virtually everybody who came to the conference could only attend one of these breakout sessions, one of these discussions and meet with anybody from the authority. This was described as a base for negotiations. Or they could just go and meet with their colleagues who represented other NGOs. And the next day these discussions were broken into roundtables. There were approximately seven roundtable sessions. But afterwards representatives from these roundtables would break out and go to individual ministries where they would discuss something with individual bureaucrats. And we formulated the main task, which was to agree to some sort of terms by which civil society organizations could work jointly with the government to at least create a base for these negotiations. And so after the forum the main question that was asked, was asked to me individually was, well, did you agree to anything, and what did you agree to? And I explained that two days is not enough to be able to agree, to come up with any sort of agreements. You can't agree to anything. And I said that from the start it's very possible that people were not prepared to conduct negotiations or discussions at this particular level. And at one of the negotiating bases there were ministries that didn't want to have any discussions with us whatsoever, and one that I happened to be at, it was called the military-industrial complex and environmental protection. There the ministries representing environmental protection had their people, the MinAtom, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, and the Ministry of National Resources was there as well. And they said they had nothing to discuss with us. And I realized that the best negotiating table for these types of discussions with these ministries is at a judge's table. And I would have to say that the presidential team that prepared these negotiating tables -- and it was their call -- did actually provide some sort of benefit, and quite a bit of themselves. For example, at the discussion of national security and foreign policy, the people who prepared these meetings had ample opportunity to speak one-on-one with the individuals who are actually involved and responsible for national security policy. The level of trust between the authorities and organizations representing civil society, civil society organizations, is very, very low. I spoke with the people who were at the table discussing Chechnya, and I asked them, "Did you agree? Were you able to come to any sort of agreements?" And they said absolutely nothing. And everybody said that this was a very argumentative meeting. People went there much less with the idea of trust than they did with the idea of hope, that maybe we'll actually be able to come to terms with something. Maybe. Who knows. Something might occur where we'll actually be able to come to some sort of terms. And so the general conclusion was that nothing was agreed to. And I understand that everybody actually came out of these meetings -- human rights activists, environmentalists came out and breathed a deep sigh of relief, because, they said, nothing bad happened. They said we didn't establish a ministry of civil society; there was no government representation of civil society, so we didn't do anything bad. And already now following the processes that came about as a result of this conference, of this forum, and we see that people are already trying to establish different structures and mechanisms with which they can work with the government following all these 21 directions of the breakout groups and the topics we were discussing; for example, the environment and health. There is an attempt to try and establish some sort of structure or mechanism by which they can have representation with the government, or even representation in the government. But we could see that although there was no general structure established, at least we can say there were individual structures established. And I would say that it probably is a little bit premature to give any sort of a final grade or conclusion as to the success of this. And at the conclusion of the forum, Premier Kasyanov was there. There were 21 people who were making presentations. They had three minutes to represent the results of these different breakout groups that they had. And, personally, I didn't hear any concrete or hopeful results as to having produced any sort of immediate agreements. There's a possibility that there can be success and work done in the future. But I would have to say that the conference ended on such a note that it would almost be naive to think that after two days we could come up with some sort of an agreement. ******* #8 From: "Dimitri Devyatkin" Subject: Putin's Ten Blows Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2001 Putin's Ten Blows by Vyacheslav Tetekin This article originally appeared in Russian in "Sovietskaya Rossia" (Soviet Russia) on 10 November 2001. Vyacheslav Tetekin, pronounced 'Tetyokin,' is a leading Russian writer on foreign affairs. "Sovietskaya Rossia" is the most influential left-patriotic daily in Russia.]. ======================================= President Putin's recent visit to the USA finalised a major turn in Russian foreign policy towards full subordination to the West. The symptoms of this major turn were evident right from the start of Mr. Putin's term in office. One may recall the ratification of the START-2 treaty that might deprive Russia of its heavy missiles - the cornerstone of our security. But the presidential decisions to support US operation in Afghanistan, and to close Russian bases in Vietnam and Cuba made the sharp turn in the Kremlin's foreign policy evident. It becomes clear that the intention to join NATO expressed by Mr. Putin in an offhand manner last year reflected a long-matured idea of a far deeper (than in Mr. Gorbachev's or Mr. Yeltsin's case) "integration into the world community". It fact the intention is to squeeze Russia into the Western economic, political and military system. Even as a junior partner. Even at the price of sacrificing independent foreign policy. For the time being Mr. Putin was just testing the ground. Evidently he was waiting for a pretext to make a strategic turn publicly. The terrorist attacks in the USA provided such a pretext. The commitment to joint struggle against "international terrorism" signaled the move to "the other side". Of course the Kremlin will deny even the idea that they have dropped an independent foreign policy. But their actions speak to the contrary. A recent statement by a group of public and political figures referred to "Putin's Ten blows" against Russia, i.e. destructive 'reforms' of land, labour, education, health, housing, the military, energy, transportation and other systems. Now one can talk of 'Putin's ten blows' against Russia's international interests. FIRST BLOW The main threat to Russia's security originates not from 'international terrorism' but from NATO expansion to the East. (1) The November, 2002 NATO summit in Prague will obviously admit a number of East European countries including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the Alliance. If this happens we shall get NATO air bases close to Moscow, Saint Petersburg and other centers of Russia. This is very dangerous. The sad experience of Yugoslavia confirms that quite convincingly. (2) But the Kremlin does not even show signs of real opposition to NATO expansion. More than that, Mr. Putin's statements during his recent visit to Helsinki were perceived as a go-ahead for NATO membership not only for the Baltic States but also for traditionally neutral Finland and Sweden. SECOND BLOW The threat to Russia's security is increasingly felt from the South. And not from the Muslim world but from NATO which is penetrating the zones of Russia's vital interests in the Balkans (3), in Transcaucasia and in Central Asia. But instead of reinforcing our Southern frontiers the Kremlin is withdrawing Russian troops from Abkhazia, Adjaria and Transnistria despite protests of the population, which is anxious to retain an alliance with Russia. There is an impression that the recent fighting in Abkhazia was a long-awaited pretext for the Kremlin to speed up its departure from that strategically important region. THIRD BLOW Yugoslavia was Russia's only ally in Europe. Mr. Yeltsin contributed to its defeat by refusing to supply anti-aircraft weapons. Mr. Putin refused Yugoslavia political and economic support by cutting gas supplies right before the 2000 presidential elections. (4) Slobodan Milosevic, committed to friendship with Russia, landed in prison. Power in Belgrade was taken over by persons fully dependent on the West, primarily Germany. The present Germany achieved what Hitler failed to achieve, i.e. the conquest of Yugoslavia. And then the Kremlin declares 'a new stage of relations with Yugoslavia.' Absurd? No. It reflects a strategy aimed at Russia's withdrawal from the Balkans. FOURTH BLOW In the Middle East the Kremlin's inconsistent policy in the Arab-Israel conflict pushes further away traditionally friendly Arab countries allowing Israel to play 'the Russian card' against both Arabs and the West, which is no longer prepared to unconditionally support Israel. FIFTH BLOW Opening Russian air space for the U.S. Air force and supplying intelligence information, as well as the silent agreement to allow recruitment of mercenaries in Russia, means the Kremlin is directly involved in the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The Americans have gotten the Kremlin's backing for a permanent U.S. presence in Central Asia - that is, in the zone of Russia's vital interests. Russia is being encircled by U.S. military bases. The premature and unconditional support by the Russian president of US retaliatory action is a major foreign policy error as he failed to assess even the short-term consequences. It is evident that the Muslim world is angrily protesting the US repressions against their brothers and that U.S. Western allies are trying to avoid participation in the 'operation' by all means. Meanwhile, the main deliveries of drugs into Russia comes not from the Taliban but from the 'friendly' Northern Alliance. SIXTH AND SEVENTH BLOWS Another major blunder is Mr. Putin's intention to close the Russian Naval base in Vietnam and the Electronic Surveillance Center in Cuba. It is impossible to think of a bigger gift to the USA. Russian public opinion is shocked. The damage to Russia's interests is so great that even the pro-presidential newspapers find it quite difficult to explain these decisions. EIGHTH BLOW Let's add Mr. Putin's nearly religious desire to get Russia into the World Trade Organization (WTO) which will completely open Russian borders for the expansion of powerful Western capital and will totally eliminate Russian industry and agriculture already only half alive as a result of 'reforms' started by Yeltsin and continued by Putin. (5) NINTH BLOW There is no doubt that sooner or later the Kremlin will stop resisting 'modification' of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, i.e. will simply agree to creation of this Star Wars system. Naive attempts to get a simultaneous reduction of U.S. nuclear warheads will lead nowhere. U.S. leaders are well aware of the pitiful state of the Russian nuclear force. Soon even without any treaty Russia will not be able to have more than 1.5 thousand warheads. Why should the US reduce its nuclear arsenal if the Russian arsenal will collapse by itself? TENTH BLOW Russian-Chinese relations will inevitably be spoiled as Russia previously promised China to take a firm position on NATO and ABMT. China is obviously watching with deep concern Russia's surrendering of these positions as well as the appearance of the U.S. Air Force close to its borders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz. One does not easily forget such things. Everything that Mr. Putin has earned by spectacular improvement of relations with China, India, Vietnam, Cuba and some other countries collapsed nearly overnight. What has surfaced was Gorbachev's primitive concept of 'common human values' - i.e. subordination of Russia's interests to those of the West. Recently Mr. Putin visited Germany and Belgium. We have not seen for a long time such an overt desire to please the West. It was a vintage Gorbachev - like 1989 when he surrendered everything to the applause of Mrs. Thatcher. The humiliating desire of the current host of the Kremlin to get the acceptance of the West has become completely shameful. (6) We have not yet returned to the 19th century Sacred Alliance in the framework of which the Emperor Alexander I put the interests of European monarchies above those of Russia. But when the head of the Russian State plunges into the creation of the alliance against "international terrorism," one recalls that the Sacred Alliance led to the 1854 Crimean War of Britain, France and Turkey against Russia. The West readily accepts this no-lose game. The artificial flattery of the Russian leader, who staunchly marches into the mousetrap, allows the West to solve strategic tasks without spending an extra penny, without endangering the lives of their soldiers. Furthermore the flow of money from Russia to Western banks continues non-stop, softening the effects of the economic crisis in the West. And what does Russia get in return? Nothing. The Kremlin seems to enjoy demonstrating a selflessness that confuses even cynical pro-presidential journalists. But it doesn't smell of selflessness. It smells of a secret agenda that obviously corresponds to Mr. Putin's long-term personal interests. Of course he has started thinking about the 2004 presidential elections. A favourable attitude by the West will be beneficial… So what is behind the radical changes in Russian foreign policy? Nothing special. Mr. Putin has simply thrown away the veil of statements about the protection of Russian national interests. His policy acquires a clearly expressed class character. Pragmatism, the defense of some 'national interests' that Mr. Putin likes to talk about at press conferences - this is just for fools. In fact we are observing a clear shift to a policy defined by the interests of the Russian oligarchs very closely connected with Western transnationals and completely dependent on their Western counterparts. If one can privatize whole branches of industry why can't one privatize foreign policy? The Land Code allowing the sale of lands to foreigners and the opening of Russian air space to the U.S. air force are links in a chain. Having handed over the national economy to Mr. Chubais, Hodorkovsky, Fridman and Co., one should forget about an independent foreign policy. But the Kremlin hardly thinks about that. The outer expressions of independence (receiving a red-carpet reception, and so on) are sufficient. Russian public opinion is clearly reluctant to recognize the West as a friend. But the Kremlin behaves like a girl in a fairy tale who, with wonderful persistence, fails to see the sharp ears and even sharper teeth of the wolf that has just eaten her grandmother. Mr. Putin's main principle of running the State is, "If one mustn't do something but wants it very much then he\she can do it". Russia will not travel far on this principle. The president should better recall the plight of his predecessor, Mr. Gorbachev, who at the top of his popularity did what he wanted without any regard for the country's interests. The real hatred that the nation now feels for Mr. Gorbachev should at least make Mr. Putin think a bit. They say that in his youth Mr. Putin was a judo expert. He does not look like one. He is far more skillful in playing into the hands of the other side. (c) "Sovietskaya Rossia" 2001 * Reprinted for Fair Use Only *******