Johnson's Russia List #5597 14 December 2001 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Reuters: TEXT-Putin speech on U.S. withdrawal from ABM treaty. 2. White House Statement: Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal. 3. Interfax: US withdrawal from ABM does not pose threat to Russia - Yabloko leader. (Yavlinsky) 4. RIA Novosti: RUSSIAN ACADEMICIAN SERGEI KAPITSA BELIEVES NECESSITY OF DIALOGUE AMONG DIFFERENT CIVILISATIONS HAS SHARPLY INCREASED. 5. Lee Wolosky: RE: 5596-Klimoff/Putin. 6. Steve Wegren: new agricultural land law. 7. Donald Barry: Belin on Constitutional Amendments. 8. Sarah Karush: amending the consitution. 9. Carmen MacDougall: New book: Soviets: Pictures from the End of the USSR. 10. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, How to Squander Presidential Prestige. 11. Moscow Times: Nabi Abdullaev, Are Chechens in Afghanistan? 12. Versiya: Vadim Saranov, CRISIS. Something needs to be done about Russia's diverse security structures. 13. The Russia Journal: Matt Taibbi, Say ‘Cheese’ — and all is OK in Russia. Businessmen wear casual clothes — FT says that proves the country is making progress. 14. Washington Times: Bill Gertz, Dissident protests Russia, China ties to U.S. war. (Bukovsky) 15. The Economist (UK): The Kremlin. Old versus new. Civil war in President Putin's camp. 16. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, 2001 In Review: For Vladimir Putin, A Year Of Transformation. 17. strana.ru: Kremlin Spin Doctor on Why He is Ditching Internet Media. (Pavlovsky)] ******* #1 TEXT-Putin speech on U.S. withdrawal from ABM treaty MOSCOW (Reuters) - The following is the text of a televised statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. The translation is by Reuters. The U.S. administration announced today they will withdraw within six months from the 1972 ABM treaty. The treaty indeed gives each of the sides the right to withdraw under exclusive circumstances. The U.S. leadership spoke of this several times and such a step was not unexpected for us. However, we think such a step is mistaken. As is well known, Russia and the United States, unlike other nuclear powers, have for a long time possessed an effective means to overcome missile defenses. Therefore I fully believe that the decision taken by the president of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. Our country did not agree on a common withdrawal from the ABM treaty, as repeatedly proposed by the United States, and did everything it could to preserve this treaty. I continue to consider, even today, that such a position is correct and well-founded. Russia first of all cared about preserving and strengthening international legal foundations in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ABM treaty is one of the cornerstones of the legal system in this sphere. And this system was created by common efforts over the last decade. We are convinced that the development of the situation in the modern world persistently dictates a definite logic of action. Today, as the world faces new threats, we cannot allow a legal vacuum in the sphere of strategic stability. We cannot undermine the regime of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I think that the present level of bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia should not only be preserved, but also be used for quickly working out new frameworks of strategic cooperation. The formalization of agreements reached on further radical, irreversible and controlled reduction of strategic weapons is a top priority, together with the problems of anti-missile defense. In our opinion, (the strategic weapons should be reduced) to a level of 1,500 to 2,200 warheads for each side. Finally, I want to say that Russia will strictly follow its principled policy, aimed at strengthening strategic stability and international security in world affairs. ******* #2 White House Statement: Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following was released today by the White House: STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal The United States welcomes President Putin 's statement. We agree with President Putin that "the decision taken by the President of the United States presents no threat to the national security of the Russian Federation." We have worked intensively with Russia to create a new strategic framework for our relationship based on mutual interests and cooperation across a broad range of political, economic, and security issues. Together, the United States and Russia have made substantial progress in our efforts and look forward to even greater progress in the future. The United States in particular welcomes Russia's commitment to deep reductions in its level of offensive strategic nuclear forces. Combined with the reductions of U.S. strategic nuclear forces announced by President Bush in November, this action will result in the lowest level of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by our two countries in decades. We will work with Russia to formalize this arrangement on offensive forces, including appropriate verification and transparency measures. Russia's announcement of nuclear reductions and its commitment to continue to conduct close consultations with the United States reflect our shared desire to continue the essential work of building a new relationship for a new century. ******* #3 US withdrawal from ABM does not pose threat to Russia - Yabloko leader Interfax Moscow, 13 December: The US intention to unilaterally secede from the 1972 ABM treaty does not pose a military threat to Russia, leader of the State Duma's Yabloko faction Grigoriy Yavlinskiy said on Ekho Moskvy radio on Thursday [13 December]. "The scale and capacities of our strategic forces are such that within the next few decades neither Americans nor anybody else will be able to design a shield for counteracting our abilities from the point of view of strategic security and defence," Yavlinskiy said. He said, however, that he did not have "pleasant feelings about such actions on the part of the Americans". The decision cannot be described "as the step of a partner, especially as we have become closer in the antiterrorist coalition", the lawmaker remarked. In this situation Russia should seek new forms of strategic stability and cooperation with the United States, Yavlinskiy said. He called for signing a new agreement with the United States, Great Britain, France and "possibly, China". It is also necessary to design a Russia-Europe antimissile tactical system with the use of Russia's territory, tactical and military capacities, including S-300 and S-400 technologies, Yavlinskiy said. "This umbrella" will bring colossal investments to the Russian defence industry, he said. ******* #4 RUSSIAN ACADEMICIAN SERGEI KAPITSA BELIEVES NECESSITY OF DIALOGUE AMONG DIFFERENT CIVILISATIONS HAS SHARPLY INCREASED MOSCOW, December 13, RIA Novosti correspondent Alexander Smotrov - Academician Sergei Kapitsa believes that after the events of September 11 in the United States the need of a dialogue among different civilisations and cultures with the aim of preventing military clashes between them has sharply increased. The scientist spoke on Thursday at the session of the round-table conference devoted to the results of the Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations under the aegis of the United Nations. The initiative of conducting this Year was put forth in 1998 by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. At the decision of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan a group of eighteen world well-known politicians, scientists and men of culture was formed. Russia's representative in this group, Academician Sergei Kapitsa, noted the need of seeking ways for such a dialogue also inside Russia, in many regions of which two or even three different civilisations co-exist. The dialogue among the world civilisations must in no way turn into a war of one civilisation against another, said Yuri Reshetov, member of the UN committee for the elimination of racial discrimination, who also addressed the session of the round-table conference. On his part, director of the UN information centre in Moscow Alexander Gorelik admitted that a strong strike on the main principles of the dialogue among civilisations was delivered by the latest events in the Middle East. In his opinion, only the efforts of the entire world community can help overcome this conflict. ****** #5 From: "Lee Wolosky" Subject: RE: 5596-Klimoff/Putin Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 Alex Klimoff's assumption that the sourcing for Fred Starr's recent WSJ piece is based on NSA intercepts is highly unlikely. The conclusion to which this leads Mr. Klimoff -- that the United States Government is purposefully engaged in a disinformation campaign concerning Putin, Central Asia and Afghanistan -- is irresponsible. Starr's sourcing is more likely Central Asian in original. Whether Starr's information concerning the true purpose of the Putin calls is accurate, or reflective instead of the motives of the source(s), is another question. Lee Wolosky Former Director, Transnational Threats National Security Council ****** #6 Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 Subject: agriculture land law From: "Steve Wegren" A few quick observations by way of follow-on to the news piece you ran in JRL 5596 regarding a new agricultural land law: 1. The primary intent of a new law on agricultural sales will be to replace a previous decree, dating from 27 October 1993, with a federal law. Decrees were intended to be temporary legal acts until federal law could be passed. The recently adopted Land Code (October 2001) was able to be passed primarily because the most contentious issue, agricultural land sales, was set aside after more than 7 years of argument. 2. The new agricultural land law, once it is passed, will add legal clarity to rural land transactions, just as the new Land Code adds legal clarity and codified urban land transactions. It is important to note that rural land transactions have been occurring since 1994. In 2000, for example, there were about 5.2 million land transactions recorded in Russia, of which 44 percent, or 2.28 million, occurred in rural areas. (Most land transactions, both urban and rural, are lease transactions. Approximately one half million rural transactions in 2000 were land purchases.) 3. The new agricultural land law is unlikely to have much of an immediate impact. The problem with the rural land market is not political or legal, but economic. This is not to say that legal clarity is bad, especially in the long run, but legal clarity is unlikely to solve the present problems of the rural land market. Those problems are twofold: (a) low purchasing power by rural dwellers, which depresses demand for land; and (b) the unattractiveness of rural land due to a decade of neglect, during which rural infrastructure and services (which already were of low quality) were significantly degraded. Until and unless the infrastructure and service problem is addressed, rural land will not be attractive to domestic urban or foreign investors, no matter what the legal environment. 4. The new agricultural land law will be skeletal, in which broad federal principles and policy orientations will be indicated. While avoiding detail, the law is likely to allow great latitude to regions to decide how much, if at all, they want to regulate their rural land markets. This has been the position of Putin since early 2000. Thus, there will be a federal law, but there will continue to be a great deal of regional variation. 5. Finally, the battle of the communist leftists to fight land sales is already lost. Land sales are a reality and have been ongoing since 1994. Their posturing attests to the antiquated nature of their policy platform. Steve Wegren Southern Methodist University ****** #7 Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 From: Donald Barry Subject: Belin on Constitutional Amendments Dear David, I'd like to submit the following comments on Laura Belin's comments in #5595 on the constitutional amendment process in Russia. Sincerely, Don Barry Donald Barry Political Science Lehigh University 302 Maginnes Hall 9 W. Packer Ave. Bethlehem, PA 18015 Tel. 610-758-3338 FAX 610-758-6554 Correcting Belin's Corrections Laura Belin in #5595 correctly points out some inaccurate or misleading statements about the amendment process as provided in the Russian Constitution. But in the process she makes some misstatements herself. Article 135, as she indicates, states that chapters 1, 2, and 9 cannot be amended by parliament, but only by convoking a constitutional assembly. This is called not by a two-thirds vote in both houses, but by a three-fifths vote. She then says that the constitutional assembly "can approve amendments." But what Article 135 actually says is that the assembly can either "confirm the immutability" of the existing constitution or develop a draft of a whole new constitution. Of course this new draft might differ from the old only by including the proposed amendments that parliament had in mind in the first place in calling for the constitutional assembly. But it might go further, too. The delegates to the convention in Philadelphia in 1787 were under instructions that their sole and express purpose was to revise the Articles of Confederation. Belin then says that the constitutional assembly can approve amendments by a two-thirds vote, but that the amendments must then be approved by a nationwide referendum. But this is not what Article 135 provides. It indicates that approval of the new draft may be either by two-thirds of the constitutional assembly or by referendum. Regarding Article 136, Belin says that "a federal constitutional law should be adopted to govern the amendment procedure for articles in chapters 3 through 8..." What Article 136 actually says is that amendments to this part of the Constitution "shall be made in accordance with the procedure established for the adoption of a federal constitutional law." That procedure, as indicated in Article 108 of the Constitution, requires an affirmative vote of at least three-quarters of the members of the Federation Council and at least two-thirds of Duma deputies. As Belin indicates, such amendments must then gain the approval of the legislatures of at least two-thirds of the federation subjects. The only other provision for amendment in the Constitution is Article 137. It concerns only Article 65, on the composition of the Russian Federation. Article 137 provides that changes in Article 65 (creation of new subjects or other changes in the status of subjects) may be effected through the adoption of a federal constitutional law. This would require the same extraordinary majorities in parliament that were mentioned above. But Article 137 requires neither a nationwide referendum nor approval by the subjects of the federation themselves. ****** #8 Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 From: sarah karush Subject: amending the consitution An amendment to Laura Belin's explanation of the procedure for amending the Constitution (JRL 5595): Belin says Article 136 states that a federal constitutional law should be passed to govern the procedure for amending chapters 3 through 8. In fact, Article 136 outlines the exact procedure. It states that these chapters can be amended through the same procedure as that for passing a federal constitutional law (three-fourths of the Federation Council, two-thirds of the Duma). It also says the amendment must be approved by two-thirds of the regional legislatures. In other words, to amend chapters 3 through 8, you need the approval of three-fourths of the Federal Council, two-thirds of the Duma and two-thirds of the regional legislatures. ****** #9 From: "Carmen MacDougall" Subject: Soviets: Pictures from the End of the USSR Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 Readers of Johnson's List in the Washington area are invited to attend a signing for a new book of photographs, "Soviets: Pictures from the End of the USSR," by Shep Sherbell on Wednesday, Dec. 19, 7-9 p.m., KramerBooks & Afterwords, 1517 Conn. Ave., NW, just above above Dupont Circle in Washington DC. In the foreword, Serge Schmemann writes: "time spent in..that black-and-white world that Sherbell has captured will stay with me forever. It is where I learned about the avarice and cruelty of unconstrained state power..and the enormous capacity of the human spirit to persevere." From a NYT review: "If what you seek is something polished, pleasant, and acceptably provocative, [this] is not the coffee table book for you. ...Sherbell's keen eye has discovered why this most enduring of authoritarian systems did not, after all, prevail." Others can see the photographs in a fairly extensive web site: www.sovietsbook.com Carmen MacDougall Vice President for Communications Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 202-939-2319 Fax: 202-332-0925 www.ceip.org ****** #10 Moscow Times December 14, 2001 How to Squander Presidential Prestige By Yulia Latynina In Russia, the idle squandering of President Vladimir Putin's prestige is taking on new forms. The presidential election in Yakutia is the most recent example of this. To put it bluntly, President Mikhail Nikolayev has a lot fewer fans than Pavel Bure. The republic's extra-budgetary funds exceed its impoverished budget by several times, and it's unclear where all the money is going. The rebuilding of Lensk, for example, smells really pretty badly: The cost of building the houses there is comparable to prices for exclusive apartments in the center of Moscow. Yakutsk resembles a polar Chernobyl: The city is located in a permafrost zone, house facades are all riven with cracks, no repair work is done and streams run along the streets from burst sewage pipes. The pipes in Yakutsk, as in any permafrost zone, are laid above ground, and in the winter months they tower over the streets like fantastic tank traps. In stark contrast, a lavish glass Palace of Childhood has been erected in the center of town at considerable expense. Let's assume that the Kremlin has decided that the odious Nikolayev is not fit to govern Yakutia. Does the Kremlin really believe that the people of Yakutia, living in cracked houses on stinking streets, are completely oblivious to his odiousness? What's the point in turning Nikolayev into a martyr by refusing to register him as a candidate for the election and throwing the owners of loyal media outlets behind bars? No doubt they would counter that Nikolayev is an autocrat, that not even a mouse dares to squeak in the republic without his consent and that if he is allowed to participate he will win the election. However, the authorities already came up against a similar problem during the 1999 parliamentary elections. In no less authoritarian Kalmykia, Yury Luzhkov's wife, who had the backing of the Kalmyk president, ran for a seat against the Kremlin-supported television anchorwoman Alexandra Buratayeva. On the eve of the elections, students from the Interior Ministry Higher School -- majors and colonels -- headed off to distant Kalmykia at "their own expense." Once there, they explained to district election commission chairmen what would happen if observers noticed the slightest attempts at vote falsification. So where, you might ask, are the PR people, who so magnificently engineered the victories of Unity and Putin himself? Have they fallen out of favor for being Berezovsky proteges? Or did the money set aside for the PR campaign disappear? Similar episodes have occurred at least twice before: in Kursk region and in Primorye. In both cases odious governors were effectively turned into martyrs, while those approved by the powers-that-be to take their place lost the elections outright due to the crudity with which they orchestrated their campaigns. I'm referring to federal inspector Viktor Surzhikov in Kursk and the deputy presidential envoy Gennady Apanasenko in Primorye. So already there have been several clear occasions, where if the authorities had behaved a bit more intelligently they would have contributed to the strengthening of the rule of law and the vertical chain of power; instead they made clear to us in no uncertain terms that the Kremlin isn't interested in the rule of law or in the people, but only in ensuring that that person get the boot and that this one take his place. It wouldn't so bad if all this was accompanied by economic reforms, but so far the only real achievement in the economy has been diverting bandits' income to the law enforcement agencies. And this means only one thing. When the oil price falls below $15 per barrel, not only will the ruble collapse. Trust in the president will collapse as well, having been steadily whittled away by the Surzhikovs, Apanasenkos and Kolmogorovs of this world. Yulia Latynina is a journalist with ORT. ******** #11 Moscow Times December 14, 2001 Are Chechens in Afghanistan? By Nabi Abdullaev Staff Writer Reports that Chechen rebels and even one of their leaders, Khattab, have been fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan have surfaced throughout the U.S.-led military campaign. But the reports have been sketchy and poorly substantiated, leaving Russian observers to speculate on how many Chechens are likely to be in Afghanistan and why. The differences in opinion seem based on different evaluations of the strength of ties between Chechens fighting for independence in Chechnya and Islamic radicals with a global cause. Most, but not all, experts on the region say there are unlikely to be large numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan, and that Khattab's presence there seems even less likely. Any Chechens fighting with the Taliban are probably motivated primarily by money, the experts say. "There is no reason for Chechens to go to fight in Afghanistan because the ideological basis for resistance for the majority of the rebels is defending their own land," said Timur Muzayev of the Panorama think tank, who was an adviser to the Chechen government from 1995 to 1996. "And those Chechens who view themselves as religious warriors against the infidels can also nicely defend their faith in Chechnya, without going anywhere else." Another Chechen insider, Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev, who was widely believed to be a confidant and private banker of first Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev, also said it was absurd for Chechens to be fighting in Afghanistan -- because the Taliban does not need them. There is no shortage of fighters in Afghanistan, which essentially already has been at war for 23 years, and a few dozen Chechens could provide little help to the Taliban, he wrote on his web site, Noukhaev.com. Muzayev agreed. "The strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan is the same as that of the Chechen rebels in Chechnya: knowledge of the local situation and the support of the local population," he said. "Guerrillas lose efficiency on alien soil." Even so, a few Chechens may be fighting in Afghanistan as mercenaries, Muzayev said. Alexander Pikayev, a military expert at the Moscow Carnegie Center, said the numbers might be slightly higher, perhaps a few dozen. "There were numerous reports about the Taliban permitting Chechen rebels to train in military camps on the territory of Afghanistan," Pikayev said. "And many rebels, forced out of Chechnya in the ongoing conflict, could have chosen to go to Central Asia or Afghanistan, rather than to Georgia or Turkey." Viktor Korgun, head of the Afghanistan section of the Moscow-based Institute of Oriental Studies, however, said the number of Chechens at the beginning of the U.S. operation could have exceeded 1,000. "There is some indirect but sufficient evidence of Chechen rebels being active in Afghanistan," Korgun said. "President Vladimir Putin's threatening the Taliban in May 2000 to bomb the terrorist camps on Afghan territory where large groups of Chechen rebels were trained is one of them." The Taliban was the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya as a state, and in February 2000, the Chechen separatist government of President Aslan Maskhadov opened an embassy in Kabul. The rebels' chief ideologist, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, was appointed ambassador. "Undoubtedly, the embassy was set up to build up military cooperation between Chechen rebels and the Taliban," Korgun said But he also said the Chechen rebels fighting in Afghanistan were attracted mainly by the money Osama bin Laden is believed to pay. In recent weeks, there have been various reports that Khattab, an Arab, has ties to bin Laden and was in Afghanistan fighting with him. General Gennady Troshev, the commander of Russian troops in the North Caucasus, and the Federal Border Guard Service insisted Khattab had not left Chechnya. Although Khattab's presence in Afghanistan might serve to bolster the Kremlin's claims that it is fighting Islamic terrorism in Chechnya, the military might be afraid it would look foolish if it let Khattab slip away. For their part, the Chechen rebels have said the reports of Chechens in Afghanistan are inspired by Western governments eager to cement the alliance with Russia. No one "is able to produce even one Chechen as proof of the 'participation of hundreds and thousands of Chechen fighters' in the war in Afghanistan," the rebel web site Kavkaz.org said. Political observers said they see political motives behind reports of Chechen rebels fighting with the Taliban. "The West is interested in dragging Russia into the war now as the ground operation is unfolding," said Pikayev of Carnegie. "The publications that link bin Laden to the Chechen rebels are to demonstrate to the world that Russia and the West are jointly opposing Islamic terrorism." Alexander Iskandarian, head of the Institute of Caucasian Studies in Moscow, said he sees another motive. "Massaging the news about foreign fighters is a well-known propagandist technique to prove that the core of the resistance has no popular origin," he said. "This helps them pretend that they are opposed not by the Afghan people, but by an international evil." Jordanian-born warlord Khattab was reportedly wounded in a battle with federal troops near the village of Nikotakhoi in the Vedeno region of Chechnya about a week ago, Itar-Tass quoted law enforcers as saying Thursday. Khattab received shoulder and leg wounds and is being treated in a mountain village in southeastern Chechnya, the sources said. Russian officials, including Akhmad Kadyrov, head of the Chechen administration, dismissed the report as rumor. ******** #12 Versiya No. 47 December 11-17, 2001 CRISIS Something needs to be done about Russia's diverse security structures Author: Vadim Saranov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND GENERAL STAFF HAVE LOST CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY STRUCTURES. THE WAR IN CHECHNYA HAS DISPLAYED ALL THE CLUMSINESS AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF MILITARY COMMAND. THE SECURITY STRUCTURES HAVE PROVED UNABLE TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES. When the split of the Soviet Union was just beginning, there were only three security structures in the country - the Defense Ministry, KGB, and Interior Ministry. The existing security structures - all 14 of them - split from the three progenitors. It was not even a split, it was a breakout. Those who wanted to earn the money and abhorred the idea of sharing it with others broke out. The Railroads Troops were the first to get out of the Defense Ministry structure. Serious money have always been filtered through the Railroads Troops, and military financiers' control grated on too many nerves. A year later the Railroads Troops' centrifugal experience was repeated by the Civilian Defense Troops. They found themselves in the jurisdiction of the newly-established Emergencies Ministry. The initiative of the new Russian leadership perplexed upper echelons of uniformed power. The Civilian Defense Troops are one of the major links of the mobilizational mechanism of the state which is still controlled by the Defense Ministry. Processes in state security were analogous. The Federal Border Guards Service, Federal Agency for Governmental Communications and Information, Federal Service of Protection, Main Directorate of Special Programs of the President, and Foreign Intelligence Service were split from state security to form independent structures. All these branches of services were withdrawn from the Defense Ministry in line with the noble principle, "Money of the army should be spent on combat readiness only." The Defense Ministry was supposed to be rid of the necessity to maintain these formations financially. It never happened. It still transacts colossal sums to the Emergencies Ministry, Railroads Troops, and governmental communications. These expenses defy imagination, and all this is financed by the Defense Ministry. The army is forced to share more than money alone. More than 50% draftees end up in the armed formations that have nothing to do with the Armed Forces. In short, the Defense Ministry and General Staff have lost the last remnants of control over security structures. Is it good or bad. It is certainly bad for army generals. All security structures fiercely independent and this state of affairs may bring to naught defense capacity of the state. Some structural units of the Defense Ministry are labelled MO (Russian for Defense Ministry) and some VS (Armed Forces). The Personnel Main Directorate is an MO, but the Main Directorate of Educational Work is a VS. What is the difference? The activities and clout of the former are restricted to the Armed Forces only, but those of the latter are broader and encompass all other armed formations as well. This is what the laws and guiding documents dictate. This is theory. In practice, however, the mechanism is not working. The war in Chechnya has displayed all the clumsiness and ineffectiveness of the existing system of military command. The security structures have proved unable to coordinate their activities. The excessive independence and isolation of the security structures doesn't annoy the upper echelons alone. Ordinary army officers are irritated with it too. First and foremost, they are annoyed by the appalling inequality of social standing differing from ministry to ministry. The average salary of an army officer is the lowest among salaries in other security structures, even though the law on social guarantees applies to all security personnel in the Russian Federation. The army is further angered by the inexplicable system of promotions in some ministries and departments. There was a time when border guards where commanded by lieutenant generals. No more. They are commanded by no less than colonel generals nowadays. There are lots of mysterious positions in the Emergencies Ministry. We found five (!) colonels in a rescue special assignment detachment which is nothing but a glorified battalion. At the same time, ordinary officers of the Defense Ministry cannot find a colonel's position in the army, because of the troop strength cuts. The Defense Ministry is still trying to regain its lost influence with the security structures. Establishing a single system of rear services may be the first step in this direction. There are plans to do just that. Restoration of the common system of armaments is the next step. Time will tell how successful all these attempts are. The stakes are too high. (Translated by A. Ignatkin) ******* #13 The Russia Journal December 7-13, 2001 Say ‘Cheese’ — and all is OK in Russia Businessmen wear casual clothes — FT says that proves the country is making progress By MATT TAIBBI Of all the legacies of the Clinton era, probably the most repulsive is the one of corporate powers reinventing themselves as hip, youth-friendly counter-cultural phenomena. In the States now, it's hard to tell an IBM print ad from a Wired magazine cover, and the TV spots for everything from Ameritrade to Chevron-Texaco feature skate-punks with platinum-dyed hair, concrete-surfing against the tide of convention... Just as Clinton packaged the abandonment of his party's working-class platform selling out to the right as a Youthful New Way, corporations began marketing capitalism itself as the engine of youth rebellion. Now, instead of concluding that their parents' world was evil and lame and dropping out of it by doing drugs and dressing like homeless people, kids were invited to wear designer imitations of the clothes of the homeless and get back at their parents by day-trading and Going Public. There were no Johnny Rottens in the Clinton era. But there were a hell of a lot of people who looked like Johnny Rotten in the offices of dot-com failures. It was a disgusting generation to be a part of. ‘Rebellious’ Russia was mostly immune to the consumerism-as-rebellion movement that hit the West so hard in the last decade. Among other things, rebellion itself was not such a hot selling point among Russians in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Whereas a company like AIG scored points (although loathsomely so) when it tied itself to a figure like Jackie Robinson, the people Russia lately identified with "breaking the old order" were, like Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev, largely also credited with taking away health insurance and living wages. To make a product "rebellious" was to give it qualities that naturally scared most Russians. The successful marketing campaigns in post-Soviet Russia were, on the contrary, mainly patriotic, traditionalist and reassuring, emphasizing quality, stability and timelessness — companies like Klinskoye beer and Prima cigarettes traded heavily on these themes. But the country couldn't stay immune forever. While a real youth protest movement, mainly violent and nationalistic, arose in cities around the country, a small network of phony youth-counter-culture bars — the face of "corporate rebelliousness" — popped up in St. Petersburg and Moscow. For the most part, these were replicas of the notorious Seattle-style bookstore-cafes that were the breeding ground for the IPO-and-day-trading generation in Clinton's America. Only in Russia there was no mistake about it: The only people who went to spend $1.90 on a Mochacinno at Coffee Bean on Pokrovka were the well-off sons and daughters of the upper class. There was nothing "rebellious," thank God, about coffee in Russia — the new cafes were just another guilt-free luxury trimming for a small group of people with spending money in the two capitals. All of this changed, however, when Andrew Jack of the Financial Times last week unleashed upon the world his feature on the rapidly metastasizing OGI cafe network. In this piece, Jack breaks ground in the manufacture of the "rebel as businessman" image in Russia. Here is the lead to his Nov. 26 story, "Cozy Havens in Russia": "Dmitry Itskovich does not look like the typical tough executive destined for success in the harsh world of modern Russian business. With his big black beard and casual clothes, he most resembles the academic he used to be." I am going to ask a rhetorical question now. If your business was running a chain of underground beer hangouts for pseudo-hippies and intellectuals in moth-eaten shirts, how would you be likely to dress? Like Gordon Gekko? In a Valentino suit, suspenders and a yellow tie? With a pound of gel in your slicked-back hair? No. Of course not. You would dress, at the bare minimum, in casual clothes. Itskovitch dresses exactly the way you'd imagine he might, but Jack calls attention to his "atypical" look because he is trying to tell you something: Itskovich is a rebel, not a businessman. He dresses casual! Bummer careers The mainstream media love these kinds of stories, and for obvious reasons. For one thing, it always loves stories about non-business types who give up their old, bummer careers and go into the sunny, happy world of business. An ex-academic who becomes a coin-counting club mogul is a beautiful thing to the business press. Ben & Jerry's was another business-press favorite. Def Jam records — two savvy street hustlers finding a way to hitch a wagon to the angry message of rap music and make it profitable. These are the stories that warm the hearts of business editors. You can see this instinct bursting through Jack's piece in this section: "Moscow's literary elite congregated, some finding jobs and partners as well as solace among like-minded souls gathered in the slightly bohemian and heavily smoky atmosphere. It was, as one macho Russian cultural critic described it, the sort of place to meet interesting women who hoped you would take them somewhere else." You see, OGI is not a place where eggheads hang around to do counterproductive things like plot the overthrow of the state and discuss their latest novels — in fact, they go there to get jobs! So they can stop being whiny writers and get some money to buy deodorant! Through the eyes of a careerist creature like Jack, this is actually what recreation means: getting together to expand networking possibilities. No sex for reporters Note also that Jack has to quote an unnamed "cultural critic" to explain that OGI is also a pick-up joint. He can't just say this himself, because, as his readers know, business reporters do not have sex — so how would he know? It was, therefore, responsible of him to quote somebody else in this matter. Jack is building up an impressive track record in the area of covering Russia by means of going to restaurants. This past August, he organized a piece that argued that Russia's economy was booming around the opening of a restaurant called "Cheese." Jack's thesis was that a country that could support a luxury restaurant whose interior is designed to look like the inside of a piece of cheese must have a booming economy. That Aug. 20 piece, titled "Fast Cars, Fancy Food; Muscovites let Good Times Roll," featured this passage: "The unexpected appetite for the luxury cars — which have a minimum price-tag of $70,000 in Moscow — is only one sign among many that while much of the world goes into a downturn, Russia's economy is still booming." As well as this mention of "Cheese": "After sitting empty and half-renovated for three years on the city's inner ring-road, Cheese opened at the start of the summer. Its Italian chef offers pizzas for a minimum of Rbs400 ($13.60), but its parking lots are filled with the latest Mercedes models." Thirteen-dollar pizzas. Club owners that don't wear ties. Russia must really be making progress. Don't these guys ever get out of town? (Matt Taibbi is editor of the Moscow-based eXile alternative newspaper.) ******** #14 Washington Times December 11, 2001 Dissident protests Russia, China ties to U.S. war By Bill Gertz Russia and China should not be involved in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism because their participation undermines American values, a former Soviet dissident said yesterday. Vladimir Bukovsky, who was imprisoned by the Soviet government for human-rights activity and who later worked to expose communism's crimes, said Russia today is moving away from democracy and is being run by ex-communists and former secret political police officials with little commitment to democracy. "The United States does not need Russia or China aboard on this coalition," Mr. Bukovsky said in an interview. "It only complicates [the United States´] own problems, their own definitions. It's already murky. You can't define terrorism. It's like a war on poverty and war on illiteracy. It sounds like a Soviet-style campaign." By adding Russia and China to the anti-terrorism coalition, the United States will make it harder to fight the problem, he said. Russia has used the campaign against terrorism to step up its own war against the breakaway region of Chechnya, while China has increased its crackdown on Muslims in western Xinjiang province. Uzbekistan, where U.S. troops are based, also has a very repressive, Soviet-style government. "They kill their [political] opponents. I mean the Russians do too, but [the Uzbeks] are really from the Middle Ages," Mr. Bukovsky said. "Do you really need allies like that?" he asked. "I can't understand that." Aligning with Russia, China and other repressive governments is "betraying your own principles," Mr. Bukovsky said. The battle against terrorism is more like the Cold War conflict than one that can be helped by such coalitions, he added. "The objective is to further your style of life, your principles, your moral values — that was the objective in the Cold War," he said. "So if you give that up in exchange for some kind of coalition, you already lose." There has been no contribution to the military effort by either Russia or China, he said. Mr. Bukovsky, who lives in Britain, is in Washington to receive an award today from the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. He is one of two recipients of the Truman-Reagan Freedom Medal, which this year marks the 10th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican, is the second recipient. The bipartisan foundation was set up several years ago to remember the 100 million people estimated to have died at the hands of communist governments around the world since 1917. The recent warming of ties between Russia and the United States has not helped efforts to further democracy in Russia, Mr. Bukovsky said. "Under [Russian President Vladimir] Putin, Russia is trying to go back" to a Soviet-style setup, he added. Democratic reform in Russia has stalled because reformers "didn't try hard enough" to institutionalize post-communist changes, he said. Mr. Bukovsky added that not enough has been done in Russia to remember the victims of communism. A stone from a Gulag prison labor camp — the symbol of communist repression — was placed in the center of Lubyanka Square, once the headquarters of the Soviet secret police, in the early 1990s. "All the nomenklatura have remained in power," he said, referring to the ruling elite of the Soviet Union. After 1993, Mr. Yeltsin "became a hostage" to the power ministries — the Russian military and the former KGB political police, he said. Mr. Putin, a former KGB officer, was put in power to "re-instate" the Soviet-style system, according to Mr. Bukovsky. "They have succeeded remarkably," he said, noting that in many ex-Soviet republics "the Communists are back in power." Additionally, Russia's media freedom also has been curbed, and several recent legal cases of espionage and political persecution show that freedom is eroding under Mr. Putin, Mr. Bukovsky said. "For the first time in 10 years we have political prisoners," he said. ******* #15 The Economist (UK) December 15-21, 2001 The Kremlin Old versus new Civil war in President Putin's camp THE Kremlin runs Russia. But who runs the Kremlin? Around President Vladimir Putin, the snowballs are flying in a battle for power and money. On one side is the "family", mostly well-connected leftovers from the Yeltsin era. Notable among them are the head of Mr Putin's administration, Alexander Voloshin, and the prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, but also included are the central-bank chief, the top prosecutor and other worthies. On the other side are the siloviki, the hard men, brought in by Mr Putin, mostly, like him, from St Petersburg, and with KGB or similar backgrounds. They include Sergei Stepashin, who runs the Audit Chamber, the state's main anti- corruption watchdog, and Nikolai Patrushev, head of the internal security service, the FSB. Both sides claim the argument is about how to run Russia. The old guard talk experience and stability. The newcomers say they want a stronger state and less crookery. Cynics say the Yeltsin-era lot are really just trying to hang on to their juicy, ill-gotten assets and incomes, whereas the newcomers just want to get their hands on the loot, and the sooner the better. The weapons in this struggle are blackmail, feigned illness (which can keep you out of jail), the legal system, and accusations of banditry and incipient totalitarianism. Oddly, both sides more or less count on the president's support. The feud has been simmering since Mr Putin took power. Now it is becoming open war. One battle is over jobs. The railways minister, Nikolai Aksyonenko, a "family" member, suffered the indignity of a late-night visit from anti-corruption investigators during his granddaughter's birthday party. Exaggeratedly, his side claimed to find echoes of Stalin's purges in this. The rumour mill has been hard at work. A television station owned by a banking tycoon close to Mr Putin reported that Mr Voloshin, an efficient administrator who seemed to have settled down with the new regime, had been dismissed. The tale was widely repeated in other media, in what looked suspiciously like planted (and paid- for) articles. So far, in fact, Mr Voloshin remains in place. Business is a second battlefield. A would-be putsch at Gazprom, Russia's biggest (and grossly mismanaged) company, failed when Mr Putin stepped in, reluctantly, to keep his newly appointed man in the top job, where he had been making little headway. Another row concerns the customs service (see article). Its bosses are mainly people from the Yeltsin era. But two now face corruption charges. The siloviki want full control. Some of the old guard are saving their own skins by turning on former friends: the prosecutor's office, a "family" bastion that the new men have tried and failed to capture, has recently given zealous support to Mr Stepashin's sleaze-hunts. Mr Putin has shown he can act fast and toughly when he wants. But he has mostly stayed out of the fight. He may be biding his time. Or maybe, understandably, he just finds both camps unappealing. ******** #16 2001 In Review: For Vladimir Putin, A Year Of Transformation By Kathleen Knox The year 2001 saw Vladimir Putin transformed in the eyes of the West, from an enigmatic potential enemy to an important ally lauded for his swift and firm support in the war against terrorism. Along the way, he has secured a bigger say for Russia in world affairs. But critics say the Russian president continues to blend authoritarian and reformist tendencies. Prague, 13 December 2001 (RFE/RL) -- In many ways, 2001 appeared to begin in old-fashioned style at the Kremlin. The old Soviet anthem was dusted off and reworded for the new era. The former KGB man at the top, Vladimir Putin, looked set for a high-stakes confrontation with the U.S. over Washington's plans to withdraw from a key arms treaty and develop a missile-defense system. And U.S. President George W. Bush added another tinge of frost to the January air when he suggested that financial aid to Russia should be linked to guarantees against corruption. But by the end of the year, NATO was offering Russia a historic say in its affairs, and a watershed in U.S.-Russian relations was hailed after Putin's fourth -- and chummiest -- meeting with Bush, this time at the U.S. president's Texas ranch in November: "Being here, I feel the will of the American people to cooperate with Russia. I can assure you, I can guarantee that the Russian people have the same feelings." Even today's expected announcement that the U.S. intends to scrap the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has so far drawn surprisingly mild reaction from Russian officials, with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov calling the decision "regrettable" but saying it will have no impact on Russian security. Stronger words may be on the way, but the warmer relations between Putin and the West are undeniable -- and unlikely to be reversed by the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. What's largely made the difference, of course, is 11 September and the warmer relations it ushered in after Putin offered Russia's firm support for the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism. The move went a long way toward boosting Putin's international prestige. At the same time, however, it raised questions about whether he is at risk of losing support at home by backing the U.S. so wholeheartedly. Archie Brown is a specialist in Russian politics at Oxford University. He says Putin has been surprisingly flexible in offering his support to the U.S.: "There was understandably some suspicion of [Putin], given his KGB background. But he has shown quite a lot of imagination, and while for the most part he has been rather cautious and has operated from within a consensus in the Russian political elite, on 11 September and immediately after he showed considerable independence from elite opinion and identified with American policy and a likely American response to terrorism with great alacrity. People who have dealt with him since then have been quite impressed with his diplomatic skills and analytical abilities." Even before 11 September, Bush was warming up to his Russian counterpart. After he met Putin for the first time in Ljubljana in June, the U.S. president called him a leader Americans can trust. "I looked him in the eye," Bush said of Putin. "I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. [I] wouldn't have invited him to my ranch if I didn't trust him." On the eve of their third meeting of the year in Shanghai -- just weeks after the 11 September attacks -- Bush was saying he couldn't wait to visit "my friend Vladimir Putin." And by the time of the mid-November summit in Crawford, Texas, Bush said he was gaining insight into what made the Russian president tick: "The more I get to know President Putin, the more I get to see his heart and soul, the more I know we can work together in a positive way." At the same time, the once camera-shy Putin seemed to be displaying a growing confidence in his role. At a July press conference at the Kremlin, he fielded questions from some 500 Russian and foreign journalists and had it broadcast live -- quite a shift in style for a president who had previously tended to face the press in small groups. At the news conference, Putin fielded questions in English and even occasionally revealed his lighter side. One journalist asked what had happened to his pet white poodle, first seen when Boris Yeltsin appointed him acting president, but since supplanted by a black Labrador. Putin responded first by saying the dog had dyed its hair: "It's a female. [Women] always dye their hair." The real answer, for any dog lover interested, is that the poodle is still there but spends more time with Putin's wife. The Kremlin press conference contrasted sharply with Putin's handling of the "Kursk" submarine disaster a year earlier. When the "Kursk" sank in August 2000 with 118 men on board, Putin was heavily criticized for not returning immediately from a Black Sea holiday. He later admitted that it would have been better from a "public relations point of view" if he had cut his holiday short. This autumn -- as if to make up for the public relations damage -- he went ahead with an unprecedented $65-million operation to recover the vessel and give its dead crewmen proper burials. Putin also recently sacked the head of the Northern Fleet and some dozen other top navy officers -- a move some saw as a delayed response to the "Kursk" disaster. Elsewhere, the Russian president met with greater criticism, particularly regarding the media. The year 2001 saw the state tighten its grip on independent media, with two broadcasters and two publications being brought under control. In April, the state-controlled gas monopoly Gazprom finally took over NTV, a television station founded by business tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky. Gusinsky's media empire further crumbled just days later when the gas giant shut down his "Segodnya" daily and fired the staff of his "Itogi" political weekly. Many of NTV's journalists fled to TV-6, owned by a rival oligarch, Boris Berezovsky. But in September, a court ruled TV-6's parent company be liquidated, at a stroke wiping out the last private broadcaster willing to air criticism of the Kremlin. In the past, Putin has brushed off suggestions that press freedom in Russia is under threat, saying that Gusinsky and Berezovsky ran into trouble because they incurred debts. But critics say the law used to squelch both TV stations would put most Russian companies out of business if it were applied across the board. Russian analyst Archie Brown: "Now, certainly there are grounds for concern about the financing of these television stations, but what has been applied, what has happened, is a selective application of the law. And it so happens that the parts of the mass media which were most independent of the state authorities and most liable to be critical are the ones which have been targeted." Putin's handling of the war in Chechnya also continues to be of concern to human rights activists. They worry that he is using the war on terrorism to justify his campaign in the breakaway republic, which has caused suffering to countless civilians. NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson, on a November visit to Moscow, said the events of 11 September had influenced the alliance's view of the problems Russia is facing in Chechnya: "We understand even more graphically what Russia has had to experience from terrorism emanating from Chechnya because of what happened in New York and Washington. We sympathize with Russia. We work alongside Russia in dealing with the terrorist networks that have caused that trouble, but we still retain some concerns about the means that Russia has used to deal with the undoubted problems that it has in Chechnya, and that remains our position and hasn't changed at all." Observers characterize Putin's style as a blend of autocratic and reformist tendencies. Just as Gusinsky's Media Most was losing control of NTV to Gazprom in the spring, Putin set out a list of priorities -- including some liberal reforms -- in a key speech to members of both houses of parliament. The civil service would be downsized, the tax regime overhauled, the judicial system reformed, and red tape hacked, he said. One of his biggest achievements came in October, when Putin signed into law the land code, making it legal to buy and sell a limited amount of Russian land for the first time since pre-Soviet days. A more ambiguous reform this year, Brown says, was Putin's drive to limit the number of political parties: "It's too early to tell whether that will be damaging for democracy. It could actually turn out to be an improvement on the existing state of affairs, because if it leads not only to fewer political parties -- which should be the case -- but also to stronger political parties, then that would be a very worthwhile result." With the economy still ticking along nicely, his international prestige boosted and his approval rating at home still high, 2001 appears to have been a very good year for the Russian president. Brown says Putin's position looks comfortable for the time being -- especially with much of the media granting him sympathetic coverage. ******* #17 strana.ru December 13, 2001 Kremlin Spin Doctor on Why He is Ditching Internet Media On Wednesday Gleb Pavlovsky, the head of the Fund of Effective Politics who is widely considered as the Kremlin's chief spin doctor, made the following statement: "Due to forced and insuperable circumstances, the Fund of Effective Politics is winding up its cooperation with the group of mass media outlets it runs on the internet -- Strana.Ru, SMI.ru, Vesti.Ru and others. In the next few days the ownership of these resources will be reorganised and consequently officially written over to another party. Gazeta.Ru asked Gleb Pavlovsky to comment about his decision. Why are you abandoning the mass media outlets which you yourself created and of which you have been the ideologist for such a long time? It's to do with the wish not to complicate cooperation between investors and the mass media outlets. The Fund of Effective Politics (FEP) which I head and I myself personally have difficult relations with the investors. There now exists real, and for me obvious, pressure on me from the investors, but not from the state authorities. The situation has arisen because the investors over exaggerate my role in public polemics between public figures. I'm convinced that the state power is not the source of this problem, although undoubtedly one group of bureaucrats or another could be the catalyst for the investors' attitude towards me. Is the pressure upon you not a continuation of the episode with Gazprom when Strana.Ru over hastily announced Alexsei Miller's resignation? note -- Alexei Miller was appointed general director of Gazprom in July. He is considered a member of the so-called "Petersburg Team" and was appointed to the post to strengthen state control over the gas giant. Gazprom has nothing to do with this affaire. There are complaints on the level of the so-called polemic of the "Kremlin Parties" (i.e. pro-Kremlin political parties) which unfolded in those media outlets. I can say that the polemic is being driven by money - it's an ordered PR campaign. The whole thing is depressing me, therefore I want leave it to put an end to the conflict. Can you name the investors who are pressuring you? Under agreement I don't have the right to do that. I'm not going to name any investors, nor bureaucrats so as not to break agreements of confidentiality. I don't have a conflict with anyone personally - to the contrary, I want to defuse the conflict. How are your relations with the Presidential Administration? With the Presidential Administration I have straight and calm relations within the framework of a circle of themes on which we cooperate. What will you do after you give up your rights to your internet media outlets? I'll continue to occupy myself with what I'm now occupied -- the Fund of Effective Politics. The Fund will no longer work in cooperation with those media outlets. The media resources will exist as a corporation or holding. Neither me nor any one else from the FEP will have access to them. Those employees of the FEP who currently work with both the Fund and those media outlets will have to choose with whom they wish to stay. ****** ------- Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: http://www.cdi.org/russia Archive for Johnson's Russia List: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation A project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI) 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036