#11
Washington Post
December 7, 2001
Russia: A Partner, But Not in NATO
By Henry A. Kissinger
Sept. 11, 2001, is etched in American minds as a vast tragedy, but it is likely that history may record it as well as the turning point in shaping the international order for the 21st century. Sept. 11 ended some of the smug illusions of the 1990s, among them that international politics has been supplanted by global economics or by the Internet.
The idea that a uniting Europe should seek its identity in distinction from the United States has been overtaken by European offers to join the American diplomatic and military campaign against terrorism. Russia has become a partner in the antiterrorism campaign. China has provided intelligence. Relations with India have grown closer despite America's reliance on Pakistani bases in the war against Afghanistan. The United States has made quiet overtures toward Iran. And the two defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan, have abandoned previous domestic constraints, Germany by sending troops beyond NATO's boundaries and Japan by deploying ships in the Indian Ocean far from home waters. None of these steps was conceivable six months earlier.
Sept. 11 brought home to our allies that Europe is without means of retaliation against similar attacks, hence that the need for a common transatlantic security relationship remains. And the steadily improving Russo-American relationship obviates the need for the incipent mediating role between Russia and America that some European leaders sought to achieve. For these reasons, within 48 hours of the terrorist attack, the NATO Council, for the first time in NATO existence, invoked Article 5 of the NATO treaty authorizing collective self-defense. The coalition diplomacy that emerged reflected a greater emphasis on bilateral cooperation with Washington on a national basis and within the North Atlantic framework than on the institutions of the European Union. The subtle coalition diplomacy of the Bush administration greatly aided this process.
A fresh perception of relations with Russia is the most important single issue. For the greater part of its history, Russia has treated its Western neighbors as a threat to its security and has responded by relentless expansion to create buffers, either by military means or by ideological intervention, as in the Holy Alliance or the Brezhnev doctrine.
Vladimir Putin, graduate of the analytical branch of the KGB, appears to have concluded that imperialism caused more tragedies than triumphs for Russia and is unsustainable by the reduced contemporary Russia, threatening it with isolation. This is why the thrust of Putin's strategy has been to strive for a kind of partnership with the United States, which is another way of saying that he is pursuing Russia's objectives by enlisting American power in their support.
President Bush has decisively seized this opening. But it is important to keep in mind that the new Russian policy results not from a personal preference but from a cool assessment of Russia's interest. Putin has left himself other options with China and with Europe, especially Germany, should his emphasis on America founder. Therefore, personal relations between leaders -- necessary to create an initial psychological framework -- must be translated into agreed permanent common interests. Otherwise, there is the risk of repeating the experience of previous Western leaders who relied on their ties to Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin (and before that to Joseph Stalin and his successors). One does Putin no favor by ascribing his policies to his personality -- impressive as it is; it is an argument that domestic opponents may well turn against him.
There is hope for improved American and Atlantic relations with Russia precisely because there is an objective new basis for them. It is not only that the current political structure of Europe bars the kind of Napoleonic or Hitlerite invasions that gave rise to Russian security concerns and that wars between nuclear powers inevitably exact costs out of proportion to any rational objective. Above all, the political calculus has changed in regions of historical contention such as the Middle East. The previous conception of a zero sum game between two dominant powers is no longer applicable. During the Cold War -- and for some period afterward -- both Russian and American leaders thought that a political gain for one side was a strategic loss for the other and systematically attempted to reduce each other's influence in the Middle East. Under post-Sept. 11 conditions, such policies would weaken both countries against Islamic fundamentalism and undermine the stability of the region in which they both have a vital interest.
The challenge is how to create consulting mechanisms capable of dealing jointly with the new common realities without giving Europe the sense that it is facing a Russo-American condominium. An attempt in that direction occurred when NATO Secretary General George Robertson (following the lead of British Prime Minister Tony Blair) advanced a scheme to fit Russia into NATO. A new NATO council including Russia is supposed to deal with specifically defined policy areas while the existing NATO council without Russia deals with all other matters. Decisions by the new body would be unanimous, thus giving Russia a veto within NATO. The topics have not yet been selected, but nuclear proliferation, terrorism and refugee displacements have been mentioned by Lord Robertson.
These subjects deserve common exploration with Russia. But Russian membership in NATO -- however partial -- is not the solution. NATO is, and remains, basically a military alliance, part of whose purpose is the protection of Europe against Russian invasion. Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of the common front against terrorism, this danger has disappeared for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the reason why former members of the Warsaw Pact have joined NATO, and why others are in the process of seeking to do so, is that Central Europeans consider history more relevant to their concerns than personalities. NATO does not protect its members against each other. To couple NATO expansion with even partial Russian membership in NATO is, in a sense, merging two incompatible courses of action.
It will be argued that this problem can be avoided by a careful definition of objectives assigned to the new NATO-Russian council. But that would not solve Russia's problem nor that of NATO. For if measures designed to protect against a reimperializing Russia -- however unlikely that contingency -- are handled separately by the same group of ambassadors who, wearing another hat, are practicing cooperation, Russia will be inclined to claim discrimination; and if Russia becomes a de facto NATO member, NATO ceases being an alliance or turns into a vague collective security instrument.
Nor is a permanent assembly of NATO ambassadors the best forum for exploring issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and migration or other global issues. For NATO is not now the principal forum for such issues. A new pattern of consultation outside the NATO framework is needed.
The situation is analogous to that posed by the collapse of the Napoleonic empire. The end of Napoleon did not end the fears of a resurgent France. But it was also recognized that permanent peace required the full participation of France in international diplomacy. The solution was the creation of the Quadruple Alliance to guard Europe against a renewal of French expansionism. France was not a member of the security undertaking. But it was invited to join as an equal partner in the so-called Concert of Europe that dealt with political issues affecting the political stability of Europe.
An analogous institutional framework is in order to address the contemporary challenge. Russia should become a full and equal partner in political discussions affecting international order. On matters affecting Atlantic relations, the consultative machinery of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could be raised to the head-of-state level; for global issues, the G-8 meetings of industrial democracies could be returned to their original emphasis on substance by giving them a political and not simply an economic subject matter. Or else a new consultative framework should be created. But what will not work is to try to squeeze the new wine of an upheaval of the international system into the old bottles of institutions created half a century ago for quite different purposes.
The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.
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