#10
The Akron Beacon Journal
7 December 2001
IS A HANDSHAKE ENOUGH TO SEAL A DEAL IN A NUCLEAR
WORLD?
By Sean Kay (sikay@owu.edu)
The writer is a politics and government professor at Ohio Wesleyan University
and has previously worked as a visiting fellow at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. He is the author of "NATO and the
Future of European Security."
Ronald Reagan used to say of the Soviet Union that we wanted to trust them on their promises, but we had to verify their actions. At last week's summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, this phrase took on a unique historical twist. Now it is America that prioritizes trust and the Russians who insist on verification of a range of sweeping changes in the nuclear arms structures that govern contemporary international stability.
President Bush insists on testing and eventually deploying a planned National Missile Defense (NMD) system arguing that the September 11th attacks demonstrate the need for missile defense now more than ever. At the core of the challenge of missile defense is the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union which banned the deployment of missile defense systems in order to maintain a relatively stable balance of forces between the two superpowers. Russia today continues to hold dearly to the ABM treaty both out of a commitment to its purposes and a fear that eventual missile defense deployments would neutralize Russia's nuclear deterrent. Probably more realistically, Russia worries that it just can not afford a missile defense technology race with the United States if the ABM treaty is discarded.
Both presidents Bush and Putin have shown a high degree of creative flexibility on this issue. Much to his credit, Bush has proposed to unilaterally cut US nuclear weapons down to as low as 1700. Vladimir Putin says Russia will respond in kind. Putin notes that the United States and Russia do share the same perception of the threat of ballistic missile proliferation, but rather disagree on the means to stop them. Thus Putin does not undermine the basic premises which support some of the Bush rationale for missile defense.
However, in their recent meetings a significant difference emerged between these two global leaders. George W. Bush indicated that a handshake should be sufficient for Washington and Moscow to move to a common understanding on new strategic concepts. President Bush and his administration have a strong resistance in principle to treaties and the extended negotiations that lead to them. In effect, they conclude that if it is in two country's interest to pursue a policy, then there is no need for legalistic wrangling. Moreover, by avoiding placing nuclear reductions in the context of a formal treaty, the US might be able to de-activate as many as two-thirds of its nuclear force by putting warheads in storage away from their missiles, but available for redeployment.
To the Russians, this approach is reminiscent of the adage - "fool me once, shame on you - fool me twice, shame on me." Moscow has been on the receiving end of what Russians perceive as broken promises by the United States over the last ten years. Russia was promised American support for billions of dollars in economic assistance with their transition to a market democracy - that money did not arrive. Russia was promised by the first Bush administration that aside from a united Germany, there would be no further NATO enlargement. And yet, within seven years, NATO included three new members and now seeks to add as many as seven more next year - including the three former Soviet Baltic countries. In the process of enlarging NATO, the Russians were reassured by the United States that this organization was a purely defensive alliance. It threatened no one and would never take offensive action. Within two years, NATO was waging an offensive war against Yugoslavia and had approved a new strategic concept declaring all of Eurasia as its area of interest.
In each of the above cases, these American commitments to Russia were made with words and handshakes. Nothing was in writing, and no formal treaties were violated. But trust was the casualty. It is with this in mind that President Putin of Russia now wants to trust the United States, but to verify in writing the commitments it is making and receiving. Russia has given the West plenty of reason to be suspicious toward Moscow. What financial assistance did come in the 1990s was largely squandered and Moscow has waged a vicious battle in Chechnya with enormous civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the United States must move to address Russia's concerns.
First, the Bush administration should work to amend the ABM treaty to allow for testing of NMD systems but defer deployment decisions for future negotiations. Second, the US should agree to a written document which codifies, via executive agreements not requiring congressional or parliamentary ratification, the plans for equal unilateral nuclear force reductions. Such an agreement must clearly define that missiles and warheads are actually being destroyed and provide for on-site verification. Third, the US and Russia should negotiate arrangements to boost existing Department of Defense and Department of Energy programs to help finance Russia's nuclear dismantling. Finally, the US should pursue its legitimate plans for NATO enlargement - but at a much slower pace than initially conceived.
Behind the smiles of Texas, serious strains remain in the US-Russian relationship. Yet, these differences have rightly taken a back seat to the war on terrorism. Washington and Moscow are forging an alliance against terrorism built upon a level of cooperation not witnessed since World War II. This historic moment is an extraordinary opportunity to build a lasting US-Russian strategic relationship. This is also not a time to be nonchalant about restructuring the stability of the global nuclear balance. If Moscow wants it in writing - give it to them.
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