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RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY
Vol. 1, No. 29, 19 November 2001
SUMMIT AFTERWORD: NOT YET THE END OF HISTORY
By Donald Jensen

Donald Jensen is an Associate Director of Broadcasting for RFE/RL and is a former foreign service officer, who served in the Political Internal Section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Last week's summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin made important progress on key issues, including nuclear arms reduction, the fight against terrorism, and the strengthening of economic ties between the United States and Russia. It remains uncertain, however, if the improvement of relations between the two countries since the 11 September terrorist attacks is a temporary partnership in the face of a common threat or a strategic shift by Russia toward the West.

Most Russians strongly sympathized with the victims of the New York City tragedies. However, many Russian elites have been surprised by the eagerness with which Putin supported the U.S. war in Afghanistan and continue to regard close cooperation with Washington with suspicion. The Russian military is wary of the deployment of U.S. forces in Central Asia, a region it has long regarded as lying within its sphere of influence. The Russian armed forces have also been disappointed with the practical results of the closer military cooperation with NATO enshrined in the 1997 Founding Act, and insist on the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty as a way to preserve the strategic balance with the United States. Russian business interests, especially in the arms sector, clamor for access to lucrative markets in Iraq and Iran, regimes hostile to the United States. Virtually forgotten in the recent publicity surrounding Moscow's closer relations with Washington have been recent Russia's arms sales to those countries. Meanwhile, Russian energy firms resent the U.S. interest in Central Asia's oil and gas resources, which they have long attempted to exploit themselves. Moreover, no matter what their views on specific issues, most Russian elites share misgivings about U.S. primacy in the world and resent their own country's loss of status since the end of the Cold War. What they cannot agree upon is how to reverse that decline.

Putin's authority has never been as unconstrained as his apologists at home and abroad have suggested. He depends for his support on a coalition of Russian elites, including allies in big business, the federal bureaucracy, parts of the security services, and regional leaders. Putin may be in no danger of being ousted -- unlike former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, there is no rival such as Boris Yeltsin waiting in the wings. But the elites limit Putin's freedom of action and his ability to implement policy. Thus, Putin may not always be able to deliver on what he promises. Moscow's stubborn unwillingness to substantially change the ABM Treaty, for example, may reflect less Putin's personal views -- by all signs he does not see a vigorous U.S. missile defense program as a serious threat to Russia's security -- than his attempt to keep a key domestic constituency on board.

Putin's assertive courtship of the West, therefore, is more likely to result in the permanent shift of Russia toward the West if it can quickly bring substantive, rather than merely rhetorical, benefits to key elements of the Russian establishment. In this regard, U.S. promises to speed Russia's inclusion in the World Trade Organization, help reform the country's banking system, and increase direct investment are promising steps.

There remain, however, serious dangers ahead. It will be difficult forging a settlement in Afghanistan that is acceptable both to the victorious Afghan factions, and to regional powers such as Pakistan, Washington, and Moscow, which has strong ties to President Burhanuddin Rabbani. A decision to expand NATO next year to incorporate the Baltic states is likely to raise hackles in parts of the Russian elite, no matter what Putin may think.

Most importantly, the Bush administration, though united behind the military effort against Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, still appears divided between those officials who favor a multilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy and those who want the U.S. to act on its own if doing so would more effectively advance American interests. Last week, for example, the U.S. refused to attend a meeting in New York on the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, which it has signed but not yet ratified. On the same day last month Secretary of State Colin Powell boasted to the international media about Washington's success at assembling a broad international alliance against terror, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told the Pentagon press corps that the U.S. was forging not "a coalition," but "many coalitions," which are directed toward purposes decided by the United States. In this regard, a unilateral U.S. expansion of the war again terrorism to include Iraq, a country with close commercial ties with Russia, would shatter Washington's current partnership with Moscow and rapidly return relations to the deep freeze.

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