#8
Chicago Tribune
November 18, 2001
Worry about the right threat
Big weapons are hard to handle
By Mitchel B. Wallerstein
Dr. Mitchel Wallerstein was deputy assistant secretary of defense for counterproliferation policy from 1993 to 1997. He is a vice president of the MacArthur Foundation
The specter of anthrax has Americans worried and on edge. Are these deadly but isolated incidents, or are they the opening salvo in an escalating use of mass-casualty weapons? I believe that the answer is most likely the former, but it is important to understand the nature of these new threats to our homeland, and to determine which aspects of this admittedly scary subject are really worth worrying about.
Mass-casualty weapons, also referred to as "weapons of mass destruction," refer to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capable of causing injury or death to many thousands--or tens or hundreds of thousands.
Concern about terrorist access to mass-casualty weapons has grown since the early 1990s, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the danger that nuclear weapons, or the fissile material used in them, might be vulnerable to theft or illegal purchase.
As of 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency had recorded 139 reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear material, though virtually none of this was of weapons grade. Moreover, there is no credible evidence that any Russian nuclear weapons are missing. It is less certain, however, whether terrorists might have been able to acquire small amounts of fissile material, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium. (The IAEA estimates, for example, that a total of more than 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium exists in research reactors in 27 countries.)
A similar concern about terrorist use of mass-casualty weapons was raised in 1995 after the attack on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, which used the chemical weapon sarin, a gas that killed more than a dozen people and sickened many hundreds. After the arrest of its leaders, authorities said they had learned that the cult also had experimented with, and actually used, the biological agent anthrax.
So how seriously should we take the threat of mass-casualty weapons use by Al Qaeda? Just within the past week, the media reported a claim by Osama bin Laden that his organization has access to chemical and nuclear weapons. There is no independent way to confirm his statement. (Notably, bin Laden made no mention of biological weapons, creating further doubt about the perpetrator of the recent anthrax attacks.)
It is, in any case, a substantial leap from having the capability to deliver anthrax spores in individual envelopes through the U.S. mail to having the know-how and the means to deliver a weapon capable of killing thousands of people in a single stroke.
Given this difference, the following analysis assesses the likelihood that particular weapons of mass destruction will be used by the terrorists against U.S. citizens and territory.
Nuclear dangers
There is no evidence, and little likelihood, that Al Qaeda could have developed an independent nuclear capability. The group has no facilities, no known expertise and has done no testing. Could terrorists have bought a weapon from some other country? Not likely. All nuclear-capable countries, including the Russian Federation, claim that their weapons are secure and accounted for.
Of greater likelihood is that terrorists could develop crude radiological weapons, which can be constructed of highly enriched uranium or plutonium (if it can be obtained) wrapped around a conventional explosive core. Such a weapon would not create a nuclear reaction; it would explode in a conventional manner but would spread radiation in the area of impact. This undoubtedly would create terror, but the effects would not be sufficiently widespread for this to be a mass-casualty weapon.
A final nuclear concern is the possibility of an attack on a civilian nuclear power plant. All reactor cores in U.S. nuclear plants are protected by heavily reinforced concrete containment structures. Still, a direct hit with a jet could cause thousands of casualties if there were a Chernobyl-type meltdown and resulting vent of radioactive material. Most vulnerable are the cooling ponds at these plants, where used fuel rods are stored before disposal. In response to these risks, the FAA has established "no-fly zones," enforced by fighter aircraft, around all U.S. nuclear reactor sites, and most (including those in Illinois) are now being protected by the National Guard.
Chemical dangers
Chemical weapons technology dates to World War I. Unfortunately, advanced expertise is not required to manufacture chemical weapons in limited quantities. But delivery is a problem.
Chemical weapons are typically bulky and cumbersome and, for that reason, hard to handle and to use covertly. Moreover, unless employed in a barrage, they would not lend themselves to use outdoors, primarily because the resulting chemical cloud would dissipate fairly quickly--especially under windy conditions.
The primary terrorist chemical weapon threat, therefore, would be against large, indoor venues or other enclosed public places, such as a transportation hub. This danger is credible, though it still would require that terrorists find a way to place a weapon in a building or transportation facility. Most venues, such as sports arenas, are now being guarded much more closely, as anyone who has recently attended an event can attest.
Public transportation terminals and stations present a bigger problem, because it is not possible to check each individual who enters. But even here, enhanced security measures are in place.
There is also the possibility of an attack against a chemical manufacturing facility with the objective of releasing a toxic cloud of noxious gas, such as chlorine or hydrogen cyanide. (Cyanide gas was released with devastating results in the industrial accident in Bhopal, India.) As in the nuclear case, the likelihood of such an attack is remote, in large part because of the detailed intelligence and precise targeting that would be required to successfully cause a chemical gas leak.
Biological dangers
There has been so much in the media about the anthrax threat that most are probably aware that this bacterium is the likely "agent of choice" for terrorists because, as a microscopic spore, it is hardy and invisible. Typically, an individual does not know exposure has occurred until symptoms begin to appear a few days later. This gives the terrorist the opportunity to disseminate the agent and depart, without having to commit suicide in the process.
But the use of anthrax has drawbacks and limitations. First, it is not contagious--it will only affect those directly exposed. Second, it degrades in sunlight and can be blown away by the wind or washed away by rain (though it will settle somewhere else). And finally, to be effective as a mass-casualty weapon, anthrax must be "aerosolized," or made airborne, which requires advanced technology and know-how. There is a vaccine for anthrax that has been used for decades by those who handle animals; and, of course, if caught early enough, anthrax is treatable with antibiotics.
Of greater concern would be terrorist use of viral agents, such as smallpox, which are highly contagious and do not respond to antibiotics. The World Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated more than a decade ago. The immunizations most adults received as children are probably no longer effective, and today's children are not vaccinated. Because of its lethality and its potential to spread rapidly to a lot of people (even with an aggressive public health response), smallpox and other viral agents potentially could constitute what some have called "the poor man's nuclear weapon."
The U.S. has 12 million to 15 million doses of smallpox vaccine on hand, and it is trying to rapidly acquire enough for the entire U.S. population, should the need arise. The good news about smallpox is that it is not easy to incorporate into a weapon or to disseminate--other than through human suicide squads moving through the population like "Typhoid Mary." There also is no evidence that Al Qaeda has access to the smallpox variola, which supposedly exists only in two secure locations, one in the U.S. and one in Russia.
Finally, the media raised the possibility of chemical or biological weapons attacks against our food or water supply systems. This probably is not a credible threat. The volume and flow of water required to support a metropolitan area the size of Chicago means that dilution--not to mention chlorine added routinely to the water--likely would neutralize virtually any agent terrorists might attempt to use. At the same time, our agriculture and food supply system is so large and diverse that it is doubtful that even a concerted attack could cause major disruptions.
As the president, attorney general and FBI director have said, there is still a significant possibility of more terrorist attacks before the war on terrorism shows results. There may be Al Qaeda cells in sleeper status in the United States. But it also seems unlikely that any such cells would have access to weapons of mass destruction. This, in fact, may be the reason the terrorists decided, in a diabolically clever manner, to turn jet airliners into flying fuel bombs, a crude form of mass-casualty weapon. Of course, it is not possible to state categorically that there will be no terrorist use of such weapons. But we do not have evidence that the current anthrax contamination is linked to Al Qaeda.
Thus, as worrisome as these dangers are, we should not overreact or blow them out of proportion. Increased vigilance, more focused and timely intelligence, and the knowledge that it is difficult to create and use mass-casualty weapons make it unlikely that Americans are now--or soon will be--in danger from any of the threats described here.
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