#7
Russian White House Corruption Viewed
Obshchaya Gazeta
8 November 2001
Article by Maksim Glikin and Dmitriy Dokuchayev:
"From Fine Tuning to a Pressure Point Attack"

Masters of clean-up operations and special operations have reached the White House

If you arrange in a single row the latest attacks that properly qualified bodies have made against high-ranking officials, it becomes obvious: it is not a question of individual actions, randomly coinciding in time, but of an object-oriented campaign. That being the case, a number of questions arise:

What was the logic of the autumn attack on the White House?

Who is behind the infamous exposures of the ministers?

On what principle did they choose the targets?

How They Explained the War

The news that the Prosecutor-General has begun an intensive investigation of matters immediately relating to several ministers resounded like thunder in the midst of a clear sky. Literally a couple of weeks before this, Mikhail Kasyanov stated that the "tuning" of the government had ended, and that he foresaw no major rearrangements in the White House. Does it turn out that the power workers have begun "artillery fire" on the upper floors of authority, suddenly and without declaring war?

In reality, the special services sounded a warning as far back as the summer. It is simply that many people did not hear it. OG reported on the large-scale intentions of the power workers in July ("Outlines of the Lyubyanskiye Futurists. The Special Services Are Planning To Take the Government, the Customs and the Kremlin," issue of 19 July 2001). It was at that time that representatives of the FSB [Federal Security Service] declassified the projects, in accordance with which an extensive shake-up awaited the authority structures by the end of the year.

Then we heard the names of those who, according to the designs of the Chekists, were to be sent off to retirement, and those who would take their place. Governor Mikhail Prusak was destined for the place of Mikhail Kasyanov, Nikolay Patrushev, director of the FSB was to inherit the post of Aleksandr Voloshin, and Yuriy Zaostrovtsev, deputy director of the FSB and supervisor of economic counter-intelligence, was proposed to head the economic bloc of the government (option -- the customs).

At that time these plans looked so exotic that few people believed them. Moreover, the FSB officially reported that the people who published these analyses were not recorded as being on the staff of a ministry. But by August, information appeared that the Interdepartmental Commission on Economic Security attached to the RF Security Council, by instructions of Vladimir Putin, had started working up a certain strategy for the country's economic security. It was reported that Yuriy Zaostrovtsev, deputy director of the FSB, Oleg Chernov, deputy head of the Security Council, and Sergey Glazyev, State Duma deputy, had been included in the work group. The first works of the commission were heard, and they clearly had a ring of the July plans of the "Lyubyanskiye futurists." It was partly a question of reviewing the results of privatization, of stiffening control over the Central Bank and the Customs Committee and of "cutting off the oligarchs' and monopolists' receipt of superprofits." Information on the enigmatic work group flashed through the small-circulation mass information media, and nothing more was reported on this subject. Although Sergey Glazyev's press-secretary confirmed to OG that the deputy was working energetically on this commission.

These strange plans and prophecies are beginning to be realized. Criminal cases concerning high-ranking staff members of the Central Bank and the Customs Committee are being investigated, the power workers are attacking the monopoly of the MPS [Ministry of Railways], and the review of the results of privatization has begun -- for the time being, only in Chelyabinsk Oblast ("the Golovlev case"). And if the cases concerning the ministers end in dismissals of their directors, the question naturally arises concerning the official conformity of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.

Where Did They Get the "Files on the Ministers"

The prosecuting workers present the case as if it were worthwhile for the Kremlin to announce that "there are no more untouchables," as they got down, in a unified impulse, to bringing out in the open all the embezzlements of the bureaucrats. With a closer look, however, it becomes clear that the claims against the high-ranking state servants arose in various years and on the most varied grounds. They took little files with compromising material out of cold-storage and combined them out of context in information reports, obviously out of market considerations. This could be clearly seen with respect to the Golovlev case and the MPS case.

This is true to an even greater extent of the claims made by the Office of the Prosecutor-General against the State Customs Committee. So far no specific accusations have been presented -- the proceedings have been instituted for the act of exceeding official powers. It is interesting, however, that an investigation made by the GTK [State Customs Committee] itself served as the grounds for it. The customs officials revealed the major machinations at the Grand and Tri Kita furniture centers, managed by Sergeyev Zuyev. The investigators discovered that, with the aid of dozens of screen-firms and one-day firms, grandiose speculations were made, making it possible to reduce customs payments to a minimum. As a result, in only two years the state treasury suffered a shortfall of at least $8 million. Mr Zuyev complained to the Office of the Prosecutor-General about the investigators, and that office unexpectedly came out on the side of the businessman.

"The case which we unraveled had no precedent -- with respect to the volume of funds revealed in shadow circulation, with respect to the level of the commercial structures which we established as guilty of machinations, and with respect to the length of the criminal chain which we tracked down," said Mikhail Bernovskiy, first deputy chief of the GTK customs inspectorate.

"We have already prepared materials to turn over to the Office of the Prosecutor-General. And this is the very time that they struck a bargain with us. They began to press the investigators, and unleashed an information war against the customs officials. It is not within our jurisdiction to judge why the Office of the Prosecutor-General actually began to act in the interests of the shadow business. It is possible that the Messrs Ustinov and Biryukov are simply giving themselves publicity on the struggles with corruption and decided that a convenient occasion had appeared to show the prosecutor's adherence to principle. The only thing unclear is why they call all this a battle against corruption."

Many observers think that the idea of turning the investigation undertaken by the customs officials against themselves belongs to Yuriy Zaostrovtsev, the aforementioned deputy director of the FSB. Some claim that he has a personal interest in the furniture business, and others think that Mr Zaostrovtsev is aiming at the seat of head of the GTK. But judging by the grandiose plans of the work group attached to the Security Council, the ambitions of the Lubyanskiy economist are much higher than a mere "clean-up" of the customs. His contribution to the present anti-corruption campaign is not so far completely clear, but it is quite possible that this young colonel-general (he is 44 years old) aspires to the role of a "new Korzhakov." Incidentally, it is to the supervisor of economic counter-intelligence that they ascribe the development of most of the "special operations" against the Most group.

The APN internet-agency broadens this, claiming that Yuriy Zaostrovtsev and Yuriy Biryukov appear as the real parties of the "furniture" conflict on the one hand, and on the other hand -- Vladimir Rushaylo and Mikhail Vanin. Whatever the case, the media war against Vanin coincided with the information attack on Rushaylo: there is a lavish mingling in the press of compromising materials on General Orlov, aide and very close associate of the former head of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

One more thing supplements this scenario: at the beginning of October, a verifying commission sent to St. Petersburg dismissed from their positions Vladimir Shamakhov, chief of the Northwestern Customs Administration, and Aleksandr Puchkov, chief of the Baltic customs. Considering the fact that Shamakhov, a man from the same district as President Putin, had long been destined for the post of head of the GTK, this action was perceived in presidential circles as an attempt made by Mikhail Vanin to free himself of a competitor. The "furniture scandal," which followed soon after could be the answering blow on the part of the opponents of the country's main customs official.

These scenarios do not contradict each other: they fit into a unified scheme to oppose the old and new power elite.

How They Chose the Targets

So it is obvious that the basic direction of the blow passes along the line, "Petersburgers" -- "non-Petersburgers": the former attack, the latter are forced to defend themselves. Classified among the "Petersburgers," that is, the main initiators of the "incursion," are the part of the president's administration which he really recruited from the city on the Neva: Sechin, Medvedev, Kozak. For them, the successful carrying out of the government "clean-up" is a chance to finally come out from the shadow of the "iron" Voloshin. Zaostrovtsev is also a man from the same district as the president, a graduate of the KGB Petersburg school.

The "non-Petersburgers" are mainly the ministers recruited as far back as pre-Putin times from the so-called "oligarchy" set. At a time when for this it was necessary, to become a minister, to enlist the support of the all-powerful Berezovskiy or to undergo a discussion in the cabinet at Abramovich's "treasurer Family." It is a question of those who fell under the blow of Aksenenko and Shoygu, as well as of Vanin, the head customs official, and Lesin, the minister of the Press, whose ministries also figure on the "black list." As for the other persons from this list -- deputy Golovlev, Malyshev, vice-governor, Nazdratenko, head of the State Committee of the Fishing Industry -- they can be considered as "incidental" victims of the anticorruption campaign. The logic of fights with them was obviously different. Let us say, the post of head of fishing was a present to Nazdratenko in exchange for refusing to be a candidate for the gubernatorial position in the Maritime region. But Vladimir Putin is hardly interested in him as a long-playing member of the government.

Anticorruption attacks have always served as cause for a rise in the ratings for those who carry them out. This is not a pressing problem for Putin today, however. His ratings are already not too bad, his positions are stable, and no serious competitors can be seen in the battle for the throne . The turnover of the MPS is assessed as at least dozens of billions of dollars a year, and the profit is about 2 billion. The GTK, Mikhail Vanin acknowledges, forms more than one-third of the country's budget income. The MChS [Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters] steals "target-oriented" money which is allocated by happenstance to every possible accident, such as occurred in Lensk. Well and, of course, all these departments have acquired numerous nonbudget funds. Even the modest State Committee of the Fishing Industry has its own "sweet" morsels, such as the quotas for catching fish, for which there is an on-going serious struggle.

It is obvious, however, that the campaign organizers are interested not only in monetary flows. It is hard to imagine a Sergey Shoygu, who would not be financially happy for the interests of the president, if he were to receive the appropriate request. Rather, the goings-on could be interpreted in a different way: Vladimir Putin is getting rid of the people who are obliged for a career take-off to someone other than him. Moreover, these ministers, who successfully survived the change in the power elite a couple of years ago could feel themselves "irreplaceable" and "unsinkable." But the president and his administration do not need those who are irreplaceable, too strong and too independent. After all, it is very hard to control such a contingent. Is this not the essence of what we have been observing during recent weeks?

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