#9
Kommersant-Vlast
No. 44
November 6, 2001,
A THIRD APPROACH
Russia is taken in by the United States again
Author: Sergei Strokan
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
CLOSING THE RUSSIAN BASES AT LOURDES AND CAM RANH HAS BEEN THE FIRST SACRIFICE ON THE ALTAR OF ALLEGED RUSSIAN-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP. HOWEVER, THESE SACRIFICES ARE LIKELY TO PROVE ONE-SIDED - IF NOT FATAL. RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE LEARNED FROM ITS EXPERIENCES IN THE "LOST DECADE" OF THE 1990S.
On the eve of the Texas summit between President George Bush and President Vladimir Putin, Moscow and Washington were seized by a long- forgotten - and, it might seem, forever lost - sense of euphoria: in the 21st century, at a new twist of history, Russia and America are again on the same side, as they were in the era of the anti-Hitler coalition in the first half of the 1940s, parting with the Cold War in the late 1980s, and in the subsequent period of dismantling communism in the early 1990s.
After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, a new sense of trust in relations between the two countries arose practically from nothing. This was primarily due to the Russian president. Americans were astounded by the fact that Putin was the first world leader to call Bush on September 11, sending the message "we are with you". The feeling that Russia is on the same side as America, as well as the rest of the West, grew stronger as Moscow demonstrated its readiness to be a member of the anti-terrorist coalition formed in Washington. As we have previously reported, before the Texas meeting Putin has made another effective move by converting the obsolete military-political "property" of the former USSR (the former outposts of Moscow in Latin America and Asia, which had grown quite futile - the radar station at Lourdes in Cuba and a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam) into a new loan of confidence.
However, does Putin's popularity in the West - which has zoomed to an unprecedented height - mean that his Texas summit with Bush is destined to be an epoch-making breakthrough?
Paradoxically enough, it's more likely to be the reverse. "Let's call it the Gorbachev-Yeltsin syndrome. The status of a pet in the West actually brings little but pain." This is not a revelation from the nationalist newspaper "Zavtra", which has already cursed Putin for the "treachery of Cuba"; but a quote from "Newsweek". According to this article, it is very likely that Putin will "fall into the old trap" that snared his predecessors Gorbachev and Yeltsin when they rushed toward the West with their arms outstretched, but received much less in response than they had expected.
When Gorbachev approved the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, he counted on NATO not to expand to the East after the unification of Germany. However, things proved to be otherwise. NATO was far from rejecting the idea of expansion, and after a few years received its first recruits from the former Warsaw Pact. Today there are others waiting in line, who are likely to end up joining NATO. By the way, in 1991 Gorbachev also pulled out of Cuba (he withdrew a Soviet army brigade), but gained no benefits from this.
Yeltsin, who succeeded Gorbachev, also believed that people in the West would duly assess his role as the destroyer of communism. However, his hopes were not justified either. Eventually, Yeltsin's reformers felt deceived by the West - which, in their view, had never managed to support the reforms started by the "Chicago boys" under the guidance of the IMF. Thus, for instance, no one wrote off Soviet-era debts for Moscow, in exchange for the splendid funeral it arranged for communism. When Russia pressed its old ally, Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milosevic, into surrendering in 1999, Russia once again got no benefits - it did not receive any new ways of affecting the situation in the Balkans. As a result of all the unfulfilled hopes of the 1990s, the last decade of the 20th century, which had begun so promisingly, came to be called the "lost decade" in the history of Russian-US relations.
Is there any guarantee that Putin will be fortunate enough to avoid the bitter experience in relations with the West that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin managed to escape? "If Russia really believes that the September terrorist attacks will make the US stop trying to unilaterally decide the fate of the world, it will be terribly disappointed. While earlier there had been some political reasons that prevented Washington from acting on its own initiative in certain situations, now there are no such restrictions," thinks Professor Peter Ruthland from the Harvard University Russian Research Center. In his view, today's "optimism among Russians" originates from a false understanding of the nature of the anti-terrorist coalition. The United States is not forming a long-term coalition, but a temporary tactical alliance that will exist not for years, but months or even weeks. Concessions made to members of this coalition are precisely measured out, and the US makes compromises only to solve particular problems. Moreover, concessions to some members of the coalition - for example, Pakistan - may enter into a direct conflict with the interests of others, for example Russia.
The extent of progress in relations between the US and Russia will greatly depend on the degree of success in bargaining on specific points - a bargaining process in which Russia plays a minor role, with its wants far in excess of its capabilities. As for the advantages it has (the bases at Lourdes and Cam Ranh were among them), it should dispose of them as rationally and sparingly as possible. The paradox lies in the fact that American and Russian euphoria over the allegedly resumed friendship doesn't favor cool accounting, but a selfless enthusiasm that would rejoice in more sacrifices on the altar of this friendship - sacrifices which are expected primarily from Russia, and which, as recent history teaches, might well be futile.
Russia is most unlikely to continue like this for long, especially when it concerns something more serious than Lourdes or Cam Ranh. But when Russia protests, it will become clear that a tactical alliance is not to become a strategic partnership.
(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky.)
Next Article