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International Herald Tribune
November 12, 2001
Hope for a Strategic Breakthrough at the Bush-Putin
Summit
William Potter and Nikolai Sokov
Mr. Potter directs the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. Mr. Sokov, a former Russian diplomat, is a senior research associate at the center. They contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.
MONTEREY, California In the improved climate of relations between the United States and Russia that has come with their close cooperation in combating terrorism, expectations have been raised that the summit meeting opening Tuesday in Washington between presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin will produce a strategic breakthrough. Many in the U.S. government hope to persuade Russia to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Russia, however, is unlikely to agree to abrogation, although it prepared to discuss amendments that would allow at least some testing of missile defense systems. The absence of a deal on the ABM Treaty will not produce serious friction between the United States and Russia, at least in the short term. Moscow has moderated its views on the treaty. It also has more important issues on the summit agenda, especially deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces and entry into the World Trade Organization. Although Russia is likely to protest U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, in turn it probably will seek revision of other arms control agreements. Referring to the American characterization of the treaty as a relic of the Cold War, the Russian minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, said recently that “following that logic, all key U.S.-Soviet treaties are to some extent relics of the Cold War as well." These include START-1 (the 1991 treaty that cut strategic offensive arms to 6,000 warheads) and INF (the 1987 treaty that eliminated American and Soviet intermediate-range land-based missiles). For attentive observers, there is little new in that statement. Mr. Putin has warned a number of times that if the U.S. withdraws from the ABM Treaty, Russia would feel free to withdraw from other arms control treaties. The new language simply adapts this old position to the new circumstances and opportunities: whereas previously it was withdrawal for withdrawal, now it is modification for modification.
Russian interest in withdrawing from arms control agreements is not driven by either doctrinal or political considerations. Rather, it is economic in nature. Departure from START-1, for example, would allow Russia to save money by ending expensive inspections and making its dwindling arsenal less costly to maintain.
But the demise of the data exchange and verification provisions of START-1 would have major consequences. A loss of reliable information about nuclear arsenals could well generate mistrust, and the hard-won cooperation between the two countries might deteriorate.
American negotiators do not appear to appreciate the verification implications if the United States abrogates the ABM Treaty. It is important, therefore, for the summit to consider how to preserve the data exchange and verification requirements of existing arms control agreements. Specifically, the two sides should begin consultations to develop an information exchange and confidence-building package to replace the mechanisms currently in place.
In addition, the two presidents need to establish a framework to discuss the issues of strategic stability so that actions of one side are clearly understood by the other and that these actions themselves are planned with a clear understanding of the other side's possible reaction.
Freedom from the formal constraints of arms control treaties should not be confused with unlimited freedom of action. In the absence of treaties, flexibility is greater, but the task of managing the U.S.-Russian relationship is more difficult. Washington and Moscow need to make sure that they are well prepared to handle the new challenges. <
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