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#2
New York Times
November 8, 2001
To the Crawford Summit
By WILLIAM SAFIRE
WASHINGTON

George Bush told Vladimir Putin last month that the 1972 ABM treaty was "outdated, antiquated and useless." Putin countered by telling Barbara Walters, in an interview ABC broadcast last night, that the treaty, which keeps the U.S. and Russia defenseless against nuclear attack, was "essential, effective and useful."

Then the Russian president added the crucial but: "But we have a negotiating platform from which we could reach agreements."

That platform was secretly nailed down on Oct. 21 in Shanghai: the useless-to-us, useful-to-them ABM treaty will be stretched to permit us to test -- in ways currently prohibited -- a defense against terrorist or rogue-state missiles.

In return, the U.S. will agree at the president's Crawford, Tex., ranch next week to a Start treaty reducing each side's nuclear missiles to under 2,000, which is all the Russians can afford to maintain. Notes the Jamestown Foundation's Harry Kopp: "Start Plus meets ABM Minus."

About the war in Afghanistan, Putin gave Walters this accurate assessment: "The United States is losing not in the military but in the information. It seems to me that on the information field, terrorists are acting more aggressively and more offensively. . . ."

The Russian leader ought to know; the ex-K.G.B. operative has long been a master of disinformation. He gained popularity among nationalists by blaming Chechen separatists for all terrorist acts in Russia. Now, in the onslaught of organized terrorism against the U.S., he volunteers to be what Russians call our partnyor in defeating it.

A politician who recently talked with him at length in Russian tells me "he's still K.G.B., but he no longer has to worry about the nationalists and militarists like Zhirinovsky and Lebed. The old Communists are dying off while the young reformers dwindle down, and he's grabbed control of the media so nobody can be heard criticizing him."

With his popularity rating soaring to Bush-like heights, Putin has three geopolitical choices: (1) to align Russia with China against the West; (2) to romance Europe and try to draw it away from the U.S. superpower; or (3) to disappoint China and astound Europe by befriending the U.S. directly.

He started moving toward that America-first option by closing down his Cuban spy operation, abandoning the Cam Ranh Bay naval base in Vietnam and withdrawing objections to our dearly desired oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea through Turkey. Though he clings to his lucrative, dangerous nuclear buildup of Iran, he no longer glowers at our desire to admit the Baltic States into NATO.

Then, after Sept. 11, Putin seized his opportunity to help the injured U.S. When he permitted our military presence on his southern flank in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, his generals dared not object publicly. He could even offer us combat troops -- "in rescue operations, including on the territory of Afghanistan" -- secure in the knowledge that the last thing anti- Taliban Afghans would tolerate would be a Russian re-invasion.

But the surest sign of Putin's strategy will be his willingness to bend the ABM treaty out of shape. Hu Jintao went to Moscow last week to argue that an American space shield would undercut China's nuclear threat to Taiwan; he was rebuffed. (Who's Hu? He's the Chinese leader likely to replace Jiang Zemin in two years, and Barbara should start going after him now.)

European leaders, opposing our missile shield in what they hoped would be a worldwide gang-up against American hegemony, are agape. How could Putin bypass their toll bridge to integration with the West, they sputter, and make a private deal with the unilateralist Bush?

Putin seeks an osobye otnosheniya -- "special relationship" -- with the U.S. for good reasons. China, bordering Russia's east, is a long-term strategic threat; the U.S. is not. Europe is not about to welcome an economic rival, but the U.S. has the money and savvy to exploit Russia's oil and gas resources, and holds the key to its entry into the World Trade Organization.

We can hope that at the Crawford summit, Bush and Putin will cut the pious soul-searching and fulsome expressions of undying trust. America's national travail has enabled Putin to speed a rapprochement, but we should not forget that once up on its hind legs, the Russian bear will growl again.

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