#10
Versiya
No. 41
October 30, 2001
WELCOME, OR: ACCESS RESTRICTED TO AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL
Security shortfalls at Russia's nuclear facilities
Author: Petr Pryanishnikov, Vladimir Kuznetsov (Green Cross Russia)
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
IN THE UNITED STATES, SECURITY AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES IS NOW BEING COMPLETELY RE-EVALUATED. RUSSIA ALSO NEEDS TO TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT SECURITY STANDARDS. ITS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE INADEQUATELY GUARDED AND MONITORED, AND OFFICIALS CAN'T EVEN AGREE ON FIGURES FOR THEFT ATTEMPTS.
In the United States, security at nuclear facilities is now being completely re-evaluated. The US nuclear industry is concerned about terrorist attacks as well as attempts to steal nuclear materials and use them for "military purposes".
Russia's nuclear facilities are guarded along the perimeter, i.e. all the territory around the fencing. This is considered to be sufficient.
Interior Ministry security forces are stationed at posts around the fencing. Checkpoints and perimeters are not currently equipped to counter terrorist attacks. What does that mean? There are no crash barriers at checkpoint entrances; sentries are visible from a distance, unprotected by protective barriers or bulletproof glass; there are no security roads, moats, or fortified barriers along perimeters. Most checkpoints lack the equipment to detect whether nuclear materials are being taken out. Thus, in principle it's easy to take something out of a nuclear facility.
Of course, security guards at nuclear facilities are authorized to use their weapons in emergencies. But whether weapons actually can be used in close proximity to a nuclear facility is another matter. There are no standardized instructions with regard to this. Instructions do set out circumstances in which weapons must not be used; but no alternatives are offered. Soldiers have to work out defensive measures for themselves.
What's more, the security guards themselves are capable of unpredictable behavior. Interior Ministry servicemen have been known to abandon their posts in search of food, because meals had not been provided to them and they were hungry. Some have refused to man their posts in protest at not being issued with winter clothing.
Security standards during transport of nuclear materials are very similar.
What might be the consequences of all this? Here are just a few examples of the wonders taking place at Russian nuclear facilities.
September 1998: At the Mayak facility, where over 30 tons of enriched weapons-grade plutonium are stockpiled, an Interior Troops sergeant shot two of his comrades dead and wounded a third, then fled, still armed. This incident led President Putin to order an investigation into nuclear safety conditions at this facility.
September 1993: Three people were detained in the marketplace of the town of Izhevsk while trying to sell a bundle of metal rods with a total weight of 140 kilograms. Tests showed that these were uranium rods, containing 0.2-0.4% Uranium-235. One of those detained worked at the Chepetsk mechanical plant in Glazov (Udmurtia). The Chepetsk plant is part of the nuclear power system. Its stores of uranium were checked, and 300 kilograms of uranium were found to be missing.
September 1998: American experts visiting Moscow were shown the building occupied by a high-security facility, where 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were stored. The building was in fact unguarded; the enterprise which owned the nuclear materials couldn't afford to pay its security guard his salary, the equivalent of $200 a month.
Officials can't even establish an accurate count of incidents of theft or quantities stolen. According to statements made by N. Redin, deputy department head at the Nuclear Energy Ministry, around 30 cases of theft of nuclear materials from Nuclear Energy Ministry facilities were recorded between 1992 and 1995. However, a year later, V. Erastov, head of the inventory and monitoring department at the Nuclear Energy Ministry, spoke of 52 cases of theft of nuclear materials in the same period. Which figure is correct? Nobody knows.
The customs people appear to know. V. Draganov, former head of the State Customs Committee, has said that in 1998 customs officers prevented a number of attempts to take nuclear materials across the border. Some attempts were made under cover of diplomatic immunity. And the materials did not originate in Russia, but were in transit across Russian territory.
The Defense Ministry also appears to know. I. Volynkin, head of the 12th Main Directorate (responsible for nuclear safety within the Armed Forces), recently told journalists quite openly that certain terrorist groups have made two attempts this year (six and eight months ago) to reconnoiter military storehouses of nuclear weapons. These attempts were foiled. But it's not known how many such attempts were not prevented.
Our entire security system for high-risk nuclear facilities was planned and created at the time those facilities were built - the middle of last century. It was based on the then-current views about potential threats to those facilities.
The analogous system in the United States was created at the same time. The United States now has more nuclear power plants (around 50) than any other country, and the newest of them is ten years old. Yes, over there they really know how to protect their nuclear power plants, storehouses, institutes, and testing grounds. But threats from the air were not considered at the planning stages. An American nuclear power plant can withstand the impact of a light plane, but not a huge Boeing passenger jet. In fact, the Americans are seriously considering rebuilding their nuclear power plants.
The United States can afford to do this. Russia is unlikely to be able to.
Then again, it's alreadly clear that attacking Russian nuclear power plants from the air is both expensive and completely senseless, under the circumstances. Anyone can just walk in there. Even before anything happened to the nuclear power plant itself, a thief would have time to carry out some nuclear materials which could then be used for other purposes.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
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